Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1937. / Description based on print version record. "Bibliographical note": p. 127. Bibliography: p. 121-124.

Issued also as thesis (PH. D.) Columbia university. / Bibliography: p. 67-69.

Texte remanié de: Habili.-schr.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Köln, 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 473-497. Index.

No description available.

O objetivo deste trabalho é o exame da concepção espinosista da verdade, com ênfase no Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). Para tanto, empreendemos a análise da teoria das idéias, presente nesse texto, em um cotejo com as demais obras do autor. Apesar disso, privilegiamos o TIE dentre as demais, com o propósito de mostrar que essa obra não é uma fase superada. Com efeito, tem-se considerado o TIE como um fracasso de Espinosa pelo fato de o filósofo não ter conseguido nele elaborar a definição do intelecto. Entretanto, o que pretendemos mostrar é que, mesmo se nao inteiramente explicitada, a definição do intelecto pode ser ali encontrada e que, portanto, a tradicional interpretacao dos editores e comentadores - apesar de longamente endossada - está equivocada. De fato, tornou-se uma convenção dizer que o TIE não possui uma densa articulação com o sistema espinosista. Mostraremos, ao contrario, que ela não apenas existe, mas pode ser perfeitamente comprovada. / The objective of this work is to investigate the Spinozan concept of truth, with emphasis on the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). In order to do so, we have analysed his theory of ideas, presented in this text, in close comparison with that presented in the rest of Spinoza\'s work. Despite this, we have given pride of place to the TIE over the rest, with the firm purpose of showing that this work is not merely a passing phase. In effect, the TIE has been considered, over the years, a Spinoza failure for its (apparent) lack of elaboration of the definition of the intellect. However, what we intend to do is to show that, even if not in an explicit way, the definition of the intellect is there and, therefore, that the editors\' and commentators\' traditional interpretation - despite its being amply endorsed - is wrong. In fact, it has become conventional to say that the TIE does not articulate easily with the core of Spinoza\'s system. It is our purpose, nonetheless, to show that not only does this articulation exist, but also that it can be thoroughly and consistently supported.

Em diversas passagens, Tomás de Aquino afirma que é impossível o nosso intelecto, unido ao corpo, inteligir algo em ato sem se converter aos fantasmas (conversio ad phantasmata). Segue-se, portanto, que a conversão aos fantasmas [i.e., o direcionamento natural do intelecto para as imagens recebidas pelos sentidos] é a condição de possibilidade da intelecção humana. Agora, se tal intelecção depende da conversão aos fantasmas, e estes, por sua vez, dependem da afecção dos entes materiais sobre os sentidos, conclui-se que o conhecimento intelectual humano só é possível a partir do conhecimento sensível. Se é correta essa simplificação, então, podemos continuar perguntando pela questão que, de fato, interessará aqui, a saber, se é possível o conhecimento dos incorpóreos, dos quais não existem fantasmas (imagens recebidas). Ora, se é indubitável que dos incorpóreos não temos fantasmas, então, como poderíamos inteligilos, uma vez que a intelecção humana depende necessariamente da conversio ad phantasmata? Para dar conta dessa problemática, propomos primeiro explicar porque a conversão aos fantasmas é a conditio sine qua non da intelecção humana. Somente depois disso, consideraremos o objetivo central desta investigação que é explicitar como Tomás de Aquino argumenta a favor da possibilidade do conhecimento de Deus, do qual não temos fantasmas / In several passages, Thomas Aquinas states that it is impossible for our intellect, united to the body, can actually to understand without conversion to the phantasms (conversio ad phantasmata). It follows therefore that the conversion to the phantasms (i.e., the natural direction of the intellect to the images received by the senses) is the condition of possibility of human intellection. Now, if such intellection depends on the conversion to the phantasms, and these, in turn, depend on the affection of the material ones on the senses, it is concluded that the human intellectual knowledge is only possible from sensitive knowledge. If this simplification is correct, then we can keep asking the question that really concern us here, namely, the question of the possibility of knowledge of incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms (received images). While it is no doubt that we have no phantasms of incorporeal things, so how could we to understand them, since human intellection necessarily depends on the conversio ad phantasmata? To resolve this issue, we propose first explain why the conversion to the phantasms is the conditio sine qua non of human intellection. Only after that, we consider the main objective of this research: to explain how Aquinas argues for the possibility of knowledge of God, of which we have no phantasms

A Filosofia do Espírito é a forma de autoconhecimento, na medida em que traça o percurso do princípio espiritual em seu processo de criação. O primeiro momento desse processo da Criação consiste na diferenciação da Unidade na multiplicidade de seres naturais. Desse modo constitui-se a fenomenologia da vida, cujo prolongamento, para Bergson, é a fenomenologia do espírito. Tal processo permite descrever a gênese do intelecto, de modo a fundamentar sua estrutura analítica e estabelecer uma crítica do conhecimento. O intelecto, dada a sua vocação pragmática, é que vai pautar os procedimentos racionais da ciência; porém, dada a sua concepção quantitativa do real aparente, não se presta ao conhecimento da metafísica. À inteligência cumpre, porém o papel inicial de procurar a presença imanente no mundo fenomênico, dando acesso, portanto ao espírito subjetivo de conhecer a substância espiritual em si mesma, em sua imediatez. Acompanhar o processo do desdobramento do Espírito em sua imediatez só é possível pela intuição, que permite uma identificação em essência com o processo gerador, de modo a constituir assim uma metafísica positiva, como pedra angular na edificação de uma Enciclopédia das Ciências ,assim como a possibilidade de cumprir com a finalidade interna, que é criar infinitamente. / The Philosophy of the Spirit is the form of self-knowledge, as it outlines the path of the spiritual principle in its process of creation. The first moment of this process of the Creation consists of the differentiation of the Unit in the multiplicity of natural beings. In this manner, phenomenology of the life is defined, whose prolongation, for Bergson, is the phenomenology of the spirit. Such process allows one to describe the genesis of the intellect, in order to base its analytical structure and to establish knowledge critics. The intellect, given its pragmatic vocation, is what will define the rational procedures of science; however, given its quantitative concept of the apparent real, it does not serve to metaphysical knowledge. Thus, intelligence triggers the initial search process for emanating presence in the phenomenon world, consequently giving access to the subjective spirit of knowing the spiritual substance in one self in its immediateness. To follow the process of development of the spirit in its immediateness is only possible by intuition, allowing identification, in essence, with the generator process, in a way to constitute a positive metaphysic, as a foundation pillar in a Science Encyclopedia, as well as the possibility to fulfill the internal objective, to create infinitely.

D.Litt. et Phil. (Organisational Psychology) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Both experimental research (Robbertse,1952)and clinical observation (Kruger, 1972; van der Merwe,1978) have indicated that pupils with a Verbal IQ score 10 or more points lower than their non-Verbal IQ (termed a 'Type 1' discrepancy in the present research) on the New South African Group Test (NSAGT) show poorer academic achievement than their peers of similar ability. The present research investigates the relationship of general retention ability, as defined by Hakstian and Cattell (1978), to Type 1 discrepancies as well as to their academic correlates. One hundred and thirty-nine standard seven English-speaking boys were tested on the NSAGT and the Junior Aptitude Test (JAT) (of which tests 8 and 9 give an indication of general retention ability) and divided into a group with Type 1 discrepancies and two control groups. All three groups were matched on full-scale IQ. Comparison of these three groups, using the analysis of variance technique, showed that there was no significant difference between them in level of general retention ability or in academic performance (measured by average percentage in the final standard seven examination). While no significant difference was found between the three groups regarding the relationship of general retention ability to academic performance, in the Type 1 discrepancy group the relationship of rote memory (JAT test 8) to academic performance differed markedly from that of associative memory (JAT test 9) to academic performance. In the Type 1 discrepancy group rote memory was highly associated with academic performance, possibly indicating a compensatory strategy for the lower Verbal ability in this group, enabling it to achieve academically on par with the control groups, contrary to what would be expected on the basis of Robbertse's (1962) findings. In terms of Jensen's (1982) Level 1/Level 11 theory of intelligence, it appears from the present research that rote memory ability (JAT test 8) varies between being a Level 11 ability (in the Type 1 discrepancy group) to acting as a Level 1 ability in the two control groups. The present research questions Verwey and Wolmarans's (1980) description of both JAT tests 8 and 9 as simple measures of retention Test 9, in particular, appears to function consistently as a Level 11 ability.

Until about 1970, little was published on research pertaining to the influence of perceptual acuity in relation to gifted children. This study was undertaken to provide empirical data that might lead to a better understanding of such a relationship, to review research performed in the fields of both perception and giftedness, and to assess the usefulness of a non-verbal instrument for elementary teachers of art in diagnosing giftedness at a perceptual level. The study was designed to determine, by means of a perceptual index test, whether or not gifted children who display above average intellectual skills, also exhibit above average perceptual skills. The MacGregor Perceptual Index (MPI) was administered to a group of twenty-four gifted and twenty-six non-gifted children between the ages of ten and twelve years. Categories included:- perception of distance, perception of embedded figures, perception of shape, perception of similarities and differences, perception of the vertical, perception modified by constancy, and perception of contour. The investigation revealed similarities and differences among children of specific intellectual capacity and ages in how they perceive and interpret visual stimuli. It was found that children with above average intellectual ability performed at a higher level on the Perceptual Index test than did subjects drawn from an average group. The findings in this study led to recommendations for further investigation. The MPI, a non-verbal perceptual test, was judged to be a reliable instrument for diagnosing gifted children. In the synopsis of factors revealed in this study, it was concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship between perceptual ability and intellectual ability. The results of the study imply that training in perceptual problem-solving skills may generally enhance a child's intelligence level, and thus should be considered as part of the school curriculum. / Education, Faculty of / Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of / Graduate