O presente trabalho de doutorado tem por objetivo expor e comentar a tese do prazer (voluptas, em latim, edoné, em grego) como o sumo bem (summum bonum), conforme a defesa do humanista romano Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), inscrita no seu diálogo De Voluptate (Do Prazer), publicado pela primeira vez em 1431. Nesta obra, que foi alvo de inúmeras polêmicas entre pensadores humanistas e escolásticos de seu tempo, a Europa do Renascimento, Valla propõe um debate entre um representante estoico e um epicurista acerca da questão sobre o fim último que dirige nossas ações, dito também o sumo bem. Como representante do partido da virtude ou do honesto (o honestum ou a honestas), o estoico, Valla escolhe ninguém menos do que um dos maiores representantes do republicanismo italiano do renascimento, o chanceler de Florença Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444). Do lado oposto, como representante do partido do prazer (a voluptas), isto é, o epicurista, ele escolhe ninguém menos do que o autor do primeiro volume de epigramas satíricos da Renascença, o poeta panormitano Antonio Beccadelli (1394-1471). Através desse debate, Valla procura rebater as críticas feitas por escolásticos e humanistas ao modelo de vida epicurista, pejorativamente chamado por seus detratores de vida dos agricultores ou rústicos, por oposição ao modelo de vida estoico do homem de negócios públicos, compromissado com deveres (officia) muito elevados, pois que visam a proteção e glória de sua cidade. / The purpose of this dissertation is to expose and comment on the thesis of pleasure (voluptas, in Latin, edoné, in Greek) as the highest good (summum bonum), according to the Roman humanist Lorenzo Valla\' defense (1407-1457) inscribed in his dialogue De Voluptate (On Pleasure), published for the first time in 1431. In this work, which was the subject of numerous controversies between humanists and other scholastics of his time in Renaissance Europe, Valla proposes a debate between a Stoic representative and an Epicurean on the question about the ultimate end that directs our actions, also said the highest good. As a representative of the party of virtue or of the honest (honestum or honestas), that is to say, the Stoic, he chooses no one but one of the greatest representatives of the Italian republicanism of the Renaissance, the chancellor of Florence, Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444). On the opposite side, as the representative of the pleasure party (voluptas), that is, the Epicurean, he chooses no one but the author of the first volume of satirical epigrams of the Renaissance, the panormitan poet, Antonio Beccadelli (1394-1471). Through this debate, Valla seeks to counter scholastic and humanist criticisms of the \"epicurean\" model of life, pejoratively called life of \"farmers or rustics\" by his detractors, as opposed to the \"stoic\" model of public business man, committed to very high duties (officia), as they seek the protection and glory to his city.

This thesis aims to explore the role and significance of the aesthetic experience in Kant&rsquo / s philosophy. To accomplish this aim / firstly, the role of aesthetic power of judgment is discovered in subject&rsquo / s production of truths about the sensible world which is attributed to the cognitive power of understanding. Secondly, the role of aesthetic power of judgment in subject&rsquo / s representation of the good and in formation of moral judgments is demonstrated. Aesthetic power of judgment which enables both the reception and production of the beauty as a necessary harmony and unity brings an aesthetic and intuitive determinability to the acknowledged transcendent field for knowledge. The thesis is concluded by the affirmation that aesthetic power of judgment as an orienting interpretative power is a necessary condition for the subject, who is limited in knowledge and sensibly conditioned in the realization of moral purposes, in order to know and to have a moral life.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The following thesis aims at offering a broad and systematic interpretation of the doctrine highest good. Based on that, we defend that the idea of highest good represents a necessary complement to Kant‟s moral theory. In order to defend that, it is needed to present the context in which the idea of highest good is introduced by Kant, observing that in this period there was no moral theory itself yet, which was based on the autonomy of the will. It is important to emphasize that both during development and among the different phases of critical philosophy the idea of highest good has been there. Thus, it is essential to analyze the relationship between the idea of highest good and the theory of morality, taking into consideration that sometimes the concept seems to be unstable regarding the foundations of the moral theory. It happens that, although the concept or idea of highest good has already its legitimacy ensured since the beginning of critical period, it is from a practical perspective of reflective judgment that it will become an essential part of the moral theory and of the architectonic of pure reason. On one hand, the following thesis has the objective of rebuilding Kant‟s argumentation regarding the idea of highest good during the critical period and, on the other hand, showing that the concept of highest good does not compromise the fundamental principle of morality. Besides that, considering that the idea of highest good is constantly retaken by Kant himself in his critical philosophy, we defend that the highest good not only has an assured place, but a privileged one in moral philosophy. Even though the highest good is an object of faith for practical pure reason moral it theologically complements moral theory representing pure reason ultimate goal for rational human beings. / A presente tese procura oferecer uma interpretação abrangente e sistemática da doutrina do sumo bem. Nessa perspectiva, defende-se que a ideia do sumo bem representa uma complementação necessária à teoria moral kantiana. Para tal empreendimento faz-se necessário apresentar o contexto no qual a ideia do sumo bem é introduzida por Kant, observando que nesse período ainda não existia uma teoria moral propriamente dita, baseada na autonomia da vontade. Cabe ressaltar que tanto no desenvolvimento quanto nas diferentes etapas da filosofia crítica a ideia do sumo bem esteve presente. Com efeito, torna-se imprescindível analisar a relação entre a ideia do sumo bem com a teoria da moralidade, tendo em vista que em alguns momentos esse conceito parece instável no tocante à fundamentação da teoria moral. Ocorre que, embora o conceito ou ideia de sumo bem já tenha a sua legitimidade assegurada desde o início do período crítico, é a partir de uma perspectiva prática da faculdade de julgar reflexionante que ele passa a se constituir como uma parte indispensável da teoria moral e da arquitetônica da razão pura. A tese tem, por um lado, o objetivo de reconstruir a argumentação kantiana referente à ideia do sumo bem no período crítico e, por outro lado, demonstrar que essa ideia do sumo bem não compromete o princípio fundamental da moralidade. Além disso, visto que a ideia de sumo bem é constantemente retomada pelo próprio Kant em sua filosofia crítica, defende-se que a ideia do sumo bem não somente tem um lugar assegurado, mas um lugar privilegiado na filosofia moral. Mesmo que o sumo bem seja um objeto de fé da razão prática pura moral ele complementa teleologicamente a teoria moral representando o fim último da razão pura para os seres racionais humanos.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This master thesis aims at reconstructing the Kantian concept of the Highest Good (höchstes Gut) since its presentation in the Critique of pure reason`s Transcendental doctrine of method (1781), passing by Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals (1785) and the Critique of practical reason (1788), until the preface of The religion within the limits of reason alone (1793). We intend here to clarify the definition that Kant presents about the concept of the Highest Good, as well as its relation with morality. That way, we maintain that in the development of the critical philosophy Kant presented different perspectives about the Highest Good, taking into account the different meanings this concept has in Kant. The same applies to Kant s conception of the foundations of moral, considering that his arguments in different stages of the critical philosophy sometimes are unstable about the determination of the origin of the moral law. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the relation of morality to the Highest Good, because it is an extremely important element of this concept. After clarifying this relation, we approach the question, linked to Highest Good and morality, about how happiness can be an element of the concept of such object without compromising its characteristic of originating from pure rational will. Furthermore, we approached the problem of the importance of the Highest Good for Kant`s practical philosophy. We take the doctrine of the practical reason`s postulates as relevant to this question. Finally, we go into Kant`s philosophy of religion in which the concept of the Highest Good seems to adopt an anthropological character, representing the final end that rational human beings aim to attain. / Este trabalho consiste em uma reconstrução do conceito kantiano de Sumo Bem (höchstes Gut) desde sua apresentação na Doutrina transcendental do método da Crítica da razão pura (1781), perpassando pela Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes (1785) e a Crítica da razão prática (1788), até o prefácio de A religião nos limites da simples razão(1793). Busca-se aqui, esclarecer a definição que Kant apresenta do conceito de Sumo Bem, assim como, de sua relação com a moralidade. Nesse sentido, observa-se que no desenvolvimento da teoria crítica, Kant expõe diferentes perspectivas a respeito do Sumo Bem, merecendo, por isso, atenção aos distintos significados usados desse conceito. O mesmo ocorre com a compreensão que ele possui da fundamentação moral, tendo em vista que sua argumentação nas diferentes etapas da filosofia crítica, por vezes, se revela instável no tocante à determinação da origem da lei moral. Por isso, faz-se necessário analisar a relação da moralidade com o Sumo Bem, uma vez que ela consiste num elemento extremamente relevante para esse conceito. Tendo esclarecida essa relação, aborda-se a questão vinculada ao Sumo Bem e a moralidade acerca de como a felicidade pode compor o conceito de tal objeto sem comprometer sua característica de ter origem na vontade racional pura. Ademais, aborda-se o problema referente à importância do Sumo Bem à filosofia prática de Kant. Para tanto, toma-se a doutrina dos postulados práticos como relevantes para a tentativa de solucionar essa questão. Por fim, adentra-se na filosofia da religião de Kant em que o conceito de Sumo Bem parece adquirir caráter antropológico, tendo em vista que ele representa o fim último da razão pura que os seres humanos racionais visam alcançar.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This master's degree work approaches the concept the highest good in three different moments of the Kant s philosophy practical. Its objective is to show that Kant attributes different papers in the ethics, in the religion and in the political philosophy for the highest good, that is, it can have different functions in the horizon of his philosophy. In the first chapter, the highest good is characterized in the Dialectics of the Critique of Practical Reason as object of the pure practical reason and it is sustained that is necessary to admit for his accomplishment that the postulates of the practical reason, God and immortality of the soul, as their possibility conditions. In the second chapter, from the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, it is described the idea of the highest good as last end of the man's moral conduct through the moral community's formation and it is shown how the radical evil show itself in the human nature. In the last chapter, it is presented the conception secular or political of the highest good as a social end. This subject is analyzed in the context of the political philosophy of Kant and it is sustained that the accomplishment of the highest good political requests the union of States in a common juridical body and, besides, it is necessary the elaboration of a cosmopolitan Constitution. / Este trabalho de mestrado aborda o conceito de sumo bem em três diferentes momentos da filosofia prática kantiana. Seu objetivo é mostrar que Kant atribui diferentes papéis na ética, na religião e na filosofia política para o sumo bem, isto é, que ele pode ter diferentes funções no horizonte da sua filosofia. No primeiro capítulo, caracteriza-se o sumo bem na Dialética da Crítica da Razão Prática como objeto da razão prática pura e sustenta-se que para a sua realização é preciso admitir que os postulados da razão prática (Deus e imortalidade da alma) são as suas condições de possibilidade. No segundo capítulo, descreve-se, a partir da Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão, a idéia do sumo bem como fim último da conduta moral do homem através da formação da comunidade moral e mostra-se como o mal radical figura na natureza humana. No último capítulo, apresenta-se a concepção secular ou política do sumo bem como um fim social. Essa questão é analisada no contexto da filosofia política de Kant e sustenta-se que a realização do sumo bem político requer a união dos Estados num corpo jurídico comum e, além disso, é necessária a elaboração de uma Constituição cosmopolita.

Dans la Logique, Kant expose clairement le rapport entre sa philosophie et l’anthropologie. Si les trois premières questions (à savoir « Que puis-je savoir ? », « Que dois-je faire ? » et « Que m’est-il permis d’espérer ? ») peuvent toutes être ramenées à la question « Qu’est ce que l’homme ? », alors quelle anthropologie qui donne la réponse à cette dernière question ? S’agissant du rapport entre l’anthropologie et la philosophie, il existe beaucoup de débats parmi les commentateurs kantiens. Ils tentent d’éclaircir ce rapport soit selon un point de vue de l’anthropologie philosophique, soit selon un point de vue de l’ontologie fondamentale. Mais en tant qu’oeuvre kantienne unique relative à l’anthropologie, l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique est absente dans ce débat dans lequel on peut dire qu’elle a été négligée. La raison qui cause cette situation réside dans la caractéristique empirique présentée par l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique. Cependant, dans la lettre du 4 mai 1793 à Karl Friedrich Stäudlin, Kant lui-même a mentionné qu’il avait fait un cours pendant plus de 20 ans sur cette question anthropologique de « Qu’est ce que l’homme ? ». D’après cela, il nous semble que l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, provenant des notes de ce cours, doit être considérée comme une oeuvre kantienne portant sur « Qu’est ce que l’homme ? ». Comment pouvons-nous résoudre cette difficulté existante dans la saisie du rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant ? Peut-on la résoudre ? Si la réponse est «oui », quel sera un tel rapport ? En effet, dans l’étude du rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant, on néglige souvent le rôle clef joué par le concept cosmopolitique. Les trois premières questions sont ramenées à l’anthropologie dans le domaine de la philosophie en son sens cosmopolitique. Que signifie alors la philosophie en son sens cosmopolitique ? Quel rapport cette philosophie a-t-elle avec la philosophie selon son concept cosmique qui a été considérée comme la recherche de la doctrine de la sagesse (à savoir le souverain bien). Si l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique peut être conçue comme une oeuvre kantienne portant sur la question « Qu’est ce que l’homme ? », comment devons-nous saisir son rapport avec les trois premières questions ?Cette étude cherche à clarifier ce rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant et le rôle joué par l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique dans ce rapport selon les « concept cosmique », « concept cosmopolitique » et le « souverain bien ». / Kant articulates the relationship between philosophy and anthropology in his Logic. When the three questions (i.e., What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope for?) are reduced to “ What is Man?”, what answer should anthropology give to the question? Concerning the relationship between anthropology and philosophy, therehas been much debate among Kant’s commentators. They attempt to clarify this relationship either from a point of view of philosophical anthropology or according to a perspective of fundamental ontology. Nevertheless, Kant's only work on anthropology, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, was absent from this debate due to its empirical characteristics. In a letter to Karl Friedrich Stäudlin dated May 4, 1793, Kant himself said that he had done a course for over 20 years on this question of anthropology, “What is man?” Therefore, it seems that the Anthropology from Pragmatic Point of View (from notes of this course) can be seen as the work of Kant on “What is man?” How can we resolve the apprehension about the relationship between philosophy and anthropology in Kant? Can it be resolved? If the answer is “yes,” then what will such a relationship be? Indeed, in the study of the relationship between philosophy and anthropology in Kant, we often overlook the key role played by the concept of cosmopolitanism. The first three questions are brought to anthropology in the field of philosophy in its cosmopolitan sense. What does the philosophy mean in its cosmopolitan sense? What relationship did this philosophy with the philosophy according to its cosmic concept that has been considered as the search of the doctrine of wisdom (namely, of the highest Good)? If the Anthropology from Pragmatic Point of View can be perceived as Kant’s work on the question of "What is man?” then how should we comprehend its relationship with the first three questions?This study aims at clarifying the relationship between philosophy and anthropology in Kant and the role played by the Anthropology from Pragmatic Point of View in this relationship according to the “cosmic concept,” “cosmopolitan concept,” and the “highest good.”

Le rapport qu’entretient Hegel à l’égard de la philosophie kantienne est ambivalent. Il la louange à maintes occasions alors qu’il la critique sévèrement à d’autres. La philosophie morale de Kant n’y fait pas exception. Hegel est réputé pour l’avoir critiquée avec véhémence. Cette critique, désormais célèbre, est connue sous le nom de critique du devoir-être ou Sollenkritik. Nous porterions préjudice à la richesse de la doctrine hégélienne si nous nous bornions à voir en cette critique un rejet catégorique de toutes les thèses avancées par Kant. Notre travail se donne une double mission. Dans un premier temps, nous montrerons quels sont les divers points litigieux entre la moralité kantienne et la doctrine hégélienne. Dans un second temps, nous nous efforcerons d’expliquer en quoi la moralité participe de la vérité que nous révèle Hegel. / The relation that Hegel maintains towards the Kantian philosophy is ambivalent. He praises it on several occasions while he criticizes it on others. The moral philosophy of Kant does not make an exception to it. Hegel is renowned for having criticized it vehemently. This criticism, now famous, is known under the name of Sollenkritik. We would harm the richness of the Hegelian doctrine if we were to limit ourselves to see this criticism as a rejection of the theories put forward by Kant. Our work will aim a double mission. As a first step, we will demonstrate what are the different litigious points between the Kantian morality and the Hegelian doctrine. As a second step, we will try to explain how morality is included in the truth that Hegel is revealing us.