No / Bakhtin's dialogism is widely used to understand the mutual constitution of self and other in action. In this article, however, I argue that there is a second hinge to Bakhtin's work that is currently underemphasized in the literature. This is his emphasis on the sense of action that accompanies dialogue. Bakhtin refers to action as sensed as 'spirit'. In contrast, he refers to action relating to the other as 'soul'. In this article, I outline these distinctions in Bakhtin's thought before arguing that there is sometimes an intriguing and imaginative struggle between spirit and soul in dialogue. In this struggle, the distinctions between fantasy and reality can become blurred as the self risks potentially life-changing encounters with genuine others. The implications that this has for research practice in socio-cultural psychology are drawn out. In particular, I argue that the 'spirit-soul' distinction introduces a humanistic and optimistic view of the self-other relationship into cultural psychology.

Theories of reflexivity have primarily been concerned with the way agents monitor their own actions using knowledge (Giddens) or deliberate on the social context to make choices through the internal conversation (Archer), yet none have placed emotion at the centre of reflexivity. While emotion is considered in theories of reflexivity it is generally held at bay, being seen as a possible barrier to clear reflexive thought. Here, I challenge this position and, drawing on the work of C.H. Cooley, argue that feeling and emotion are central to reflexive processes, colouring the perception of self, others and social world, thus influencing our responses in social interaction as well as the way we reflexively monitor action and deliberate on the choices we face. Emotional reflexivity is therefore not simply about the way emotions are reflexively monitored or ordered, but about how emotion informs reflexivity itself.

This thesis is out from the relationship between imagination and memory. Imagination is always from memory. After expressing my imagination through pencil, things that are invinted are actually familier to the past. Based on what I have done about my thesis, the invention of using mirror image as a dimension system come up. / Master of Architecture

The practice of architecture exists because man has sought shelter from the forces of the world he finds himself. It is wonder of this same world that has caused him to shape his rooms from age to age. In every instance, he recreates the world within the world with the materials of that world. It is the marks, the cuts, the juxtaposition, and the joining of these materials in which ornament dwells. It is present wherever man has shaped material for construction. It is a whisper when homogenized, and it is a trumpet blast when varied. This thesis will delve into the making of ornament, and my love for it. My first cognizant encounter with architecture, was my fascination with the sculpted stones of the gothic cathedrals. It was the ornament that caused me to be fascinated and to remember. So for this thesis, I sought to imagine walls worth remembering. I wanted to touch every material with my mind's eye so that it might be a gift for others. I wanted to ornate. It seemed best for the design to be sacred and to be in an urban setting. I also thought that the presence of time and aging might help the thesis. I came to choose the program of a catholic cemetery in Philadelphia. I hoped to explore what meaningful marks and arrangements of materials I could impart to this ephemeral world. / Master of Architecture

In this project, I advocate for what I call “embodied imagination” and an entangled multiplicity in lieu of binary oppositions through embodiment. This is not merely about the body; embodiment includes the mind, spirit, and other factors such as intersubjectivity, spatiotemporality, difference, and repetition—all in co-dependent and co-emergent relation. The history of Cartesian dualism and Western metaphysics looms large, and my argument stems from an alternative reading of what is possible for human life through acknowledgment of the multifaceted role of embodiment. To make sense of claims that can seem rather abstract, I ground my arguments and sources in examples and connections within the martial art of karate. More specifically, I most often reference kata, which are series of techniques taught in sequences from teacher to student and performed against imaginary opponents. The practice and performance of embodiment manifest through movement practices like martial arts; practitioners imagine virtual possibilities and execute actual decisions in creative modes. In creating and performing a kata that aligns with the themes of each chapter, I highlight this process of experimentation and exploration as a way to interrogate binary sets such as the mind/body and the real/virtual. In so doing, this project raises prescient questions about human being—what it means to be human, and, through embodied imagination, what we have the potential to become.

This architectural thesis reimagines the design of prisons, proposing a new typology that helps with a more beneficial transition for prisoners back into society. By drawing insights from documentaries, movies, interviews, and existing prison models, the thesis envisions a utopian prison environment centered on rehabilitation and social reintegration. This approach challenges the conventional punitive model and aims to address the pressing issues of high recidivism rates and the marginalization of ex-offenders. The proposed prison design integrates structured psychological treatments, meaningful social interactions, and opportunities for skill development and personal growth. These elements create a dual reality for prisoners, juxtaposing the harsh physical conditions of confinement with a supportive psychological environment that encourages inner resilience and hope. This thesis explores the architectural symbolism embedded in both dystopian and utopian prison designs, reflecting societal values of control, oppression, freedom, and rehabilitation. By emphasizing the power of hope and imagination, this thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between physical confinement, mental resilience, and societal ideologies. It aims to shed light on the human capacity to maintain agency, identity, and purpose even in oppressive environments, contributing to broader discussions on justice, rehabilitation, and societal change. / Master of Architecture / This architectural thesis challenges traditional perceptions of prisons by proposing a new typology focused on facilitating prisoners' successful reintegration into society. Inspired by diverse sources, including documentaries, films, and interviews. This thesis envisions a utopian prison model that prioritizes rehabilitation over punishment. This innovative design aims to reduce recidivism and address systemic issues within the current penal system. The proposed approach combines structured psychological treatments, meaningful social interactions, and skill development opportunities to create an environment where inmates can thrive both mentally and physically. By analyzing architectural elements and their symbolic significance, this thesis highlights the contrast between conventional punitive prison designs and a new rehabilitative model. Through this reimagined prison design, this thesis explores the themes of mental resilience, hope and imagination, and architectural symbolism. It underscores the potential for prisoners to maintain a sense of identity and purpose despite physical confinement, offering a transformative vision for the future of incarceration and societal reintegration

In this paper I present, and offer a solution to, a heretofore unacknowledged textual puzzle that arises from Margaret Cavendish's use of inconceivability to make claims about what is metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, Cavendish asserts that objects or events she cannot conceive of are impossible in nature (i.e., inconceivability entails impossibility in nature). On the other hand, she writes that there are some things that exist or occur in nature that are inconceivable to humans (i.e., inconceivability does not entail impossibility in nature). Put simply, Cavendish seemingly contradicts herself. This textual puzzle not only threatens to undermine Cavendish's philosophical method; it also calls her opposition to human exceptionalism into question. By asserting that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, Cavendish implies by contraposition that she can conceive of everything that is metaphysically possible. In so doing, she seems to make an exception at least for herself: though she believes that other parts of nature cannot conceive of everything in nature, she implies that she can. Ultimately, I argue that Cavendish thinks we can sometimes tell why something is inconceivable. In some cases, something is inconceivable because it lies beyond the limits of humans' mental capacities. In other cases, something is inconceivable because it is contradictory. This interpretation solves the textual puzzle, as it is consistent for Cavendish to maintain that some objects and events in nature are beyond our mental limits and that we can derive the impossibility of some object or event in nature from its contradictoriness. My interpretation preserves Cavendish's opposition to human exceptionalism, moreover, as no part of nature can conceive of contradictions. That is, Cavendish's claim is not merely that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, but rather that what is inconceivable to her and to every other part of nature is impossible in nature. / Master of Arts / Margaret Cavendish, a seventeenth century philosopher, makes two seemingly contradictory claims throughout her philosophical works. On the one hand, she implies that if something is inconceivable to her — that is, if she cannot form a mental picture of it — that thing is impossible in nature. On the other hand, she writes that there are plenty of things that exist or occur in nature which are inconceivable to humans. A textual puzzle therefore arises: Cavendish seems to simultaneously maintain (1) that something is impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it, and (2) that something is not necessarily impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it. In this paper, I propose that Cavendish believes humans can at least sometimes determine why something is inconceivable. That is, we can at least sometimes diagnose our inability to form a mental picture of something. In some cases, Cavendish thinks, we cannot form a mental picture of something because of our limited, human mental capacities. (We might think, for example, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of all the colors butterflies see.) In other cases, we cannot form a mental picture of something because that thing is contradictory. (We might think, for instance, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of an apple that is both red all over and not red all over.) I further argue that Cavendish only asserts that something is impossible in nature if it is inconceivable because it is contradictory. On my account, the textual puzzle I presented above is in fact not so puzzling. Cavendish thinks that if something is inconceivable because it is contradictory, then it is impossible in nature. She also thinks that there are plenty of things in nature that we cannot conceive of because of our limited human mental capacities. Thankfully, these two claims are not in tension.

La nature de l'imagination, son rôle dans la connaissance et particulièrement ses rapports avec l'intelligence sont des questions qui ont suscité l'intérêt des philosophes au cours des âges. Les réponses apportées, surtout dans les temps modernes, sont les plus diverses et les plus opposées, car pour certains l'imagination est la source principale des erreurs, pour d'autres elle se confond plus ou moins avec l'intelligence et pour d'autres encore elle constitue la puissance cognitive suprême de l'homme. Dans cette thèse, nous nous proposons d'examiner la position d'Aristote et de son école (particulièrement St. Thomas d'Aquin) sur le rôle que joue l'imagination dans la démarche de l'intelligence, plus particulièrement lorsque celle-ci s'applique à l'acquisition des sciences spéculatives. Dans un premier temps nous examinons brièvement la nature des deux puissances en question. Ainsi, notre première partie est consacrée à une considération générale de l'imagination et la seconde a un examen de l'intelligence. Dans un deuxième temps nous passons à la comparaison entre les deux, dans le contexte des rapports généraux entre les sens et l'intelligence. Trois conclusions se dégagent de cet examen: premièrement, l'image agit comme cause efficiente dans l'acquisition de la connaissance intellectuelle; deuxièmement, une fois cette connaissance acquise, l'image reste un instrument nécessaire à la considération de cette connaissance; finalement, comme corollaire, nous concluons à l'impossibilité de penser sans images. A la suite de ces considérations générales, un certain nombre d'autres questions sont abordées également dans cette troisième partie: l'imagination et l'acte de jugement propre à chaque science spéculative; le rôle du langage dans la connaissance et ses rapports avec l'imagination; le rôle de l'imagination dans la découverte; et, finalement, la possibilité des habitudes dans l'imagination. A la suite de toutes ces considérations, nous concluons que l'imagination n'est ni la puissance suprême de l'homme, ni l'ennemi de la vérité, mais un instrument indispensable de la pensée.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2009-2010 / Dans ce mémoire, nous tentons de découvrir la place fondamentale de l'imagination dans la vie de tout humain. À cette fin, il nous apparaît nécessaire en premier d'identifier les effets de cette faculté: 1. son rôle dans le processus de la connaissance, 2. de quelle façon elle aide l'humain à vivre mieux. Ensuite de cerner sa nature. Nous verrons que l'imagination, bien que souvent accusée d'être ± trompeuse ¿, s'avère d'une puissance infinie. La substance propre de l'imagination ne saurait être connue sans une analyse serrée : d'abord, de ce qui la distingue de la mémoire et de l'intelligence ; puis du lien qu'elle entretient avec la sensation - de laquelle elle semble dépendre - ; enfin de la nature de l'image, elle-même. Voir ce qui appartient de droit à chacune des parties de cette articulation, nous permettra de nous rendre compte de l'importance primordiale de cette faculté à tort mal connue. La quête de sens de toute vie humaine en dépend. Nous sommes, aujourd'hui, plus que jamais à la merci de ceux qui envahissent nos vies par des images médiatiques ; et de la technique qui les produit. Or les enjeux humains de la vie et de la mort ne sont pas des images. L'omniprésence des images virtuelles sur les nombreux écrans qui nous entourent nous assure-t-elle une vie meilleure ou ne faut-il pas plutôt nous en méfier ? Peut-on, actuellement, mesurer les conséquences d'une méconnaissance de l'importance de l'imagination ? Peut-on se payer le luxe d'une telle ignorance alors que les jeunes d'aujourd'hui meurent à cause d'un sens qu'ils ne savent imaginer ? Telles sont, parmi d'autres, les questions qui animent notre recherche.

Il s'agit dans cette thèse d'explorer la question du dualisme substantiel et sa relation avec l'union chez Descartes en choisissant comme angle d'attaque le rapport entre imagination et idée. Si, comme l'ont soutenu de nombreux commentateurs, l'imagination a été écartée par Descartes dès 1630 et surtout à partir de 1637 parce qu'il lui importait de démontrer la distinction réelle de l'âme et du corps et de fonder cette démonstration sur l'existence de Dieu, alors la théorie des idées qu'il développe dans ce contexte, devrait être déterminée indépendamment de la notion d'imagination. Nous montrons que les notions d'imagination et d'image servent à constituer sa théorie des idées, ce qui indique que cette faculté occupe toujours pour lui une place importante dans sa théorie de la connaissance et qu'elle n'est en aucun cas exclue de sa métaphysique. Comment concilier cette position épistémologique avec la thèse de la distinction réelle? Nous avons reconsidéré le statut ontologique de l'imagination, conçue comme un mode de la substance pensante mais exclue de l'essence de celle-ci. Cette distinction modale est cruciale pour ne pas interpréter la distinction réelle esprit/corps comme un dualisme dur. Car si une propriété est un mode, elle ne peut être exclue de l'essence de la substance dont elle est le mode. Nous concluons que l'imagination est en réalité exclue de l'essence de l'âme purement intellectuelle mais non de l'essence de l'âme humaine et qu'il n'y a de distinction réelle qu'entre l'âme pure et le corps. / This doctoral dissertation concerns the substantial Cartesian dualism and its relation with union in the light of the link between imagination and ideas. If imagination was removed since 1630 and 1637, as a lot of commentators argued, because Descartes wanted to demonstrate the real distinction between body and soul, and found his demonstration on the existence of God, then his theory of ideas should be constituted independently of the notion of imagination. We argue that the notions of imagination and image help to establish this theory: this shows that imagination is still important in Descartes' theory of knowledge and that it is not excluded from his Metaphysics. How to conciliate this epistemological position with real distinction thesis? We reconsidered the ontological status of imagination as a mode of a thinking substance but excluded from the essence of this substance. This modal distinction is crucial in order not to misinterpret the real distinction between soul and body, seen not only as a hard dualism. Yet, if a property is a mode, it cannot be excluded from the essence of the substance of which it is the mode. We conclude that imagination is removed from the essence of a purely intellectual soul but not from human soul and that there is only a real distinction between pure soul and body. Imagination reinforces the intelligibility of dualism since it serves to understand why the real distinction between soul and body is compatible with their substantial union.