L’intervention est l’acte par lequel un Etat tiers intervient dans une instance pendante pour protéger ses droits. Elle est prévue aux articles 62 et 63 du Statut. La première disposition reconnaît le droit d’intervention à tout Etat tiers justifiant d’un intérêt juridique en cause. En revanche, la seconde accorde aux seuls Etats tiers également partie à une convention dont l’interprétation est en cause la possibilité d’intervenir. La question principale soulevée par l’intervention est de savoir si cette procédure est conforme au principe du consensualisme qui gouverne le Statut de la Cour. Concernant que l’article 62 du Statut, cette question s’explique par la controverse au sein de la doctrine au sujet du statut de l’Etat intervenant. En effet, certains auteurs soutiennent que l’Etat intervenant est partie à l’instance. Dans ce cas, ils considèrent que l’article 62 ne respecte pas le principe du consensualisme. Afin de concilier l’intervention avec ce principe, ils pensent que la Cour ne peut admettre l’intervention sans le consentement des parties. D’autres avancent, au contraire, que l’intervention est conforme au principe du consensualisme parce que l’Etat intervenant n’est pas partie à l’instance. D’autres soutiennent encore que l’article 62 du Statut admet les deux formes d’intervention développées par les précédents auteurs. L’objet de l’étude est de démontrer que l’article 62 du Statut donne lieu à une interprétation large, en ce sens qu’il autorise non seulement une intervention en tant que non partie, mais aussi une intervention en tant que partie et que le principe du consensualisme est respecté dans les deux cas. En effet, cette étude établit que tant les conditions que les effets de l’intervention sont conformes à ce principe. / Intervention is the procedure by which a third State intervenes in a pending proceeding to protect its rights. It is laid down in Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute. The first provision recognizes to every State justifying a legal interest in the case in question the right to intervene. In contrast, the second gives the third States also party to a Multilateral Convention whose interpretation is in question the right to intervene. The main issue raised by the intervention is whether this procedure is consistent with the principle of consent that governs the Statute of the Court. Concerning Article 62, this issue is due to the controversy within the doctrine on the status of the intervening State. Indeed, some authors argue that the intervening State is a party to the proceeding. In this case, they consider that Article 62 does not respect the principle of consent. To reconcile this principle with the intervention, they think that the Court can not accept the intervention without the consent of the parties. Others argue, however, that the intervention is consistent with the principle of consent because the intervening State do not become a party to the proceeding. Others still argue that Article 62 recognizes two forms of intervention as developed by the previous authors. The purpose of the study is to demonstrate that Article 62 gives rise to a broad interpretation, as it allows not only intervention as a non-party, but also as a party and that the principle of consent is respected in both cases. Indeed, this study shows that both the conditions and the effects of the intervention are consistent with this principle.

L’augmentation des moyens relatifs aux droits de l’homme devant la Cour internationale de Justice pose la question de la forme juridique que prend leur application dans le cadre d’un contentieux de la responsabilité interétatique et généraliste. La procédure de la Cour, conçue en vue de la défense d’intérêts étatiques subjectifs, paraît impropre à tenir compte des relations juridiques complexes dans lesquelles s’établit la responsabilité de l’Etat pour violation des droits de l’homme « internationalement garantis », et se limitant aux rapports de responsabilité bilatéraux entre les Etats parties au différend. Pourtant, au lieu de penser les liens juridiques en cause en fonction des seuls Etats parties au litige et dans des termes d’extériorité de l’individu, la Cour raisonne dans une logique de corrélation. Des relations tripartites émergent entre l’Etat auteur de la violation, les autres Etats également créanciers et débiteurs des obligations, et l’individu titulaire de droits. Mais alors qu’elle est prête à préciser ces relations juridiques, voire à les conceptualiser, la Cour n’en dénature pas pour autant sa fonction juridictionnelle traditionnelle. L’individu est certes pris en compte dans l’engagement de la responsabilité entre Etats : il n’en reste pas moins marginalisé au stade de la mise en oeuvre proprement dite de la responsabilité, mise en oeuvre centrée sur l’Etat et définie par le droit international public. Cette conception particulière de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour violation des droits de l’homme souligne que celle-ci ne saurait être réduite à la relation entre l’individu et l’Etat, dont les autres Etats ne seraient au mieux que les garants désintéressés, mais qu’elle détermine aussi et directement les rapports entre Etats. / The increasing number of human rights based claims before the International Court of Justice raises the question of their implementation in the framework of generalist and interstate litigation. The procedure of the Court has been thought and conceived for the defense of subjective interests of States. Therefore, the Court seems unable to take into account the complex legal relationships in which lies State responsibility for “internationally guaranteed human rights” violations and its scope, limited to bilateral responsibility amongst State parties. But, instead of conceiving the legal connections in dispute as to the only State parties or as external to the individual, the Court endorses a correlation approach. Tripartite relations emerge between the State perpetrator of the human rights violation, other States which are equally creditor and bearer of the obligations infringed and the individual who holds the rights. However although the Court is ready to clarify or even conceptualize the legal relationships involved, it does not distort its traditional judicial function. While the individual is taken into account in the incurrence of State responsibility it is nevertheless marginalized in its implementation, which continues to be centered on the State and defined by public international law. This particular conception of State responsibility for human rights violations underlines that it cannot be reduced to the relation between the individual and the State, for which other selfless States would stand guarantor as the most, but that it also and directly determines interstate relations.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit international (LL.M)" / L'une des critiques fondamentales adressée au droit international à partir du l6ème siècle tient à l'absence des voies d'exécution efficaces. Pour cette raison, les négateurs du droit intemational en contestent la juridicité. Le présent mémoire étudie l'ensemble des mesures qui tendent à l'exécution volontaire et forcée des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice. Pour ce faire, il analyse principalement l'article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies qui est le siège de la question y relative. Cette étude s'attache, en un premier temps, à l'examen du fondement de l'obligation d'exécution dans l'esprit du caractère consensuel de la justice internationale permanente. Dans ce cadre, elle se penche sur les conditions et conséquences de la saisine de la Cour et accorde une attention particulière aux applications pratiques. L'étude des affaires tranchées par la Cour permet de faire remarquer que la plupart de ses arrêts ont été respectés par les parties perdantes. Les cas d'exécution difficile nous enseignent à ne pas sous-estimer le rôle des négociations entre les parties ou l'action des tiers dans la phase post-juridictionnelle. Ensuite, elle met l'accent sur la voie d'exécution forcée prévue au deuxième paragraphe. En raison du pouvoir discrétionnaire que détient le Conseil de sécurité et des risques d'utilisation du droit de véto par l'un des membres permanents, ce mécanisme est d'une efficacité réduite. Dès lors, il est loisible au créditeur de la décision d'adopter des mesures compatibles avec le droit international pour contraindre l'État défaillant à y donner suite. Le rôle des organes de l'O.N.U. ou institutions internationales et l'impossibilité pour certains États d'adopter des contre-mesures amènent à conclure que ce degré d'efficacité réside dans le manque d'intégration de l'ordre juridique intemational. / One of the main criticisms addressed to international law from the 16th century denounces the weaknesses of its enforcement's mechanisms. For this reason, some positivist thinkers question its existence. This thesis studies complîance with decisions of the intemational Court of Justice. To do so, it examines mainly Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, which takes both their binding effect and their enforcement into account. On one hand, the obligation of execution in the spirit of a consenting justice has been analyzed. A special attention has been paid to the conditions under which a dispute is presented to the Court and the practice followed. This step helps understand the fundamental role of the parties or tierce in the post-judicative phase. On the other hand, emphasis has been placed on the legal framework for enforcement of the lntemational Court of Justice's decisions. The role of the Security Council of the United Nations under Article 94 (2) has been emphasized. Its action in a case of non-compliance with a final judgment or an order indicating provisional measures is uncertain because one of the five permanent members may use its power of veto. Other remaining possibilities such as the recourse either to some intemational institutions or to unilateral coercive measures may not be of a greater practical importance. This research concludes that the strengthening of the procedure under Aliicle 94 (2) is not an option for improvement as long as the international society is not sufficiently integrated.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in April 1945 South Africa affirmed the principle of respect for human rights in a Preamble it proposed for inclusion in the Charter of the United Nations. The proposal was approved and the Preamble was accorded binding force. While South Africa participated in the earliest attempts of the United Nations to draft a bill of rights, it abstained on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its municipal legislation was incompatible with some articles. Similarly, South Africa did not become a party to the international human rights instruments the declaration inspired, and avoided an active role in their elaboration. Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly undertook several studies on discrimination in the field of human rights. They provided evidence that racial discrimination in South Africa intensified after the National Party came to power in May 1948 on the platform of apartheid and diverged from global trends in humanitarian law. The gap between the Union and the United Nations widened. At the first General Assembly in 1946, India successfully asked that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa be inscribed on the agenda. The Indian question was later subsumed in the charge that South Africa's racial policies violated the Charter and in 1952 the General Assembly began to discuss apartheid. South Africa protested that these actions contravened Charter Article 2(7), which prohibited intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and were ultra vires. Criticism of the Union increased in intensity, until in 1960 it culminated in calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions. Research shows that South Africa was the main architect of its growing isolation, since it refused to modify domestic policies that alienated even its potential allies. Moreover, it maintained a low profile in United Nations debates on human rights issues, abstaining on all substantive clauses in the two draft covenants on human rights. These actions were interpreted as lack of interest in global humanitarian affairs. South Africa had little influence on the development of customary international law in the field of human rights but was a catalyst in the evolution of international machinery to protect them. / Jurisprudence / (LL.D)

La délimitation des frontières maritimes revêt une importance capitale pour un grand nombre États, que cela soit d’un oint de vue symbolique, culturel, stratégique ou économique. Néanmoins, le droit international conventionnel reste au mieux largement ambigu, au pire entièrement silencieux sur la question de savoir quelles sont les méthodes précises pour résoudre les éventuels différends entre États pouvant surgir lors de la délimitation de leurs espaces maritimes. Face à ces ambiguïtés et silences conventionnels et face aussi à une pratique étatique incohérente et dépourvue d’une opinio juris, c’est principalement dans leur propre vision que les juridictions internationales ont puisé la règle de l’équidistance/circonstances pertinentes, en vertu de laquelle toute délimitation maritime décidée, quel que soit l’espace maritime considéré, y inclus le plateau continental étendu, et quelle que soit la configuration côtière, débute par la construction d’une ligne d’équidistance provisoire. Cette ligne pourra éventuellement être modifiée pour tenir compte descirconstances particulières de chaque affaire dans une deuxième phase de la délimitation. En dépit de la consécration claire et – une première dans l’histoire de la CIJ – unanime de la règle de l’équidistance/circonstances pertinentes dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire en 2009, de nombreuses zones d’ombre et difficultés d’ordre technique existent dans sa mise en œuvre pratique par les cours et tribunaux internationaux, notamment en ce qui concerne le risque d’une part trop importante de subjectivité, voire d’arbitraire, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le choix des points de base et le rôle joué par la proportionnalité. De même, afin de garantir une « matérialisation » efficace de la frontière maritime décidée sur le « terrain », une collaboration étroite entre le juriste d’une part et le cartographe, l’hydrographe, le géologue et le géographe d’autre part s’impose. / The delimitation of maritime boundaries is of utmost importance for many states, whether on a symbolic, cultural, strategic or economic level. Nevertheless, international treaty law is at best largely ambiguous, at worst entirely silent as to what the precise methods for resolving possible disputes that might surface during the delimitation process are. Confrontedwith these ambiguities and silences, but also with incoherent state practice devoid of any opinio juris, it is primarily from their own vision that international jurisdictions have drawn the equidistance/relevant circumstances rule, according to which, regardless of the maritime zone concerned, including the extended continental shelf, and regardless of the coastalconfiguration, every decided maritime delimitation begins with the establishment of a provisional equidistance line. This line can later be modified in a second phase of the delimitation to take into account the particular circumstances of each case. In spite of the unequivocal and – a premiere in the history of the Court – unanimous consecration of theequidistance/relevant circumstances rule by the ICJ in the Delimitation in the Black Sea case in 2009, numerous unsettled areas and technical difficulties remain in the delimitation process, notably regarding the risk of too great a degree of subjectivity, if not arbitrariness, particularly regarding the choice of the base points and the role to be played by proportionality. Likewise, in order to guarantee a smooth “materialisation” of the border on the “ground”, a close collaboration between the jurist on the one hand and the cartographer, geologist, hydrologist and geographer on the other hand is indispensable.

This thesis examines the process applied by international tribunals for delimiting Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf boundaries under international law. Maritime delimitation is governed by articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which are customary international law. However, owing to the vagueness of such legal provisions, international tribunals have been developing a standard process for delimiting maritime boundaries. The delimitation process has evolved significantly since the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in North Sea Continental Shelf. The ICJ re-stated this process in its 2009 Black Sea judgment as being constituted of three stages: first, an equidistance line is provisionally drawn; second, this line is adjusted should relevant circumstances so require; third, the overall equitableness of the boundary is evaluated by assessing the proportionality between the length of the relevant coast and the marine areas appertaining to each state. This thesis analyses each stage of the delimitation process as re-stated in Black Sea. By way of introduction, chapter 1 outlines the relevant legal provisions and the historical evolution of the delimitation process through the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Chapter 2 discusses both the notions of the relevant coast and of the relevant area, and the practical methods for their identification. Since Black Sea, international tribunals have tended to identify the relevant coast and the relevant area prior to establishing a provisional equidistance line. Chapter 3 discusses the issues concerning the drawing of the provisional equidistance line. Chapter 4 examines relevant circumstances and the methods for adjusting an equidistance line. Chapter 5 discusses proportionality. Using doctrinal legal research methodologies, this thesis aims to assess the degree of consistency in the international tribunals’ application of the three-stage delimitation process. It argues that, while great leaps forward have been made since 1969, there is still a number of unresolved issues, in relation to which this thesis endeavours to provide some workable solutions.

Cette recherche aborde la question de l’avis consultatif de la CIJ sur la conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo du 22 juillet 2010 et ses possibles incidences sur la question de la sécession du Québec. Plus précisément, ce mémoire traite de la migration des idées constitutionnelles au sujet des questions d’autodétermination dans les cas kosovar et québécois, en effectuant une analyse comparative des deux situations. Le présent mémoire conclut tout d’abord à un respect du droit international public par la CIJ dans son avis, le Kosovo remplissant les conditions de mise en oeuvre de la sécession remède. Néanmoins, notre recherche conduit à affirmer une impossibilité de transposition de solution du cas kosovar à la problématique québécoise, mais à une possible migration des influences, qui assouplirait la position prise ces dernières années par le Canada, notamment avec la Loi sur la clarté. / This research studies the ICJ advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo delivered on 22 July 2010 and its probable impacts on the question of Quebec’s secession. Specifically, it examines the migration of constitutional ideas concerning the right to self-determination in the cases of Kosovo and Quebec. A comparative analysis of both situations is thereby undertaken. This thesis concludes to a non-violation of general international law by the ICJ in its opinion, Kosovo being an illustration of remedial secession. Nonetheless, our research leads us to assert an impossibility of transposition of the ICJ solution about the former Serbian province to the Quebec issue. However, the case is not closed as a migration of the spirit of the advisory opinion could take place, which would soften the position adopted by Canada, especially with the Clarity Act.

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