Notion centrale des rapports entre l’État et les individus, l'ordre public mis en œuvre par la police administrative est traditionnellement identifié comme étant matériel. Essentiel à l'équilibre entre maintien de la paix sociale et garantie des droits et libertés individuels, il y est particulièrement fait recours lorsqu'est en cause la sécurité. La législation (lato sensu) récente en matière d'état d'urgence le rappelle. Mais l'ordre public n'est pas uniquement matériel, limité à la sécurité, à la tranquillité et à la salubrité publiques. Notion classique du droit public, l'ordre public ne cesse d'évoluer. Il est en effet possible de tirer de divers phénomènes épars l'existence d'un ordre public immatériel dont l'émergence et l'utilisation visent à répondre à des déséquilibres apparus dans l'État de droit. Permettant notamment la protection de valeurs objectives à partir desquelles la société est ordonnée, l'ordre public immatériel vise à rééquilibrer les rapports entre le collectif et l'individuel. Il est en ce sens une notion fonctionnelle. Il est ainsi possible de définir l'ordre public immatériel et de construire un régime juridique qui lui soit adapté. Impuissant à restreindre les libertés dans la vie privée, il s'exprime dans le cadre de l'espace public auquel il est cantonné, ce qui limite d'autant les risques d'intrusion de l'État. Il peut être vu comme une notion autonome. Cette formalisation permet d'identifier plus facilement l'ordre public immatériel. Surtout, elle laisse entendre qu'il pourrait s'imposer durablement dans l'ordre juridique français. / A key notion in the relationship between the State and individuals, public order implemented by the administrative authorities is normally considered as material. Essential to the balance between maintaining social peace and ensuring respect for individual rights and freedoms, public order is implemented especially where security is involved. Recent legislation (in the broad sense) introducing the state of emergency is a case in point. However, public order is not merely material or restricted to matters of public security, peace or health. Public order, a traditional notion in public law, continues to evolve. From the various different phenomena, it is indeed possible to deduce the existence of an immaterial public order, the emergence and implementation of which are intended to offset the disequilibrium arising from the rule of law. The purpose of immaterial public order, which ensures the protection of objective values around which society is organised, is to restore the balance between the public and the individual. In that sense, it is a functional notion. It is therefore possible to define immaterial public order and build a legal system adapted to it. Immaterial public order, which is powerless to restrict freedoms in private life, expresses itself in the public domain to which it is confined, thereby limiting the risks of State intervention. lt can be seen as a notion in its own right. As a result of this formalisation, immaterial public order can be more readily identified. Above all, formalisation suggests that it could become a permanent feature of the French legal system.

Minority protection mechanisms in international law aim to guarantee certain individual rights to persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, such as freedom of culture, religion and language. These rights can be considered to be of collective interest for minority group identity and therefore often require the possibility of collective enjoyment. In addition to general human rights and principles of non-discrimination, minority protection can alternately be ensured through minority specific rights. However, minority specific rights would not operate effectively without evolving a concept of collective (or group) rights in international law. Hence, while this kind of approach can provide legal methods for balancing the interests of individuals, groups and the state, it creates the possibility of conflicts with the international framework of individual rights. The ottoman millet system sets a historical example of minority protection instruments based on a collective concept of human rights. Furthermore, the ottoman history offers an illustration of what could go terribly wrong with a collective rights model. By analyzing the millet system and the ottoman legal reforms in the nineteenth century I will discuss reoccurring issues with collective rights. I will argue that incorporating collective rights within a structure founded on individual rights is a problematic way of protecting individuals belonging to minorities and other vulnerably ethnic groups. Looking through the historical development of universal human rights some important aspects of its main principles will be brought up in this paper.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carolina de Souza Soro.pdf: 826416 bytes, checksum: 7e44b54e445051e5c4de466d10ff4bab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-01 / This paper is intended to analyze some of the major aspects of award calculation and performance of generic conviction issued in a class action lawsuit concerning the protection of homogeneous individual rights. For this purpose, we systematically analyzed the Public Civil Action Act and the Consumer Protection Code - chief laws that regulate class actions - and were supported by the most authoritative and recent doctrine on the matter. The study took an approach to the legislative evolution of our collective procedural law , mentioned some proposals disclosed in the Bill of the Brazilian Code of Collective Lawsuits as well as some instruments of collective rights protection. With the aim of better analyzing the proposed matter, some peculiarities of the public or collective civil action were examined, such as legitimacy, jurisdiction, lis alibi pendens and res judicata. Based on such elements and on the general aspects of the award calculation and performance within the framework of individual rights occasion in which some amendments incorporated by the recent procedural reform of Act 11 232/05 were discussed - we took an approach to the central matter so as to analyze the main issues regarding award calculation and performance of generic conviction issued in a class action lawsuit for the protection of homogeneous individual rights. At the end, some aspects of debtors modes of defense were analyzed - stressing on opposition - and also some brief considerations were given to the institute of fluid redress and behavior adjustment commitment / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo a análise de alguns dos principais aspectos da liquidação e do cumprimento da sentença genérica proferida em ação coletiva relativa a tutela de direitos individuais homogêneos, sendo que, para tanto, é realizada a análise sistemática da Lei de Ação Civil Pública e do Código de Defesa do Consumidor, principais diplomas legais que regulamentam as ações coletivas, como também buscou-se o amparo da mais abalizada e recente doutrina sobre o assunto. Foi realizada uma breve abordagem acerca da evolução legislativa do nosso direito processual coletivo , inclusive com a menção a algumas das propostas veiculadas no Anteprojeto de Código Brasileiro de Processos Coletivos, e também a alguns dos instrumentos para a proteção dos direitos coletivos. Com vistas a possibilitar a melhor análise do tema efetivamente proposto, examinaram-se algumas das peculiaridades da ação civil pública ou coletiva, tais como a legitimidade, competência jurisdicional, litispendência e coisa julgada. A partir destes elementos, e não sem antes abordar os aspectos gerais da liquidação e do cumprimento de sentença na esfera do direito individual - oportunidade em que, inclusive, foram discutidas algumas das alterações introduzidas pela recente reforma processual operada pela Lei 11.232/05 - é que foi feita a abordagem do tema central, buscando analisar as questões mais problemáticas a respeito da liquidação e do cumprimento da sentença condenatória genérica proferida em ação coletiva relativa a tutela de direitos individuais homogêneos. Ao final, foram analisados alguns aspectos dos modos de defesa do devedor, com ênfase para a impugnação, e também foram feitas breves considerações sobre o instituto da reparação fluida e o compromisso de ajustamento de conduta

Reflet du rapport des individus avec le pouvoir public, le droit de la procédure administrative non contentieuse a sensiblement évolué depuis quatre décennies, en France comme en Grèce. Cette évolution, rattachée dans les deux pays à des projets politiques et juridiques de réforme administrative, a pu nourrir la réflexion doctrinale sur l’avènement d’une « démocratie administrative ». Or, l’évolution des règles qui concernent en particulier la procédure d’édiction de décisions individuelles répond toujours à un problème juridique aussi classique que fondamental : celui de la protection des individus vis-à-vis du pouvoir unilatéral de l’administration, dont l’exercice intervient dans la sphère des droits et libertés substantiels. Pour l’exploration de la situation juridique des administrés dans la procédure administrative non contentieuse, la prise en compte de la fonction qu’accomplissent dans cette procédure les droits procéduraux des administrés paraît dès lors nécessaire. La contribution des droits procéduraux, et plus spécialement des droits d’être entendu et à la motivation, à la protection des droits individuels substantiels mis en jeu dans l’opération normatrice de l’administration s’avère être un étalon essentiel pour la détermination de la portée juridique des droits procéduraux en cause. La qualité de ces derniers comme instruments de protection individuelle permet en effet la compréhension cohérente de l’évolution des sources juridiques des droits d’être entendu et à la motivation, de la délimitation du domaine d’application de ces droits et du traitement réservé par les juges français et grec de l’excès de pouvoir aux hypothèses de violation des mêmes droits. / Reflection of the individuals’ relation to state power, law in the field of administrative procedures has significantly evolved during the last four decades in France and in Greece.This evolution, associated in both countries with political and normative projects aspiring to administrative reform, has largely alimented doctrinal debate on the establishment of an“administrative democracy”. However, the evolution of rules governing in particular individual decision making is also a response to a classic and fundamental legal problem, namely the protection of individuals against unilateral administrative intervention in the sphere of their substantive rights and liberties. The legal status of individuals during the elaboration of individual acts deserves therefore to be explored in view of the function accomplished by procedural rights -such as the right to hearing and to reason giving- in administrative procedures of such type. In fact, the contribution of procedural rights in the protection of substantive rights concerned by the individual decision making process turns out to be crucial for the treatment of procedural rights under French and Greek administrative law. More specifically, the quality of procedural rights as instruments of individual protection allows to coherently understand the evolution of their sources and scope as well as various aspects of judicial handling of their eventual violation by administrative bodies.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Pagliusi Rodrigues.pdf: 2108054 bytes, checksum: 02e638a7bb6d0cc3149e4227de1ebbb1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-06 / This work concerns the responsibility of the State with view to its evolution and conformation to the political and juridical superstructure of social stamp, built on a capitalist infrastructure. To follow the evolution of the adjective responsible it is first necessary to be aware of the development of the State. From the appearance of the first model of capitalist State absolutism - to the current paradigm of welfare State, its history is confused with the history of a social class - bourgeoisie that was born, expanded itself, consolidated its power and intends to keep its supremacy. In a first moment, the absolutism served to centralize political power, to unify the territory and to put limits to the powers of feudal lords, but due to the development of trade, driven by the great maritime expeditions and industrialization, it became a hindrance to the capitalism expansion. Therefore, revolutions have been financed - in special the French one- to put an end to absolutism. The fall of the absolutism occasioned the raise of the non-intervention state policy, on the grounds of liberalism. Until this time, the State did not act and, therefore, could not be set as responsible. Considering the social and economic problems generated by liberalism, frequent revolts happened as from the second half of 19th century, culminating in the two world-wars and in the appearance of the Soviet Union, and so the State was requested to intervene again to alleviate the crisis and provide survival for the capitalism. Together to the need for intervention emerged the theory of the State responsibility and in this scenario the more development the State achieved, the more responsibility the State had to support. The matter of such theory is that it was built on a liberal basis for a State of welfare with a view to the strict protection of the individual rights, essentially the property, without concerning about the violation of social rights. It is worth mentioning that the Welfare State is capitalist and, therefore, its performance is restricted by the economic potential of its domestic market, which causes, therefore, a limitation of social rights. Meanwhile, the public responsibility is being understood as equivalent to indemnity but, in fact, this is a partial view of the issue, because it is insufficient as a sanction against violations of social rights, it is able to generate privatization of public resources and makes the State unable to comply with its social desideratum. Thus, the public responsibility should evolve not to serve as an obstacle to the acting of the State, but to impose it to act. / Este trabalho trata da responsabilidade do Estado visando sua evolução e enquadramento à superestrutura política e jurídica de cunho social, erguido sobre uma infra-estrutura capitalista. Para se estar a par da evolução do adjetivo responsável é mister, primeiro, o conhecimento do desenvolvimento do Estado. Desde o surgimento do primeiro modelo de Estado capitalista absolutismo - até o atual paradigma de bem-estar, a sua história é confundida com a de uma classe social burguesia - que nasceu, expandiu, consolidou seu poder e pretende manter sua supremacia. O absolutismo serviu, num primeiro momento, para centralizar o poder político, unificar o território e colocar peias aos poderes dos senhores feudais, mas, pelo desenvolvimento do comércio, empurrado pelas grandes navegações e industrialização, tornou-se um entrave à expansão capitalista. Destarte, foram financiadas revoluções em especial a francesa - para pôr fim ao absolutismo. O ocaso do absolutismo deu azo à política de não-intervenção estatal, calcada num liberalismo. Até esse momento, o Estado era irresponsável pois, se ele não atuava, não haveria como ser responsabilizado. Considerando os problemas sociais e econômicos gerados pelo liberalismo, constantes revoltas aconteceram a partir da 2º metade do século XIX culminando nas duas guerras mundiais e no aparecimento da União Soviética, sendo o Estado chamado para voltar a intervir para minorar as crises e proporcionar sobrevida ao capitalismo. O contraponto ao pedido de intervenção viria com a teorização de sua responsabilidade e, consoante o Estado se desenvolvia, da mesma forma sucedia com a responsabilidade. A problemática dessa teoria é que ela foi assentada em bases liberais para um Estado de bem-estar com vistas à estrita proteção dos direitos individuais, precipuamente os patrimoniais, sem se preocupar com a violação dos direitos sociais. Não se pode perder de vista que o Estado social é capitalista e, por isso, sua atuação é restringida pelo potencial econômico de seu mercado interno, acarretando, por conseguinte, uma limitação aos direitos sociais. Entrementes, vem sendo utilizada a responsabilidade pública como equivalente de indenização, quando, na verdade, essa é uma visão parcial do tema, já que é insuficiente como sanção à violação dos direitos sociais, podendo gerar privatização de recursos públicos e impossibilitar o Estado de cumprir seu desiderato social. Assim, a responsabilidade pública deve evoluir não para servir de óbice ao atuar do Estado, mas sim para impingi-lo a agir.

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)

L’accord d’association Algérie-Union Européenne, paraphé à Bruxelles le 19 décembre 2001 et entré en vigueur le 1er septembre 2005, fonde un partenariat en matière des droits de l’homme. Déclenché par la Déclaration de Barcelone du 27 et 28 novembre 1995, il fournit aujourd’hui le modèle le plus complet pour une meilleure mise en œuvre réelle et effective des droits de l’homme dans le cadre des accords d’associations. Inspiré, d’une politique euro-méditerranéenne qui a pour objectif la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme, tel qu’énoncée dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, inspire les politiques internes et internationales des parties et constitue un élément essentiel pour la mise en œuvre de l’accord d’association Algérie-UE. Y’a-t-il une réelle mise en œuvre de l’accord d’association Algérie-Union Européenne dans les perspectives du respect des droits de l’homme ? Et quels sont les moyens mis en place? / The Algerian-European association, signed on 19 December 2001 in Brussels and enforced on 1 September 2005, represents a partnership in terms of human rights. Sett off by the Barcelona Declaration of 27 & 28 November 1995, it nowadays serves as the best model for a genuine implementation of human rights in the field of assocation agreements. Inspired by Euro-Mediterranean policy whose objective is the promotion as well as protection of human rights, as stated in the universal declaration of human rights, it affects the parties, domestic and international policies and represents and essential element in the implementation of the Algerian-European association agreement. Is there a genuine implementation of the Algerian-European association agreement in the perspective of the respect of human rights? And what are the means used for that propose?