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Can Philosophers make a genuine and substantive contribution to the theory and practice of moral education? Contrast the following two answers. According to one approach, analytic moral philosophy is concerned with constructing moral theories. As such, moral education is a secondary concern of the moral theorist and a moral theory will, at most, only have implications for moral education. Call this the strict theoretical approach. An alternative account holds that moral education is a central topic of moral philosophy. As such, moral theorists who ignore questions of moral education are offering incomplete theories. Call this the educative approach. In this dissertation, I argue that moral philosophers need to take the educative approach more seriously. In part one, I argue that the educative approach is well grounded in the western tradition of moral philosophy (particularly in the eudaimonist tradition of ethics). In part two, I show how recent work in virtue theory can make a genuine and substantive contribution to the interdisciplinary field of moral education.

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The thesis is an attempt to find a satisfactorv grounding for universal moral rights. It attempts to ground universal moral rights in a revised version of the framework of moral reasons offered by T.M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Oflzer. In doing so it takes on several related projects. It makes a case for why rights generally, and universal rights in particular, are an essential part of a proper moral theory. It then attempts an extended argument in support of why the method of grounding universal rights at which I eventuallv arrive is superior to competitors. The argument encompasses both why I believe that universal rights need to be grounded in an objective meta-ethcs, and why I take the sort of irrealist cognitivism advanced by Scanlon to be the most promising form of moral objectivism. The argument is admittedly defeasible: it is not so ambitious as to try to eliminate every competing rights theory, but it purports to be strong enough to show that my theory enjoys significant adivantages over manv others. In the course of making this argument I align myself with the natural law tradition, and claim that mv position is best understood as a new natural law theory. The thesis goes on to defend many elements of the Scanlonian picture of moral reasons, but also to revise that picture in important ways, particularly by arguing that Scanlon’s contractualism is best understood to be underpinned bv an account of the sacred offered by Ronald Dworkin, and that some moral reasons are reasons we all share. The final chapter of the thesis shows how rights are derived from Scanlonian reasons, and particularly how universal rights are derived from shared reasons.

Hans Jonas ranks among a small but expanding group of recent ethicists who have argued that a robust ethical theory must account for human ontological considerations. He is among those who make claims that such considerations issue from biological foundations. In The Phenomenon of Life, he reclaims elements of the Aristotelian biological ontology of the soul while adjusting this ontology to the theory of evolution. The first problem with Aristotelian biological ontology, one suffering from essentialism, is the confrontation with the biological flux of species, presented in the Darwinian theory of natural selection. The dissertation explains that Jonas was correct in his return to Aristotle, insofar as there are elements of human beings that are natural and universal. The task is to follow Jonas by constructing a robust philosophical anthropology. Jonas's philosophical anthropology understands human beings as nature's most magnificent and advanced examples of what he calls "needful freedom." Jonas's argument includes a refutation of reductive materialism and epiphenomenalism, one that leaves the possibilities of the human soul/consciousness and freedom in at least as good a position as offered by Kant. His argument is also an attempt to rescue ontology, human nature, and ethics from the relativism of Heideggerian thought. He does this by replacing Heidegger's concept of "thrown projection" with an idea of "projection" based on biological ontology. With this ontological foundation in place, Jonas's "ethics of the future" sees human beings as the caretakers not only of themselves but of the totality of nature and not simply for anthropocentric reasons. Jonas's philosophical anthropology was incomplete insofar as it lacked an accounting of sexual reproduction, a key element for Jonas's ethical theory where political responsibility is modeled after parenthood. After offering a critique of Jonas's incomplete philosophical anthropology and the gap it leaves for his ethical theory, this dissertation shows that the value of his contribution remains intact. / Philosophy

At present two options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. One takes its formulation from the work of Kant, the other stands in the tradition of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty mid obligation. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the practice of virtue. Both theoretical perspectives have debilitating deficiencies. A spectrum of moral experience is presented that represents the wood opportunities available to the agent in life experience. The polarities of this spectrum pull most naturally towards either an Aristotelian or a Kantian perspective, although neither perspective is capable of addressing the requirements of the entire spectrum. The Aristotelian perspective is associated with the life of non-dilemmic virtue, undertaken in community, where relational realities and the contextual contingency of moral life is emphasized. The Kantian perspective is associated with dilemmic situations to be resolved by a process of moral The central problem of the dissertation acknowledges the antithetical nature of these perspectives, and the dichotomous nature of their philosophical roots. The central task of the dissertation is the establishment of a dialogic process that has the potential to reconcile this dichotomy, and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other. This task is accomplished by providing responses to a central research question that is accompanied by a series of subsidiary questions. From an analysis of various theories of moral education, Kohlberg's theory of structural developmentalism is chosen for reformulation as it is informed by the exploration of the requirements of the dialogic process. To address the research questions, additional Spectra are offered to provide an epistemological and ontological basis for a five-step dialogic treatment that combines, through a developmental climacteric, the Magistral dialogue of Vvgotsky Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin. The five-step model is comprised of a recursive loop through the four steps of the Magistral dialogue prior to an entrance into a Socratic dialogue. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The aim of this study is to examine Hume&rsquo / s moral theory as expressed in his two main books, Treatise and Enquiry and to show the defects of this theory. Without explaining some basic doctrines such as moral motivation, moral judgment, sympathy, passions, virtues, justice e.t.c., it is not possible to understand Hume&rsquo / s moral theory. To this aim, first, Hume&rsquo / s moral theory is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the theory, its relation with his epistemology and his aesthetics are explained. Afterwards, few philosophers who influenced Hume&rsquo / s thought such as Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson have been briefly discussed. Consequently, it is claimed that Hume&rsquo / s moral theory has a heterogeneous structure so it is difficult to understand his moral theory. Hume&rsquo / s moral theory contains an ambiguity due to his conception of sympathy, which has led to some misinterpretations.

When facing a dilemma about what to do, rational agents will often encounter a conflict between what they ought to do, morally speaking, and what they most want to do. Traditionally we think that when there is a moral imperative for an agent to do something, even if she does not want to do it, she nevertheless ought to do it. But this approach inevitably fails to be able to explain why agents often choose to do what they most want, in many cases flouting such moral imperatives. The purpose of this thesis is to offer a plausible alternative to this way of understanding these deliberative dilemmas. I argue that communitarian moralism, the account according to which genuine moral imperatives are only imperatives on communities, rather than agents, and according to which agents’ moral conduct is necessarily bound up with her particular preferences, projects and commitments, is the most plausible way to understand dilemmas in which agents must choose between doing moral and self-interested actions.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Este trabalho apresenta uma análise crítica à forma de se abordar casos jurídicos e proferir decisões judiciais denominada abordagem judicial pragmática, disseminada pelo magistrado e professor norte-americano Richard A. Posner. O objetivo é explicitar suas principais características e contornos, bem como sua repulsa pela teorização abstrata e pelos debates e argumentos morais na decisão judicial. A partir disso, pretende-se refutar parte dessa abordagem pragmática, por meio de argumentos levantados por filósofos morais e profissionais do direito a saber: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan Jr e Martha C. Nussbaum - em defesa de uma abordagem que prega a inevitável utilização do raciocínio teórico, assim como a argumentação e reflexão moral na resolução de casos difíceis relacionados ao direito. Também será destacado como a repulsa pragmática pela teoria moral e abstrata é incompatível com a conjuntura justeórica contemporânea e como a análise de alguns casos difíceis expõe a falibilidade, ainda que parcial, desse estilo de abordagem pregado por Posner. / This paper presents a critical analysis of the way of approaching legal cases and rendering judicial decisions called Pragmatic Adjudication, disseminated by the magistrate and American professor Richard A. Posner. The aim is to explain its main features and contours, as well as his repulsion for abstract theorizing and moral debates and arguments in judicial decision. Based on that, it is intended to refute part of this pragmatic approach using arguments raised by moral philosophers and legal professionals - namely: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Martha C. Nussbaum - in defense of an approach that preaches the inevitable use of theoretical reasoning, as well as moral argumentation and reflection to solve hard cases. It will also be highlighted how the pragmatic rejection by moral and abstract theory is incompatible with the contemporary legal theory situation and how the analysis of some hard cases partly exposes the fallibility of this style of approach preached by Posner

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The following thesis aims at offering a broad and systematic interpretation of the doctrine highest good. Based on that, we defend that the idea of highest good represents a necessary complement to Kant‟s moral theory. In order to defend that, it is needed to present the context in which the idea of highest good is introduced by Kant, observing that in this period there was no moral theory itself yet, which was based on the autonomy of the will. It is important to emphasize that both during development and among the different phases of critical philosophy the idea of highest good has been there. Thus, it is essential to analyze the relationship between the idea of highest good and the theory of morality, taking into consideration that sometimes the concept seems to be unstable regarding the foundations of the moral theory. It happens that, although the concept or idea of highest good has already its legitimacy ensured since the beginning of critical period, it is from a practical perspective of reflective judgment that it will become an essential part of the moral theory and of the architectonic of pure reason. On one hand, the following thesis has the objective of rebuilding Kant‟s argumentation regarding the idea of highest good during the critical period and, on the other hand, showing that the concept of highest good does not compromise the fundamental principle of morality. Besides that, considering that the idea of highest good is constantly retaken by Kant himself in his critical philosophy, we defend that the highest good not only has an assured place, but a privileged one in moral philosophy. Even though the highest good is an object of faith for practical pure reason moral it theologically complements moral theory representing pure reason ultimate goal for rational human beings. / A presente tese procura oferecer uma interpretação abrangente e sistemática da doutrina do sumo bem. Nessa perspectiva, defende-se que a ideia do sumo bem representa uma complementação necessária à teoria moral kantiana. Para tal empreendimento faz-se necessário apresentar o contexto no qual a ideia do sumo bem é introduzida por Kant, observando que nesse período ainda não existia uma teoria moral propriamente dita, baseada na autonomia da vontade. Cabe ressaltar que tanto no desenvolvimento quanto nas diferentes etapas da filosofia crítica a ideia do sumo bem esteve presente. Com efeito, torna-se imprescindível analisar a relação entre a ideia do sumo bem com a teoria da moralidade, tendo em vista que em alguns momentos esse conceito parece instável no tocante à fundamentação da teoria moral. Ocorre que, embora o conceito ou ideia de sumo bem já tenha a sua legitimidade assegurada desde o início do período crítico, é a partir de uma perspectiva prática da faculdade de julgar reflexionante que ele passa a se constituir como uma parte indispensável da teoria moral e da arquitetônica da razão pura. A tese tem, por um lado, o objetivo de reconstruir a argumentação kantiana referente à ideia do sumo bem no período crítico e, por outro lado, demonstrar que essa ideia do sumo bem não compromete o princípio fundamental da moralidade. Além disso, visto que a ideia de sumo bem é constantemente retomada pelo próprio Kant em sua filosofia crítica, defende-se que a ideia do sumo bem não somente tem um lugar assegurado, mas um lugar privilegiado na filosofia moral. Mesmo que o sumo bem seja um objeto de fé da razão prática pura moral ele complementa teleologicamente a teoria moral representando o fim último da razão pura para os seres racionais humanos.