This is the first such study of Operation Banner: taking three Battalions as case studies, drawing upon extensive interviews with former soldiers, primary archival sources including unpublished diaries, this thesis closely examines soldiers' behaviour at the small infantry-unit level (Battalion downwards), including the leadership, cohesion, orientation and motivation that sustained, restrained and occasionally obstructed soldiers in Northern Ireland. It contends that there are aspects of wider scholarly literatures - from sociology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology - that can throw new light on our understanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland. The thesis will also contribute fresh insights and analysis of important events during the early years of Operation Banner, including the murders of two men in County Fermanagh, Michael Naan and Andrew Murray, and that of Warrenpoint hotel owner Edmund Woolsey in South Armagh in the autumn of 1972. The central argument of this thesis is that British Army small infantry units enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful, highly aggressive or benign and conciliatory way as their local commanders saw fit. The strain of civil-military relations at a senior level was replicated operationally – as soldiers came to resent the limitations of waging war in the UK. The unwillingness of the Army's senior leadership to thoroughly investigate and punish serious transgressions of standard operating procedures in Northern Ireland created uncertainty among soldiers over expected behaviour and desired outcomes. Mid-ranking officers and NCOs often played important roles in restraining soldiers in Northern Ireland. The degree of violence used in Northern was much less that that seen in the colonial wars fought since the end of World War II. But overly aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units – with negative consequences for the Army's overall strategy in Northern Ireland.

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軍事制度為廣義政治制度的一種。傳統有關中國政治制度的研究，多將焦點集中於職官制度或是監察制度部分；相形之下，有關軍事制度所受到的注意就遜色許多。事實上，軍事制度對國家整體局勢的影響，遠較一般人想像中來的重要。軍事制度又稱﹁兵制﹂，其制度建構的優劣，嚴重左右一個朝代的興衰；如觀察中國的歷史就可以發現：往往一個朝代的兵制設計良好，則其武功強盛，享國亦較久；相反的，兵制的建構若存有嚴重的缺失，則該朝代很容易積弱不振，這些實例可從唐、宋兩帝國明顯的對比中得到證實。 基本上，若從歷史的發展過程來看，明代衛所制度與其國勢強弱間，亦存有密不可分的關係。早期衛所制度上軌道之際，國力強盛；如太祖的統一天下、成祖的幾次北征等，均有賴其強大的軍力為後盾。而從明正統以後，因軍屯的兼併、私役到軍士的逃跑等緣由，促使衛所制度日益崩解。而在衛所軍士不能用且無法用的情況下，嘉靖中期為應付各地戰亂的需要，開始進行大規模的募兵；此舉對明帝國來說，無疑是一個相當大社會經濟上的負擔。後來，為支應內外戰事所催征的剿餉、練餉及遼餉等，更是促使明帝國覆亡相當重要的關鍵之一。故如欲了解明代由盛轉衰的關鍵，實在必須對明代衛所制度的相關建構，進行更澈底的研究。 原則上，本論文共分九章，其中： 第一章「緒論」，主要探討論文寫作的由來，此外，更說明本論文的研究方法、範圍、限制與主題為何。並藉由相關文獻的檢閱來觀察以往學界對於明代衛所制度的研究概況。 第二章「明代衛所制度的淵源與形成原因」，旨在敘述歷代兵制的概略演變，並且從當中的更迭情形，了解明代衛所制度與前朝兵制的差異，及其參酌歷代兵制而來的成分、要因為何；另外，更從當時時空背景等要素，推敲此一制度的主要形成原因，大約係出於政治、經濟及國防上的諸多考量而來。 第三章「明代衛所的組織」，分成一般衛所組織的設置與京營組織的概況演變兩部分。其中，一般衛所組織分成組織概況、設置情形、地方軍事體制的演變等來論述；京營部分則係以時間區分來做探討。 第四章「明代衛所的職掌」，一般衛所多具有屯田、巡捕、備禦、製造軍器等功能；但因所處地理位置的差異，或是最早設置之目的即有不同，有些衛所在上述職掌外，必須負擔京操、漕運、護陵、邊班或是馬政、草場、營建、採木等任務。而從當時衛所軍士職掌的多樣化，可以發現過重的勤務是後來促使軍士逃亡，乃至於衛所逐漸瓦解的主因之一。 第五章「明代衛所軍士的訓練、裝備與獎懲」，早期衛所軍士的訓練嚴格確實、裝備精良、賞罰嚴明，因此能提供明初統一天下與明成祖對北方數次征戰所須；中期以後，衛所人力淪為私用，裝備不齊、器具敗壞、軍紀喪失，衛所軍幾無戰鬥能力可言；此處從衛所軍士的訓練、裝備、獎懲等方面來觀察，恰好可以得到一鮮明的對照。 第六章「明代衛所制度的社會基礎」，所謂社會基礎，意指以人為根本的各項討論議題，包括衛所的軍士來源、軍籍與軍戶的設計、勾軍與清軍、武官的世襲等。 第七章「明代衛所制度的經濟基礎」，亦即衛所的給養問題，早期衛所設置的目的，很重要的立意在於自給自足，只是隨著軍屯田地的兼併、屯軍私役等，促使衛所軍士的大舉逃亡，軍屯逐漸破壞；而為供應龐大的軍餉支出，於是又有各種補救措施的出現，包括商屯、太倉銀等；只是隨著國家財政支出的日益擴大，後期任何加稅措施，均是飲酖止渴而已；明廷就在內憂外患的雙重夾擊下，最後終於以亡國收場。 第八章「明代衛所與其他政治組織的關係」，明代政治組織約略可分成軍事組織、官僚組織、監察組織與宦官組織四大部分；衛所為廣義政治組織之一，自然會與前述四大部分有所關連，本章主要即在探討衛所與這四大組織的互動情形。 第九章「結論-明代衛所制度的作用、毀壞及其影響」，衛所制度的作用較早顯然具有軍事及經濟上的重大功用，然至中期以後，竟慢慢淪為政府力役的供應場所；其中的變化除因制度本身的設計盲點外，更因社會及經濟等層面因素影響而漸趨毀壞；而明代的國勢則是跟衛所制度間，存在不可分割的關連性。本章重點即是針對衛所制度的功過作一總評。

La loi du 19 juin 1851 qui étatise la police de Lyon marque une rupture majeure dans l’histoire du maintien de l’ordre en France. Depuis la Révolution française, les maires ont en effet été chargés de la police dans toutes les communes françaises, Paris exceptée. À partir de 1851, Lyon fait donc figure d’exception. Parce qu’elle s’est signalée par ses colères récurrentes depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle, qu’elle est considérée comme la capitale du sud-est de la France et que sa population apparaît unanimement comme rétive à toute forme de domination, elle passe pour une cité rebelle. Dans le contexte d’un « Printemps des peuples » marqué par les soulèvements réguliers des partisans de la République démocratique et sociale, en juin 1848 puis en juin 1849, Lyon devient aux yeux des autorités, le quartier général de tous ceux qui veulent renverser l’ordre social en France voire en Europe. Or, durant cette période, la police lyonnaise donne chaque jour les preuves d’une défaillance complète face à la criminalité et à la délinquance, malgré une réorganisation générale tentée à l’automne 1848. En réaction, le pouvoir parisien place progressivement Lyon « hors du droit commun ». La ville et ses faubourgs sont d’abord privés de leurs gardes nationales en juillet 1848, lesquelles ne seront jamais réorganisées, à la différence des autres municipalités, car elles sont perçues, entre Rhône et Saône, comme peu sûres, faibles face à l’émeute et promptes à se retourner contre l’armée et la police. Le 15 juin 1849, une nouvelle insurrection éclate à Lyon. Réprimée par l’armée, elle enclenche la réforme générale de l’organisation administrative et policière de la ville et des faubourgs. Dans l’immédiat, Lyon et les cinq départements de la 6e division militaire sont placés et maintenus en état de siège. Tentée une première fois à l’automne 1849, la réforme aboutit avec la loi du 19 juin 1851. Désormais, Lyon jouit d’une police étatisée, aux mains d’un préfet du Rhône devenu préfet de police, agissant dans une nouvelle entité administrative, l’agglomération lyonnaise, qui regroupe une douzaine de communes et faubourgs. Le décret du 24 mars 1852 fait aboutir cette réforme, en supprimant le maire et en attribuant ses fonctions au préfet, en annexant les communes suburbaines et en divisant la ville en cinq arrondissements. Sur le plan policier, les services sont réorganisés jusqu’en 1854, sur la base des modèles parisien, londonien et genevois. La police d’État lyonnaise traverse le Second Empire et devient le modèle à partir duquel les polices des préfectures de plus de 40 000 habitants sont étatisées en 1855. Cette pérennité de la police d’État ne doit pourtant pas dissimuler une contestation permanente de son existence au cours des années 1860, au Corps législatif puis au Conseil général du Rhône. Les élus républicains demandent en effet la restitution à Lyon d’une municipalité élue, prélude au retour de la ville dans le « droit commun » sur le plan policier. Progressivement, la surveillance politique de l’agglomération s’avère difficile à assurer et les effectifs policiers apparaissent insuffisants. C’est néanmoins la défaite de Sedan qui aura raison de la police d’État. La République proclamée, la municipalité lyonnaise tout juste recomposée reprend immédiatement la direction du maintien de l’ordre le 4 septembre 1870 / The law of 19th June 1851 which establishes state control over the police of Lyon marks a major break in the history of urban policing in France. Since the French Revolution, mayors were in charged of the police in all the French municipalities, Paris excepted. From 1851, Lyon thus became an exception. Because it differenced itself by its recurring revolts since the end of the XVIIIth century, because it is considered as the capital of the southeast-part of France and because its population appeared unanimously as refusing any kind of domination, it was considered as a rebel city. During the "people’s spring" marked by the regular uprisings of the partisans of the democratic and social Republic, in June, 1848 then in June, 1849, Lyon became for the authorities, the headquarters of all those who wanted to turn upside down social order in France and even in Europe. Yet, during this period, the police of Lyon gave daily proofs of a total failure to fight criminality, in spite of a general reorganization tempted in autumn 1848.In reaction, the Parisian power gradually put Lyon "outside the common law". The city and its suburbs were firstly deprived of their national guards in July 1848, unlike the other municipalities, because its guards were perceived, between the Rhône and the Saône, as weak in front of riots and quick to turn around against the army and the police. On June 15th 1849, a new uprising burst in Lyon. Repressed by the army, it engaged the general reform of the administrative and police organization of the city and the suburbs. Lyon and the five departments of the 6th military division had immediately been are placed and maintained under state of siege. Firstly tried in autumn 1849, the reform succeeded with the law of 19th June 1851. From then on, Lyon had a state-controlled police, in the hands of the prefect of the Rhône who became a prefect of police, acting in a new administrative entity, the Lyon agglomeration, which included a dozen municipalities and suburbs. The decree of March 24th, 1852 made this reform succeed, by suppressing the mayor and by attributing its functions to the prefect, by annexing the suburban municipalities and by dividing the city into five districts. On the police plan, services were reorganized until 1854, on the basis of the models of Paris, London and Geneva.The State police of Lyon crossed the Second Empire and became the model from which the polices of the prefectures of more than 40 000 inhabitants passed under state control in 1855. Nevertheless, the State police is contested during the 1860s, in the Legislative Corps and the General Council of the Rhône. The republican asked for the restoration of an elected municipality in Lyon, seen as the first step of the return of the city in the police "common law". Gradually, political surveillance of the urban space became increasingly difficult, and the police staff seemed insufficient. Nevertheless, it was the defeat of Sedan that would mark the end of the State police. Once the Republic had been proclaimed, the municipality of Lyon just recomposed took back immediately the direction of the police on September 4th, 1870.

The Peace Agreement of 2016 between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army raised hopes after decades of internal armed conflict, but the levels of violence continue to be high in rural areas. Cauca is the department of Colombia where most social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed since 2016. To resist violence, to defend life and the territories, and to uphold rule of law based on the 1991 Colombian Constitution, the Indigenous Guards of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca use an integral method of nonviolence in the everyday setting. The aim of this study is to understand the impact of this method, perceived by the local people, as an alternative way to create peace in Colombia with concepts defined by Johan Galtung. With a decolonial research approach, an exemplifying qualitative comparative case study with fieldwork for the data collection has been carried out in Cauca, to give voice to and learn from the local communities. The results show a complex situation of an uneven progress of conflict transformation within the department, with significant economic inequalities. The challenges of cyclical war on a small scale are occurring, as in the case of the Proyecto Nasa in the Municipality of Toribío. At once, the possibilities of using this method to break the cycles of war through the power of asymmetry have occurred by conflict resolutions of dialogs with armed actors, as in the case of the resguardo of Paletará in the Municipality of Puracé Coconuco. It is claimed that by strengthening the institution of the Indigenous Guards, the collective actions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the territories can improve the process of conflict transformation by revitalizing the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement with its territorial focus and the ethnic chapter. / El Acuerdo Final de Paz de 2016 entre el Gobierno Colombiano y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo elevó la esperanza tras décadas del conflicto armado interno, pero los niveles de violencia siguen siendo altos en las zonas rurales. El Cauca es el departamento de Colombia donde la mayoría de los lideres sociales y los defensores de derechos humanos han sido asesinados desde 2016. Para resistir a la violencia, para defender la vida y los territorios, y para mantener el Estado de Derecho basado en la Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991, el Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca utiliza un método integral de la no-violencia en el entorno cotidiano. El objetivo de este estudio es comprender el impacto de este método, percibida por la población local, como una vía alternativa para crear paz en Colombia con conceptos definidos por Johan Galtung. Con un enfoque de investigación decolonial, un estudio de caso comparativo con trabajo de campo para la recolección de datos ha sido realizado en el Cauca, para dar voz y aprender de las comunidades locales. Los resultados muestran una situación compleja con un progreso irregular de la transformación del conflicto dentro del departamento con disparidades significativas económicas. Los desafíos con una guerra cíclica a una pequeña escala están ocurriendo; como es el caso de Proyecto Nasa en el Municipio de Toribío. A la vez, las posibilidades con el uso de este método para romper con los ciclos de guerra a través del poder asimétrico han ocurrido por la resolución de conflicto con diálogos con actores armados; como en el caso del Resguardo de Paletará en el Municipio de Puracé Coconuco. Se afirma que, por el fortalecimiento de la institución de la Guardia Indígena, las acciones colectivas del mantenimiento de la paz y la consolidación de la paz en los territorios pueden mejorar el proceso de transformación del conflicto, revitalizando la implementación del Acuerdo Final de Paz de 2016 con el enfoque territorial y el capítulo étnico.