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Under 1960 och 1970-talen grep militären makten i en rad latinamerikanska länder. Uruguays förvandling från ”Sydamerikas Schweiz” till en av de hårdaste diktaturerna i regionen skedde inte i isolering utan under en längre process där utomstående aktörer även spelade en avgörande roll. Denna uppsats använder en rad nyligen offentliggjorda amerikanska och brasilianska dokument för att visa hur dessa två länder, ibland på egen hand och ibland med viss koordinering, påverkade Uruguay under den kritiska perioden då landets militär tog makten i landet. / During the 1960s and 1970s, the military seized power in several Latin American countries. Uruguay's transformation from "the Switzerland of South America" to one of the harshest dictatorships in the region did not happen isolation, but during a longer process in which outside actors also played a crucial role. This essay uses a range of recently declassified American and Brazilian documents to demonstrate how these two countries, sometimes independently and sometimes with some coordination, influenced Uruguay during the critical period when the country's military took control of the country.

The 1972 Paris Peace Talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho brought the American involvement in the Vietnam War to a close by early 1973. The main sticking points theretofore were stipulations in draft cease-fire agreements allowing Northern troops to remain in the South and the National Liberation Front's participation in South Vietnam's government. President of South Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu adamantly opposed both proposed stipulations lest his power be diluted. Thus, Kissinger had to broker a diplomatic agreement between Thieu and Le Duc Tho which was acceptable to US foreign policy viz. “peace with honor.”

Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / This paper discusses the Linebacker II bombing campaign of the United States in North Vietnam, more famously known as the "Christmas Bombings." It examines the campaign as an attempt to compel North Vietnam to accept changes to the peace agreement being negotiated in Paris by Henry Kissinger and others. Specifically, it looks at three aspects of compellence—capability, credibility, and clarity of goals—and analyzes how the United States did in each of these three areas, concluding that the United States ultimately failed to adequately compel North Vietnam. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. / text

<p>The thermal decomposition of four energetic cocrystals composed of 4-amino-3,5-dinitropyrazole (ADNP)/diaminofurazan (DAF), 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT)/ 2,4,6,8,10,12-hexanitro-2,4,6,8,10,12-hexaazaisowurtzitane (CL20), 1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazacyclooctane (HMX)/CL20, and 1-methyl-3,5-dinitro-1,2,4-triazole (MDNT)/CL20 were studied using simultaneous differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermogravimetry analysis (TGA), and hot-stage microscopy. The kinetic parameters of their thermal decomposition reaction were determined using the Kissinger and Ozawa kinetic analysis methods. Each cocrystal’s peak exothermic temperature (decomposition temperature), activation energy, and pre-exponential constant are reported. Furthermore, these parameters from each cocrystal were compared to the same parameters from the corresponding stoichiometric physical mixture in order to identify changes in behavior attributable to the cocrystallization process. For ADNP/DAF, the cocrystal shows an 8% increase in the peak exotherm temperature and a 11-13% decrease in peak activation energy as compared to its physical mixture. For TNT/CL20, this comparison shows a much smaller change in the peak exotherm temperature (<1%) but shows a 5% decrease in activation energy. This cocrystal also experiences phase stabilization—where a phase transition of one or both coformers is omitted from the decomposition process. The HMX/CL20 cocrystal shows a 1% change in the peak exotherm temperature and shows a 2% increase in activation energy. Finally, for MDNT/CL20, this comparison shows nearly a 4% increase and a drastic decrease in peak activation energy by 42-44%. Cocrystallization clearly affects the thermal decomposition and reaction kinetics of these materials, offering the potential to create a hybrid-class of energetic materials which combines the high performance of an energetic material with the safety and insensitivity of another. </p>

The master thesis deals with DSC measurments a calculation of kinetic parameters. In the theoretical part, iron alotropy is briefly described, followed by a description of the DSC analysis itself. The thesis also includes division and derivation of isoconversional methods for calculating the activation energy. In the experimental part, a series of measurments is perfomed on pure iron prepared by Cold Spray method. In the paper the influence of deformation on the Curie temperature of the magnetic transformation in -Fe and transformation > is investigated. The activation energy is calculated for transformation > for different degrees of deformation. The degree of deformation is monitored by channeling contrast.

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This dissertation “To Balance the World: The Development of the U.S. National Interest, 1935 – 1963” traces the transfer of American geopolitical thinking from military intellectuals inside the War Department in the 1930s to university defense intellectuals who began to set strategic agendas in the 1950s and 1960s. I study the concept of balance of power not as an idea or a theory but as an ideology in the Cold War through the twin rise of the military intellectual and the defense intellectual as policymakers. I argue the balance of power ideology animated the thinking of international lawyer Frederick Sherwood Dunn and U.S. geostrategist Nicholas Spykman in the 1920s and 1930s; political scientist Arnold Wolfers in the 1940s; career U.S. Army officer and strategic planner George A. Lincoln in the 1950s; and defense intellectual Henry Kissinger in the 1950s/1960s as they crafted national security policy. I work against the presumption that grand strategy serves as an intellectual architecture for policymaking. Rather, I argue grand strategy is a closed ideological circuit determined by a “strategic field” of planners and practitioners consisting of individuals like Dunn, Spykman, Wolfers, Lincoln, and Kissinger. Retired general disarmament activist Tasker A. Bliss served as an important and early voice of dissent to the balance of power ideology in the interwar period. The balance of power ideology, the belief that a single powerful state maintained the balance between states, guided their discussions as they agreed on the U.S. assuming responsibilities to guarantee international order and stability from the British Empire. Over the decades, balance of power colored their perceptions of any changes or transformations within the international system. “Order” and “stability” were their watchwords. Grand strategy subsequently serves as the “laboratory” for national interest. The balance of power ideology led to the strategic field’s adoption of survival as the U.S. national interest. The strategic field subsequently employed limited war as the policy of choice to “preserve” the United States’ survival. My findings highlight the antidemocratic principles within the design of grand strategy, particularly as they relate to the unequal power dynamic between the military-academic nexus and the U.S. public. / 2026-03-26T00:00:00Z