Many studies have been completed on factors affecting judicial decisions. Studies have focused on civil rights cases, economic cases, criminal cases, sexual discrimination and obscenity cases, but no work has specifically looked at religious liberty cases. This work examines the factors affecting United States Courts of Appeals judges' decision-making in religious liberty cases. I hypothesize that gender, race, religious background, prior judicial experience, circuit, region and litigant status will all influence the way judges vote in religious liberty cases. The explanatory power of this study is relatively low, but the results indicate that judges follow the law when making decisions in religious liberty cases.

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Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

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O presente trabalho examina a amplitude do fenômeno do Processo Judicial Eletrônico e as perspectivas de resposta à sociedade com relação à razoável duração do processo e sua celeridade pela utilização dos meios eletrônicos. Com este objetivo, analisa as possibilidades de acesso à justiça e os desafios do desenvolvimento de um novo método que permita aperfeiçoar a participação dos sujeitos processuais para que os escopos jurisdicionais sejam plenamente atingidos. Neste sentido, observa as reconfigurações que as opções políticas realizadas a partir do início deste século engendram, tanto nos princípios processuais em face às garantias constitucionais, quanto na jurisdição e suas interdependências com outros aspectos do direito processual civil. Subsidiariamente, contextualiza o desenvolvimento da atuação estatal no ciberespaço, as estratégias formuladas e a inserção do Poder Judiciário nesta seara. Ao concluir, verificar-se-á que o Processo Judicial Eletrônico é um método em construção que, já dentro do caráter atual de forma autorizada pela Lei nº 11.419/06, quando complementada pela legislação e regulamentação correlata, possibilita maior transparência e participação, tendente a prover efetividade à prestação jurisdicional na sociedade pós-moderna. / This paper investigates the extent of the digital process phenomenon and the perspectives of its impact on the society concerning the examination of the case in a reasonable period of time and its celerity upon the employment of electronic means. In view of this, this study aims to analyze the possibilities of access to justice and the challenges imposed by the development of a new method which enables the improvement in the participation of all related parties in the judicial proceedings so as to fully accomplish the scope of the jurisdictional function. As follows, it examines the reconfiguration engendered by the political options which have been taking place since the beginning of this century both in the procedural principles in light of constitutional guarantees and in the jurisdiction and on its correlation with other aspects of civil procedure. Alternatively, this dissertation contextualizes the progression of the governmental interaction on the cyberspace, the conceived strategies and the insertion of the Judiciary in this field. In conclusion, it will be possible to establish that the digital process is still under development, but even under its current status, as authorized by Law 11,419/06 and complemented by other corresponding regulations, is nonetheless able to ensure more transparency and a higher level of participation, tending to provide effectiveness to the jurisdictional function in the postmodern society.

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My dissertation examines the influence of partisanship in decision making on redistricting in state commissions and judicial rulings. My central questions are twofold. First, do Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges engage in decision making that favors their respective parties? Second, what is the extent of partisan voting on bipartisan state redistricting commissions? These issues possess considerable substantive importance. Some states have considered moving redistricting responsibility out of the legislature and into state commissions, while some political scientists and legal scholars have suggested more vigorous court involvement in the regulation of redistricting. Implicit in many of these arguments is the assumption that federal courts and state commissions will act as neutral arbiters. But, very little social science research exists on the behavior of these institutions. My investigation combines quantitative and qualitative evidence, using interviews I conducted of federal judges and redistricting commissioners across the country, together with statistical analyses of court decisions and commission votes. I have 138 court cases from 1981 to 2006, totaling 414 observations or judicial votes. I argue that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor partisan maximizers. Rather, federal judges act as constrained partisans. Judges do not necessarily favor their own party's plans in court cases anymore than they do plans created by both parties under divided government. But, when a federal judge reviews a redistricting plan drawn up by a different party, and where the judge's own party is the victim of partisan line-drawing, she will be more attuned to issues of unfairness in the process. Under circumstances where Supreme Court precedent is unclear, partisan cues become more salient for the judge, increasing the probability she will rely on partisan influences to declare the plan invalid. Interestingly enough, these partisan effects in judicial voting vanish in cases where the Supreme Court delineates unambiguous rules, such as litigation concerning 1 person 1 vote equal population claims. My analysis of state redistricting commissions, based on the votes of commissioners and in-depth interviews with them, illustrates that commissions, like courts, are also not immune to partisan decision-making. Partisan factors tend to be the overriding concern of commissioners. / text

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

O presente trabalho examina a amplitude do fenômeno do Processo Judicial Eletrônico e as perspectivas de resposta à sociedade com relação à razoável duração do processo e sua celeridade pela utilização dos meios eletrônicos. Com este objetivo, analisa as possibilidades de acesso à justiça e os desafios do desenvolvimento de um novo método que permita aperfeiçoar a participação dos sujeitos processuais para que os escopos jurisdicionais sejam plenamente atingidos. Neste sentido, observa as reconfigurações que as opções políticas realizadas a partir do início deste século engendram, tanto nos princípios processuais em face às garantias constitucionais, quanto na jurisdição e suas interdependências com outros aspectos do direito processual civil. Subsidiariamente, contextualiza o desenvolvimento da atuação estatal no ciberespaço, as estratégias formuladas e a inserção do Poder Judiciário nesta seara. Ao concluir, verificar-se-á que o Processo Judicial Eletrônico é um método em construção que, já dentro do caráter atual de forma autorizada pela Lei nº 11.419/06, quando complementada pela legislação e regulamentação correlata, possibilita maior transparência e participação, tendente a prover efetividade à prestação jurisdicional na sociedade pós-moderna. / This paper investigates the extent of the digital process phenomenon and the perspectives of its impact on the society concerning the examination of the case in a reasonable period of time and its celerity upon the employment of electronic means. In view of this, this study aims to analyze the possibilities of access to justice and the challenges imposed by the development of a new method which enables the improvement in the participation of all related parties in the judicial proceedings so as to fully accomplish the scope of the jurisdictional function. As follows, it examines the reconfiguration engendered by the political options which have been taking place since the beginning of this century both in the procedural principles in light of constitutional guarantees and in the jurisdiction and on its correlation with other aspects of civil procedure. Alternatively, this dissertation contextualizes the progression of the governmental interaction on the cyberspace, the conceived strategies and the insertion of the Judiciary in this field. In conclusion, it will be possible to establish that the digital process is still under development, but even under its current status, as authorized by Law 11,419/06 and complemented by other corresponding regulations, is nonetheless able to ensure more transparency and a higher level of participation, tending to provide effectiveness to the jurisdictional function in the postmodern society.

This is a Master´s Degree Dissertation that agrees with the premise that Law cannot be dissociated from Moral and with the conclusion that leads to the path to rationalize moral values in the juridical atmosphere. In that way, constitutional jurisdiction attempts its objectives and legitimates itself upon social medium by using juridical argumentation´s methods, which must be particularly respected, in Brazil, in the sphere of the analysis of administrative improbity´s acts. At the same time, Constitution is not only the main juridical text of a given State, endowed with normative power and imperative norms, but represents, fundamentally, the great variety of mankind knowledge´s lines, as well as it is guided by a truly axiological sense. Based in that post-positivist context, this Master´s Degree Dissertation comments about the Administrative Improbity Law (Brazilian Federal Law nº 8.429/1992) by offering, initially, a general panorama of the above-mentioned law; soon after, it specifies the object of study with its species and penalties. Finally, this work shows study about the necessity to establish a procedure tending to investigate the real occurrence of an improbity act and, in that way, it is put forward another contribution, intending to rationalize the fixation of Administrative Improbity Law s sanctions, together with the application of Proportionality. / Trata-se de Dissertação de Mestrado que concorda com a premissa de que o Direito não pode ser dissociado da Moral e com a conclusão que conduz ao caminho de racionalizar a inserção dos valores morais na atmosfera jurídica. A jurisdição constitucional, neste sentido, cumpre seu papel e se legitima perante o meio social quando utiliza métodos de argumentação jurídica, os quais devem ser particularmente respeitados, no Brasil, na esfera de análise de atos de improbidade administrativa. Paralelamente, a Constituição não é apenas o principal texto jurídico de um Estado, dotado de força normativa e normas imperativas, como também representa, fundamentalmente, as mais diversas linhas do conhecimento humano, além do que, é norteada por um verdadeiro sentido axiológico. Baseada em tal contexto póspositivista, esta dissertação discorre a respeito da Lei da Improbidade Administrativa (Lei nº 8.429/1992) oferecendo, inicialmente, um panorama geral do referido diploma normativo para, logo depois, especificar o objeto de estudo nas modalidades e nas sanções nela contidas. Finalmente, o presente trabalho mostra estudo a respeito da necessidade de ser estabelecido um procedimento tendente a apurar a efetiva ocorrência de atos ímprobos para que, passo seguinte, seja apresentada outra contribuição, no sentido de racionalizar a aplicação das penalidades da Lei da Improbidade Administrativa, com o necessário uso da Regra da Proporcionalidade.