Standardization as a topic is only getting more and more relevant in today’s high-tech markets. The topic of this thesis is to highlight the differences in how the courts handle cases regarding the abuse of a dominant position of an intellectual-property right and standard essential patents. This difference will be shown through a presentation and analysis of the evolution of settled case law regarding refusal to license from the CJEU that will be compared to the case of Huawei v ZTE from 2015. I will also show a few examples how different national courts in the Union have received the courts judgement in “Huawei” and if there are any leftover questions that need to be cleared up. This thesis will show that there are several differences between the handling of refusal to license and standard-essential patents of the court. Differences regarding the underlying interests that the court considers, the courts view on the consumer, and to what degree the court regards the effect of the parties actions in their judgement.

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Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur artikel 101 och 102 FEUF förhåller sig till varandra i den beskrivna situationen och därigenom möjliggöra förståelse för hur reglerna skall tolkas. Uppsatsen är främstämnad att riktas till verksamma bolagsjuristermen även till juriststudenter.

Competition law constitute a significant part in the maintenance of an internal market. Due to its relevance and its deleterious effects that may emerge in the lack of competition between companies, the European union has institute laws to prevent lack of competition and to encourage a free competition. In accordance with the purpose to achieve an internal market, the European union has enacted article 101 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Despite the prohibition against anti-competitive collaborations nevertheless companies conclude agreements with anti-competitive contents. For instance, competitive companies agree to set sales prices, limit or control productions or/and share markets or sources of supply. As a result of these anti-competitive actions the commission has acquired a far-reaching authority to detect and to remediate anti-competitive collaborations. This capacity that the commission has received, is however restrained by the rights and freedoms prescribed in the European Convention on Human Rights. According to article 6 in the European Convention on Human rights everyone within the members’ jurisdiction is guaranteed the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial contains inter alia a right to remain silent and also a right to not incriminate oneself by being forced to leave oppressive information. Article 6 in the convention also includes a right to not be presumed guilty until convicted or until evidence can prove otherwise. Pursuant to this presumption of innocence it is the prosecutor, or more rightfully in this case, the commission, that has the burden to prove that the accused is in fact guilty. Furthermore, article 6 stipulates that independence and impartiality of courts is of great importance in the context of the right to a fair trial. Associated with the requirement of an independence and impartial court, the commission has been criticized for not attain these demands. This paper aims thus to investigate if the right to not incriminate oneself according to article 6 in the European Convention on Human rights is respected in the European Union, and to establish whether a company that is suspected for anti-competitive collaborations is guaranteed a trial in an independent and impartial court. The essay is based on relevant directives and regulations, doctrine and relevant practice. The European Convention is intended to have a permeating effect by providing inviolable rights and freedoms for everyone. However, after a comparison between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights some differences can be noted. It seems that the right to a fair trial, and more specific, the right to not incriminate oneself, is not as established and far-reaching in the practice from the Court of Justice of the European Union as it is in the practice from the European Court of Human Rights. It can be noted that the commission's entities seem to have a more primary position when it comes to competition law rather than fully uphold the right to not incriminate oneself, which the European Court strictly enforce. Furthermore, the legal status of the Commission as an independent and impartial court can be questioned due to the Commission's dual roles as both investigators and prosecutors. Against that background some questions could be raised concerning which legal status the European Convention of the Human Rights actually has in the European Union in field of competitive law. / Konkurrensrätten utgör en viktig beståndsdel i främjandet av den inre marknaden inom EU. På grund av dess stora relevans och med bakgrund av de skadliga effekter som kan uppstå vid en brist på konkurrens, har den europeiska unionen instiftat lagar för att upprätta och vidmakthålla en effektiv konkurrens. I enlighet med syftet att uppnå en inre marknad med fri rörlighet, har unionen antagit artikel 101 Funktionsfördraget vilken stipulerar ett förbud mot konkurrensbegränsande samarbete. Trots det förbud som finns lagstadgat så förekommer det ändå att företag ingår överenskommelser med varandra som har ett konkurrensbegränsande syfte och/eller resultat. Uppgörelserna består ofta i ett försök att fixera försäljningspriserna, begränsa eller kontrollera produktionen och/eller fördela marknader eller inköpskällor.  På grund därav har kommissionen getts långtgående befogenheter för att upptäcka och beivra konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten mellan företag. De befogenheter som kommissionen har tilldelats begränsas emellertid av de rättigheter samt friheter som den Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna, Europakonventionen, uppställer. Enligt artikel 6 Europakonventionen ska alla garanteras en rätt till en rättvis rättegång. Rättigheten omfattar bland annat en rätt att tiga samt en rätt att inte behöva lämna uppgifter som betraktas vara besvärande för den misstänkte. Artikel 6 Europakonventionen omfattar även en rätt att betraktas vara oskyldig tills dess att motsatsen har bevisats, den så kallade oskyldighetspresumtionen. Enligt denna presumtion åligger det åklagaren, eller snarare kommissionen i det här fallet, att frambringa bevis som styrker att den misstänkte faktiskt är skyldig. Därutöver stipulerar artikel 6 Europakonventionen en rätt att få sitt ärende prövat av en opartisk samt oavhängig domstol. Under den senaste tiden har kritik riktats mot kommissionen då organet inte anses uppfylla de krav som uppställs för att få betraktas vara en domstol i konventionens mening. Den här uppsatsen syftar till att utreda huruvida de nämnda rättigheterna i artikel 6 Europakonventionen garanteras och respekteras i EU:s konkurrensrätt. Uppsatsen är baserad på relevanta förordningar, doktrin samt rättspraxis. Europakonventionen är tänkt att ha en genomsyrande effekt genom att tillhandahålla okränkbara rättigheter och friheter för alla. Vid en jämförelse mellan den praxis som har utarbetats av EU-domstolen och den praxis som har sammanställts av Europadomstolen, kan emellertid vissa skillnader noteras. Rätten till en rättvis rättegång, eller snarare rätten mot självangivelse, synes inte vara lika etablerad och långtgående i EU-domstolens praxis vad avser konkurrensrättens område, till skillnad från Europadomstolens praxis. Inom unionen tycks kommissionens befogenheter ha en primär position och konventionens rättigheter en sekundär sådan. Vidare kan kommissionens legala status som en opartisk och oavhängig domstol ifrågasättas då organet agerar såväl utredare som åklagare. Med bakgrund därav kan det diskuteras kring vilken status som konventionens rättigheter och friheter egentligen har och om dessa är förenliga med konkurrensrätten.

<p>Problem: Should the european competition law be used as a integrationfriendly tool? </p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyse wheather europena competition law should be govenrned by the aim of integrating the european market. Method: A traditional swedish law method har been used. </p><p>Result: My conclusion is that marketintegration in itself should not be the only aim when applying european competition law.</p>

<p>Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law.</p><p>The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market.</p><p>In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry.</p><p>The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.</p>

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