[pt] Nesse trabalho foi realizado um estudo cinético do revenido de reações do aço de baixa liga (AISI 1050) usando a dilatometria não isotérmica. Os parâmetros cinéticos do primeiro e terceiro estado do revenido (aqui foram nomeados como processos I e II ) foram calculados assumindo que as reações obedecem ao modelo cinético de Johnson--Mehl--Avrami--Kolmogorov (JMAK) . Os formalismos mediante os quais os parâmetros cinéticos (E, n, Ko) são calculados é apresentado. Foram usados cinco formalismos para realizar o estudo . Três destes formalismos estão embasados em diferentes aproximações da integral da temperatura, um na regra de adição e um destes não usa nenhuma aproximação para o calculo. Os intervalos de confiança dos parâmetros também foram calculados. O resultado mostra que os valores calculados coincidem independentemente do método usado. Além disso, não dependem da temperatura ou da fração transformada. Conclui-se que neste caso ocorreu um processo com saturação de sítios. / [en] In this paper we present a kinetic study of the reactions of tempering in low-alloy steel (AISI 1050), using the non-isothermal dilatometry. The kinetic parameters of the first and third state of the tempering (here were named as processes I and II) were calculated assuming that the reactions follow the kinetic model of Johnson - Mehl - Avrami - Kolmogorov (JMAK). The calculation of the parameters was not done by setting any model. The formality by which the kinetic parameters (E, n, Ko) are calculated was presented. Five formalisms have been used mainly for the study. Three of them are based on different approximations of the integral of temperature. Another method were based on addition rule .Finally the last method does not use any other approach to the calculation. The result shows that the calculated values are very similar and these values are independent of the method used. Also, do not depend on temperature or transformed fraction .In this study it was concluded that this case happened a process with saturation of sites. During the study the confidence intervals of the parameters were calculated.

This thesis examines the nature and dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations during the Cold War under the leadership of U.S. President Richard Nixon, his adviser Henry Kissinger, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran. This revisionist account critically examines the popular view of Mohammad Reza Shah as a mere instrument of American strategies of containment during the Cold War. Relying on recently declassified American documents, British government papers, and the diaries, memoirs and oral histories of Iranian actors, this thesis restores agency to the shah as an autonomous Cold War actor and suggests that Iran evolved from a client to a partner of the United States under the Nixon Doctrine. This partnership was forged during Nixon’s first term in office between 1969 and 1972, as the United States embraced a policy of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf region. Thanks to a long-standing friendship with the president, the shah was able to exercise extraordinary influence in the Nixon White House. This partnership reached its peak during Nixon’s second term as the United States supported Iran’s regional primacy against the challenge from Iraq. The shah drew Nixon and Kissinger into Iran’s secret war against Iraq in Kurdistan in 1972, by portraying Iran’s long-standing regional conflict with Iraq as a Cold War confrontation with the Soviet-backed Ba’th regime in Baghdad. When the shah unilaterally decided to abandon the Kurds in a deal with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger had little choice but to acquiesce, despite the personal embarrassment and domestic recriminations that followed. The U.S.-Iran partnership declined following Watergate and Nixon’s resignation in 1974. In spite of the best efforts of the shah and Kissinger, between 1974 and 1976 the United States and Iran were unable to reach an agreement on U.S. nuclear exports to Iran. President Gerald Ford tried to impose a discriminatory nuclear agreement on Iran that was rejected by the shah because it violated Iran’s national sovereignty. Under Ford, the United States reverted to treating Iran as a client rather a partner of the United States.

Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United States keep its edge against the other world superpower. Most historians point to the similarities between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets. This influence is strong in their first works written at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German émigrés. This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances against the Soviet Union.

This MA thesis titled as - India-U.S. Relations in the Late 1960s and in the First Half of the 1970s - focuses on mutual relations of the U.S. on one side and India on the other. It elaborates various events, which influenced these relations during the late 1960s and in the first half ot the 1970s. The result of this work is the confirmation that the U.S., in its foreign policy strategy, strictly followed the principle of realpolitik. Thanks to that their interests, however, often collided with those of India. Its effort of rapprochment with the PRC, during which Pakistan played an important role as the main communication channel between both countries, was a 'thorn in the side' of India's top officials, including its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The U.S. foreign policy, which was mainly in hands of the National Security Advisor of President Richard Nixon Henry Kissinger, had to logically prefer an alliance with Pakistan. This, of course, was not welcomed by India because these two Asian countries waged several wars against each other and had strained relations since their birth. Thus, in spite of the fact that India might seem as the best American partner, given its strong democratic principles, the opposite was true. Nixon/Kissinger, in defiance of all obstacles, did not relent and remained firm...

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This thesis is a study of national security decision making in the Ford Administration. The subject for study is the Kissinger- Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear age and the means by which to preserve detente. An examination of the substantive policy differences will be preceded by an examination of the conceptual disagreements between the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of international politics. Studies on decision making in intemational politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception of the role that the United States should have in the international system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the preservation of peace. After having defined the theoretical differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues in international politics, an analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's conception of the international system. Policy differences between the two will be shown to have evolved out of disagreements over policy goals, and not policy implementation. Any study of individual decision making in defense and foreign affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of issues. Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy goals when new leadership emerges with which they are uncomfortable. It will be shown, through an analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that foreign nations expressed concern for the outcome of this policy split. In particular, it will be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union. In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach a compromise on issues of policy because of funamental differences between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition of the national security in the nuclear age and the negotiating strategy that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations. These differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that each Secretary had on the nature of the international system. The study of their individual perceptions will help to give one an understanding as to why the policy disagreements made compromise impossible.

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This thesis reviews the significance of the 1969 Japan-US Summit between Prime Minister Satii Eisaku and President Richard Nixon in light of official documents that have been disclosed in Japan since 2010 and in the United States since the 1990s. Based on newly available sources, this thesis shows that the 1969 Summit should be considered a Japanese-led initiative with two aims: firstly, to announce a deadline for Okinawa's return with all nuclear weapons removed; and secondly, to reform the Japan-US security treaty system without repeating the kind of outright revision concluded in 1960. The Japanese plan to reform the security treaty system involved simplifying the prior consultation formula by making a public commitment to the security of South Korea of sufficient strength that the United States would agree to the dissolution of the 1960 secret 'Korea Minute'. The Japanese Government achieved its first aim but only partially succeeded in its second. Whilst the return of Okinawa was announced, the status of US bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan continued to be governed by an elaborate web of agreements, public and secret, which damaged public confidence and hampered an improvement in relations between Japan and its neighbouring countries. This thesis shows that commonly held academic opinions about the 1969 Summit are incorrect. Firstly, there was no quid pro quo in which Japan linked its security to South Korea in exchange for Okinawa: both these outcomes were in fact Japanese objectives at the beginning of the summit preparations. Secondly, the success of the summit did not depend on 'backchannel' negotiations between Wakaizumi Kei and Henry Kissinger: it is likely that an announcement on Okinawa's reversion would have been achieved in 1969 even if preparations for the summit had been left to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the US State Department. Word Limit: Approx. 98,000 words, excluding Bibliography

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