<p>Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law.</p><p>The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market.</p><p>In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry.</p><p>The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.</p>

No description available.

No description available.

Problem: Should the european competition law be used as a integrationfriendly tool? Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyse wheather europena competition law should be govenrned by the aim of integrating the european market. Method: A traditional swedish law method har been used. Result: My conclusion is that marketintegration in itself should not be the only aim when applying european competition law.

Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law. The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market. In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry. The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.

No description available.

No description available.

Chinas first comprehensive competition law, the Anti-monopoly law of the People’s Republic of China (AML), was enacted on August 1, 2008. Despite a long history of planned economy, the Chinese economy has developed into one of the fastest growing economies in the world during the last decades. The adoption of the law was a crucial step towards a more market-based economy. Article 1 of the AML states that one of the aims to achieve with this law is to develop a socialist market economy. The notion was founded in the 1990s and can be found in several other Chinese legislations. The concept has no prominent definition and can be interpreted in many different ways, which opens up for the ruling Party to interpret the notion in accordance with their political believes. The central government will probably put most emphasize on the word “socialist” instead of “market economy” when interpreting the concept. The concept is of central meaning and will affect the interpretation of the other aims stated in article 1. The other aims are not ranked in any hierarchical order and are in conflict with each other. The central government will give priority to the aims which are beneficial for a socialist society. The aim to promote public interest, which includes state owned enterprises, will be strongly favored. Also the aim economic efficiency will be prioritized since China strives to become a rich country. Consumer welfare will not be highlighted but might be more important in the future. One reason that the aims are vague and not put in any hierarchical order could be that the objectives for adopting AML were not solely of competition reasons. The objectives show that AML is part of a wider economic policy. Neither does the central government strive towards a free market. Instead the goal is to establish a fair market. A fair market will most probably be a market beneficial for state owned enterprises and can therefore be contradictory to the keystones of competition. Competition principals arise from sophisticated market economies and China aims to apply those principals in the light of socialist ideology. AML covers the general competition provisions but with a specific chapter to regulate administrative monopolies. It can still be seen as contradictory to prohibit administrative monopolies but without any sanctions stipulated for violation of the provisions. Also the fundamental elements for establish effective competition are missing. The statute cannot be seen as objective or provide legal certainty and the competition authorities do not have divided responsibilities. Neither is any specific competition court established. Other factors that can contribute to an inefficient competition law are China’s history and culture, affected by socialist ideology. Time is required in China in order to develop an efficient competition culture. Altogether, it is no coincident that the notion of socialist market economy is undefined. The notion includes a quest to enhance the socialist society with strong economic development. More specific guidance is determined by the central government when the right time has come. From a Chinese perspective, the aims in article 1 will be achieved since the undefined concepts open up for different interpretations. From a sophisticated point of view, the aims will not be seen as achieved since no effective competition is established.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda innebörden av ett företags rätt till domstolsprövning och en rättssäker process enligt Europakonventionens artikel 6 och i rättighetsstadgans artiklar 41, 47 och 48. Målsättningen är att visa hur dessa rättigheter bedöms i EU-domstolen och Europadomstolen samt vilken betydelse de mänskliga rättigheterna har inom EU:s rättsordning. De mänskliga rättigheterna är ett rättsområde i ständig utveckling som startade med Europakonventionens skapelse efter andra världskriget. Även inom EU har skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter kommit att utvecklas genom EU-domstolens rättspraxis, vilket har gett upphov till rättighetsstadgan. Efter Lissabonfördragets ikraftträdande utgör mänskliga rättigheter en primärrätt inom EU och EU är även skyldig att ansluta sig till Europakonventionen, vilket ännu inte har skett. En anslutning skulle leda till en större rättssäkerhet för medlemsstaterna, men även en mer enhetlig bedömning av mål i EU-domstolen och Europadomstolen. Vad som emellertid måste hållas i åtanke, är de olika värdegrunder som EU respektive Europakonventionen bygger på. Upprätthållandet av konkurrensrätten är ett av de viktigaste målen inom EU och kommissionen har därför getts vittgående befogenheter för att verkställa konkurrensreglerna. För företag som underkastas en av kommissionens konkurrensutredningar innebär befogenheterna dock en risk för att deras rätt till domstolsprövning och en rättssäker process inte respekteras. Företag har rätt att få sitt mål prövat av en domstol med full jurisdiktion som kan pröva sakfrågor såväl som rättsfrågor. De har även rätt till en oavhängig och opartisk domstol. Kommissionen uppfyller inte nyss nämnda krav varför det är viktigt att EU-domstolen grundligt överprövar kommissionsbeslut, någonting som idag inte alltid sker. Företagens rätt till en rättvis rättegång inkluderar bland annat rätten till ett kontradiktoriskt förfarande. Detta innebär att företagen har rätt att ta del av alla handlingar som kommissionen använder i målet, någonting som EU-domstolen har skapat ett skydd för genom rättspraxis. Företagen skall även åtnjuta en rätt mot självangivelse, en rätt som är väletablerad i Europadomstolens praxis. Tyvärr erbjuds inte ett motsvarande skydd för rätten mot självangivelse som för rätten att ta del av handlingar genom EU-rättspraxis. Det kan dock argumenteras att företag i konkurrensmål inte alltid bör erbjudas ett lika långtgående skydd för sina mänskliga rättigheter som individer, på grund av förstnämndas makt och vikten av att upprätthålla en fungerande, fri och rättvis konkurrens.

Som en följd av Sveriges medlemskap i EU ska unionsrätten tillämpas i Sverige och de svenska konkurrensrättsliga reglerna har till stor del influerats av EU:s konkurrensregler. Tanken är att den nationella konkurrenslagstiftningen ska ge utrymme för att unionsrätten får en viss genomslagskraft. EU:s mål om en sund konkurrens nås främst genom att de nationella domstolarna begär förhandsavgöranden från Europeiska unionens domstol enligt artikel 267 FEUF. De högsta instanserna har en skyldighet att inhämta förhandsavgöranden från EU-domstolen medan de lägre instanserna har möjligheten att göra detsamma avseende tolkningen och tillämpningen av unionsrätten. Skyldigheten att begära förhandsavgöranden har till syfte att säkerställa att unionsrätten tillämpas korrekt och tolkas enhetligt i alla medlemsstater. Den är dessutom en del av samarbetet mellan EU-domstolen och de nationella domstolarna som ska tillämpa unionsrätten. Bakgrunden till uppsatsens uppslag har varit den kritik som framförts mot domstolarna i Sverige avseende deras obenägenhet att inhämta förhandsavgöranden från EU-domstolen. Syftet har varit att identifiera likheter och skillnader i de konkurrensrättsliga mål där frågan om förhandsavgöranden enligt artikel 267 FEUF avseende artiklarna 101 eller 102 FEUF aktualiseras. Är domstolarna obenägna att begära förhandsavgöranden från EU-domstolen i konkurrensrättsliga mål? Tio konkurrensrättsliga rättsfall har presenterats. Genomgången visar på att inga förhandsavgöranden har inhämtats angående artikel 101 FEUF men två förhandsavgöranden har inhämtats avseende artikel 102 FEUF. Utifrån motiveringarna i målen kan det sägas att det föreligger en viss obenägenhet att inhämta förhandsavgöranden från EU-domstolen i konkurrensrättsliga mål. Obenägenheten är dock till viss del motiverad av kompetensfördelningen mellan EU-domstolen och de nationella domstolarna. / Swedish competition law rules have been largely influenced by the EU competition rules due to Sweden’s EU membership. The idea is that EU law has certain impact on the na-tional competition law. The aim of fair competition in the EU is best achieved when the national courts ask the COJ for preliminary rulings under Article 267 TFEU. The final courts of appeal have an obligation to ask for preliminary rulings from the COJ, whereas the lower courts of appeal have the possibility to do the same, regarding the interpretation and application of EU law. The obligation to seek a preliminary ruling is intended to ensure that EU law is applied correctly and interpreted uniformly throughout all the Member States. It is also a part of the collaboration between the COJ and the national courts considering the application of EU law. The idea behind the essay derived from the criticism leveled against the Swedish judiciary for their reluctance to seek preliminary rulings from the COJ. The purpose of the thesis has been to identify similarities and differences in competition law cases where the issue of a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU in relation to Articles 101 or 102 TFEU was addressed. Are the courts reluctant to seek preliminary rulings from the COJ in Swedish competition law cases? Ten Swedish competition law cases have been presented. The review shows that no preliminary rulings have been obtained with regard to Article 101 TFEU, but two preliminary rulings have been obtained regarding Article 102 TFEU. Based on the reasoning the cases it can be said that there is a certain reluctance to seek preliminary rulings from the COJ in competition law cases. The reluctance is, however, partly motivated by the division of jurisdiction between the COJ and the national courts.