Dans ce travail nous avons d’abord cherché à présenter la psychose. Nous avons fait appel à deux symptômes cardinaux, le délire et l'hallucination, et à deux catégories nosoiogiques traditionnelles, la paranoïa et la schizophrénie. A ces concepts classiques nous avons tenté d’insuffler une dynamique et une extension philosophiques en citant des auteurs et des travaux qui se situent à la jonction des deux disciplines (psychiatrie et philosophie). La rencontre psychiatrique est une forme particulière de relation interpersonnelle. Par souci de clarté, nous avons distingué la rencontre diagnostique de la rencontre thérapeutique qui représentent deux scènes séparées où les enjeux théoriques de l’interaction se posent en termes différents. Pour la rencontre diagnostique, une analyse épistémologique a été proposée, faisant appel à la distinction husserlienne des attitudes naturaliste et personnaliste. La rencontre thérapeutique a été envisagée à partir d’un modèle qui distingue quatre approches principales : objective-descriptive, psy chanalytique, phénoménologique-existentielle et interpersonnelle. L’analyse a été ensuite étendue au cas particulier de la psychose et aux formes contemporaines de psychothérapie. La psychose n ’est-elle pas un obstacle insurmontable à cette qualité de communication qu’on appelle le dialogue? Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons interrogé deux philosophes du XXe siècle, Martin Buber et Emmanuel Lévinas. Buber décrit deux manières de communiquer. La première privilégie la proximité et l’unité, la seconde consent à la distance et à la séparation. Dire Tu, c’est sortir de soi, engager la totalité de son être, assumer flimmédiateté de la relation. Dire Cela, c’est rester confiné à l’intérieur de soi, refuser la présence et la réciprocité. Lévinas conçoit la relation avec autrui comme une responsabilité sans limite. L’égalité et la symétrie sont des illusions néfastes. Le tiers introduit une contradiction dans l’asymétrie de la relation et rend possible la justice, la réciprocité des droits et des devoirs. Toute rencontre véritable confronte le patient psychotique à un dédoublement de sa vie relationnelle, à une mise en concurrence des interlocuteurs. Nous avons appliqué les catégories bubériennes et l’éthique lévinassienne à la situation particulière de la rencontre psychiatrique avec un sujet psychotique. L’épisode fécond ne témoigne-t-il pas aussi des dangers du Je-Tu? Le handicap social du schizophrène ne se manifeste-t-il pas d’abord dans la sphère, plus précieuse qu’il ne paraît, du Je-Cela? Les intuitions de Lévinas, sa conception de la subjectivité comme responsabilité unilatérale et illimitée, comme otage, révèlent à leur tour 1’ « incondition » du psychotique. La psychose est à la fois une expérience relationnelle et une pathologie de la relation. Celle-ci affecte la communication avec soi, avec le monde et avec autrui. Ce travail vise à clarifier les multiples facettes de l’expérience psychotique, à rendre compte de la diversité des points de vue et des savoirs. Il offre ensuite une analyse épistémologique de la rencontre psychiatrique avec un sujet psychotique en distinguant les deux étapes de la relation : celle du diagnostic et celle du traitement. Il interpelle enfin deux philosophes du dialogue, Martin Buber et Emmanuel Lévinas, avec, en toile de fond, cette question préliminaire : la psychose n’est-elle pas un obstacle insurmontable à cette qualité de la relation qu’on appelle le dialogue? Nous montrerons que toute rencontre véritable confronte le patient psychotique à un dédoublement de sa vie relationnelle mais que malgré les obstacles, un travail de rapprochement demeure toujours possible.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / A brief introduction to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics is based on the Other/other. He argues that we are in an asymmetrical relationship with our neighbour that pre-destines us with ethical responsibility even before consciousness or choice. In the face-to-face encounter an infinity and alterity about our neighbour is revealed, which is irreducible to my ontological grasp and thereby compels me to respond to him. It is also through this relation that our humanity is released as our solipsistic all-for-myself becomes a being-for-the-other. Furthermore, the I is irreplaceable, thereby making each of us ethically responsible for our neighbour to the point of responsibility for his material misery. This paper introduces this stance with the aim to underscore it. A brief discussion on the priority of ethics before ontology in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas The incessant theme of Levinas’ writing over 25 years has been “Ethics as First Philosophy,” which is synonymous with “The Subject’s Ethical Responsibility for his Neighbour.” This paper is a short discussion of this theme of the origin of ethics. Levinas’ arguments on pre-original time, the Infinite, language and human corporeality by which he establishes a subjectivity that is not fundamentally determined by intentionality and self-sameness, but by the proximity of our neighbour, will be considered. For Levinas it is this relation to the Other that answers the question of the meaning of being and is also the first word of words. First Philosophy is accordingly to be found in the face-to-face which is a subordination of knowledge to a mode of meaning beyond totality.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Article I: Subject and the realisation of ethical responsibility. The Idea of the Infinite in Levinas' Totality and Infinity. In Totality and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas writes about the categorical character of the ethical responsibility that the subject owes to the other. The confrontation with the suffering other puts the subject's natural self interest into question, and brings him to realise an ethical responsibility of which he cannot unburden himself. The question arises as to what in the constitution of the subject makes him susceptible to the realisation of ethical responsibility. This article illustrates that in order to accentuate ethical responsibility as strongly as he does, Levinas needs to take a quasi-metaphysical step. The "trace of the infinite" that "creation" has left on the finite subject, predisposes the subject to the appeal of the other. Levinas' use of words such as "God", "the Good", "creation" and "the Idea of Infinity" does not have a theological or a mystical underpinning. These metaphysical concepts are philosophical figures of speech that Levinas borrows from Plato and Descartes. Article II: Levinas and the question of socio-ethical responsibility in South Africa. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas contains far-reaching consequences for social ethics. This article gives an account of its significance for the South African situation. The lines that are taken up with regard to the question of guilt for the injustice in the South African social reality, are of two kinds. Either one is held guilty because of committing a gross human rights violation, or one is held guilty because of profiting from the apartheid system at the cost of others. Both these approaches depart from a concern with the historical processes that brought the injustices about. Levinas, however, offers an alternative approach. While he will more or less go along with the previous two approaches, he points to an ethical imperative with which the actual social reality confronts us. One can be held responsible, simply because one has always already done too little for those who are destitute. The ethical subject's pre-original openness to the appeal of others, makes him susceptible to the realisation of ethical responsibility. This is explained in a concise exegesis of Levinas' s work. The article concludes by considering the question of whether philosophers ought to give an account of the good social order, and whether they ought to tell us how it is to be reached. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel I: Subjek en etiese verantwoordelikheidsbesef. Die Idee van die Oneindige in Levinas se Totality and Infinity. In Totality and Infinity skryf Emmanuel Levinas oor die kategoriese aard van die verantwoordelikheid wat die subjek aan die ander verskuldig is. Die subjek se natuurlike eie-belang word ter diskussie gestel deur die konfrontasie met die misdeelde ander. Dit bring die subjek tot die besef van 'n verantwoordelikheid wat hy nie kan ontloop nie. Die vraag kan gevra word na wat in die konstitusie in die subjek, die subjek vatbaar maak vir die verantwoordelikheidsbesef. Hierdie artikel voer aan dat Levinas - ten einde etiese verantwoordelikheid so nadruklik te aksentueer - nodig het om 'n kwasi-metafisiese stap te neem. Die "spoor van die oneindige" wat die "skepping" op die eindige subjek nagelaat het, maak die subjek ontvanklik vir die aanspraak van die ander. Levinas se gebruik van woorde soos "God", "die Goeie", "skepping" en "die Idee van die Oneindige" het nie 'n teologiese of 'n mistiese onderbou nie. Hierdie metafisiese begrippe is filosofiese spraakfigure wat Levinas aan die werk van Plato en Descartes ontleen. Artikel II: Levinas en die vraag na sosiaal-etiese verantwoordelikheid in Suid-Afrika. Die denke van Emmanuel Levinas hou verreikende implikasies in vir sosiale etiek. Hierdie artikel gee rekenskap van die betekenis daarvan vir die Suid-Afrikaanse situasie. Twee lyne van argumentasie word normaalweg opgeneem met betrekking tot die vraag omtrent skuld vir die ongeregtigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse sosiale werklikheid. 'n Mens word skuldig gehou of omdat mens 'n growwe menseregte skending begaan het, Of omdat 'n mens uit die apartheidsisteem gewen het ten koste van andere. Albei hierdie benaderings het as eerste oorweging die historiese prosesse wat die ongeregtighede teweeg gebring het. Levinas bied egter die moontlikheid van 'n altematiewe benadering. Terwyl hy meerendeels sal saamstem met genoemde twee benaderings, wys hy op 'n etiese imperatief waarmee die sosiale werklikheid self ons konfronteer. "n Mens kan verantwoordelik gehou word, bloot omdat 'n mens altyd alreeds te min gedoen het vir diegene wat misdeeld is. Die subjek het 'n voor-oorspronklike openheid vir die aanspraak van andere. Die maak die subjek ontvanklik vir die etiese verantwoordelikheidsbesef. Die artikel sluit af met 'n bespreking van die vraag of filosowe konkrete rekenskap van die goeie sosiale orde behoort te gee en moet aandui hoe dit bereik behoort te word.

The aim of this study is to attempt a re-conceptualisation of ethics and politics away from the well-rehearsed structure of singularity versus community, particularity or individuality versus universality, as well as from the inadequate dyadic positioning of these sets of terms. Dominant scholarship on Lévinas's and Derrida's work has generally been divided into those who see Derrida's work as continuing the Lévinasian legacy, and thus having little to offer to the political, and those who would like to divorce the trajectory of deconstruction from the Lévinasian heritage, and thus reveal it as being inherently political. The above split in opinion is largely based on a divergence in the interpretation of Lévinas's own writings as essentially about ethics, and therefore as either having little to offer to our thinking of the political, or as undergoing something like a ‘split', with the focus coming to rest more clearly on politics through the figure of the third, in later writings. My contribution to this impasse is to foreground a recent, though much overlooked notion within Jacques Derrida's work as an alternative to thinking being-with: that of community of singularities. I also suggest the notions of alteronomy and fiendship as alternatives to thinking being-with, which take into account the way in which the other-within-the-self restructures the concepts of freedom and autonomy and takes them beyond a humanist context. I will be arguing from two overarching points: a) that Lévinas's own work can convincingly be interpreted as not only concerned with the political from his earliest writings, but as setting up the political as the interruptive force within the ethical, thus providing a shift in perspective for what is essentially a mutually-interruptive relation between ethics and politics, and b) that Derrida's own writing need not be ‘divorced' from Lévinas's trajectory of thought, in order to be considered as having something to offer to our re-thinking of the relation between ethics and politics.

MAIA, João Vítor Moreira. Uma leitura da dimensão ética da Gestalt-Terapia: um diálogo com Martin Buber e Emmanuel Lévinas. 2013. 121f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Psicologia, Fortaleza (CE), 2013. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-27T11:35:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-JVMMAIA.pdf: 901329 bytes, checksum: 9a52035d8a13916c6374a565b1de935a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-27T13:49:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-JVMMAIA.pdf: 901329 bytes, checksum: 9a52035d8a13916c6374a565b1de935a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-27T13:49:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-JVMMAIA.pdf: 901329 bytes, checksum: 9a52035d8a13916c6374a565b1de935a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / We inquire to understand how the ethical dimension of gestalt therapy, in your theoretical and methodological referential, understanding that such referential attitude that guide the therapist in this approach has his/her work listening to each other. The research arises from the need to understand and systematize the ethical dimension of gestalt therapy, this ordinarily, subliminally in theoretical elaborations of the gestalt approach. It is proposed, originating in perspective philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, conduct a survey of theoretical. It is understood the Gestalt Therapy as a psychotherapeutic approach eminently comprehensive and experiential, starting from the prejudice that in gestalt therapy is an ethical placed upon understanding and acceptance of the Other, in it´s essential difference, which can be understood as the ethical encounter, dialogical, epistemologically rooted in dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber. Looking up, too, walk the paths trodden previously by Freire (2000), with reference to Levinasian ethics, in which ethical condition succeeds in opening the Other, originally given as a condition of possibility of all subjectivity, making it necessary to understand the centrality of the concept of the Other for the ethical discussion. It proposes a dialogue between gestalt therapy, dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber and the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas radical otherness. It is considered the end of the research that gestalt therapy, in the form as expressed in their theoretical and epistemological, not aware of the ethical requirements that bring the thought of Martin Buber, and especially that of Emmanuel Levinas. It is understood, however, that such requirements are not entirely foreign to the set of beliefs and values that make up the perspective of gestalt approach. It is noticed that gestalt therapy brings in their theoretical and epistemological elements that allow conjecture with these ethical approaches. / Busca-se compreender como ocorre a dimensão ética da gestalt-terapia, em seus referenciais teórico-metodológicos, entendendo-se que tais referenciais orientam a atitude que o terapeuta desta abordagem exerce em seu trabalho de escuta do outro. A pesquisa surge da necessidade de compreender e sistematizar a dimensão ética da gestalt-terapia, presente, de ordinário, de maneira subliminar nas elaborações teóricas da abordagem gestáltica. Propõe-se, com origem na perspectiva hermenêutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, realizar uma pesquisa de cunho teórico. Entende-se a gestalt-terapia como abordagem psicoterápica eminentemente compreensiva e experiencial, partindo-se do preconceito de que em gestalt-terapia se encontra uma ética que se lança à compreensão e acolhimento do Outro, em sua diferença essencial, podendo ser entendida como ética do encontro, dialógica, enraizada epistemologicamente na Filosofia dialógica de Martin Buber. Busca-se, também, percorrer os caminhos trilhados anteriormente por Freire (2000), tomando como referência a ética levinasiana, na qual a condição ética sucede na abertura ao Outro, dada originariamente como condição de possibilidade de toda subjetividade, fazendo-se necessário entender a centralidade do conceito de Outro para a discussão ética. Propõe-se um diálogo entre a gestalt-terapia, a Filosofia dialógica de Martin Buber e a Filosofia da alteridade radical de Emmanuel Lévinas. Considera-se ao fim da pesquisa que a gestalt-terapia, na forma como se expressa em seus fundamentos teórico-epistemológicos, não dá conta das exigências éticas que trazem o pensamento de Martin Buber e, principalmente, o de Emmanuel Lévinas. Entende-se, todavia, que tais exigências não são totalmente estranhas ao conjunto de crenças e valores que compõem a perspectiva da abordagem gestáltica. Percebe-se que a Gestalt-terapia traz em seus fundamentos teórico-epistemológicos elementos que permitem conjecturar aproximações com estas exigências éticas.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T16:10:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Flavio Alves Barbosa FE-UFG.pdf: 615872 bytes, checksum: 0db8531077c9885d80894cf5a5cbaa5f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-24 / Cette recherche se trouve dans l axe de la Culture et Procedés Educationels ayant pour but l étude de la subjectivité et l éducation selon l oeuvre Totalité et l Infinit, d Émmanuel Lévinas. En s approchant de l idée de Lévinas, j interroge sur le sens de la subjetivité et de l éducation dans un monde remplie par la violence, indiférence, par des éxpériences d un videment détruisant des enfants, femmes et hommes, placés dans une situation limite, c est à dire, de défiguration de leur condition humaine. L archéologie des idées fondamentales de l oeuvre citée comme celles de l Ontologie, la Réprésentation, le Même, l Autre, le Visage, la Séparation, la Demeure et l Extériorité a démontré que la raison dans l Occident a soubi un procés d enchantement dans lequel, elle qui avant métait le monde mitique en question est devenue universelle par l auto-suffisance du Je pense en lui trasnformant en vérité en Je peux . Et encore, la raison a tellement insisté pour la liberté qu elle a fini pour construire une subjectivité que n a pas réussi aller au déla de soi même ; elle n a pas prévue dans son essence la responsabilité vis à vis de l autre. Les idées dévélopées par Lévinas, en Totalité et l Infinit rendent possible mettre en question l Éducation que met les idées à la place des personnes, absorbe les interlocuteurs et leur remplace par le thème, en se conformant à une négation de l éxtérieur par le rapport logique de la totalité et la réduction du savoir à un savoir objectif que perd son essence critique et finit par forgé un sujet incommunicable et renvoyé à soi même. Cette recherche, de nature bibliographique, interroge sur l oeuvre Totalité et Infini, en se mettant à l écoute de l auteur et d autres studieux de son oeuvre. Pour comprendre une réalité spécifique dans la perspective phénomènologie de Levinas, il faut renoncer à toute prétention de totalité, parce que l Autre ne se laisse pas prendre par aucun système, au contraire, il nous fait sortir du centre, nous libére et nous rend disponible pour les autres. Je conclue que le sens de la subjecticvité se trouve dans la réponse à être donné à l Autre, réponse non conforme et capable de créer une rupture dans le présent et de résistence à la Totalité. Alors, la subjectivité n est pas dans le retour à l Autre mais dans l accueille de l Autre ; et aussi que l Éducation doit être pensée en termes de l Èducation de l Autre, donnée par l Autre, que surpasse les limites de l être et le rend responsable par la vie dans toutes ces formes. Dans ces termes l Éducation et language et visage et doit tenir compte d une Éducation qui a pour embasement les compétences et les habilités établies par une sociéte sans temps et sans histoire. L Èducation c est l éxtériorité et l incontinue dans le rapport avec l Autre pour affirmer la singularité de l Autre humain et l Éducation en droits humains en tant que fondements de l Éducation. / Este trabalho insere-se na linha de pesquisa Cultura e Processos Educacionais e tem como objeto de estudo a subjetividade e a educação à luz da obra Totalidade e infinito, de Emmanuel Lévinas. Na aproximação com o pensamento levinasiano, pergunto pelo sentido da subjetividade e da educação em um mundo impregnado pela violência, pela indiferença, por experiências de esvaziamento destrutivo de crianças, mulheres e homens, colocados numa situação limite, enfim, de desfiguração de sua condição humana. A arqueologia de algumas ideias fundamentais da referida obra, tais como Ontologia, Representação, Mesmo, Outro, Rosto, Separação, Morada e Exterioridade, revelou que a razão no Ocidente passou por um processo de encantamento, no qual ela, que antes colocara o mundo mítico em questão, universalizou-se pela autossuficiência do eu penso , transformado, na verdade, em eu posso . E, mais, a razão insistiu tanto na liberdade que acabou por construir uma subjetividade que não conseguiu ir além do cuidado consigo mesmo, não contemplou em seu instituinte a responsabilidade pelo outro. As ideias desenvolvidas por Lévinas em Totalidade e infinito possibilitam colocar em questão a educação que põe as ideias no lugar das pessoas, absorve os interlocutores e os substitui pelo tema, conformando-se com uma negação da exterioridade pela relação lógica da totalidade e a redução do saber a conhecimento objetivo que perde a sua essência crítica e acaba por forjar um sujeito incomunicável e devolvido a si mesmo. Esta pesquisa, de natureza bibliográfica, interroga a obra Totalidade e infinito, colocando-se na escuta do autor e de outros estudiosos de sua obra. Para compreender uma determinada realidade na perspectiva fenomenológica levinasiana, é preciso abandonar qualquer pretensão totalizante, porque o Outro não se deixa prender por nenhum sistema, ao contrário ele nos descentra, nos liberta e nos faz disponíveis aos outros. Concluo que o sentido da subjetividade está na resposta a ser dada ao Outro, resposta inconformista e desestabilizadora ao ponto de causar ruptura no presente e colocar-se na resistência à Totalidade. Assim, a subjetividade não está no retorno ao eu, mas no acolhimento do Outro; e também que a educação deve ser pensada nos termos de uma educação da alteridade, dada pelo Outro, que transborda os limites do ser e o faz responsável pela vida em todas as suas formas. Nesses termos, a educação é linguagem e rosto, que problematiza uma educação que tem como princípio fundador as competências e habilidades estabelecidas por uma sociedade sem tempo, sem história. A educação é exterioridade e descontinuidade na relação com o outro, para afirmar a singularidade do outro humano e a educação em direitos humanos como fundamento da educação.

Si la philosophie d’Emmanuel Levinas fut souvent présentée comme une philosophie de l’éthique, et fut identifiée à des notions telles que le visage, autrui ou la responsabilité, cette thèse vise à démontrer que ces notions se comprennent à partir d'un primat accorde au temps, voire d’une métaphysique de la temporalité. Il s’agira d'établir que la philosophie levinassienne inaugure une nouvelle philosophie du temps que nous pouvons qualifier de « discontinuiste », s’opposant aux pensées de la continuité comme la philosophie bergsonienne de la durée et husserlienne du flux. La constitution de la subjectivité par émergence et distinction d’avec l'existence atemporelle, encore nommée « l'il y a », son rapport au monde comme sa rencontre avec autrui ne se comprennent qu’à l’aune de leur temporalisation. Toutefois, cette structuration temporelle du sujet et de l’altérité invite à dégager différents types de temporalité et à spécifier l’essentielle dialectique entre le temps et l’autre. / If Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy has often been introduced as a philosophy of ethics, determined by famous notions such as the face, the other or the responsibility, this thesis aims at demonstrating that these notions can be understood thanks to the primacy of time, and to a metaphysics of temporality. The goal lies in explaining how Levinas' philosophy ushers a philosophy of time that we can qualify as « discontinuist », opposed to Bergson's philosophy of duration and Husserl's theory of time flow. Subjectivity is processed through a distinction with the atemporal existence or the « there is », the connection to the world and relations to the others can be appreciated thanks to the notion of temporalisation.However this temporal structuration of the subject and the otherness encourages us to make several distinctions between different types of temporality and to consider the essential dialectic between time and the other.

Zvolil jsem si téma etiky ve filmu Slib (1996) tvůrců Jeana-Pierra Dardennea a Luca Dardennea jakožto příkladovou studii užití filozofie, v tomto případě filozofie francouzského filozofa Emmanuela Levinase (1906–1995), a jak jeho filozofie ovlivňuje všechny aspekty vyprávění. Ačkoliv se nejedná o jedinou možnou interpretaci jejich díla, myšlenky Levinase jsou nejvíce relevantní jak pro příběh, tak i pro vyšší intelektuální cíle filmu. Zde je jeho pojem etiky jádrem postav a vyprávění až do bodu, kde se film sám o sobě stává testem pro přijatelnost Levinasovy filozofie, jako myšlenkového experimentu ve filmové podobě. Přijatelnost Levinasovy filozofie zůstává na konci filmu neprokázána. I přes filozofické a vyprávěcí nedostatky je Slib dobrým příkladem užití filozofie ve filmu, v jehož lepších částech se ukazuje síla tohoto přístupu, nicméně v horších částech můžeme vidět nebezpečí, které z tohoto přístupu vychází. V následujících filmech je zřejmé, že se bratři Dardenneové poučili ze svých chyb.

ARAÚJO, Iago Cavalcante. Peter Schmid e a Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa: uma aproximação à alteridade radical. 2015. 116f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Psicologia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-06-05T15:29:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_icaraujo.pdf: 1035970 bytes, checksum: 7a2baf5b3ee9043c0608ba563346d681 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-06-05T17:19:35Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_icaraujo.pdf: 1035970 bytes, checksum: 7a2baf5b3ee9043c0608ba563346d681 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-05T17:19:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_icaraujo.pdf: 1035970 bytes, checksum: 7a2baf5b3ee9043c0608ba563346d681 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / The Person Centred Approach (PCA), founded by Carl Rogers, can only be justified from a set of values and ethics and not only as an application of skills and knowledge. Furthermore, from studies of Figueiredo (1996), it is established the importance of ethos as a search for a place to the Other in the constitution of psychologies. In what refers to the place of the Other in the constitution of subjectivity, Freire (2002) investigates the place to alterity in several modern psychologies and states that in PCA, the place for Levinas’ radical alterity is vacant, as in other psychologies. The Other, as postulated by Levinas (2008 [1961]), is precedent and transcendent to the I; not being possible to totalize and understand it fully; it shows the dimension of the strange in the psychological experience. This Other is not so dear figure to psychologies as it appears to be. On the other hand, Peter Schmid (1999) conceives that ethics is the first issue to be considered when it comes to PCA, either its theory or its practice. Hence, the present paper aims to present the work of Peter Schmid to the Brazilian community of Rogerian approach. The perspective of this author is grounded in an important dialogue with the philosophies of dialogue and a vision of the human as radically a person, which offers another way to face the alterity in Rogerian theory and practice. Such change presents a fruitful approach to ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. A methodology for the study, we used an almost-in-method inspired by the philosophies of Levinas (2008 [1961]) and Derrida (2007), in which we seek, among other things, to put on display the polysemy of the studied speeches. We conclude that, despite the divergences among the prospect formulated by Schmid with Levinasian ethics, doing readings of the main concepts of the PCA, it shows a closer relationship with that one and a new way of dealing with the alterity within the framework of the Rogerian approach. With this work, we hope to foment a greater dialogue and production on the clinical and psychotherapeutic care of the person and the place offered to otherness in Rogerian psychology. / A Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (ACP), fundada por Carl Rogers, só pode ser justificada a partir de um conjunto de valores e de uma ética e não somente como uma aplicação de técnicas e conhecimentos. Além disto, a partir dos estudos de Figueiredo (1996) fica estabelecida a importância do éthos como busca de um lugar para o Outro na constituição das psicologias. Naquilo que se refere ao Lugar do Outro na constituição da subjetividade, Freire (2002) investiga o lugar para a alteridade nas diversas psicologias modernas e afirma que, na ACP, o lugar para a alteridade radical levinasiana está vacante, assim como nas demais psicologias. O Outro, conforme postulado por Lévinas (2008 [1961]), é precedente e transcendente ao Eu; não sendo possível totalizá-lo e compreendê-lo inteiramente, ele apresenta a dimensão do estranho na experiência psicológica. Este Outro não é figura tão cara para as psicologias como aparenta ser. Por outro lado, Peter Schmid (1999) concebe que a ética é a primeira questão a ser pensada quando se trata da ACP, quer de sua teoria, quer de sua prática. Daí que este trabalho objetivou apresentar a obra de Peter Schmid à comunidade brasileira da abordagem rogeriana. A perspectiva deste autor está alicerçada em um diálogo importante com as filosofias do diálogo e uma visão do humano como radicalmente pessoa, o que oferece outra forma de encarar a alteridade na teoria e prática rogerianas. Tal mudança apresenta uma profícua aproximação com a filosofia ética de Emmanuel Lévinas. Como metodologia para o estudo, utilizou-se um quase-método inspirado nas filosofias de Lévinas (2008 [1961]) e Derrida (2008), em que buscamos, entre outras coisas, pôr à mostra a polissemia dos discursos estudados. Concluiu-se que, apesar da perspectiva formulada por Schmid apresentar divergências com a ética levinasiana, ao fazer releituras dos principais conceitos da ACP, ela apresenta uma maior aproximação com aquela e uma nova forma de lidar com a alteridade dentro do arcabouço da abordagem rogeriana. Espera-se, com este trabalho, fomentar um maior diálogo e produção acerca do cuidado clínico e psicoterapêutico com a pessoa e o lugar oferecido para a alteridade na psicologia rogeriana.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magister en Axiología y Filosofía Política / No autorizada su publicación a texto completo, según petición de su autor / En el siguiente trabajo, fueron examinados el infinitos de Marx y Levinas, en tanto críticas del infinito verdadero hegeliano, para demostrar que la noción de Infinito es crucial desde el punto de vista metodológico, ya que tiene consecuencias sobre las exigencias que sufren los conceptos y categorías para adquirir el estatus de realidad en la filosofía política. Para fundamentar lo anterior, en primer lugar se realizó un análisis del infinito verdadero de Hegel y así adquirir la batería conceptual necesaria para determinar, en un segundo capítulo, el infinito político de Marx y finalmente (capítulo III) el infinito sensible de Levinas.