The ideas of liberty presented in the important works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and On Liberty (1859), are often viewed as belonging to the same conceptual tradition, that of English liberalism. This thesis is an articulation of the diversity between the theories of liberty expressed by Locke and Mill in the Second Treatise and On liberty. \ am aiming to provide a corrective to the tendency to ignore or to gloss over very significant differences between the two men. The work concentrates on the philosophical aspects of each theory of liberty, arguing that they differ in four respects. These are; definitions of liberty; justifications of liberty; how much liberty and for whom they recommend it, and finally, who they believe threatens liberty and how this threat is to be curbed. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that in terms of these areas Locke and Mill are pursuing different ends. I conclude that Locke and Mill present strikingly different theories of liberty and cannot be thought of as belonging to the one conceptual tradition in terms of the definition, the justification, the prescription and the threat to liberty. Ultimately, I question the value of including Locke and Mill in the one conceptual tradition of liberty solely on the basis that they argue ‘freedom from.’

John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government argues that the ideal form of government is representative. In this paper, I interpret Mill’s argument as a utilitarian argument for a political system with the salient feature of authoritative public participation. Mill argues for this feature in the first three chapters of Representative Government. This argument is interpreted in the context of Mill’s utilitarian views as elaborated in Utilitarianism, with emphasis on Mill’s understanding of pleasure formation and high quality utility.

Thèse--Université de Paris. / "Bibliographie": p. [155]-157.

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Ce travail examine le problème de l'intervention d'un État ou d'un peuple dans les affaires d'un autre tel qu'il fut formulé dans le libéralisme naissant et à partir de la conjoncture ouverte par la Révolution française de 1789. Après un détour par les auteurs du droit des gens, il examine les écrits de Burke et de Godwin afin de donner à voir la nature polémique et les origines révolutionnaires du concept d'intervention. Puis, prenant comme fil directeur l'œuvre de John Stuart Mill, qui s'est penché de manière récurrente sur ce problème, en lui apportant des réponses diverses et contradictoires, il s'efforce d'en montrer l'équivocité. Loin de pouvoir se ramener à un simple chapitre de la théorie de la guerre ou du droit international, la question de l'intervention militaire fut au contraire réfléchie en relation avec l'économie, la politique ou encore la morale - les penseurs libéraux, tels que John Stuart Mill, Benjamin Constant, ou encore Richard Cobden, s'efforçant, dans chacun de ces champs et en faisant circuler les concepts, les maximes et les raisons, d'élaborer un ou des principes de non-intervention. Il propose enfin une nouvelle traduction et une lecture des « Quelques mots sur la non-intervention » de John Stuart Mill, en exhumant la nature dialectique de cet article de 1859. / This study examines the issue of intervention from a State or a people within the affairs of another as formulated in the nascent Liberalism and from the situation brought about by the French Revolution of 1789. After considering the authors of the law of nations, the study examines the writings of Burke and Godwin in order to highlight the controversial nature and revolutionary origins of the concept of intervention. Then, following the work of John Stuart Mill as a guiding theme, a philosopher who has provided diverse and contradictory answers in his recurrent study of this issue, an attempt is made to demonstrate the equivocal nature of intervention. Far from being a simple matter of war theory or international law, the issue of military intervention has on the contrary been considered in relation to economies, politics, and even morals - liberal thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill, Benjamin Constant, and Richard Cobden, having endeavored, in each of these fields and by spreading concepts, maxims and reasons, to elaborate one or several principles of non-intervention. Lastly, a new translation and an interpretation of "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" by John Stuart Mill are proposed by highlighting the dialectical nature of this 1859 article.

Comment rendre compte de la richesse syncrétique, souvent mésestimée, de la pensée politique de John Stuart Mill ? Nous soutenons que celle-ci est cohérente et que sa clé d'unification se trouve dans sa conception du Progrès, conçu à la fois comme nature et comme destination humaine, qui permet de subsumer la diversité de ses théories au sein d'une utopie d'un type nouveau, libérale et centrée sur les conditions de sa production et de son maintien. En ce sens, la Partie I s’attache à identifier les différents apports idéologiques qui nourrissent ses écrits, entre libéralisme, socialisme et conservatisme, ainsi que leurs limites respectives. La Partie II propose le concept de « libéralisme transcendantal » pour décrire la relation et la complémentarité de ces différentes influences au sein d’une doctrine unifiée sous l'hégémonie du libéralisme, promouvant avec exigence l’autonomie humaine à l’échelle individuelle comme à l'échelle collective en s'attachant toujours à ses conditions de possibilité, aux fins du Progrès. La Partie III s'intéresse alors aux ressorts matériels, moraux et politiques de ce Progrès : développement indéfini des individualités et de « l'art de vivre », c'est-à-dire bonheur dynamique, dans un état économique et démographique pourtant « stationnaire », et sous des institutions représentatives vouées à cultiver l'excellence dans le respect du pluralisme. Au terme de cette reconstitution théorique, les Perspectives proposent des éléments pour une refondation de la pensée progressiste, en particulier écologique et éducative, émancipée des clivages partisans contemporains, dans l'esprit de John Stuart Mill. / John Stuart Mill's syncretic political thought is too often misestimated. My work aims to demonstrate that it is though consistent and that its pivotal point lies in Mill's vision of Progress: this one is conceived at the same time as the human nature and the human telos and as such, it unifies his views on education, happiness, social justice, economic stability and the aims and means of the representative government. All these elements build a new kind of utopia, a liberal utopia focused on the conditions of its own advent and preservation. In this perspective, my First Part will sort out which influences nourish Mill's writings, between liberalism, socialism and conservatism – none of these ideologies being completely accurate. Part Two will then theorize “transcendantal liberalism” so as to describe his approach as a unified doctrine polarized by liberalism but always keeping in mind what “liberty” relies on, i.e. the preconditions of individual and collective autonomy. Part Three will stress on which material, moral and political devices are required by such a goal: a steady-state economy and demography, moral growth and the culture of an “Art of Living” and a “religion of Humanity”, and finally the flourishing of a truly pluralist representative government. To conclude, the Perspectives will highlight a few elements inspired by Mill and likely to be useful for the renewal of nowadays ideology of Progress, particularly from an ecological standpoint.

Freedom of speech is under serious threat in the west, primarily in the US with policies and regulations infringing on this core value in democratic societies. Universities form policy in order to silence opinions they find contradictory to their values, causing students and teachers alike to risk academic punishment for statements which normally would be guarded within the First Amendment. The central argument behind these infringments are individuals subjective feelings towards, as one may put it, controversial opinions. The aim of this study is through an argument analysis, illustrate the values of freedom of speech in contrast to the demands of primarily minority groups and their advocates, using respectable philosophers and scientists such as John Stuart Mill to answer the question if infringements are applicable in democracies. The conclusions drawn in this essay based on all relevant arguments concludes the answer to be no; a democracy should not infringe on the freedom of speech to safeguard individuals from negative emotional reactions as a result of any legal speech.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

This thesis focuses on the issue of whether or not the government is ever justified in prohibiting the actions of an individual who is harming herself but not others. I first analyze some of the key historical figures in the paternalism debate and argue that these accounts fail to adequately meet the needs of a modern, pluralistic society. Then, I analyze and critique the nuanced, soft-paternalist strategy put forth by Joel Feinberg. Finally, I defend a version of hard paternalism, arguing that a balancing strategy that examines each action on a case-by-case basis shows all citizens equal, and adequate concern and respect.