Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-30T14:04:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000467586-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 434851 bytes, checksum: 3fe4e22ee69d62614f9c4e059dc989bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / The present dissertation, developed in the research line Violence, Crime and Public Safety, is a critic reflection about the systemic imperatives that colonize the legal (criminal) system appearing as reifying social pathologies. For this, at first, we propose an analysis of systemic functional Niklas Luhmann's proposal, which we believe have the potential to reveal certain pathologies underlying the present society, especially when his speech is projected to legal and criminal matters. In this perspective, the critical theory of Axel Honneth appears in a second moment as a fruitful theoretical framework for the demonstration that functionalism-systemic effectively reveals expressively social pathologies in the form of reification. Reification, understood according to Honneth as forgetting of recognition, manifests itself in a particularly harmful way in the sphere of criminal law - in particular, it seems, at the time of application of the criminal penalty, which is taken in this work as a practical expression in which the reification unfolds and takes shape. / A presente dissertação, vinculada à linha de pesquisa Violência, Crime e Segurança Pública, busca articular uma reflexão crítica direcionada aos imperativos sistêmicos que colonizam de forma velada, sub-reptícia, o âmbito jurídico (penal), revelando-se como patologias sociais reificantes. Para isso, em um primeiro momento, propõe-se uma análise da proposta sistêmico-funcional de Niklas Luhmann, a qual entendemos ter o potencial de desvelar certas patologias que subjazem à sociedade atual, notadamente quando seu discurso é projetado no âmbito jurídico-penal. Nesta perspectiva, a teoria crítica de Axel Honneth aparece, em um segundo momento, como um arcabouço teórico frutífero para a argumentação no sentido de que o funcionalismo-sistêmico efetivamente revela de modo expressivo patologias sociais, na forma de reificação. Esta, compreendida consoante a leitura de Honneth como Esquecimento do Reconhecimento, se manifesta particularmente nociva na esfera do direito penal – em especial, nos parece, no momento de aplicação da pena, a qual é tomada nesse trabalho como uma expressão prática em que a reificação se revela e ganha corpo.

La presente tesis de licenciatura tiene como tema central indagar sobre la posibilidad de una individualidad plena y autónoma en el marco de la teoría de reconocimiento planteado por Axel Honneth. Desde este contexto, nos acercaremos a problemáticas que las injusticias epistémicas representan en el individuo y, asimismo, a la relación existente entre el campo epistémico y las expectativas normativas de una sociedad. El objetivo principal de esta tesis es, por lo tanto, exponer los aportes de la teoría del reconocimiento de Honneth a la realización de un individuo autónomo y destacar la importancia del análisis crítico de las bases epistemológicas que sirven de apoyo a la concepción normativa de una sociedad democrática. La estructura a desarrollar en esta investigación consiste en tres capítulos, cuyos propósitos son los siguientes. En el primer capítulo, se buscará exponer una lectura contemporánea de la obra de Hegel respecto a su concepción del reconocimiento intersubjetivo en miras a comprender la influencia hegeliana en la teoría social de Axel Honneth. En el segundo capítulo se realizará una explicación de la teoría del reconocimiento de Axel Honneth y su planteamiento sobre la autonomía en la sociedad. Finalmente, en el tercer capítulo se presentará el caso de las injusticias epistémicas y se tratará de esclarecer el vínculo entre las base normativa y el campo epistémico de una sociedad democrática.

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2010-2011 / Dans ses plus récents travaux, Axel Honneth propose un projet ambitieux : reconstruire la Théorie critique dans le cadre d'une nouvelle philosophie sociale. En reformulant le motif central de la tradition francfortoise en fonction de la théorie de la reconnaissance, il élabore un cadre catégorial susceptible de rendre compte, tant sur le plan descriptif que normatif, des pathologies sociales contemporaines. Honneth vise ainsi à faire valoir un point de vue moral qui puisse nous permettre de critiquer de manière rigoureuse les nouvelles formes d'aliénation définies en terme de mépris social. Cette étude est consacrée aux moyens théoriques par lesquels Honneth entend rendre à nouveau crédible une théorie à la fois normative et descriptive de la société suivant laquelle les pathologies sociales contemporaines peuvent être interprétées en termes de "paradoxes du capitalisme" et de "reconnaissance idéologique".

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 406253.pdf: 910726 bytes, checksum: 3fe13a64dcbd91721d05feb7942f276d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-09-30 / O trabalho tem como objetivo encontrar na teoria de Axel Honneth uma proposta de atualiza??o do conceito hegeliano de eticidade (Sittlichkeit), reestruturado a partir de um modelo assentado em esferas comunicativas de reconhecimento. Situado no quadro te?rico que se configura entre Hegel e Honneth, tem-se em vista precisar a caracteriza??o que o conceito hegeliano de eticidade adquire no tratamento contempor?neo. O desenvolvimento da argumenta??o ser? desdobrado em tr?s partes. Inicialmente, apresentam-se as linhas gerais que permeiam a id?ia original de Hegel do v?nculo entre reconhecimento e eticidade. Em seguida, exp?e-se a literatura cr?tica acerca de problemas da abordagem hegeliana, visando expor a plausibilidade da atualiza??o da eticidade a partir da revis?o do conceito hegeliano de esp?rito e do tratamento especulativo do reconhecimento. A terceira parte discute a reatualiza??o de Hegel na teoria de Honneth, na qual ? apresentada, num primeiro momento, a exposi??o do modelo de eticidade proposto por Honneth em Luta por Reconhecimento. Procura-se sustentar que a teoria de Honneth, ao propor uma gram?tica moral dos conflitos sociais, propicia uma consistente articula??o entre a intui??o original de Hegel de eticidade e o estabelecimento de uma base mais s?lida proporcionada pela inflex?o emp?rica, no marco de um projeto de atualiza??o que busca adaptar a proposta de Hegel ?s exig?ncias do pensamento p?s-metaf?sico. Num segundo momento, ? apresentada a proposta honnethiana de atualiza??o da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel, cuja perspectiva ? orientada para a remodela??o do conte?do normativo das esferas da eticidade. A partir da discuss?o da teoria de Honneth, esta an?lise tem em vista indicar novas possibilidades de retorno a Hegel, relido a partir de novos padr?es conceituais.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2015-04-23T11:05:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 467586 - Texto Parcial.pdf: 434851 bytes, checksum: 3fe4e22ee69d62614f9c4e059dc989bc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-23T11:05:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 467586 - Texto Parcial.pdf: 434851 bytes, checksum: 3fe4e22ee69d62614f9c4e059dc989bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-15 / The present dissertation, developed in the research line Violence, Crime and Public Safety, is a critic reflection about the systemic imperatives that colonize the legal (criminal) system appearing as reifying social pathologies. For this, at first, we propose an analysis of systemic functional Niklas Luhmann's proposal, which we believe have the potential to reveal certain pathologies underlying the present society, especially when his speech is projected to legal and criminal matters. In this perspective, the critical theory of Axel Honneth appears in a second moment as a fruitful theoretical framework for the demonstration that functionalism-systemic effectively reveals expressively social pathologies in the form of reification. Reification, understood according to Honneth as forgetting of recognition, manifests itself in a particularly harmful way in the sphere of criminal law - in particular, it seems, at the time of application of the criminal penalty, which is taken in this work as a practical expression in which the reification unfolds and takes shape. / A presente disserta??o, vinculada ? linha de pesquisa Viol?ncia, Crime e Seguran?a P?blica, busca articular uma reflex?o cr?tica direcionada aos imperativos sist?micos que colonizam de forma velada, sub-rept?cia, o ?mbito jur?dico (penal), revelando-se como patologias sociais reificantes. Para isso, em um primeiro momento, prop?e-se uma an?lise da proposta sist?mico-funcional de Niklas Luhmann, a qual entendemos ter o potencial de desvelar certas patologias que subjazem ? sociedade atual, notadamente quando seu discurso ? projetado no ?mbito jur?dico-penal. Nesta perspectiva, a teoria cr?tica de Axel Honneth aparece, em um segundo momento, como um arcabou?o te?rico frut?fero para a argumenta??o no sentido de que o funcionalismo-sist?mico efetivamente revela de modo expressivo patologias sociais, na forma de reifica??o. Esta, compreendida consoante a leitura de Honneth como Esquecimento do Reconhecimento, se manifesta particularmente nociva na esfera do direito penal ? em especial, nos parece, no momento de aplica??o da pena, a qual ? tomada nesse trabalho como uma express?o pr?tica em que a reifica??o se revela e ganha corpo.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2016-05-30T16:43:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_TAPIR_TABAJARA_CANTO_DA_ROCHA_NETO_PARCIAL.pdf: 395003 bytes, checksum: 06c683f3f74c173ccd2667ae1e4ebb5b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-30T16:43:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_TAPIR_TABAJARA_CANTO_DA_ROCHA_NETO_PARCIAL.pdf: 395003 bytes, checksum: 06c683f3f74c173ccd2667ae1e4ebb5b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-04 / This work is inserted in the search line Legal and Criminal Contemporaries Systems under the guidance of Prof. Dr. Giovani Agostini Saavedra. The present work suggest a dogmatic and critical analysis in respect to promulgation of Law number 12.683/2012, especially in relation to problematic issues from extinction, of the Brazilian legal system, the list of predicate crimes that can generate money laundry. A superficial reading of the new law would allow the understanding that any form of conduct positively as a criminal offense would have aptitude for materialization the money laundering crime, simply if the profit earned by an offense or a misdemeanor was hidden or concealed. From the examination about Axel Honneth?s Theory of Recognition and the current context in which inserted the global economy, the dissertation intends to establish that we can only speak in money laundry if there is an offense to the transparency of developed financial relations as part of an order capitalist economic and democratic. / O presente trabalho est? inserido na linha de pesquisa Sistemas Jur?dico-Penais Contempor?neos, sob a orienta??o do Prof. Dr. Giovani Agostini Saavedra. Prop?e-se uma an?lise cr?tica em rela??o ? promulga??o da Lei n? 12.683/2012, sobretudo em rela??o ?s problem?ticas advindas da extin??o, do ordenamento jur?dico brasileiro, do rol de crimes antecedentes pass?veis de gerar a lavagem de dinheiro. Uma leitura superficial do tipo do referido delito permitiria a compreens?o de que toda e qualquer forma de conduta positivada como infra??o penal teria aptid?o para a materializa??o da reciclagem de capitais, bastando que o proveito auferido por um delito ou por uma contraven??o penal fosse ocultado ou dissimulado. A partir do exame da Teoria do Reconhecimento de Axel Honneth e do atual contexto em que inserida a economia global, pretende-se estabelecer que somente ser? poss?vel falar em lavagem de dinheiro se houver uma ofensa ? transpar?ncia das rela??es financeiras desenvolvidas no ?mbito de uma ordem econ?mica capitalista e democr?tica.

Why do we defend the social conditions responsible for our injustice and exploitation? We are confused when disadvantaged women of color cite personal shortcomings rather than the social system as the source of their precarity. Yet, when social philosophers take up these questions by appealing to the concept of ideology, they turn to structural accounts and dismiss theories of false consciousness outright. Accounts of false consciousness, often understood as an epistemic failing to recognize some features of our inadequate social world, meet with a host of objections. Some argue that ascriptions of false consciousness involve authoritarianism, while others criticize the concept for commitments to an implausible correspondence picture of truth. Meanwhile, dismissal of false consciousness accounts of ideology have led to the neglect of an important feature of how ideology works: in and through our own agency. Without an account of false consciousness, critics fail to account for the fact that social structures are the result of our collective consent. They also fail to address how social structures are not analyzable without turning to the self-understandings of the participants in these very institutions. This dissertation addresses issues in ideology critique that account for our agency. By preserving what is still alive in a theory of false consciousness while addressing the long-standing concerns about authoritarianism and correspondence, this project reconstructs the notion of false consciousness. It closely engages with figures in critical social theory such as Marx, Lukacs, Habermas, Haslanger, Honneth, and Jaeggi, while widening the terms of the debate to consider the relevance, for instance, of object relations psychoanalysis for social philosophers. Beyond this, this dissertation shows that false consciousness is a damaged way of relating to ourselves, to each other, and to the social world. It is characterized, I propose, by affective investment. This move helps us clarify both the phenomenology of false consciousness and what a viable form of critique could look like. Psychoanalysis offers us a new way of understanding ideology critique by directing us beyond the model of critique as judgment as part of overcoming false consciousness.

El objetivo de la presente investigación es mostrar la insostenibilidad de una teoría del reconocimiento explícita en Marx; sin embargo, sí es posible articular una propuesta del reconocimiento sobre la base de las premisas marxianas, anclada en lo mejor de la tradición marxista. Con la finalidad de lograr estos propósitos iniciaremos presentando el contexto teórico del concepto de reconocimiento en la tradición alemana (Fichte y Hegel), luego expondremos la recepción del concepto de reconocimiento hegeliano en filósofos como Honneth y Taylor, continuaremos dando cuenta sobre el conflicto de interpretaciones en torno al concepto de reconocimiento en Marx (Renault, Quante, Gunn y Wilding), y finalizaremos sosteniendo que la lógica del sistema capitalista genera el reconocimiento enajenado.

Ce travail consiste en une confrontation systématique entre la théorie de la reconnaissance développée par Axel Honneth depuis une vingtaine d'années dans ses travaux et la Philosophie du droit (1820) de Hegel. Il propose de réfléchir aux problèmes que pose le statut, à la fois socio-ontologique, normatif et historique, des institutions. Trois questions en forment la trame :1) Comment penser l'articulation entre reconnaissance interpersonnelle et institutions ?2) Quels sont les critères normatifs définissant ce que sont de « bonnes » institutions ?3) Quel est le diagnostic qu'il serait possible de poser sur l'évolution des sociétés modernes et de leurs principales institutions (la famille, le marché économique, l'ordre juridique, l'Etat) ?<p> <p>Dans une première partie, nous exposons les grandes lignes de la théorie de la reconnaissance de Honneth. Nous y développons successivement sa « morale de la reconnaissance », la conception normative de la justice sociale qui en découle, ainsi que la manière dont Honneth appréhende l'articulation entre reconnaissance et institutions. Nous nous intéressons ensuite, dans une deuxième partie, à l'institutionnalisme éthique de Hegel dans sa Philosophie du droit. Partant d'une lecture non-métaphysique de l'œuvre berlinoise, nous défendons la thèse interprétative d'un « institutionnalisme faible » chez Hegel par opposition à un « institutionnalisme fort ». Cet « institutionnalisme faible » stipule que les principales institutions du monde éthique moderne doivent pouvoir permettre à l'ensemble des agents individuels qui les composent d'atteindre, à travers leur participation à une série de relations intersubjectives fondées sur la réciprocité de leurs droits et de leurs obligations, des formes croissantes d'autonomie rationnelle (autonomie affective dans la famille, autonomie socioprofessionnelle et juridique dans la société civile, autonomie civile et politique au sein de l'Etat constitutionnel). <p><p>Au final, il ressort de la confrontation entre théorie de la reconnaissance et institutionnalisme hégélien dans sa version « faible » que, contrairement au reproche de « surinstitutionnalisation » adressé par Honneth, la philosophie hégélienne du droit se montre toujours d'actualité s'agissant 1) de penser conjointement les deux dimensions éthiques du système objectif des institutions et des relations intersubjectives de reconnaissance, 2) de définir une série de critères normatifs concernant une « bonne » forme de vie dans les institutions, voire même 3), malgré le caractère parfois historiquement daté de son analyse institutionnelle, de poser à terme un diagnostic critique sur l'évolution « pathologique » des sociétés modernes. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Le point de départ des travaux entrepris est la définition lefortienne de la démocratie par opposition au totalitarisme. Le totalitarisme est l’institution d’une société organique, une et homogène, dans laquelle aucune division sociale, aucun désaccord avec l’idéologie véhiculée par le parti ne sont possibles. La spécificité de la démocratie, a contrario, est de s’enrichir de la désintrication du pouvoir, du droit, et du savoir. Les citoyens, dotés de droits fondamentaux, sont juges de la légitimité du pouvoir établi. Leurs désaccords ainsi que l’antagonisme entre les classes sociales nourrissent l’exercice d’un commun litigieux. De là, une question fondamentale : une telle définition de la démocratie est-elle historiquement datée, ou continue-t-elle d’être pertinente aujourd’hui ? Doit-on encore concevoir la démocratie, pour la rendre authentique, par le conflit civil érigé en principe politique, ou faut-il l’envisager de manière consensualiste au lendemain de son opposition avec le totalitarisme ? Claude Lefort s’inspirait de Machiavel pour dépasser les limites du marxisme et repenser la démocratie par la valorisation du conflit civil, indissociable de la figure de l’imaginaire social. La thèse ici soutenue adopte différemment une perspective néo-machiavélienne. Elle revient à proposer un espace public dissensuel à partir du modèle machiavélien de l’entente dans le conflit, par confrontation avec l’espace public habermassien et d’autres conceptions du tort et du conflit dans les démocraties contemporaines. Comment concevoir aujourd’hui les figures du conflit civil et de l’imaginaire social, en s’inspirant paradoxalement de Machiavel pour interroger la démocratie ? / The starting point of the present work is the Lefortian definition of democracy as opposed to totalitarism. Totalitarism is the institution of an organic society, one and homogeneous, where no social division, no disagreement with the party’s ideology are possible. On the contrary democracy’s specificity consists in enriching itself with the disentanglement of power, law and knowledge. Citizens, endowed with fundamental rights can judge of the legitimacy of the power in place. Their disagreements as well as the antagonism between social classes fuel the dispute about common good.Hence a fundamental question: is such a definition of democracy historically dated or is it still relevant today? To make it authentic should democracy be seen through civil conflict made into a political principle or should it be viewed in a consensualist way just after its opposition to totalitarism? Claude Lefort drew from Machiavelli to go beyond the limits of Marxism and rethink democracy by giving more importance to civil conflict as an integral part of the theme of social imaginary. The present dissertation adopts in a different way a neo-Machiavellian perspective. It amounts to proposing a dissensual public space on the Machiavellian model of understanding within conflict by confronting it with the Habermassian public space and with other conceptions of wrong and conflict in contemporary democracies.Today how can the themes of civil conflict and social imaginary be viewed – paradoxically drawing from Machiavelli- to question democracy?