The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between individuals and society in the context of healthcare and medical research, more specifically concerning the rights and duties of individuals in regard to biobank-based research. My starting point is that we all have a strong vested interest in improved healthcare, and therefore the possibilities to conduct important research should be optimized. In the first article, I investigate whether individual results from research using samples in large-scale biobanks should be returned. I conclude that there is good reason not to implement such policies, and instead to allocate available resources to pursuing medical advances. In the second article, I compare consent for using stored samples in research with consent for organ donation, whereby many countries have adopted opt-out strategies in order to increase the number of organs available. I claim that the default position should be changed in biobank research as well, i.e. it should be presumed that individuals want to contribute rather than that they do not. In the third article, I argue that safeguarding autonomy by requiring informed consent for using samples in research not only defeats the interests of society but also runs counter to the interests of the individuals the policy purports to protect. Finally, in the fourth article I suggest that it is reasonable to view participation in medical research from the perspective of a social contract, built on our mutual need for medical advances, and that this implies that there is a moral duty to adhere to the contract by allowing one’s samples to be used in research. A central conclusion in this thesis is that biobank research should be viewed as a natural part of healthcare, like quality control, method development and teaching, and that as such, it ought to be endorsed and facilitated.

Thesis advisor: Peter Skerry / The United States military imposes restrictions on individual rights virtually nonexistent in the rest of American society. The theoretical perspectives of Huntington and Janowitz provide fruitful ground for understanding the basis of authority for the military to enforce these controls. Each perspective examines the relationship between civilian control over the military and the impact on military effectiveness. These opposing viewpoints offer an analytical framework to evaluate restrictions on service members’ freedom of speech and freedom of religion. This analysis will demonstrate the tendency for the military to adhere to more of the Janowitzian principles since the end of the Cold War by integrating features of civil society. This transition away from the Huntington-dominated military institution is due to an increasingly complex and dangerous international environment and the end of conscription. However, the military is still a distinct society from the larger community. Therefore, the military should adopt more inclusive measures but only to the extent that they do not negatively impact military effectiveness. Finally, when service members undergo an indoctrination period, known as initial entry training, their understanding of rights begins to transition from the American civilian conception to the military conception. As a result, service members tend to be more accepting of rights restrictions because of a belief in the common good and the sense of a higher purpose. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

O presente trabalho apresenta uma nova perspectiva para as discussões jurídicas e bioéticas acerca dos direitos da personalidade dos pacientes terminais e encontra em nosso ordenamento jurídico, na afirmação de um direito geral da personalidade, a plenitude da tutela civil dos bens jurídicos personalíssimos do enfermo, sobretudo nas etapas finais da doença, ocasião em que a hipermedicalização do processo de morrer destaca-se como o principal fator gerador de lesões de diversas naturezas a esses bens. No caminho para chegarmos à proteção geral da personalidade, examinamos alguns direitos especiais que emergem ao final da existência humana, como o direito à morte em momento natural. No intuito de recuperar a centralidade da pessoa humana como fim único a que devem servir o Direito e a Medicina, construímos a trajetória do conceito de pessoa em seu desenvolvimento jusfilosófico para afirmar que todo ser humano é pessoa e sujeito de direito (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), ainda que não possua capacidade jurídica de fato, e, com isso, demonstrar a impossibilidade de pertença a uma classe de não pessoas independentemente de circunstâncias ou do desenvolvimento biopsíquico humano. Asseveramos, também, que o cuidar e o tratar em pacientes gravemente enfermos e terminais deve relacionar-se, antes, ao homem em sua dignidade e plenitude, em uma concepção biomédica, filosófica e metafísica conjugada da sua existência, e não se reduzir à simples obstinação prognóstica e terapêutica, visão reducionista que relaciona tratar a doença a um investimento no prolongamento estéril da vida humana. Nesse sentido, apresentamos perspectiva jurídica inovadora para a enfermidade e para a vivência dessa condição, do ponto de vista de pacientes terminais, cuidadores e equipes de saúde, à luz do pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas e à centralidade que ele outorga à figura do Outro, que ilumina nossa hermenêutica do instituto dos direitos da personalidade. Concluímos que se faz necessária uma mudança do paradigma atual de cuidados de saúde em fim de vida também na esfera jurídica, com a aceitação, na escolha terapêutica, da naturalidade do evento morte ao final da existência: da busca da cura, para o cuidar; da quantidade para a qualidade da vida que resta. / The thesis presents a new perspective of the legal and bioethical discussions regarding individual rights of terminal ill patients and finds in our legal system, in the assertion of a general individual right, the plenitude of the protection of the legal rights of the ill, especially at the last stages of the disease, when hipermedicalization of the dying process asserts itself as the major source of the various damages caused to individual rights. On the pathway to achieve the general protection of the personhood, we highlight some special rights which emerge at the end of human existence, as, for instance, the right for a death at a natural moment. To recover the centrality of the human person as the single and only end to which Law and Medicine should serve, we present herein a path of the concept of personhood in its juridical and philosophical development to affirm that every human being is an individual (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), even if he/she doesnt have legal capacity and, therewith, demonstrate the impossibility of belonging to a class of non-persons independently of circumstances or the bio-psychic development. We also argue that treating and caring of seriously ill and terminal patients should be related with person in its dignity and fullness, in a biomedical, philosophical and metaphysical conception of existence, irreducible to mere obstinacy in prognosis and treatment, as a result of a reductionist perspective which relates treating a disease to a futile investment of a sterile extension of human life. In this sense, we present a innovative juridical perspective to illness and the experience of this condition, from the point of view of terminal ill patients, caregivers and health care teams in light of the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas and the centrality that he grants to the figure of the Other, which illuminates our interpretation of individual rights. We conclude that a change in the extant paradigm of the end-of-life care in Brazil is imperative also in the legal realm, with the acceptance, in the therapeutic choice, of the natural path of death at the end of our existence: from the search for cure, to care; from quantity to quality of the remaining life.

Despite already having the most expensive healthcare system in the world, the U.S. is facing rapidly rising costs, a growing population not covered by health insurance, and outcomes that are no better, and frequently worse, than those seen in the majority of developed nations with universal healthcare. Popular justifications of keeping the state out of healthcare appeal to protecting individual liberty; those who assert that there is a universal right to healthcare usually fail to address this claim. This paper describes the kinds of obligations in healthcare that are consistent with, if not demanded by, theories of justice that emphasize liberty. I give three different perspectives on liberty, and compare their relationship with healthcare obligations. First, I examine a plausible account of liberty, based on the condition of equal freedom, given by Immanuel Kant and Arthur Ripstein, and show how this account necessitates a system of universal public healthcare. Second, I grant the specifically libertarian approach to liberty through inviolable self-ownership, which seeks to limit the abilities of the state – using a reasonable interpretation of the Lockean proviso, as given by left-libertarians such as Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, this approach undoubtedly brings about increased equality in a society, which would have positive implications for healthcare access. Third, I grant furthermore the right-libertarian limited reading of the proviso, and demonstrate that even with Robert Nozick’s unhindered rules for property ownership, right-libertarianism properly understood obligates the state to act in many important aspects of healthcare.

<p>The aim of this study is through a policy analysis to illuminate the decisions that the EU has taken to respond to the terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid and London and through this analysis try to explain the problem of each decision and find out if these decisions might risk the individual rights of the European Union’s citizens.</p><p>In order to reach this purpose the following questions are to be answered: In what way has the EU’s decision-making process, regarding its fight on terrorism, been affected by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London? What consequences may the EU’s decisions against terrorism have on the individual rights?</p><p>The method that has been used is qualitative studies of literature and the main material is overarching policy documents from the EU.</p><p>The conclusions are that the bombings in Madrid and London have increased the speed of the decision-making process and more areas have been included in the union’s fight against terrorism. If individual rights are at risk by the union’s decisions there are reasons to be concerned. But my conclusion is that the European Union has to have strong and effective instruments to answer to the threat of terrorism.</p>

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the challenges of immigration on the modern concept of citizenship by interpreting the perceptions of individuals. It tries to reveal the ways in which citizenship practices and conceptualizations of second-generationTurkish-Germans support and/or diverge from the theoretical approaches that attempt to explicate the immigration/citizenship problem. Second-generation Turkish-Germans&rsquo / experiences and perceptions of citizenship are investigated with respect to three aspects of citizenship that are legal status, identity, and civic virtue.

BRAGA, Raphael Brasileiro. Altruísmo e tolerância em meio ao pluralismo: a proposta de John Rawls em favor de uma sociedade justa. 2010. 132f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-21T16:28:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_rbbraga.pdf: 781553 bytes, checksum: 6f981040e1783c4f5b77073373d543d6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-23T15:00:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_rbbraga.pdf: 781553 bytes, checksum: 6f981040e1783c4f5b77073373d543d6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-23T15:00:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_rbbraga.pdf: 781553 bytes, checksum: 6f981040e1783c4f5b77073373d543d6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / For John Rawls, a fair society, at first, is a political community where there is the prevalence of cooperation, sense of justice and citizenship virtues. His theory presents the principles of justice, which will be the basis for a well-organized social basic structure in which each citizen acts with justice and contributes for the maintenance of fair institutions. However, for Robert Nozick a fair State with its citizens is a State that respects the individual behavior. The author says that a State does not have right of force a person more privileged to contribute with a less privileged in order to this has increased his well-being. If you are forced, or by State, or by any person, to contribute to well-being of third party, your rights are violated. Like this, Nozick says that the Minimal State is the most extensive that we can justify. Any other wider violate the citizens’ rights. / Para John Rawls, uma sociedade justa é, em princípio, uma comunidade política onde prevalecem a cooperação, o senso de justiça e as virtudes da cidadania. Sua teoria apresenta princípios de justiça, que servirão de fundamento para uma estrutura básica social bem-ordenada, na qual cada cidadão age justamente e contribui para a manutenção de instituições justas. Para Robert Nozick, porém, um Estado justo em relação aos seus cidadãos nada mais é do que um Estado que respeita a conduta individual. O autor afirma que um Estado não tem o direito de forçar uma pessoa mais privilegiada a contribuir com um menos favorecido a fim de que este tenha seu bem-estar aumentado. Se você for forçado, seja pelo Estado, seja por alguém, a contribuir para o bem-estar de terceiros, seus direitos estarão sendo violados. Diante disso, Nozick afirma que o Estado Mínimo é o mais extenso que se pode justificar. Qualquer outro mais amplo viola os direitos dos cidadãos

O presente trabalho apresenta uma nova perspectiva para as discussões jurídicas e bioéticas acerca dos direitos da personalidade dos pacientes terminais e encontra em nosso ordenamento jurídico, na afirmação de um direito geral da personalidade, a plenitude da tutela civil dos bens jurídicos personalíssimos do enfermo, sobretudo nas etapas finais da doença, ocasião em que a hipermedicalização do processo de morrer destaca-se como o principal fator gerador de lesões de diversas naturezas a esses bens. No caminho para chegarmos à proteção geral da personalidade, examinamos alguns direitos especiais que emergem ao final da existência humana, como o direito à morte em momento natural. No intuito de recuperar a centralidade da pessoa humana como fim único a que devem servir o Direito e a Medicina, construímos a trajetória do conceito de pessoa em seu desenvolvimento jusfilosófico para afirmar que todo ser humano é pessoa e sujeito de direito (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), ainda que não possua capacidade jurídica de fato, e, com isso, demonstrar a impossibilidade de pertença a uma classe de não pessoas independentemente de circunstâncias ou do desenvolvimento biopsíquico humano. Asseveramos, também, que o cuidar e o tratar em pacientes gravemente enfermos e terminais deve relacionar-se, antes, ao homem em sua dignidade e plenitude, em uma concepção biomédica, filosófica e metafísica conjugada da sua existência, e não se reduzir à simples obstinação prognóstica e terapêutica, visão reducionista que relaciona tratar a doença a um investimento no prolongamento estéril da vida humana. Nesse sentido, apresentamos perspectiva jurídica inovadora para a enfermidade e para a vivência dessa condição, do ponto de vista de pacientes terminais, cuidadores e equipes de saúde, à luz do pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas e à centralidade que ele outorga à figura do Outro, que ilumina nossa hermenêutica do instituto dos direitos da personalidade. Concluímos que se faz necessária uma mudança do paradigma atual de cuidados de saúde em fim de vida também na esfera jurídica, com a aceitação, na escolha terapêutica, da naturalidade do evento morte ao final da existência: da busca da cura, para o cuidar; da quantidade para a qualidade da vida que resta. / The thesis presents a new perspective of the legal and bioethical discussions regarding individual rights of terminal ill patients and finds in our legal system, in the assertion of a general individual right, the plenitude of the protection of the legal rights of the ill, especially at the last stages of the disease, when hipermedicalization of the dying process asserts itself as the major source of the various damages caused to individual rights. On the pathway to achieve the general protection of the personhood, we highlight some special rights which emerge at the end of human existence, as, for instance, the right for a death at a natural moment. To recover the centrality of the human person as the single and only end to which Law and Medicine should serve, we present herein a path of the concept of personhood in its juridical and philosophical development to affirm that every human being is an individual (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), even if he/she doesnt have legal capacity and, therewith, demonstrate the impossibility of belonging to a class of non-persons independently of circumstances or the bio-psychic development. We also argue that treating and caring of seriously ill and terminal patients should be related with person in its dignity and fullness, in a biomedical, philosophical and metaphysical conception of existence, irreducible to mere obstinacy in prognosis and treatment, as a result of a reductionist perspective which relates treating a disease to a futile investment of a sterile extension of human life. In this sense, we present a innovative juridical perspective to illness and the experience of this condition, from the point of view of terminal ill patients, caregivers and health care teams in light of the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas and the centrality that he grants to the figure of the Other, which illuminates our interpretation of individual rights. We conclude that a change in the extant paradigm of the end-of-life care in Brazil is imperative also in the legal realm, with the acceptance, in the therapeutic choice, of the natural path of death at the end of our existence: from the search for cure, to care; from quantity to quality of the remaining life.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Para John Rawls, uma sociedade justa Ã, em princÃpio, uma comunidade polÃtica onde prevalecem a cooperaÃÃo, o senso de justiÃa e as virtudes da cidadania. Sua teoria apresenta princÃpios de justiÃa, que servirÃo de fundamento para uma estrutura bÃsica social bem-ordenada, na qual cada cidadÃo age justamente e contribui para a manutenÃÃo de instituiÃÃes justas. Para Robert Nozick, porÃm, um Estado justo em relaÃÃo aos seus cidadÃos nada mais à do que um Estado que respeita a conduta individual. O autor afirma que um Estado nÃo tem o direito de forÃar uma pessoa mais privilegiada a contribuir com um menos favorecido a fim de que este tenha seu bem-estar aumentado. Se vocà for forÃado, seja pelo Estado, seja por alguÃm, a contribuir para o bem-estar de terceiros, seus direitos estarÃo sendo violados. Diante disso, Nozick afirma que o Estado MÃnimo à o mais extenso que se pode justificar. Qualquer outro mais amplo viola os direitos dos cidadÃos. / For John Rawls, a fair society, at first, is a political community where there is the prevalence of cooperation, sense of justice and citizenship virtues. His theory presents the principles of justice, which will be the basis for a well-organized social basic structure in which each citizen acts with justice and contributes for the maintenance of fair institutions. However, for Robert Nozick a fair State with its citizens is a State that respects the individual behavior. The author says that a State does not have right of force a person more privileged to contribute with a less privileged in order to this has increased his well-being. If you are forced, or by State, or by any person, to contribute to well-being of third party, your rights are violated. Like this, Nozick says that the Minimal State is the most extensive that we can justify. Any other wider violate the citizensâ rights.

Yes / This paper examines the conceptual origins of individual rights that shaped the UN and UNESCO model of human rights and the origins of group rights as they emerged in the post–colonial era to challenge inequality. It argues that the idea of rights to self determination, associated initially with decolonization in Africa based on equal statehood status in international relations, has, since decolonization, reinvigorated the promotion of group or peoples’ rights as a framework for challenging poverty and inequality, including access or rights to development.