Bien que la juridiction inhérente des cours superIeures constitue une notion souvent utilisée par les tribunaux au Canada, plusieurs facettes importantes de cette notion demeurent inconnues et incomprises. Le présent mémoire s'attarde à retracer l'origine et les fondements des pouvoirs inhérents afin d'en expliquer la constitutionnalisation dans l'ordre constitutionnel canadien contemporain. Pour ce faire, nous avons retracé l'essence des pouvoirs inhérents au moyen d'une démarche historique afin d'énoncer une théorie constitutionnelle cohérente des pouvoirs inhérents qui permettra de juger du bien-fondé de leurs nombreuses manifestations contemporaines. L'enchâssement de la juridiction inhérente dans la Constitution canadienne repose sur le statut, la nature et les caractéristiques uniques des cours supérieures. Plus particulièrement, le principe constitutionnel de l'indépendance judiciaire constitue le fondement contemporain de la constitutionnalisation de la juridiction inhérente. Cette constatation permet alors d'avancer l'idée selon laquelle les pouvoirs inhérents nécessaires au maintien de l'indépendance judiciaire des cours supérieures doivent être élevés au rang de normes constitutionnelles supralégislatives. / The inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts is frequently used by the courts in Canada. However, many of its major aspects are still unknown or misunderstood. This paper tries to identify the origins and foundations of the inherent jurisdiction to explain its constitutionalization in contemporary Canadian constitution law. To achieve this purpose, we retrace the essence of the inherent powers by way of an historical approach. This allows us to construct a coherent constitutional theory of the inherent jurisdiction which will be useful to evaluate the legitimacy and appropriateness of its manifold modern uses. The constitutionalization of the inherent jurisdiction rests on the unique status, nature and characteristics of the superior courts in Canada. More specifically, the constitutional principle of judicial independence is the modern foundation of the constitutionalization of the inherent jurisdiction. This assertion allows us to advance the idea that the inherent powers needed to maintain the judicial independence of the superior courts must be elevated to the level of supralegislative norms. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maître en droit". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline. Commentaires du jury : "Le mémoire apporte un point de vue fort éclairant sur un sujet difficile et peu exploré sur un mode systématique".

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / Some digitised pages may appear illegible due to the condition of the original hard copy / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, in which certain provisions of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act were subjected to constitutional review. The outcome of the case was the striking down of certain provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, and the removal of Judge Willem Heath from his position as head of the Unit. The provisions were said to infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, an implicit term of the Constitution of South Africa. This principle affects the extent of the judicial power because of its influence on determining the acceptability of extra-judicial functions. The doctrine of separation of powers is therefore considered in its historical and theoretical context, with particular reference to the way in which it tends to limit or define the role of judges. Following this analysis, the status of institutions supporting constitutional democracy is examined, and the legislation governing Special Investigating Units is compared with that which regulates the office of the Public Protector. As a result, some alternative legislative means of achieving the ends of the Units, namely the combating of state corruption and maladministration, are suggested. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis volg op die uitspraak van die Grondwetlike Hof in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, waarin sekere bepalings van die Wet op Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede en Spesiale Tribunale aan grondwetlike hersiening onderwerp is. Die uitkoms van die saak was dat sekere ongrondwetlike bepalings van die Wet ongeldig verklaar is, en dat Regter Willem Heath van sy posisie as hoof van die Eenheid onthef is. Dit is bevind dat die bepalings die beginsel van skeiding van magte, 'n implisiete term van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, geskend het. As gevolg van sy invloed op die bepaling van aanvaarbaarheid van buite-juridiese funksies, beïnvloed dié beginsel die omvang van die juridiese mag. Die skeiding van magte leerstuk word dus in sy historiese en teoretiese konteks oorweeg, met spesifieke verwysing na die manier waarop dit neig om die rol van regters te beperk of te omskryf. Na hierdie analise word die status ondersoek van instellings wat grondwetlike demokrasie ondersteun, en die wetgewing wat die Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede beheer, vergelyk met dié wat die Openbare Beskermer reguleer. Op grond hiervan word sekere alternatiewe wetgewende metodes voorgestelom die doeleindes van die Eenhede, naamlik die bekamping van staatskorrupsie en wanadministrasie, te bereik.

This thesis challenges some of the current limits to the grounds for judicial review of legislation accepted by most Canadian jurists. More specifically, it makes a common law-based argument in favour of the priority over legislation of principles which are implied from the Imperial Constitution Acts 1867-1982 and which originally derive from the English constitution – namely implied constitutional principles. The argument faces two main interrelated legal objections: Parliamentary sovereignty and the Framers’ intentions. The first objection is rebutted by arguing that Parliamentary sovereignty possesses an ability to change in a way that can incorporate substantive legal limitations. The most prevalent common law-based theories of change to Parliamentary sovereignty suggest that the courts can authoritatively determine if implied constitutional principles can check legislation. The second objection is rebutted by reference to the notion of progressive interpretation as conceived under Hartian and Dworkinian theories of law and adjudication. Under these theories, progressive interpretation is an aspect of the courts’ best overall interpretation of the constitution, which includes implied constitutional principles. Such progressive interpretation can result in these principles constraining legislative authority. Justification of the progressive interpretation of implied constitutional principles can be based on the rule of law from which derive a number of these principles. One plausible conception of the Canadian rule of law is that it rejects the view that implied constitutional principles can prevail when in conflict with legislation. However, the better conception is that, as an attempt to adapt implied constitutional principles to relevant changes in society and to protect their underlying values, the judiciary should interpret these principles as capable of checking legislation to the extent that they form part of the core content of the rule of law. Such a conception and an operation of implied constitutional principles can properly be explained by Hartian or Dworkinian common law-based progressive interpretation of these principles and by their relationship with legislative authority.

Les facteurs historiques, politiques, sociologique ou culturel propres à chacun des deux pays, que nous évoquons dans l’introduction, traduisent une interprétation différente de la notion d’indépendance du juge en France et en Thaïlande. L’exigence d’indépendance attachée à la fonction des juges va de pair en France avec la crainte d’un retour du « gouvernement des juges », et la méfiance à l’égard du corporatisme et du pouvoir des juges. Si l’indépendance du juge est bien établie en France, elle est « une indépendance surveillée ». Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que cette indépendance est moins grande que l’indépendance sans surveillance. En Thaïlande, d’une manière générale, la Justice n’est pas regardée avec méfiance, mais elle a été délaissée. Depuis l’Ancien régime, elle n’a fait l’objet d’une réforme qu’en 1997 où la Constitution thaïlandaise a créé, sans obstacle, selon une interprétation rigide du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs, un vrai corps judiciaire puissant, séparé et isolé du gouvernement et peut-être de la société. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’elle installe une véritable indépendance. L’arbitraire de l’exécutif, qui est la justification de la protection, peut être remplacé par l’arbitraire du corps lui-même. Le statut des juges judiciaires de ces deux pays que nous traitons dans les deux parties de cette thèse exprime cette diversité. / The historical, political, and cultural factors of each country, which we will describe in an introduction, give a different interpretation of judicial independence concept in Thailand and France. The requirement of judicial independence attached to the profession of judge is along with French tradition of fear regarding to return of the "government of judges", corporatism, and the power of judges. If independence of judiciary is well established in France, it would be the "supervised independence". This does not mean that it is less independent than independence without supervision. In Thailand, justice, in general, has not been suspicious by the other powers, but it has been abandoned. The Constitution of Thailand, without obstacle, because of the rigid and strict separation of powers, made Justice which has just been reformed in 1997 since the Ancien Regime, to become a real powerful judiciary, separated and isolated from Government and maybe from society. However, this does not mean that a true independence of judge is established. The arbitrariness of the executive power, which is the justification of protection, can be replaced by the arbitrariness of judge itself. The legal status of judges in both countries which we treat in both parts of this thesis will reflect this diversity.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diogo Rais Rodrigues Moreira.pdf: 1887934 bytes, checksum: 902a7e44e783ee9b9ee96abb92e43d2a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-23 / Is it possible to identify zones of accommodation and conflict between the activity of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ National Council of Justice) and jurisdictional independence? What constitutes these zones? How can they be categorized? The aim of this thesis is to seek answers to these and other questions. Our research is based on the assumption that jurisdictional independence should not be an insurmountable obstacle to the activity of the CNJ, nor should the Council s activity bring about the end of jurisdictional independence. Therefore, this research follows a central thread formed by a series of questions related to the national judiciary branch and the insertion of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça in its structure. We address the relation between jurisdiction and non-jurisdiction and the protection of jurisdictional independence through international norms and through the Brazilian Constitution, with the specific aim of presenting definitions of judicial and jurisdictional independence. We then analyze the decisions of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça that directly address jurisdictional acts. This analysis was based on an initial list of 2.750 normative and disciplinary acts issued by the Conselho Nacional de Justiça, of which only those specifically aimed at jurisdictional decisions were selected. This selection was then organized and categorized according with common features and results found in the acts, leading to the creation of the categories herein referred to as zones of interface and interference. Lastly, the results of the research are interpreted in the light of the definition of jurisdictional independence herein adopted. We thus seek to offer some conclusions about the relationship between the activity of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça and jurisdictional independence, either by means of an interface zone or through direct interference / É possível identificar zonas de conforto e de conflito entre a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) e a independência jurisdicional? Como elas se constituem? Como podem ser categorizadas? Buscar respostas para essas e outras indagações é o objetivo desta tese. Parte-se da premissa de que a independência jurisdicional não deve constituir barreira intransponível para a atuação do CNJ e nem sua atuação poderia ser a derrocada da independência jurisdicional. E, para isso, esta pesquisa segue um fio condutor formado por diversos questionamentos que identifica o Poder Judiciário Nacional e a inserção do Conselho Nacional de Justiça nesta estrutura, abordando a relação entre jurisdição e não jurisdição, bem como, a proteção da independência judicial seja por atos internacionais seja pela Constituição brasileira, com o objetivo específico de apresentar definições de independência judicial e jurisdicional, e por fim, a análise da atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça diante de atos jurisdicionais. Esta análise se iniciou a partir de um rol de 2.750 registros sobre atos normativos e disciplinares do Conselho Nacional de Justiça, dos quais foram selecionados aqueles dirigidos especificamente aos atos jurisdicionais, sendo sistematizados e categorizados de acordo com os seus denominadores em comum e agrupados de acordo com o resultado que produziram, formando o que se denominou de zonas de interface e de interferência. Por fim, a tese apresenta o entrelaçamento dos resultados da pesquisa empírica com a definição de independência jurisdicional com o objetivo de trazer conclusões a respeito deste relacionamento constatado entre a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça e a independência jurisdicional, seja por suas interfaces, seja por suas interferências

There is currently no satisfactory account of how judges of the Supreme Court of India and High Courts in the states are appointed, transferred, impeached or employed postretirement. For a higher judiciary commanding immense public attention, enjoying wide constitutional powers of judicial review, this is a conspicuous gulf in academic literature. This thesis intends to bridge this gulf by providing such an account. Part I extracts the Constituent Assembly Debates pertaining to these four facets of judicial functioning, describes key developments over time and analyses the extant processes in operation today. On this basis it makes three arguments: first, appointments to the higher judiciary and transfer of judges between High Courts follow processes that are indefensible as a matter of constitutional law; second, impeachment operates in an excessively slow and inefficacious manner; third, the pervasiveness of post-retirement employment of judges in government-appointed positions demonstrates inadequate attention to institutional design. Most crucially, each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability or both. This is not a peculiarly Indian problem— in several countries, the values of judicial independence and accountability have been deemed to be in tension, often irreconcilably. Part II tackles this widely articulated tension by providing a conceptual framework to understand these concepts. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary'. Whether indeed the processes governing the four selected facets of judicial functioning in India lead to an effective judiciary is assessed in Part III. Where they are found lacking, appropriate reform is suggested. Such reform is intended to ensure that the selected processes operate in a manner that is justifiable in terms of judicial independence and accountability in principle and is efficacious in practice.

Cette thèse examine le rôle du secteur privé au sein du Système de Gestions des Cours et du Greffe (SGCG) qui a pour objectif de fournir un soutien administratif aux tribunaux judiciaires du Canada. Si, jusqu’à présent, cette tâche revenait au personnel des diverses cours, il est finalement apparu nécessaire de réduire les délais de procédure et d’accroître l’efficacité des tribunaux en sollicitant le secteur privé. C’est ainsi que les gouvernements ont pris l’initiative de moderniser le SGCG en investissant dans la transformation numérique, afin de permettre la numérisation et l’indexation des documents, ainsi que l’automatisation du flux de travail. Au coeur de cette étude nous pouvons identifier un certain mécontentement quant à la manière dont le droit public tend à réglementer les services offerts par le secteur privé aux tribunaux. Plus précisément, cette thèse soutient que la méthode employée par les différents gouvernements (fédéral et provincial) concernant la réglementation des contrats, ne permet pas de faire face à la pression croissante que les acteurs privés exercent sur l’indépendance judiciaire, valeur pourtant fondamentale. Cela s’explique par le fait que cette régulation est trop centralisée, et qu’elle ne tient pas compte des besoins spécifiques à chaque institution et aux projets impliquant le secteur privé. Cette thèse suggère donc de s’appuyer sur des instruments alternatifs – tels que le processus d’acquisition de marchés et les clauses contractuelles qui en découlent – afin de combler les lacunes réglementaires existantes. / This thesis examines the role of the private sector in the delivery of courts and registry management services (“CRMS”) for courts across Canada. CRMS represents a segment of court administration that can also be referred to as court support services. Traditionally, such services have been provided by the courts’ administrative personnel. However, the private sector offers an opportunity to digitize and automate many services. Because the modernization of CRMS is instrumental in reducing procedural delays and increasing the efficiency of our courts, governments across the country have been investing money in technology-driven court administration solutions developed by the private sector. At the heart of this thesis is a dissatisfaction with how public law regulates this privatized segment of court administration. Particularly, this thesis argues that the federal and provincial approaches to the regulation of government contracts are not prepared to address the mounting pressure exerted by private actors on the core value of court administration: judicial independence. Largely, this is because the regulation of government contracts is too centralized and does not account for the specific needs of different institutions and privatization projects. This thesis suggests relying on alternative instruments – such as the procurement process and the resulting contract clauses - to fill the regulatory gaps.

Mémoire de recherche / Le juge est une figure primordiale dans un État de droit chargé d’individualiser la règle de droit lors de différends. C’est aussi un contre-pouvoir chargé de surveiller le législatif et l’exécutif. Pourtant, c’est le pouvoir le plus fragile qui ne bénéficie pas de la légitimité de l’élection. Pour juger, il doit être libre. La liberté est un concept fondateur de nos sociétés de droit et pourtant, c’est un concept bien compliqué à comprendre et analyser. L’histoire de ce mot nous apprend que c’est un concept juridique et jamais absolu, il ne se traduit qu’aux pluriels, assurés toujours par une autorité supérieure. Individuellement, c’est la capacité d’être la cause de ses propres actes, pourtant, la liberté n’est jamais absolue. Nous sommes aussi déterminés, c’est-à-dire qu’il existe des externalités qui viennent être la cause de nos actes. Mais, alors, qu’en est-il pour le juge, est-il libre ? Est-il déterminé ? Dans sa pratique, la liberté du juge se traduit par l’indépendance judiciaire, assurée tout autant que contrainte par les institutions. Dans sa pratique le juge est relativement libre de qualifier et d’apprécier les faits sous réserve du contrôle des tribunaux. En outre, le juge est aussi une personne et, à ce titre, il est déterminé tout autant que n’importe quelle personne, il possède donc des biais et des émotions qui vont interagir avec sa pratique de juge et, potentiellement, venir le déterminer dans les réponses qu’il offre. Alors que les services de cyberjustice, particulièrement les outils d’aides à la décision, entrent dans l’office du juge, comment ces technologies s'apprêtent à bousculer son indépendance judiciaire et sa liberté ? Tantôt ces outils son contraignant pour lui, tantôt ils le libèrent et lui permettent de se concentrer sur ses motifs. / The judge is an essential figure in a state governed by the rule of law, responsible for individualizing the law in the event of disputes. They are also a counter-power responsible for monitoring the legislative and executive branches. However, judicial authority is the most fragile power since it does not benefit from the legitimacy of the election. To judge, they must be free. Freedom is a founding concept of our societies and yet it is a very complicated concept to understand and analyse. The history of this word teaches us that it is a legal concept and never absolute, it can only be translated in the plural, always assured by a higher authority. Individually, it is the ability to be the cause of one's own actions, yet freedom is never absolute. We are also determined, i.e. there are externalities that cause our actions. But, then, what about the judges, are they free ? Are they determined? In practice, the judges’ freedom is reflected in judicial independence, which is both guaranteed and constrained by the institutions. In practice, the judges are relatively free to qualify and assess the facts subject to the control of the courts. Moreover, the judges are also human beings and as such are determined as much as any other person, and therefore has biases and emotions that will interact with his practice as judges and potentially determine them in the answers he/she offers. As cyberjustice services, particularly decision support tools, enter the judge's office, how are these technologies about to disrupt his judicial independence and freedom ? Sometimes these tools are restrictive for them, sometimes they free them and allow them to concentrate on reasons.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)

The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable. The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)