Dominance rank often determines the share of reproduction an individual male can secure in group-living animals (i.e. dominance rank-based reproductive skew). However, our knowledge of the interplay between individual and social factors in determining rank trajectories of males is still limited. The overall aim of this thesis was therefore to investigate mechanisms that underlie individual dominance rank trajectories in male crested macaques (Macaca nigra) and to highlight potential individual and social determinants of how males can achieve and maintain the highest rank possible. Data for this thesis were collected on 37 males during a field study on a natural population of crested macaques living in the Tangkoko-Batuangus Nature Reserve in Indonesia. In study 1, I validate Elo-rating as a particularly well suited method to quantify dominance hierarchies in animal species with dynamic dominance relationships. In studies 2 and 3, I suggest a personality structure for crested macaque males consisting of five distinct factors and further demonstrate that two personality factors determine whether males will rise or fall in rank. Finally, in study 4, I present results on how males utilize coalitions to increase their future rank. Together, these results shed light on how individual attributes and social environment both can impact male careers. Ultimately, in order to understand what determines rank-based reproductive skew, we need to consider the complexity and likely diversity of the mechanisms underlying rank trajectories of individual males which are likely to differ across different species.

Dominance rank often determines the share of reproduction an individual male can secure in group-living animals (i.e. dominance rank-based reproductive skew). However, our knowledge of the interplay between individual and social factors in determining rank trajectories of males is still limited. The overall aim of this thesis was therefore to investigate mechanisms that underlie individual dominance rank trajectories in male crested macaques (Macaca nigra) and to highlight potential individual and social determinants of how males can achieve and maintain the highest rank possible. Data for this thesis were collected on 37 males during a field study on a natural population of crested macaques living in the Tangkoko-Batuangus Nature Reserve in Indonesia. In study 1, I validate Elo-rating as a particularly well suited method to quantify dominance hierarchies in animal species with dynamic dominance relationships. In studies 2 and 3, I suggest a personality structure for crested macaque males consisting of five distinct factors and further demonstrate that two personality factors determine whether males will rise or fall in rank. Finally, in study 4, I present results on how males utilize coalitions to increase their future rank. Together, these results shed light on how individual attributes and social environment both can impact male careers. Ultimately, in order to understand what determines rank-based reproductive skew, we need to consider the complexity and likely diversity of the mechanisms underlying rank trajectories of individual males which are likely to differ across different species.

Wie kann Lobbyingerfolg von Interessengruppen erklärt werden? Lange Zeit standen ausschließlich Ressourcen als Explanans für Lobbyingerfolg im Zentrum der theoretischen Auseinandersetzung. Später traten weitere unabhängige Variablen zur Erklärung von Lobbyingerfolg hinzu: Framing, Arenen, Issuetypen, Koalitionen und die politisch-ideologische Ausrichtung der Entscheidungsträger als intervenierende Variable. Die empirischen Beobachtungen am Beispiel der EU-Emissionspolitik zeigen, dass keine der genannten Variablen Lobbyingerfolg alleine erklären kann. Die Kongruenzanalyse wird belegen, dass die Erklärungs- und Prognosekraft der Variablen in den einzelnen Arenen variiert. Ressourcen sind ein guter Prädiktor für Lobbyingerfolg in der Arena der Kommission. In der Arena des Europäischen Parlaments ist vor allem das Lobbyingziel der einzelnen Interessengruppen entscheidend. In der Arena des Rats hängt der Lobbyingerfolg von einem komplexen Zusammenspiel aus Lobbyingziel, formellen Abstimmungsregeln und der Positionierung der Mitgliedstaaten ab, die wiederum von der Zusammensetzung der jeweiligen Regierungsexekutiven und der Ressourcenstärke einzelner Interessengruppen in den Mitgliedstaaten beeinflusst wird. In der Arena des Vermittlungsausschusses entscheidet die politisch-ideologische Position des Berichterstatters. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass sowohl in der Arena des Europäischen Parlaments als auch in der Arena des Rats bestimmte Framing-Strategien erfolgversprechend sind. Wohingegen die Zugehörigkeit eines Issues zu einem bestimmten Issuetypus von vornherein die Erfolgsaussichten mindert. Lobbyingerfolg am Ende des Mitentscheidungsverfahrens ist also das Resultat von Lobbyingerfolgen, die in den einzelnen Arenen auf unterschiedliche kausale Effekte zurückzuführen sind. Bemerkenswert ist, dass Lobbyingerfolg von einer Reihe von Faktoren abhängt, die von Interessengruppen selbst nicht unmittelbar beeinflussbar sind. / How can lobbying success of interest groups be explained? For a long time, solely resources were at the centre of the theoretical debate. Later, other independent variables were added to explain lobbying success: framing, arenas, types of issues, coalitions and the political-ideological position of decision-makers as an intervening variable. Empirical observations using the example of the EU emissions policy however show that none of the above variables can explain lobbying success alone. A congruence analysis demonstrates that the explanatory and predictive power of the variables varies in different arenas. Resources are a potent predictor of lobbying success in the arena of the Commission. In the arena of the European Parliament, it is the lobbying goal of stakeholders, which determines success. In the arena of the Council, lobbying success is the result of a complex interplay of lobbying goal, formal voting rules and the political position of the Member States. The political position of Member States, in turn, is influenced by the political-ideological composition of the government executive and the resources of individual stakeholders in the Member States. In the arena of the Conciliation Committee, the political and ideological position of the rapporteur is pivotal. In addition, it can be shown that both in the arena of the European Parliament and of the Council certain framing strategies support lobbying success. In contrast, the nature of an issue can diminish the chances of lobbying success right from the outset. Thus, lobbying success at the end of the co-decision procedure is the result of the combination of lobbying successes in the co-decision arenas, which are due to different causal effects. It is noteworthy that lobbying success depends on a number of factors, which cannot be directly influenced by interest groups themselves.

One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φE value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.

One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φE value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.

Welche Kommunikationsstrategien benutzen Koalitionsparteien während ihrer Zeit im Amt? Koalitionsparteien stehen vor einem Dilemma, dass sie zwar nach aussen Einheit demonstrieren sollen, sich aber gleichzeitig von ihren Partnern differenzieren müssen. Ich argumentiere, dass politische Kommunikation eine wichtige Rolle dabei spielt, wie Parteien versuchen, ihr individuelles Profil zu erhalten. Dazu habe ich drei Hauptstrategien definiert, die Parteien benutzen können. Basierend auf einem Datensatz von über 35'000 deutschen und niederländischen Pressemitteilungen von Koalitionsparteien analysiere ich, was Parteien in ihrer Strategiewahl beeinflusst. Meine Resultate zeigen, dass Personalisierung, definiert als ein verstärkter Fokus auf Individuen, davon beeinflusst wird, wie stark sich Koalitionsparteien ideologisch unterscheiden. Ich benutze einen supervised classification algorithm, um die deutschen Pressemitteilungen in verschiedene thematische Kategorien zu klassifizieren. Ich nutze diese Klassifizierung um zu analysieren, ob Parteien während dem Wahlkampf einen besonderen Fokus auf die Themen legen, die ihnen wichtig sind. Dies ist nicht der Fall, und meine Analysen zeigen, dass Parteien kurz vor einer Wahl sogar einen geringeren Schwerpunkt auf diese Themen legen, ungeachtet ideologischer Differenzen zwischen ihnen und ihren Koalitionspartnern. Schließlich analysiere ich die Präsenz von negativem Campaigning in deutschen Pressemitteilungen und in einer Auswahl von Episoden einer politischen Talkshow. Im Falle der Pressemitteilungen stelle ich fest, dass die Parteien mit zunehmender Wahrscheinlichkeit "feindlich gesinnte" Politiker erwähnen, je näher die Wahl rückt, und dass diese Erwähnungen mit einem generell negativerem sentiment der betreffenden Pressemitteilungen korrelieren. / What communication strategies do coalition parties use during their time in office? Coalition parties face a dilemma between unity and differentiation, because while they need to keep relations with their partners stable, they also have to keep up constant efforts to differentiate themselves sufficiently from them. I argue that political communication plays a key role in how parties try to maintain a strong individual profile. I have defined three main strategies that parties can use to achieve this. Based on a dataset that contains over 35'000 press releases by German and Dutch coalition parties, I analyze what influences the usage of the three strategies in question. I find that the usage personalization, which is defined as focusing on individual politicians, is affected by the ideological distance between coalition partners. I use a supervised classiffication algorithm to classify the press releases issued by German coalition parties into issue areas to analyze whether parties use election campaigns to emphasize issues that are already important to them. I find that this is not the case, and that parties actually de-emphasize these issues as an election approaches, regardless of ideological distance between them and their partners. Lastly, I analyze the presence of negative campaigning in German press releases and in a selection of episodes from a political talk show. In the case of press releases, I find that parties are more likely to specifically mention hostile politicians as an election approaches, and that these mentions correlate with a more negative sentiment of the press releases in question.