Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T19:58:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Aline Scavazini de Matos Galvao.pdf: 799182 bytes, checksum: b0ae9b94c388ef327ca21328dc62de0f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-26 / The aim of this research is to analyze how the form of the novel works the wandering theme in the novels of José Saramago and Milan Kundera, comparing them to the axis of the characters to answer the following questions: how the exile lived by characters (un)consacrates the image of wanderers? How this can give a new signification to the idea of identity, understood as a product of relation to the country they came from? Some hypothesis raised: the separation of homeland gives to the outcasts a critical and sensitive consciousness about the relationship between people and their land. The novel, as form of the transcendent homelessness, captures the wanderer with a new image and updates his critical view. The essayistic form, in both novels, contributes to the thematic discussion, being a compositional element of the works. As theoretical axis, we stand out the ideas of Lukács, Adorno and Walter Benjamin, as well critical texts of José Saramago and Milan Kundera as fundament to the creation of poetics of the novel. Regarding the wandering theme, we choose the studies of Michel Maffesoli and Édouard Glissant. The comparative method gave us a more in-depth debate about the wandering theme and how the novel forms echoes the contemporary dilemma regarding notions of identity and globalization. / O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar como a forma romanesca opera a temática da errância nas obras de José Saramago e Milan Kundera, comparando-as a partir do eixo das personagens, a fim de responder às seguintes questões: de que modo o desterro, vivenciado pelas personagens, (des)sacraliza a imagem do errante? Como isso pode ressignificar a concepção de identidade, entendida como produto da relação com a terra onde nasceram? Algumas hipóteses foram levantadas: o afastamento da terra natal leva os desterrados a uma consciência crítica e sensível sobre a relação entre o indivíduo e a terra; o romance, como forma do desterro transcendental, apreende o errante em nova imagem e atualiza sua identidade crítica; a questão ensaística, em ambos os romances, contribui para a discussão da temática, ao se apresentar como elemento de composição nas obras. Como eixo teórico sobre o gênero romanesco, destacamos as propostas de Lukács, Adorno e Walter Benjamin, além de utilizarmos textos críticos de José Saramago e Milan Kundera como base para a elaboração de uma poética do romance. Sobre a temática da errância, destacamos os estudos de Michel Maffesoli e Édouard Glissant. A escolha do método comparativo resultou em um aprofundamento da reflexão sobre a temática da errância e sobre a maneira como a forma romanesca reflete os dilemas da contemporaneidade em relação aos conceitos de identidade nacional e globalização

O aprendizado muitas vezes se encontra vinculado à idéia de que é necessário superar o estado de desconhecimento, de não-saber, para alcançar o saber enquanto instância almejada. No presente trabalho, estudamos o conceito de douta ignorância desenvolvido por Nicolau de Cusa por acreditar que ele encerra uma dimensão essencialmente pedagógica que se revela na importância que esse filósofo do século XV dá ao não-saber. Para ele, a busca pelo conhecimento está inteiramente alicerçada na ciência que o homem alcança de sua própria ignorância. É o saber de seu não-saber que permite que o ser humano construa, de forma progressiva, o conhecimento. A concepção de conhecimento à qual subjaz uma imagem dinâmica de ser humano como a que encontramos em Nicolau de Cusa retorna em pensadores contemporâneos. Bachelard, por exemplo, no século XX, reafirma a positividade dos erros, defendendo a sua importância na construção do saber científico e no processo de aprendizagem. Aquilo que, no discurso comum, era apontado apenas como intercorrência a ser evitada, passa a ser revalorizado, resgatando uma tradição que acreditamos ter em Nicolau de Cusa um expoente fundacional. Nosso trabalho busca apresentar uma abordagem positiva desses dois elementos constitutivos do aprender o não-saber e o erro , considerados parte de um processo que entra em movimento quando o professor permite que o aluno exercite o ato de formular perguntas: na formulação de uma pergunta está contido o potencial de ir além de um saber já adquirido, de superar dificuldades ou erros. A pergunta abre a perspectiva do conhecimento e aponta para o que ainda está por ser alcançado. Ela é, assim, um veículo para a continuidade do aprendizado. / Learning finds itself many times tied to the idea that it is necessary to surmount the state of ignorance, of unknowing, in order to achieve knowledge as a yearned instance. In the present work, we studied the concept of learned ignorance developed by Nicholas of Cusa due to our belief that it contains an essential pedagogic dimension which reveals itself in the importance this philosopher from the XV century confers to the unknown. According to him, the search for knowledge is entirely based on the science man acquires of his own ignorance. It is the knowledge of what is unknown that allows the human being to build knowledge progressively. The conception of knowledge to which underlies a dynamic image of the human being reassembles in contemporary thinkers. In the XX century, Bachelard, for instance, reaffirms the mistake positivity, defending its importance to the construction of scientific knowledge in the process of learning. What, in the common discourse, was cited merely as intercurrence starts to be revalued, recovering a tradition we believe has in Nicholas of Cusa a founding exponent. Our work aims to present a positive approach of these two learning constitutive elements the unknown and the mistake considered, in this tradition, part of a process that begins its movement when the teacher allows the student to practice the act of formulating questions: within the formulation of a question is contained the potential to go beyond an acquired knowledge, to surmount difficulties or mistakes. The question widens the perspective of knowledge and indicates what is yet to be achieved. It is, therefore, a means for the resumption of learning.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabiano de Oliveira Mina.pdf: 1438012 bytes, checksum: 353d26d5873fa7aec6980e2cd3956e33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This study, work under the Nicholas of Cusa s De Docta Ignorantia, aims to present an epistemology apophatic (denial knowledge) aiming at "function of denial", contributing to discussions relevant to the Theory of Knowledge, justified by the material produced little bias in this epistemological author and this work is compared to others in Brazil. Therefore, contributing to the appreciation of the Department of Religious Sciences. Fundamentally it is a theoretical analysis of the first two books in this same work, analyzing the limits of reason (ratio) before the intuition (intellectus), under the concepts Absolute Maximum, Privative Universe and Concrete Maximum, the relationship between Creator (One) and creature. The creation (explicatio) contained in God (complicatio) inevitably requires an "apophatic dialectic" that assumes the paradoxalidades in and of the world. Therefore, a Apophatic Philosophy". This requires that we become "ignorant scholars" / Esta dissertação, sob a obra De Docta Ignorantia de Nicolau de Cusa, tem como objetivo apresentar uma epistemologia apofática (conhecimento via negação) com vistas na função da negação , contribuindo para discussões pertinentes à Teoria do Conhecimento, justificado pelo pouco material produzido nesse viés epistemológico desse autor e obra se comparado a outros no Brasil. Portanto, contribuindo também para apreciação do Departamento de Ciências da Religião. Fundamentalmente é uma análise teórica dos dois primeiros livros dessa mesma obra, analisando os limites da razão (ratio) diante da intuição (intellectus), sob os conceitos Máximo Absoluto, Universo Privativo e Máximo Concreto, na relação entre Criador (Uno) e criatura. A criação (explicatio), contida em Deus (complicatio), inevitavelmente exige uma dialética apofática que assume as paradoxalidades no e do mundo. Portanto, uma Filosofia Apofática . Para isso é necessário que nos tornemos doutos ignorantes

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nayara Graciela Sales Brito.pdf: 1228124 bytes, checksum: 994fcb02f2abcb654e77ed919e77f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-06 / The scope of this study is to examine the ignorance of the law issue beginning with a historical study of criminal liability and mistake, moving on to the birth of culpability theories and the approaches to the knowledge of unlawfulness. This study addresses the development of culpability and mistake of law in Brazil, mainly through the study of Brazilian criminal statutes and bills. To this end, this study shows the development of the theory around the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness, and the prevailing opinions of Brazilian jurists in the sense of considering it to be in opposition to the established order of the community. This study is justified by the complexity and importance of the topic, both to crime theory and legal pragmatics, especially when one considers the numerous statutes enacted in Brazil, many of which date from the post-industrial period, as a means of keeping up with the risks posed by a global and technological society. The theoretical framework follows the historical and chronological line, and is not intended to exhaust the approaches to the subject nor is it aimed at offering solutions to all the lines of thought herein mentioned. This study covers different conceptions of culpability: psychological, normative, finalist, and the functional views of Claus Roxin and Günther Jakobs. Next, formal, material and intermediary theories of the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness is addressed in order to attain a critical view of inexcusable nature of the ignorance of the law defense in the face of the dignity of the human person / Esta dissertação tem como escopo a análise da especial questão do desconhecimento da lei penal, partindo-se do estudo histórico da responsabilidade criminal e do erro até o advento das teorias da culpabilidade e os respectivos tratamentos sobre a consciência da ilicitude. Examina-se a evolução da culpabilidade e do erro de proibição no Brasil, sobretudo por meio do estudo dos diversos diplomas penais, como também de alguns projetos de lei. Expõem-se o desenvolvimento teórico sobre o objeto da consciência da ilicitude e a posição majoritária da doutrina brasileira no sentido de considerá-lo como sendo a contrariedade à ordem comunitária. Justifica-se o trabalho pela complexidade e relevância do tema, tanto para a teoria do delito, quanto para a pragmática jurídica, mormente em se considerando a edição de inúmeras leis que ingressam no ordenamento jurídico pátrio, muitas delas advindas do período pós- industrial, como meio de se acompanhar os riscos da sociedade globalizada e tecnológica. O percurso teórico filia-se à linha histórico-cronológica, sem a pretensão de esgotar as abordagens relativas ao assunto, nem oferecer soluções para todas as correntes de pensamento expostas. Apresentam-se as concepções sobre a culpabilidade: psicológicas, normativas, finalistas e as visões funcionalistas de Claus Roxin e de Günther Jakobs. Em seguida, o estudo perpassa pelas teorias formal, material e intermediária do objeto da consciência da ilicitude, para se alcançar um posicionamento crítico da inescusabilidade da ignorância da lei penal em face do princípio da culpabilidade e da dignidade da pessoa humana

O aprendizado muitas vezes se encontra vinculado à idéia de que é necessário superar o estado de desconhecimento, de não-saber, para alcançar o saber enquanto instância almejada. No presente trabalho, estudamos o conceito de douta ignorância desenvolvido por Nicolau de Cusa por acreditar que ele encerra uma dimensão essencialmente pedagógica que se revela na importância que esse filósofo do século XV dá ao não-saber. Para ele, a busca pelo conhecimento está inteiramente alicerçada na ciência que o homem alcança de sua própria ignorância. É o saber de seu não-saber que permite que o ser humano construa, de forma progressiva, o conhecimento. A concepção de conhecimento à qual subjaz uma imagem dinâmica de ser humano como a que encontramos em Nicolau de Cusa retorna em pensadores contemporâneos. Bachelard, por exemplo, no século XX, reafirma a positividade dos erros, defendendo a sua importância na construção do saber científico e no processo de aprendizagem. Aquilo que, no discurso comum, era apontado apenas como intercorrência a ser evitada, passa a ser revalorizado, resgatando uma tradição que acreditamos ter em Nicolau de Cusa um expoente fundacional. Nosso trabalho busca apresentar uma abordagem positiva desses dois elementos constitutivos do aprender o não-saber e o erro , considerados parte de um processo que entra em movimento quando o professor permite que o aluno exercite o ato de formular perguntas: na formulação de uma pergunta está contido o potencial de ir além de um saber já adquirido, de superar dificuldades ou erros. A pergunta abre a perspectiva do conhecimento e aponta para o que ainda está por ser alcançado. Ela é, assim, um veículo para a continuidade do aprendizado. / Learning finds itself many times tied to the idea that it is necessary to surmount the state of ignorance, of unknowing, in order to achieve knowledge as a yearned instance. In the present work, we studied the concept of learned ignorance developed by Nicholas of Cusa due to our belief that it contains an essential pedagogic dimension which reveals itself in the importance this philosopher from the XV century confers to the unknown. According to him, the search for knowledge is entirely based on the science man acquires of his own ignorance. It is the knowledge of what is unknown that allows the human being to build knowledge progressively. The conception of knowledge to which underlies a dynamic image of the human being reassembles in contemporary thinkers. In the XX century, Bachelard, for instance, reaffirms the mistake positivity, defending its importance to the construction of scientific knowledge in the process of learning. What, in the common discourse, was cited merely as intercurrence starts to be revalued, recovering a tradition we believe has in Nicholas of Cusa a founding exponent. Our work aims to present a positive approach of these two learning constitutive elements the unknown and the mistake considered, in this tradition, part of a process that begins its movement when the teacher allows the student to practice the act of formulating questions: within the formulation of a question is contained the potential to go beyond an acquired knowledge, to surmount difficulties or mistakes. The question widens the perspective of knowledge and indicates what is yet to be achieved. It is, therefore, a means for the resumption of learning.

Platon problématise un moment philosophique charnière : le coup de force donné par Socrate à la conception de l’expertise. La problématique s’inscrit, d’un point de vue externe, dans un contexte de crise des valeurs de la démocratie athénienne à la fin du Ve siècle, et d’un point de vue interne, dans l’exploitation platonicienne de l’expertise technicienne en vue d’établir une véritable epistèmè, une science-vertu. La souplesse originale de langage à laquelle Platon soumet le champ des trois termes relatifs au savoir, epistèmè, technè et sophia, participe à la problématisation de l’expertise comme mise en condition de ce qui force à penser. Une conception nouvelle de l’expertise émerge de la mise en scène, dans les dialogues de jeunesse, d’une pratique de questionnement et d’examen à laquelle tantôt Socrate se soumet lui-même, tantôt il soumet ses interlocuteurs. Cet angle d’approche tant de l’Apologie que des autres dialogues de jeunesse met en évidence des pratiques d’expertise impliquant un rapport autre à la connaissance qui est révolutionnaire : un examen critique, interrogatif et inventif, empreint de conscience de son ignorance et de souci de soi. La conception de l’expertise réévaluée est exploitée, à trois niveaux de la problématique de la justice traitée dans la République : elle intervient comme levier interrogateur des conceptions traditionnelles et sophistiques de la justice, elle participe à la compréhension de la définition de la justice et elle préside au projet de cité idéale.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

In recent years, there has been a significant amount of new attention to white dominance and privilege (or whiteness) as the often unmarked inverse of racial oppression. This interest has spawned the academic domain called Critical Whiteness Studies (CWS). While the critical investigation of whiteness is not new, and has been pioneered by Black scholars beginning at least since the early 1900s in the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, what is notable about this new interest in whiteness is its advancement almost exclusively by white scholars. The paucity of literature centering the Black voice in the study of whiteness both suggests the lack of appreciation for the importance of this perspective when researching the phenomenon of racial dominance, and raises questions about the manner in which racial equity work is approached by some Whites who do work that is intended to advance racial equity. This study investigates the context of racial equity collaborations between Blacks and Whites, responding to this knowledge deficit in two ways: a) it centers the Black voice, specifically and intentionally seeking the perspectives of Blacks about racial equity collaborations b) it investigates the nature and effects of the relationships between Blacks and Whites in these collaborative endeavours. This qualitative research study uses in-depth interview data collected from ten Black racial equity workers who collaborate with Whites in doing racial equity work. The data makes evident that the Black participants find these collaborations to be necessary and strategic while at the same time having the potential to undermine their own agency. The study examines this contradiction, discussing several manifestations of it in the lives of these Black racial equity workers. It outlines the importance of Black embodied knowledge to racial equity work and to these collaborations, and outlines an epistemology of unknowing and a politics of humility that these Blacks seek in their white colleagues. The study also outlines the collective and individual strategies used by these Black racial equity workers to navigate and resist the contradictory terrain of their collaborations with Whites in racial equity work.

Les logiques multivalentes sont définies comme une famille de logiques non classiques dont la caractéristique commune est de ne pas restreindre les valeurs de vérité aux seuls « vrai » et « faux ». À cet égard, Kleene (1938) a offert une logique se fondant sur l’intuition que tout énoncé est soit vrai, soit faux ; mais qu’il existe néanmoins des énoncés dont la valeur de vérité n’est pas connue. La formalisation d’une telle intuition amena Kleene à introduire une troisième attribution de valeur de vérité pour les énoncés : « inconnu ». Pour autant, une telle formalisation reste ambiguë : elle échoue à résoudre la dichotomie entre le fait que tout énoncé est soit vrai, soit faux et le fait qu’il existe des énoncés dont l’attribution de valeur de vérité n’est ni « vrai », ni « faux ». L’enjeu de la présente thèse sera l’introduction d’une nouvelle logique multivalente intitulée logique de l’agent rationnel se fondant sur les idées de Kleene tout en en éliminant l’ambiguïté décrite plus haut.La logique de l’agent rationnel permet de modéliser le raisonnement d’un agent en considérant la connaissance (ou l’ignorance) qu’il peut avoir de la valeur de vérité classique des énoncés. D’un point de vue technique, nous introduisons plusieurs définitions de la notion de conséquence logique dans ce cadre, et construisons sur cette base, des sémantiques complètes de notre logique. Nous montrons ensuite l’intérêt d’une telle formalisation en l’appliquant à l’étude d’un problème épistémologique connu sous le nom de « paradoxe de la connaissabilité ». D’un point de vue épistémologique, l’introduction de la logique de l’agent rationnel permet d’analyser la notion d’ignorance comme indépendante de celle de connaissance. Une telle formalisation ouvre ainsi la voie à une position inédite, selon laquelle la notion d’ignorance est primitive et non analysable. / Many-valued logics is a family of non-classical logics, which is characterized by the fundamental fact that they do not restrict the truth values to only truth and falsity. According to this line of inquiry, Kleene (1938) constructed a logic that is based on the idea that every proposition is either true, or false, but there exist propositions for which the truth value is unknown. The formalisation of this idea leads to the introduction of a third assignment of truth value to propositions, interpreted as “unknown”. However, this formalisation contains an ambiguity, because it does not permit the resolution of a contradiction between the fact that every proposition is either true or false, and the fact that there exist propositions for which the assignment of truth value is neither “true” nor “false”. The initial aim of the present thesis is to explore Kleene’s idea in order to introduce and analyse a new many-valued logic, to be called the logic of a rational agent, that is founded on Kleene’s ideas, but that eliminates the above-mentioned ambiguity.The logic of a rational agent models the reasoning of an agent, taking into account the knowledge (or ignorance) of the classical truth value of a proposition that the agent can have. On the technical level, we introduce diverse definitions of entailment relations and construct consistent and complete semantics on this base. We then show the interest inherent in such a formalisation, by proposing an application of this logic to a famous epistemological problem, known as the “knowability paradox”. On the epistemological level, the logic of a rational agent permits us to offer an analysis of the notion of ignorance, as understood independently from the notion of knowledge. Such a formalization.