This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

The main purpose of this study was to develop an analytical framework for the study of terrorism, and secondly to apply it on the Israel/Palestine conflict. To achieve the first purpose, I examined the history and background of the conflict. The purpose of the study has been achieved by using a qualitative text analysis. The questions that were requested answers in this study are: - What are the main reasons that might trigger terrorism?- What are the main reasons that might triggered the terrorism in this case? The outcome of this study is that the cause-factors to the terrorism appearance is modernisation and urbanisation, social tolerance of political violence, revolutionary ideologies and beliefs, powerless states and state response, the lack of political participation and minorities and terror-leader dissatisfaction. I developed the theory that I used and added other factors like occupation, strive for independence and self-sufficiency, and other like the diplomatic impasse, provocative event and religion that have characterised the conflict from the beginning.

John Warden är en inflytelserik luftmaktsteoretiker som låg bakom koalitionens luftkampanj mot Irak 1991. Han menar att luftmakt bör användas för att slå ut motståndarens motståndskraft genom att rikta anfall mot kritiska tyngdpunkter. Han illustrerar tyngdpunkterna genom att måla upp motståndaren som ett system bestående av fem ringar som visar hur systemet bör angripas. Shaun Clarke menar att småstater inte kan använda Wardens luftmaktsteori eftersom det kräver stor massa och därför en stormakts resurstillgångar. Han lanserar därför SPOT-paradigmet som en väg för småstaten att anamma strategisk bombning på ett resurseffektivt sätt. Denna studie prövar Wardens och Clarkes förklaringskraft genom en fallstudie på Israels luftmaktsutövande under operation Protective Edge 2014, för att se om Clarkes påstående är giltigt och om SPOT-paradigmet är användbart för småstaten.Studien visar att femringsmodellen har låg förklaringskraft på Israels nyttjande av luftmakt. Man har i huvudsak inte följt Wardens rekommendationer. SPOT-paradigmet har däremot hög förklaringskraft och studien förefaller stärka teorin i småstatens luftanfall mot en svagare motståndare.

2006年1月25日巴勒斯坦舉行立法議會(PLC)選舉，哈馬斯(Hamas)出乎意料贏得議會過半席次，擊敗執政黨法塔(Fateh)，並依法律組成新政府。 以美國為首的西方國家對哈馬斯勝選感到十分震驚，因為西方國家迄今仍將哈馬斯列入恐怖組織名單。美國表示除非哈馬斯宣布永久放棄暴力及承認以色列生存權，否則拒絕與哈馬斯接觸。 哈馬斯勝選將衝擊以巴和平進程(peace process)的發展。1991年馬德里和會（Madrid Conference）後，以巴之間開啟談判大門，並於1993年雙方簽訂奧斯路協議(Oslo Accord)。然而，哈馬斯不但堅決反對奧斯路協議，更多次在以色列境內發動自殺炸彈攻擊，導致以巴之間衝突不斷，而哈馬斯則被國際社會認為是以巴和平進程的障礙。 事實上，哈馬斯並不完全是西方媒體所描述的恐怖組織。哈馬斯以伊斯蘭作為其政治理念，在各地設立醫院、學校與活動中心等社會福利設施，並強調結束以色列佔領的重要性，獲得多數巴勒斯坦人民認同與支持，以及受到阿拉伯國家與伊斯蘭世界的援助。 本文將先探討哈馬斯成立背景、組織結構、理念與發展經過，再深入分析哈馬斯對以巴和平進程的認知與策略。 本文認為，未來以巴和平進程必須將哈馬斯納入其中。若國際社會一味的排斥與孤立哈馬斯政府，不僅不能促進以巴和平進程，反而使巴勒斯坦社會更趨於孤立與激進，造成以巴局勢動盪不安，進而影響中東區域安全與穩定。 / On January 25, 2006, Palestine held a legislative election; unexpectedly, Hamas won more than half of the seats in the council and defeated the Fateh which dominated the Palestinian Council in the last decade. As s result, a new government was formed by Hamas. Western countries, especially the United States, were astonished at Hamas’s victory. Since the United States still lists Hamas as a terrorist group, Washington insists that Hamas must denounce violence and recognize the Israel’s right to exist, otherwise the U.S. would refuse to deal with Hamas. Hamas’s victory seems to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. After the Madrid Conference in 1991, Israel and Palestine signed the Oslo Accord in 1993. However, Hamas strongly opposed the Oslo Accord, and launched many suicide attacks within Israel that resulted in the bloody confrontations. In fact, Hamas is not a terrorist group. Hamas uses Islam as the political value to establish hospitals, schools and centers for activities in the occupied Palestinian territory and emphasize the importance of ending Israel’s occupation. Hamas is supported by the most Palestinian as well as by the Arab countries and the Islamic World. This paper first examines Hamas’s background, organizational structure, and its development. Then Hamas’s position toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its peace strategy will be analyzed. This paper argues that if the international community deliberately excludes the Hamas government from the peace process, it will neither promote the peace process nor result in peace.