Can Hegel's Philosophy of Right do without the Science of Logic?”. The question posed by this paper’s title refers to the attempts of some contemporary authors, amongst them Axel Honneth, to update the central theses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, though precisely (and deliberately) doing so without its alleged dependence on the Science of Logic. On account of several methodological and hermeneutical reasons, it is not easy to answer this question. It is well known that Hegel emphatically asserts that both works and philosophical projects depend on each other, but there is no consensus amongst specialists on how much the Logic actually influences the Philosophy of Right and in what way it does so. On the other hand, clearly any social philosophy needs a logical theory in a broad sense, whether it may be Hegelian or not. This is even more so if the aim is to update the Hegelian construction implicit in the notion of freedom. In any case, the discussion seems to bring forth the paradox of asserting both the current relevance and the obsolescence of the Hegelian notion of freedom. / La pregunta planteada en el título de esta contribución alude a los intentos de algunos autores contemporáneos, entre ellos el de Axel Honneth, por reactualizar los planteamientos centrales de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel, pero prescindiendo precisamente (y deliberadamente) de su supuesta dependencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica. Responder a esa pregunta no es fácil por diversas razones, metodológicas y hermenéuticas. Es sabido por cierto que Hegel sostiene enfáticamente la dependencia entre ambas obras y empresas filosóficas, pero no hay consenso entre los especialistas sobre qué peso real y de qué tipo posee la Lógica sobre la Filosofía del Derecho. De otro lado, es evidente que cualquier filosofía social requiere de una concepción lógica en sentido amplio, sea esta hegeliana o de otro tipo, más aun si lo que se pretende es actualizar la construcción hegeliana implícita en el concepto de libertad. En cualquier caso, la discusión parece mostrar un hecho paradójico que consiste en afirmar simultáneamente la actualidad y la obsolescencia de la concepción hegeliana de la libertad.

Orientador: Jeanne Marie Gagnebin de Bons / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T12:21:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gatti_LuciannoFerreira_D.pdf: 1986024 bytes, checksum: e4a4ddd20d8a20be128d4516b5c3a7a0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Este trabalho pretende lidar com a relação entre arte e verdade, tal como ela é iscutida nos debates a respeito de um conceito materialista de crítica de arte, ocorridos durante a década de 1930 entre Theodor W. Adorno e Walter Benjamin. A tarefa central aqui é a de articular a idéia original de um projeto comum aos dois autores, cujo ponto de partida estaria em aspectos da obra de juventude de Benjamin, e o desenvolvimento posterior por cada um deles como uma concepção própria de crítica no momento em que eles são confrontados com elementos das artes de vanguarda e da cultura de massa das primeiras décadas do século XX. Com o intuito de salientar que as divergências surgidas na Correspondência entre Adorno e Benjamin originam-se sobretudo de posicionamentos distintos perante estes fenômenos artísticos, as questões pertinentes são apresentadas e discutidas em três momentos: 1) a exposição de aspectos dos escritos de juventude de Benjamin, fundamentais à compreensão dos debates da década de 1930; 2) as divergências entre Adorno e Benjamin a respeito da interpretação das obras de Bertolt Brecht e Franz Kafka; 3) os posicionamentos distintos dos dois autores perante a arte de massa, tal como apresentados em seus respectivos trabalhos sobre o cinema e o jazz / Abstract: This work intends to deal with the relationship between art and truth as they are discussed in the debates over a materialistic concept of art criticism taken place in the 1930s between Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin. The main effort here is to articulate the original idea of a common project shared by both authors -- whose background is situated in some aspects of Benjamin¿s early writings -- and its subsequent development by each author as his own distinctive concept of art criticism when they are both confronted with elements of the avant-garde and of the mass culture of the first decades of the 20th century. After pointing out that the divergences discussed on the Correspondence between Adorno and Benjamin rise from different attitudes with regard to the mentioned artistic phenomena, the ensuing questions are presented and discussed in three different moments: 1) the presentation of certain problems of Benjamin¿s early writings, indispensable to an understanding of the discussions emerging later in the 1930s; 2) the divergences between Adorno and Benjamin concerning the interpretation of Bertolt Brecht¿s and Franz Kafka¿s works; 3) their different positions on mass culture so as they are presented in their respective works on film and jazz / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Contemporanea / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-13T16:00:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paula_WanderAndradede_M.pdf: 1941842 bytes, checksum: 8860b07f0e10bd95a5f9641d19a80e47 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: A pesquisa pretende apresentar as diferentes facetas de Sócrates no Nascimento da Tragédia, de Friedrich Nietzsche. Analisaremos, para isso, a interpretação nietzschiana da morte da tragédia pelo efeito da ação combinada de Sócrates e Eurípides e, principalmente, quais as conseqüências geradas por essa destruição, que vão muito além do campo da arte. Examinaremos como a arte era produzida instintivamente pelo grego antigo e como ela passou a ser produzida de modo consciente a partir de Eurípides, invertendo a relação que o grego antigo mantinha com a tragédia. Reconstituiremos as análises de Nietzsche sobre a oposição entre pessimismo trágico e otimismo teórico, sobre o papel da arte como transfiguração e superação do pessimismo, bem como sobre a relação entre otimismo socrático e modernidade. Levando-se em conta que Nietzsche não trata somente da figura de um Sócrates paladino da ciência, analisaremos a possibilidade de outra faceta da interpretação nietzschiana acerca do socratismo, bem como as implicações geradas por ela na relação estabelecida por Nietzsche entre arte e ciência. Merecerá ainda atenção especial a originalidade da leitura nietzschiana da Grécia clássica, assim como sua oposição à filologia acadêmica de seu tempo. / Abstract: The research aims to show the several faces of Socrates at Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. We will analyze, for this aim, the Nietzsche's interpretation of the death of the tragedy by the effect of the combined action of Socrates and Euripides and, mainly, what are the outcomes generated for this destruction, which don't comprehend only the scope of art. We also will analyze how the art was produced instinctively by the ancient Greeks and how it passed to be produced consciously by Euripides, so as to reverse the relationship which the ancient Greeks kept with the tragedy. We will reconstitute the analyses of Nietzsche about the opposition between tragic pessimism and theoretical optimism, about the function of the art like transfiguration and overcoming of the pessimism, like that about the relationship between Socratic optimism and modernity. Considering that Nietzsche doesn't treat just of the figure of a crusader Socrates of the science, we will analyze the possibility of another facet of the Nietzsche's interpretation about the socratism, besides the implications generated from it at the relationship established by Nietzsche between art and science. We will still pay attention to the originality of the Nietzsche's analysis of the classic Greece, and his opposition to academic philology of his period. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientadores: Zeljko Loparic, Volker Gerhardt / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T03:13:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Scherer_FabioCesar_D.pdf: 1353056 bytes, checksum: 49c64c6dc8be5d97af6df5b999f353ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: O presente trabalho sobre a filosofia kantiana objetiva demonstrar a exequibilidade de juízos jurídico-políticos a priori em geral, o que acarreta o problema de provar a realizabilidade do fomento universal e contínuo da paz. É através de regras e mecanismos de aplicação dados na política em geral (política a priori e política empírica), assim como pela sensificação do conceito de vontade universal coletiva a priori, no âmbito da filosofia da história, que são validadas as leis a priori da doutrina do direito. Tais leis são formuladas em virtude do dever - imposto pela razão prático-jurídico a priori - de aceitar a máxima de agir continuamente na direção da execução do fim último do direito e da política. Desta forma, se demonstra que a paz perpétua, ainda seja que irrealizável, não é uma mera quimera, porém, que contém realidade objetiva prática e efetividade. Descrita enquanto exercício da doutrina do direito, a política como "ciência crítica" requer o estudo dos princípios puros deduzidos do conceito de direito e, consequentemente, da derivada teoria dos juízos a priori sobre o meu e o teu no plano do direito privado e do direito público em geral. A construção de tal teoria jurídico-política a priori é somente possível graças ao acréscimo do domínio de ações executáveis pelo agente humano livre aos objetos possíveis, uma das principais inovações em Die Metaphysik der Sitten. De acordo com as exigências do projeto crítico kantiano, determinadas no âmbito da razão especulativa, e os resultados obtidos em Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, a pesquisa de conceitos e juízos práticos requer a demonstração de sua possibilidade lógica e de sua aplicação nesse novo domínio prático, bem como a prova dessa teoria dos juízos. Mediante esta chave de leitura analítico-lógica, que contém como procedimento de prova o método de análise e síntese, é que apresento uma reconstrução da teoria kantiana jurídico-política a priori, exposta em Rechtslehre. Pretendo, desta forma, oferecer uma interpretação diferenciada sobre a doutrina do direito e da política do Kant tardio, em que seja possível, entre outras coisas, responder a algumas questões abertas na pesquisa kantiana sobre a construção e a aplicabilidade dos juízos a priori desses subcampos práticos. / Abstract: The present study about Kantian philosophy aims to demonstrate the feasibility of a priori juridical-political judgments in general, which results in the problem of proving the achievability of universal and continuous peace fomentation. It is through rules and application mechanisms given on politics in general (a priori politics and empirical politics), as well as the sensification of the concept of a priori universal collective will in the history philosophy extent that the a priori laws of the Law doctrine are validated. Those laws are formulated due to duties - imposed by the a priori practical-juridical reason - of accepting the maxim of acting continuously towards the execution of the ultimate of law and politics. Thus, it is demonstrated that perpetual peace, even if it is non-achievable, it is not a mere chimera, however which contains practical objective reality and effectiveness. Described as exercise of the law doctrine, the politics as "critical science" requires the study of pure principles deducted from the law concepts and, consequently, from the a priori judgment theory derivative about "mine and yours" private and public law fields in general. The construction of this a priori juridical-political theory is only possible due to the increase of the domain of executable actions by the human agent free to the possible objects, one of the main innovations in Die Metaphysik der Sitten. According to the Kantian critical project demands, determined in the speculative reason extent, and the results obtained in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, the research of practical concepts and judgments requires the demonstration of its logical possibility and its application in this new practical domain, as well as the proof of the judgment theory. Through this analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof procedure the analysis and synthesis method, it is presented a reconstruction of a priori juridical-political Kantian theory, exposed in Rechtslehre. It is intended, thus, to offer a differentiated interpretation about late Kant's law and politics doctrine, in which it is possible, among other things, to answer some open questions in the Kantian research about the construction and applicability of the a priori judgments of these practical subfields. / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T03:22:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Hahn_Alexandre_D.pdf: 2008463 bytes, checksum: 7b8a3b66eb4b4f79b1564aeea1e04200 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Pretende-se, neste trabalho, determinar a função da antropologia moral na filosofia prática de Kant. Na Metafísica dos costumes, a mencionada antropologia é designada como a contraparte (Gegenstück) da moral pura, isto é, como o outro membro (Glied) da filosofia prática. Tal concepção impulsionou a presente investigação, de entender como Kant concebe a conexão entre a moral e a antropologia, uma vez que o filósofo também parece demarcar uma rigorosa separação entre a moral e a antropologia. Em vista disso, este trabalho defenderá a tese de que a antropologia moral de Kant é uma ciência pragmática, cuja função consiste em aplicar a moral no homem. Dito de outra forma, pretende-se mostrar que a antropologia moral, tomada como a contraparte da moral, cumpre o papel de formar o caráter moral do homem. A fim de demonstrar essa tese, os dois primeiros capítulos apresentarão um panorama da metafísica dos costumes (filosofia prática pura), expondo os problemas e soluções apresentados por Kant, e as evidências que sustentam a necessidade de haver uma antropologia moral. O terceiro capítulo explorará a definição do conceito de uma antropologia kantiana. O quarto capítulo elencará e discutirá alguns elementos que compõem a natureza moral do homem. O último capítulo apresentará alguns dispositivos responsáveis pela formação moral do homem. / Abstract: The aim of this work is to determine the function of moral anthropology in Kant's practical philosophy. In the Metaphysics of Morals, this anthropology is called the counterpart (Gegenstück) of pure morality, that is, the other member (Glied) of practical philosophy. Such concept drove the present investigation in its attempt to understand the way Kant conceives the link between morality and anthropology, once the philosopher also seems to mark a strict distinction between morality and anthropology. Considering this, this work defends the thesis that Kant's moral anthropology is a pragmatic science, whose function consists on applying morality to man. In other words, my purpose is to show that moral anthropology, taken as the counterpart of morality, performs the role of forming the moral character of man. In order to prove this, the first two chapters present a description of the metaphysics of morals (pure practical philosophy), exposing the problems and solutions proposed by Kant, and the evidence that supports the necessity for moral anthropology. The third chapter explores the definition of a Kantian anthropology. The fourth chapter lists and discusses a few elements which are part of the moral nature of man. The last chapter presents a few devices that are responsible for the moral formation of man. / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Moderna / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-04T18:52:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pavao_AguinaldoAntonioCavalheiro_D.pdf: 13472945 bytes, checksum: 5daf00a9fef9016209dc57a48bea8526 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: A tese examina a doutrina do mal radical em Kant. Nas duas primeiras partes, é feita uma reconstrução do argumento de kantiano, tal como desenvolvido na primeira parte da Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão.Também são discutidas as teses da Religião tendo em vista sua consistência com os conceitos fundamentais da filosofia moral apresentada nas obras Fundamentação da Metafisica dos Costumes e Critica da Razão Prática. Na terceira parte, argumenta-se a favor de uma leitura segundo a qual o mal radical deve figurar ao lado do conceito de dever em termos de dignidade conceitual dentro da filosofia prática de Kant. Criticam-se assim as leituras teológicas e antropológicas acerca do lugar e do papel da teoria kantiana do mal moral / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Cette thèse se donne pour tâche d’expliciter et de déployer, à partir de l’œuvre de Husserl, les diverses conceptions phénoménologiques directrices du mouvement de la chair. En un premier temps, nous cherchons à préciser le contexte d’origine du concept de « kinesthèse », élaboré une première fois à l’été 1907 dans le cadre des leçons de Husserl sur la chose et l’espace. En un deuxième temps, il nous apparaîtra nécessaire d’élargir la signification technique et restreinte que possède le se-mouvoir dans la phénoménologie statique de la perception, afin de prendre en compte le mouvement en tant qu’action pratique du sujet dans divers horizons du monde. L’étude de certains textes qui relèvent de la phénoménologie génétique semble alors permettre de parler d’une co-constitution pratique entre la mobilité de la chair et la choséité, et ainsi de considérer à neuf l’hypothèse d’une historicité de la chair. Dans un troisième et dernier temps, il s’agira d’opérer une radicalisation de la compréhension du mouvement de la chair, afin de la ressaisir comme « geste », c’est-à-dire non plus simplement comme officiant des projets intentionnels de l’ego, mais bien comme origine et support des structures cardinales du monde. La lecture croisée de divers textes tardifs de Husserl et de Heidegger nous permettra de dégager une compréhension ontologique, et non plus strictement sensualiste ou pratique, de la mobilité charnelle. Au travers de ces études, le mouvement se révèle originairement impliqué dans les divers niveaux de la constitution de la mondanéité, mais aussi constitué en retour. / This thesis sets itself the task of clarifying and deploying the various phenomenological conceptions of bodily movement within Husserl’s work. As a first step, we seek to shed light on the context which guided the formation of the concept of “kinesthesis” in the 1907 summer lectures on thing and space. As a second step, it will appear necessary to expand the narrow and technical meaning that this “moving-oneself” has in the static phenomenology of perception, in order to take into account the movement thought as a practical action throughout various horizons of the lifeworld. Some texts pertaining to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology seem to allow us to speak of a practical “co-constitution” between the mobility of the flesh and the handiness of the thing and, in doing so, to consider anew the hypothesis of a historicity of the flesh. As a third and final step, we will operate a radicalization of the understanding of bodily movement, in order to grasp it as a “gesture”, that is to say, not only as a mere implement of the intentional projects of the ego, but as the very origin and support of the cardinal structures of the world. The cross-reading of different later texts by Husserl and Heidegger seems to support the project of setting forth an ontological understanding of mobility that is no longer in any way sensualistic or pragmatic. Through these meanings, bodily movement reveals itself as being originally involved in the various constitutive levels of worldliness.

Le présent mémoire retrace l’évolution du concept de contradiction dans l’œuvre de Karl Marx de la rédaction de L’Idéologie allemande (1845-1846) à la publication du Capital (1867). Il se concentre sur le rôle de la contradiction dans l’explication du processus par lequel un mode de production peut produire les conditions de son propre dépassement. Au-delà de la formule générale selon laquelle les forces productives entrent en contradiction avec les rapports de production au sein desquels elles se développent, nous verrons une transformation de l’appareil conceptuel marxien qui modifie la manière dont est pensée la contradiction. Cette transformation, déterminée principalement par la construction de sa critique de l’économie politique, conduit Marx à penser la contradiction du capital à partir de catégories lui étant spécifiques et non seulement à partir de catégories applicables à l’ensemble des modes de production. Ce changement de perspective centre le caractère contradictoire d’un rapport donné sur ses modalités de reproduction le rendant intenable et pousse à interroger les conséquences tirées des premières utilisations marxiennes du concept de contradiction. En suivant une pensée en constante évolution, ce mémoire permet de situer les origines d’un concept clé autant dans l’œuvre de Marx que dans les traditions s’inspirant de celle-ci. / This master’s thesis follows the evolution of Karl Marx’s concept of contradiction from the German Ideology (1845-1846) to the publication of the Capital (1867). It focuses on the role of contradiction in explaining how a mode of production can produce the conditions of its own overcoming. Beyond the general view according to which the development of the forces of production ‘‘contradicts’’ the actual relations of production, we will also examine how this contradiction is conceived at different points in Marx’s intellectual trajectory. We will see how this evolution is essentially a result of the development of Marx’s critique of political economy. In particular, progress at the level of theory leads him to conceive the contradiction of capital in terms of categories specific to this mode of production, instead of categories applicable to all modes of production. With this shift and from that point forward, the contradiction is based on the modes of reproduction of given relations of production which prevent their sustainability. By following a theoretical production in constant evolution, this master’s thesis specifies the origins of a key concept both in Marx’s work and in the traditions inspired by it.

No description available.

Cette analyse porte sur le schématisme des concepts purs de l’entendement, tel que présenté par Emmanuel Kant dans la Critique de la raison pure et interprété par Martin Heidegger. La lecture proposée par Heidegger est critiquée par un bon nombre de commentateurs dans la mesure où ils considèrent que son interprétation ne lui sert qu’à faire valoir ses propres théories philosophiques au sujet du Dasein et de l’ontologie fondamentale. Notre approche se distingue de la leur dans la mesure où nous tentons de comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé Heidegger à défendre l’interprétation du schématisme qui est la sienne. Notre étude s’attarde au texte de Kant de manière à en souligner les éléments qui ont permis à Heidegger d’établir sa lecture, telle qu’il la présente dans son ouvrage de 1929, ayant pour titre Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. La méthode utilisée est comparative, car notre but est de démontrer la valeur de l’interprétation heideggérienne contre celle des commentateurs qui le critiquent pour des raisons insuffisantes. Bref, le thème du schématisme kantien est analysé de long en large et la conclusion à laquelle nous parvenons est que Heidegger a permis des avancées philosophiques considérables par son herméneutique de la Critique et qu’il est nécessaire de leur accorder l’attention qui leur est due. / The subject of this analysis is the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding, as presented by Emmanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason and interpreted by Martin Heidegger. The reading proposed by Heidegger is criticized by a large number of commentators because they consider that his interpretation only serves to give value to his own philosophical theories on Dasein and on fundamental ontology. Our approach is different from theirs in that we are trying to understand the reasons that justify Heidegger in his interpretation of schematism. Our study dwells on Kant's text in order to extract the elements that allowed Heidegger to build up his thoughts, as he presented them in 1929 in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The method used is comparative, since our goal is to demonstrate the relevance of Heidegger's interpretation against the commentators who have insufficient reasons to criticize him. In short, the theme of Kant's schematism is analyzed thoroughly and the conclusion we come to is that Heidegger allowed for considerable philosophical progress with his hermeneutics of the Critique and that it is necessary to give them the attention they deserve.