This paper explores the apparent contradiction between Rwanda’s impressive and internationally-recognized development in physical, economic and social conditions largely driven by the Kagame’s administration policies and the pervasive human rights violations also resulting from government policy. The author asks the question whether the nation – two decades removed from the 1994 genocide which resulted in the death of 800,000 people in 100 days – is ready and capable of transitioning to a political system and set of policies that value human rights and economic development equally, and whether that transition would reduce the risk of future unrest and violence.

Rwanda is a small resource poor country in East Africa that has experienced almost two decades’ worth of significant growth following a genocide that claimed almost 10% of the country’s population. This paper explores the role of positive autonomy in the countries path to development hoping to demonstrate that countries that are ready to pursue independent policy initiatives ought to be encouraged to do so by their international partners. Positive autonomy has three defining characteristics; the ability of a country to pursue its own internally driven policy choices, especially in the face of external opposition but not necessarily in the face of opposition, “ownership” of a community over policy developments that affect them, i.e. their involvement in the administration of policy, and lastly, the ability of a country to reject policy propositions from the outside. Negative autonomy would be a lack of two or more of those conditions. Using this model, I seek to show that these three characteristics have been pursued by Rwanda as a result of its pre-genocide history. I also seek to show that these three characteristics have played a vital role in the development of Rwanda by allowing the government to pursue innovative strategies outside of international norms. To demonstrate this conclusion, I first look to the pre and post-colonial histories of Rwanda in order to examine the role of negative autonomy, seeking to build a case that demonstrates its lasting impact in Rwanda’s political character. I then examine an extreme case of negative autonomy in the case of the CFA monetary union followed by an extended examination of a clear case of positive autonomy in Rwanda and the benefits and failures it has produced. I then briefly examine the relationship between development aid and influence also demonstrating that Rwanda’s position on development aid mirrors its position on positive autonomy in general. Finally, I briefly examine three different examples of positive autonomy in Rwanda as a supplement to the extended example to demonstrate that some of the biggest policy initiatives undertaken by the Rwandan government are either the result of positive autonomy, are successful because of positive autonomy or can be drastically improved by a better implementation of positive autonomy. I hope that this research can be seen as a fresh lens for examining the relationship between weak and powerful states to validate the position that more autonomy for weaker states in their decision-making processes can produce much more successful results in their development drives.

Le 22 juin 1994, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU vote la résolution 929 autorisantle déploiement d’une force multinationale humanitaire, neutre et impartiale au Rwandaayant pour mission de mettre fin aux massacres. Concrètement, c’est la France, àl’initiative de ce projet, qui va assurer le commandement de la mission dénomméeOpération Turquoise. Celle-ci se heurte à l’opposition des rebelles tutsis du FrontPatriotique Rwandais, aux réserves des organisations humanitaires mais elle reçoit lesoutien appuyé du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais hutu. L’Opération Turquoisesuscite surtout une vague d’accusations dans la presse française, le président FrançoisMitterrand et les militaires français étant accusés de « complicité de génocide », voire de« participation au génocide ». Ces accusations perdurent et reviennent régulièrementdepuis plus de vingt ans, relayées par des journalistes qui disent avoir découvert puisrévélé « l’inavouable » rôle de la France au Rwanda.Cette étude analyse les enquêtes journalistiques menées de 1994 à 2014 et lesconfronte aux documents confidentiels et secret-défense issus des archives américaines,françaises, rwandaises et onusiennes, ainsi qu’à la stratégie militaire mise en oeuvredurant l’Opération Turquoise. Elle permet ainsi d’identifier les sources sur lesquellesreposent ces accusations et d’en évaluer le bien-fondé. Ce faisant, elle met en évidence lafaçon dont la recherche s’est concentrée sur le génocide au détriment de la lutte arméeinitiée par le FPR de 1990 à juillet 1994, laissant de côté des aspects essentiels à lacompréhension de la tragédie rwandaise. / On the 22nd June 1994, the UN Security Council passes the resolution 929authorising the deployment of a multinational humanitarian, neutral and impartial force toRwanda having as its mission to put an end to the massacres. In concrete terms, it isFrance, on initiative of this project, who goes to carry out the command of the missionnamed Operation Turquoise. This comes up against the opposition of the Tutsis rebels ofthe Rwandan Patriotic Front, to the reservations of the humanitarian organisations but itreceives the backup support of the acting Rwandan Hutu government. OperationTurquoise incites above all a wave of accusations in the French press, with the PresidentFrançois Mitterand and the French military soldiers being accused of 'complicity ingenocide', even of taking part in the genocide. These accusations have endured and havebeen regularly coming back for more than twenty years, relayed by journalists who claimto have discovered then revealed the shameful role of France in RwandaThis study analyses the journalistic inquiries led from 1994 to 2014 and comparesthem with confidential secret defence documents stemming from American, French,Rwandan and UN records, as well as the military strategy put in place during OperationTurquoise. It also allows identification of the sources on which these accusations lie andevaluation of their validity. In so doing, it brings to the fore the way in which the researchhas focused on the genocide to the detriment of the armed struggle initiated by the RPFfrom 1990 to July 1994, leaving aside essential aspects in the comprehension of theRwandan tragedy.