The negotiation process of a peace agreement is an uncertain period where adversaries can have a difficult time credibly guaranteeing their commitment to an approaching agreement. However, violence is often ceased before a peace agreement is signed, demonstrating their importance for understanding non-violent and violent behavior by warring actors. Furthermore, research finds that rebels at times comply with laws of war during conflict and negotiations. Hence, the purpose of this study is to derive a better understanding of rebel groups’ non-violent behavior, and whether it relates to the commitment problem and the negotiation process. This paper argues that by complying with international law, rebels can convey a signal with a peace-making objective, increasing the likelihood of a successful negotiation. Through a qualitative, structured and focused comparative case analysis of the FMLN in El Salvador and the NPFL in Liberia, the study finds that rebel’s compliance with IHL may serve as a costly signal that mitigates the credible commitment problem and leads to the signing of a successful peace agreement. However, further research is needed to support this hypothesis.

Two international treaty frameworks - Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) - have been developed to prohibit or restrict the use of landmines. However, reflecting a gap in current academic research, there is a lack of knowledge of their effectiveness in supporting the humanitarian goals that underpin both treaties. In order to address gaps in the existing literature, this thesis applies an analytical framework grounded in regime theory to develop new insights into the design, implementation and effectiveness of APII and the APMBC within the broader framework of international humanitarian law (IHL). Two main hypotheses are explored. The first considers the importance for regime effectiveness of the relationship between design and implementation processes. The second analyses the significance for the landmine regimes of regime interplay and nesting within wider IHL and mine action discourses. In addressing these hypotheses, design/implementation interplay, agency dynamics and normative considerations represent key themes that enable us to develop new insights to a specific issue area that also demonstrates important linkages to wider humanitarian, security and developmental agendas.

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Two international treaty frameworks ¿ Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) ¿ have been developed to prohibit or restrict the use of landmines. However, reflecting a gap in current academic research, there is a lack of knowledge of their effectiveness in supporting the humanitarian goals that underpin both treaties. In order to address gaps in the existing literature, this thesis applies an analytical framework grounded in regime theory to develop new insights into the design, implementation and effectiveness of APII and the APMBC within the broader framework of international humanitarian law (IHL). Two main hypotheses are explored. The first considers the importance for regime effectiveness of the relationship between design and implementation processes. The second analyses the significance for the landmine regimes of regime interplay and nesting within wider IHL and mine action discourses. In addressing these hypotheses, design/implementation interplay, agency dynamics and normative considerations represent key themes that enable us to develop new insights to a specific issue area that also demonstrates important linkages to wider humanitarian, security and developmental agendas.

The main purpose of this work is to investigate if the US ́s killing of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad in Pakistan was lawful. The background to the killing is what happened on 11 September 2001 when four US airplanes were hijacked and crashed into World Trade Center and Pentagon. Al Qaeda, a terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden, was immediately suspected for the attacks, which led to the starting point of the US ́s ‘global war on terror’. This work tries to give a short brief on ‘global war on terror’ and answer if there is a global war on terror and/or if a new category of war is needed. In order to get an answer to the main question of this work I had to investigate if US is in an international armed conflict or in a non-international armed conflict with Al Qaida. Another important question to investigate is if an armed conflict in one State can spill over to another State and still be consider as an armed conflict. Other important questions to answer are, if Osama bin Laden was a legitimate target under international humanitarian law, if he was a civilian or if he had a continuous combat function and what level of participation in hostilities he had? Not less important is also to investigate if human rights law is applicable when Osama bin Laden was killed, especially the fundamental right to life. Lastly I end my investigation with a quick review of the laws of jus ad bellum in order to get an answer if US had a right to resort to force in Pakistan. My conclusion is that the US was not involved in an armed conflict with al Qaeda in Pakistan where the killing took place. The conflict between the US and al Qaeda in Afghanistan is to be categorised as a non-international conflict. This conflict cannot be described as a conflict that has spilled over to Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was killed. All people, including Osama bin Laden, has a right to life. Because of lack of information on what happened in Abbottabad when Osama bin Laden was killed it is impossible to give a clear legal answer if the US had the right to kill him. It could be lawful, but it could also be considered as a crime against international human rights law.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the fastest developing technologies globally. AI has recently entered warfare and thus taken a place in international law. Today the use of AI in warfare is through machine learning and autonomous weapon systems. Autonomous weapons are expected to play a decisive role in future war- fare and therefore have a major impact on both civilians and combatants. This gives rise to an examination of the role of artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous weapon systems in international law, specifically international humanitarian law (IHL).  The purpose and main research question of the thesis is to examine how the use of AI, machine learning and autonomous weapon systems is regulated within international law. Further the thesis examines if the regulations sufficiently can ensure the protection that is guaranteed within IHL or if additional regulation is needed. The research question is answered by examining the relevant rules in IHL, compliance with the protection stated in the principles of distinction, pro- portionality and precautions in attack and lastly by analyzing the consequences for civilians and combatants.  Conclusions that can be made is that the rules of IHL are both applicable and sufficient to, in theory, regulate autonomous weapon systems. However the weapon itself must be capable to follow IHL and in order to guarantee this ad- ditional regulation is needed on the use of autonomous weapons. The use of autonomous weapon systems does not necessarily violate the principles of dis- tinction, proportionality and precaution in attack. On the contrary, the use of autonomous weapons can possibly ensure that the principles are respected even further. This however depends on the actual capabilities of autonomous weapon systems and whether they can make the complex judgments required for each principle. It is although still of importance to ensure that the element of human control is never completely lost. The issue that keeps returning is the potential loss of human control. At all times human control must be guaranteed to ensure that the final decision always remains with a human. If humanity in warfare is lost the consequences and risks for civilians will increase. Not only is there a possibility of increase in use of violence but also an increase of indiscriminate attacks. The rules of IHL aim to protect civilians as well as combatants, and the use of this new weapon will lead to difficulties to navigate armed situations for combatants. This will increase the suffering of civilians, but also risk overriding the protection of combatants that IHL ensures.