This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

<p>The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates.</p><p>The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.</p>

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Andrea Scarantino, Tim O'Keefe, George Rainbolt, committee members. Electronic text (38 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 18, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 38).

L’objet de cette thèse est d’engager une discussion concernant l’épistémologie de la discipline rhétorique et de formuler des propositions visant à la refonder. En partie spéculative, la réflexion que je mène à partir des travaux de Chaïm Perelman notamment, rattache cette antique discipline à la « raison pratique ». Une raison agissante qui donne l’occasion d’assumer et d’affronter l’indétermination du monde – sans pour autant faire de cette indétermination un chaos, ni en prendre ombrage pour sombrer dans le relativisme. Dans cette perspective, la rhétorique se trouve conçue comme un dispositif propre à accompagner les hommes dans le difficile exercice d’une liberté citoyenne. Une liberté au sens fort, ancrée dans la pratique du politique, telle que l’entendaient les Anciens. Je m’efforce tout d’abord de montrer que, dès l’origine, la rhétorique a représenté une compétence nouvelle, mais aussi une occasion unique de dire, d’habiter et de séculariser le monde. Ma démarche consiste donc à réfléchir l’émergence de la rhétorique dans la Grèce ancienne. À ce titre, j’analyse la fonction politique, sociale, symbolique, attribuée à la parole dans cette Cité démocratique dont elle a accompagné l’invention. Parole qui s’est vue accorder une place inégalée : comme support et comme condition de l’action citoyenne. Pourtant, force est de constater que, malgré ce succès, la rhétorique a très vite été dénoncée comme un art de tromper, de mentir, de dissimuler ses lacunes. Des générations de philosophes, d’hommes d’Église ou de scientifiques se sont attachés à démonter son fonctionnement, sa dynamique, à décrier son enseignement et, finalement, à souhaiter son évincement. C’est pourquoi, je m’intéresse aux critiques qui ont été adressées à la parole rhétorique depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’au XIXe siècle. Par là, j’entends donner une vision nouvelle de cette antique « fonction » du langage, par-delà la synthèse de ses caricatures. En outre, mon propos s’attache à mettre en lumière les lieux communs sur lesquels se fonde notre relation au discours. Dans une optique qui va d’Aristote à Perelman, je défends l’idée selon laquelle la rhétorique ne constitue pas (comme on pourrait le penser) une méthode pour apprendre à vivre ensemble dans la paix des mots, mais, avant tout, une façon de pratiquer la critique avec et contre l’autre : l’adversaire. Et ceci afin de prendre des décisions dans le monde contingent des affaires humaines. Or, c’est justement au titre de sa fonction agonistique que la rhétorique a perdu sa place et son sens dans nos démocraties. Face à cela, l’enjeu de mon travail est de mettre en évidence, après Perelman, l’existence d’une raison tout à la fois une et plurielle. En effet, la multiplicité des voies possibles, leur antagonisme, n’est pas le signe d’une raison anarchique et inconséquente, le signe d’une raison hantée par la déraison. Il s’agit, au contraire, d’une chance offerte à la raison de se mettre à l’épreuve et de risquer la liberté. Du reste, perdre cette dimension agonistique, la dénoncer, la condamner comme irrationnelle, ainsi que le font les théories normatives de l’argumentation, revient à manifester la coupure entre le langage et les ressources critiques de la rhétoriques qui permettent de faire de nos prises de parole un moyen et une ressource de l’émancipation.

The aim of the current thesis was to explore the possible link between System Justification Theory (SJT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) in gender context and from the perspective of intergroup relations in a sample of Turkish university students. Having recently attracted research attention, the relation between the two theories is based on the effect of mortality salience (MS) on the tendency to justify the existing system. Accordingly, three research questions were investigated to see whether (1) ambivalent sexism toward women (hostile and benevolent sexism / HS and BS, respectively) and gender-group favoritism (on both explicit and implicit measures / expGF and impGF, respectively) were related to gender-specific system justification (GSJ), and whether (2) gender and (3) MS moderated the relation of GSJ to ambivalent sexism and gender-group favoritism. Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that (1) GSJ would predict HS, BS, expGF, and impGF, and that these predictions would be stronger (2) among women than among men and (3) when mortality is made salient as compared to when it is not. The hypotheses were tested with 185 participants (86 men, 99 women) who completed a questionnaire package including the demographic information form, GSJ Scale, MS manipulation, Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, and a scale measuring expGF along with a computer-administered task for impGF. The results revealed that higher levels of GSJ predicted higher levels of benevolent and hostile attitudes toward women as well as higher levels of explicit ingroup favoritism and lower levels of favoritism toward women. Only GSJ &ndash / HS and GSJ &ndash / expGF relationships were moderated by gender. The moderating role of MS was not observed in any of the four relationships. However, GSJ scores were found to be unevenly distributed across MS conditions, thereby, casting doubt on the reliability of the results concerning the moderating role of MS. The findings, as well as the contributions and limitations of the study, were discussed.

This thesis focuses primarily on the question ”why is freedom of speech valuable in a democratic context?” I argue that it is problematic that free-dom of speech takes for granted and that the main question therefore is absent in current political science research, in legal texts, and in public discourse. I also argue that in democratic states the focus, regarding freedom of speech, is often on its boundaries and limits rather than on its justification. But it is highly problematic to find and establish its limits without dis-cussion why freedom of speech is desirable in the first place. The thesis poses two questions. The first concerns how freedom of speech is justified by the five strongest available arguments. I analyze the arguments and conclude that they justify freedom of speech differently but that they are similar in one aspect. Freedom of speech is not primarily justified as an individual right. It is rather justified in terms of the public good. The second question asks if we can reach a better understanding of the central arguments. I argue that the arguments have something in common; all of them justify freedom of speech with reference to a common value. I argue that this common value is what I call, a “reliable communication process”. All five arguments claim that freedom of speech is valuable because it promotes a reliable communication process. This process is reliable in terms of its capacity to create a pluralistic public discourse that exposes citizens to ideas and perspectives that they would not have chosen in advance. This study results in the following findings. First, that freedom of speech is valuable in a democratic context because the reliable communication process supports the central democratic value of the enlightened understanding of the democratic citizen. Secondly, that I can give a principled reason for the boundaries of freedom of speech. This means that, according to the arguments, there are reasons to abolish or limit freedom of speech if the reliable communication process is damaged or absent, for example in case of war, anarchy, or violent circumstances. Third, that there are strong reasons in support of a public service media, and greater state intervention in media politics. One strong reason for that conclusion is that a public service media can ensure a pluralistic communication in society and counteract information conformity and intolerance among the members of society.

Direct taxation is an area which has not been harmonized entirely within the European Community. Nevertheless, the ECJ has in its case law stated that even though direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they may not exercise that competence by breaching EC law. At the same time the EC Treaty provides certain exceptions in the form of justifications for national measures resulting in such breach of EC Law. The justification grounds provided by the EC Treaty are, however, limited and general and not suitable for justifying tax measures. That is why the rule of reason has played such an important role within the area of direct taxation. The rule of reason made it possible to in-voke justification grounds that were not expressly mentioned in the EC Treaty. Since the list of justifying grounds, not provided by the EC Treaty, is open-ended, Member States have been invoking several different justifying grounds which were suitable for tax measures. One of those justification grounds which has been used the most is the preservation of the cohesion of the national tax system. The first time the cohesion of a national tax system was brought forward as a justifying reason for a restrictive measure was in the Bachmann case. There the ECJ held that the Belgian legislation could be justified on the ground of the cohesion of the national tax system. However, the ECJ has been applying the cohesion justification very restrictively and never accepted it as a valid justification ground after the Bachmann case. What the ECJ has done in subsequent cases is to develop the meaning of the principle and adding new criteria which must be fulfilled in order for the cohesion justification to be successfully invoked. However, during this course the ECJ has been very unclear and inconsistent, harming legal certainty, which taxpayers are supposed to expect. Even in the doctrine, authors have been questioning the validity of the cohesion justification due to the ECJ’s reluctance to accept it again. In connection with recent case law concerning cross-border dividend taxation, voices have been heard, demanding the ECJ to address the cohesion justification once more in order to set out clear boundaries for its application and to disperse the current legal uncer-tainty regarding the matter. As a consequence the aim of this paper is to analyze the appli-cation of the cohesion justification to cross-border dividend situations from a legal certainty perspective. As becomes clear from analyzing recent cross-border dividend cases, the ECJ seems to have departed from earlier established criteria and a new line of thought seems to direct the development towards the introduction and application of new criteria. Conclusively, we have found that the application of the cohesion justification by the ECJ has been very inconsistent and that this inconsistency has led to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty, making it difficult to predict the outcomes of future cases. Therefore, we conclude that the ECJ should take the opportunity, which has presented itself in recent cases concerning cross-border dividend taxation, to clarify the cohesion justification and set out clear definitions for how to apply it.

The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates. The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.

The claim of my dissertation is that some basic concepts are required for perception. Non-basic concepts, we acquire, and I give an account as to how that process changes our perception. Suppose you are looking at the Mona Lisa. It might seem that you can perceive a lot more shades of color and a lot more shapes than for which you possess precise concepts. I argue against this. For every color or shape in appearance you have the ability to categorize it as that color or shape. It’s just that this is done by your sensory system prior to appearance. I argue that empirical studies show this. Blindsighted patients, for instance, are blind in part of their visual field. But they can use color and shape information received through the blind portion. I take this, along with other studies, to show that once you perceive a color or shape, it has already been categorized. I then argue that we perceive only low-level properties like colors and shapes. For in-stance, we don’t perceive high-level kind properties like being a table or being a wren. I do think that wrens or tables might look different to you after you become disposed to recognize them. Some take this to show that being a wren or being a table can be represented in your perception. I argue that this inference does not follow. If you are not disposed to recognize wrens, but we track the attention of someone who is, and we get you to attend to wrens in that same way, your visual phenomenology might be exactly the same as theirs. But there is no reason to think that it represents a wren. After all, you lack a recognitional disposition for wrens. I take this and other arguments to show that we perceive only low-level properties like colors and shapes.

The claim of my dissertation is that some basic concepts are required for perception. Non-basic concepts, we acquire, and I give an account as to how that process changes our perception. Suppose you are looking at the Mona Lisa. It might seem that you can perceive a lot more shades of color and a lot more shapes than for which you possess precise concepts. I argue against this. For every color or shape in appearance you have the ability to categorize it as that color or shape. It’s just that this is done by your sensory system prior to appearance. I argue that empirical studies show this. Blindsighted patients, for instance, are blind in part of their visual field. But they can use color and shape information received through the blind portion. I take this, along with other studies, to show that once you perceive a color or shape, it has already been categorized. I then argue that we perceive only low-level properties like colors and shapes. For in-stance, we don’t perceive high-level kind properties like being a table or being a wren. I do think that wrens or tables might look different to you after you become disposed to recognize them. Some take this to show that being a wren or being a table can be represented in your perception. I argue that this inference does not follow. If you are not disposed to recognize wrens, but we track the attention of someone who is, and we get you to attend to wrens in that same way, your visual phenomenology might be exactly the same as theirs. But there is no reason to think that it represents a wren. After all, you lack a recognitional disposition for wrens. I take this and other arguments to show that we perceive only low-level properties like colors and shapes.