Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, afirma haver duas formas de o hábito atuar na produção de inferências, a saber, conforme princípios regulares e irregulares da imaginação. Em decorrência, estipula determinadas regras gerais para marcar a atuação do hábito no primeiro modo, restringindo a ela o espaço da causa e efeito. A intenção desta tese é investigar o estatuto dessas regras, bem como as suas consequências quanto ao estabelecimento das fronteiras entre a razão e a imaginação. Trata-se de questionar, inicialmente, qual é o parâmetro que permite uma separação, nos juízos, entre operações regulares e irregulares da imaginação, considerando-se que Hume mostra não haver uma justificativa racional para a relação de causa e efeito. Em contrapartida, pretende-se indicar em que medida uma nova noção de racionalidade experimental é configurada a partir da interposição desse novo critério, bem como discutir como é também a estabilização do agir do entendimento sobre a imaginação que se encontra no horizonte da normatividade instaurada pela regulação, via regras gerais do juízo. / In \"A Treatise of Human Nature\", Hume claims that there are two manners through which custom influences the production of inferences, namely, according to regular and irregular principles of imagination. Consequently, he stipulates certain general rules in order to point out the influence of custom on the first manner, circumscribing the realm of cause and effect to it. This thesis investigates these rules as well as their consequences regarding the establishment of the boundaries between reason and imagination. Considering that, according to Hume, there is not any racional justification to the cause-effect relationship, first we must question which is the parameter that allow us to separare, in reasoning, regular and irregular operation of the imagination. On the other hand, we intent to point in what extend a new notion of experimental rationality is constituted from the intervention of this new criteria. We also intent to discuss how the estabilization of understanding act works over imagination, which is placed in the range of normativity established by regulation, through the general rules of judgment.

125f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T18:59:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Jonas de Almeidaseg.pdf: 626207 bytes, checksum: b1c9c6b10c3fd4389fef3a65e82a8613 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-16T17:37:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Jonas de Almeidaseg.pdf: 626207 bytes, checksum: b1c9c6b10c3fd4389fef3a65e82a8613 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-16T17:37:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Jonas de Almeidaseg.pdf: 626207 bytes, checksum: b1c9c6b10c3fd4389fef3a65e82a8613 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Ao deslocar a necessidade causal das coisas para o espírito, Hume dá uma nova definição de necessidade. Enquanto a tradição filosófica a definia como um liame objetivo e interno entre a causa e o efeito, Hume a define como um sentimento imediato de determinação na mente que nos leva a passar de uma idéia àquela que lhe é habitualmente associada. Este sentimento será transferido como uma força, como uma vivacidade que irá carregar a segunda idéia. Esta idéia assim avivada será chamada de crença no Tratado da Natureza Humana. A crença é uma maneira de conceber uma idéia, uma maneira mais vívida de concebê-la. Além disso, para que uma idéia ganhe vivacidade é preciso que haja uma relação de semelhança entre os casos observados ou associados na imaginação. Ora, em virtude da determinação imediata no espírito, a crença se dá mesmo quando não há uma semelhança completa entre os casos. Hume acrescenta, então, uma outra operação para regular esse mecanismo automático: a reflexão. Essa operação irá nos remeter à teoria das regras gerais, indispensável para uma compreensão adequada do projeto de Hume. No sistema moral do livro 3 será esta a operação responsável pela estabilização do juízo moral. A afetividade e a reflexão constituem, assim, a unidade do Tratado. Esses dois componentes da natureza humana se articulam ainda em uma teoria das paixões que, como diz Hume, é a pesquisa principal de sua filosofia desde o livro 1. A fantasia, por sua vez, irá aparecer no Tratado seja enquanto fator de desestabilização da crença, exigindo uma operação reflexiva ou corretiva do entendimento, seja enquanto fator criador de regras artificiais úteis à sociedade. Por isso, suas funções não possuem o mesmo valor e sentido. No livro1, ela ameaça de dentro a ciência, as inferências legítimas. Nos livros 2 e 3, ela possui uma positividade, subordinada apenas à utilidade de suas regras para a estabilidade social. Essa utilidade depende também de uma reflexão sobre as tendências dessas regras artificiais de promover a ordem e a estabilidade sociais. Hume se apresenta como o Newton das ciências morais. Seu empreendimento é científico nesse novo sentido de ciência experimental. Sua física do homem descreve este último como um animal governado por princípios gerais de associação de idéias e de paixões, assim como por instintos. / Salvador

Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, afirma haver duas formas de o hábito atuar na produção de inferências, a saber, conforme princípios regulares e irregulares da imaginação. Em decorrência, estipula determinadas regras gerais para marcar a atuação do hábito no primeiro modo, restringindo a ela o espaço da causa e efeito. A intenção desta tese é investigar o estatuto dessas regras, bem como as suas consequências quanto ao estabelecimento das fronteiras entre a razão e a imaginação. Trata-se de questionar, inicialmente, qual é o parâmetro que permite uma separação, nos juízos, entre operações regulares e irregulares da imaginação, considerando-se que Hume mostra não haver uma justificativa racional para a relação de causa e efeito. Em contrapartida, pretende-se indicar em que medida uma nova noção de racionalidade experimental é configurada a partir da interposição desse novo critério, bem como discutir como é também a estabilização do agir do entendimento sobre a imaginação que se encontra no horizonte da normatividade instaurada pela regulação, via regras gerais do juízo. / In \"A Treatise of Human Nature\", Hume claims that there are two manners through which custom influences the production of inferences, namely, according to regular and irregular principles of imagination. Consequently, he stipulates certain general rules in order to point out the influence of custom on the first manner, circumscribing the realm of cause and effect to it. This thesis investigates these rules as well as their consequences regarding the establishment of the boundaries between reason and imagination. Considering that, according to Hume, there is not any racional justification to the cause-effect relationship, first we must question which is the parameter that allow us to separare, in reasoning, regular and irregular operation of the imagination. On the other hand, we intent to point in what extend a new notion of experimental rationality is constituted from the intervention of this new criteria. We also intent to discuss how the estabilization of understanding act works over imagination, which is placed in the range of normativity established by regulation, through the general rules of judgment.

The Environmental Code is a central environmental policy instrument, which contributes to achieve Sweden’s national environmental objectives. Therefore, the implementation of the rules and regulations of the Environmental Code are of importance. This thesis focuses on the identified research gap in the implementation of the general rules of consideration in the Environmental Code, adopting a Swedish perspective and seeking to understand the reasons why. This thesis intends to increase the understanding of both external and internal aspects affecting the implementation at a municipal level. The results show that the implementation deficiency in the general rules of consideration consists of several complex, interconnected factors. The findings implicate three fundamental aspects affecting the implementation: prerequisites, work procedures and interpretations of the general rules of consideration. Furthermore, the implementation requires an improved understanding among concerned stakeholders. This thesis argues that there is a shortage of knowledge and understanding of the general rules of consideration among stakeholders, therefore there is much more to learn, in order to reduce the implementation deficiency of the rules. Additionally, the findings indicate a need for exemplified guidance from state authorities and government agencies, to reduce the knowledge gap among municipalities and operators. Furthermore, operators ought to increase the understanding of the general rules of consideration, to contribute to the implementation of the general rules of consideration.

Le contrat est un outil destiné à servir les intérêts des parties par la mise en oeuvre d'un projet dont le résultat est désiré. Exécuté conformément aux stipulations convenues, le contrat est censé procurer au créancier la satisfaction qu'il escompte, tout en libérant le débiteur de son obligation.Toutefois, dans certaines hypothèses, et sans que le contrat fasse l'objet d'une exécution reflétant ce qui a été convenu à l'origine, le créancier est satisfait tandis que le débiteur est libéré du poids de sa dette. En effet, en dépit de sa nature prévisionnelle, le contrat ne s'achève pas nécessairement par un paiement, ce dernier ne constituant pas l'unique forme de dénouement satisfactoire et libératoire. La satisfaction substitutive fait appel à différents mécanismes issus du droit des contrats et du régime général des obligations. L'étude de cette notion offre une grille de lecture apportant une lumière nouvelle sur des concepts classiques mais qu'il semble a priori impossible de relier, tant leurs natures juridiques et fonctions respectives semblent inconciliables. Par un examen de leur structure et de la logique qui les inspire, il apparaît toutefois possible de mettre en évidence des problématiques convergentes et des conséquences pratiques susceptibles d'impacter la technique contractuelle. Face à l'imprévu, la meilleure stratégie consiste à recentrer le contrat sur son véritable objectif, à savoir la réalisation d'un dénouement optimal, quitte à ce que celui-ci s'écarte du projet initialement convenu. La satisfaction substitutive illustre la recherche permanente de la solution la plus économiquement avantageuse, que ce soit par les parties, le juge ou la loi. / The contract is a commitment aimed to serve the interests of the contracting parties through the execution of a project carrying a desired outcome. Executed accordingly to what has been agreed originally, the contract is supposed to provide to the creditor the satisfaction he is expecting, while the debtor is being released from the obligation. However, in some hypotheses, and while the contract is not performed the way it should beaccording to what was agreed, the creditor benefits from a satisfaction where as the debtor isnot anymore under the burden of his debt. Indeed, despite its forward-looking nature, the contract does not always end by a payment, as this form of termination does not constitute the single way to provide satisfaction to the creditor and discharge to the debtor. The substitute satisfaction, as an atypical form of termination, relies on different mecanismscoming from contract law and general rules of obligations. Studying this notion gives keys forunderstanding that bring a new light on some classical concepts which seem difficult to linktogether, since their structure and logics appear irreconcilable. By examining their structureand their logic, it appears possible to highlight convergent problematics and practicalconsequences that can have impact on contractual technique. To face the unforeseen, the best strategy is to refocus the contract on its true objective, which is to bring an optimal termination, even if there is a discrepancy between what was agreed andwhat is done. Substitute satisfaction illustrates the permanent search for the most worthwhile solution on an economic point of view by the contracting parties, the judge or the law.

L'analyse de la dimension collective des réseaux de distribution en droit turc permet de constater concrètement les effets juridiques induits entre les membres de réseau par l'entrelacement des contrats bilatéraux. Il est important de relever que le réseau n'est pas constitué par une simple addition de contrats mais par une composition de contrats dont leur entrelacement produit des effets juridiques à l'égard de tous les contractants. Cette recherche s'applique à mettre en lumière jusqu'où un réseau peut développer des obligations et des responsabilités pour ses membres et tend à systématiser les règles générales de réseau qui peuvent organiser ces effets induits tout en respectant les limites du droit commun des contrats. En l'absence d'une stipulation contractuelle, les règles de réseau pouvant être induites à la charge des adhérents sont très réduites par rapport à celles induites à la charge du promoteur, puisque les adhérents ne possèdent pas d'un pouvoir de direction de réseau comparable à celui du promoteur. D'une part, les adhérents du même réseau ne peuvent pas agir dans leur fonction de distributeur comme s'il n'appartenait pas au même réseau, en d'autres termes, chaque adhérent a le devoir de prendre en considération les autres adhérents dans l'accomplissement de ses obligations, dès qu'il s'agit des obligations dont l'inexécution affecte l'activité commerciale d'autres adhérents ou l'image commune du réseau, d'autre part, en tant que le fondateur et le directeur permanent d'un système contractuel, le promoteur a l'obligation d'assurer la cohérence du réseau et la cohésion du réseau. / The analysis of the collective dimension of distribution networks in Turkish law reveals to observe in concrete the legal effects induced between the network members by the interlacing of bilateral contracts. It is important to note that the network is not formed by simple addition of contracts but with interlacing of contracts that produce legal effects for all contractors. This research applies to highlight how far a network can develop responsibilities and obligations to its members and aims to systematize the general rules of network which can organize these induced effects while respecting the limits of the law of contract. In the absence of a contractual provision, the network rules can be induced at the expense of the adherents are very small compared to those induced at the expense of the promoter, since the adherents do not have the power of directing the network comparable to the promoter's. On the one hand, adherents of the same network cannot act in their function as distributor as if he does not belong to the same network, in other words, each member has a duty to consider the other adherents in the accomplishment of its obligations, since it is about obligations where the non-execution affects the business of other members or the common image of the network, on the other hand, being the founder and permanent director of a contractual system, the promoter has the obligation to assure the coherence and cohesion of the network.

Le présent travail propose une étude d’ensemble sur le droit commun, notion fondamentale au coeur de la théorie et de la pratique quotidienne du droit. Contrairement à une première impression suivant laquelle il serait une notion à géométrie variable (droit civil ? théorie générale ? droit romain ? droit européen ? principes ?), le droit commun apparaît comme le concept technique désignant, pour une institution donnée, les règles juridiques dont le domaine d’application est indéfini. En outre, l’étude en révèle les deux applications pratiques fort distinctes que sont le droit commun territorial et le droit commun matériel. Le droit commun territorial d’abord, apparaît mal connu mais techniquement et historiquement premier ; c’est celui que l’on trouve par exemple à l’article 1393, alinéa 2, du code civil (qui vise le « droit commun de la France » des régimes matrimoniaux), ou dans un principe fondamental reconnu par les lois de la République dégagé par le Conseil constitutionnel en 2011. Le droit commun matériel ensuite, se révèle mieux connu mais appelle une synthèse ; c’est celui qui est visé, par exemple, dans la section contenant les articles 2333 et suivants du code civil (sur le « droit commun du gage ») tels qu’ils résultent de l’ordonnance du 23 mars 2006. Ces deux volets du droit commun expriment une "summa divisio", dans laquelle s’ordonnent toutes ses utilisations en droit positif. S’ils présentent des similitudes de régime, ils se distinguent néanmoins : ils ne renvoient pas aux mêmes règles – règles au domaine d’application "ratione loci" indéfini d’un côté, règles au domaine d’application "ratione materiæ et personæ" indéfini de l’autre. / This work offers a comprehensive study on the “droit commun” (approximately translated into “general rules of law” or “ordinary law”), a fundamental concept at the core of the theory and daily practice of French law. Contrary to traditional approaches involving the impression of a changing and variable concept (civil law, general theory, Roman law, European law, principles?), “droit commun” is a technical concept referring, for a given institution, to the legal rules whose scope of application is indefinite. This study also reveals the two distinct applications of “droit commun”; “droit commun territorial” (“territorial general rules of law”) and “droit commun matériel” (“material general rules of law”). The first application, “droit commun territorial”, although lesser known, is technically and historically primal. Droit commun territorial is specifically mentioned for in article 1393 of the French civil code (regarding the matrimonial property regimes), and in a fundamental principle identified by the French Constitutional Council in 2011. The second application, “droit commun matériel”, is better known but needs an overview. In particular, the section of the French civil code which contains articles 2333 and following (on the “droit commun” of pledging of corporeal movables), refers to it. These two applications of “droit commun” are the expressions of a summa divisio. Although both applications have similarities, they remain fundamentally different. The respective applications of “droit commun” do not refer to the same rules of law: rules where territorial scope of application is unlimited versus rules where material and personal scope of application is unlimited.

Distinguer entre le droit commun et le droit spécial est une habitude fortement ancrée chez les juristes, dans le domaine de la théorie comme de la pratique. Les rôles attribués à cette distinction sont d’une grande diversité ; mais ils sont aussi sous la menace de deux phénomènes : la multiplication des degrés de spécialité et le développement de rapports -horizontaux - entre droits communs d'une part, et entre droits spéciaux d'autre part. Véritable "summa divisio", elle disposerait cependant toujours d’une vertu ordonnatrice très importante,tant pour le législateur que pour le juge, et tant à l’université que dans la pratique.Il y a pourtant un singulier paradoxe. Le droit commun et le droit spécial sont indéfinissables ; leur relativité est telle qu’ils ne se conçoivent pas abstraction faite l’un de l’autre. Et, toutefois, la relation qu’ils entretiennent est généralement décrite en termes d’opposition. Or, la relativité appelle bien plutôt la collaboration que l’opposition.C’est ainsi que, s’agissant de l’élaboration du droit, des influences positives sont à l’oeuvre. Le droit commun et le droit spécial se servent mutuellement de modèle. Leur évolution se déroule en contemplation l'un de l'autre. Cela permet surtout, concernant l’application du droit, de réfuter l’idée suivant laquelle le droit commun et le droit spécial s’excluraient mécaniquement. En dehors des hypothèses prévues par le droit écrit, aucun fondement ne justifie l’exclusivisme. Ce dernier ne dispose en outre que d’un régime juridique plein d’incertitude. La valeur de la solution préconisée par l’adage "Specialia generalibus derogant" n’est que celle d’une présomption, simple. « Sur-mesure », le droit spécial est supposé mieux adapté à la situation litigieuse, mais il peut concrètement se révéler moins approprié que le droit commun / Distinguishing between general and specific rules of law is a deeply rooted habit among civilist lawyers, concerning the field of theory as the practice one. The roles of this distinction are very different, but they are threatened by two kinds of phenomenas as well : the increasing degreesof specialization and the development of -horizontal- relationship between general rules of lawon the one hand, and specific rules of law in the other hand. As a genuine, it would work,however, always as a good way to order the priority of different rules of law for both legislature and judges, both in academia and in practice.There is however a singular paradox. The general and specific rules of law can't be defined,their relativity is such an obvious one that they inconceivable if the other doesn't exist. According to this idea, their relationship is usually described in terms of opposition. Yet, the meaning of "relativity" is closer to collaboration rather than opposition.Thus, as regards to the development of the law, positive influences are at work. General and specific rule of law are a model to each other. Their evolution takes place in contemplation ofeach part. This especially helps the application of law to refute the idea that the general andspecific rules of law are mechanically mutually exclusive. A part from the possibilities provided by statute law, no basis justifies exclusiveness. Furthermore, specific rules of law sometimes contain a lot of less-defined rules. The value of the solution advocated by the adage "specialia generalibus derogant " is just a presumption, a simple one. A specific rule of law is supposes to be perfectly adapted to a situation, but it may pragmatically, about some case, be less appropriate than the general rule of law.

The study was conducted in the Brits District. Six schools were chosen of which 3 belonged to the former model C schools where the language of teaching and learning is Afrikaans, and the other 3 schools were previously disadvantaged/rural schools. A qualitative study was used to garner information in the form of interviews, document analysis and observation. The study attempt to find out the exact role that the School governing body (SGBs) play in the implementation of language policy as stipulated in the Constitution. It was revealed that of the 2 types of schools the school governing body (SGBs) for former model C schools are aware of the role they have to play in the implementation of the language policy whereas the school governing body (SGBs) for the rural schools are still grappling with their role as custodian of language policy implementation. A number of concepts emerged from the study where it became apparent that rural schools and former model C school’s play field were not equally levelled from the onset. Former model C school governing body (SGBs) seem to be aware of their role in the implementation of language policy, whereas the rural school, school governing body (SGBs) are aware of their other roles e.g. school maintenance, school fund and hiring of educators. On the other hand they are of the opinion that language policies is for the principal and the school management team. In addition it was observed that the school governing body (SGBs) for rural schools has low morale, do not have the language policy document and generally lack interest in the services they are supposed to provide critical theory underpins this study. / Educational Leadership and Management / M. Ed. (Education Management)