Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Essenism is, according to the data being discussed in this thesis, closely associated with the Dead Sea Scrolls material and had alienated itself from Second Temple Judaism as manifested through both Pharisaism and Sadduceanism. The problem that presents itself is the fact that Essenism is sometimes seen, with Pharisaism and Sadduceanism, as one of the three major trends within Second Temple Judaism, albeit schismatic in origin and nature. With Sadduceanism deriving its authority from the Temple and written Torah, and with Pharisaism its authority from both the written Torah as well as the oral tradition of the Sages, this thesis attempts to determine the criteria to be applied to cults of the Second Temple period in order for them to be classified as being Judaic. This is done in order to be able to establish what, in their own minds, set the Essenes apart from the other two prominent groups. That their motivation for exclusiveness must have been very strong becomes clear through the fact that, in their writings, the Essenes did not see themselves as just another group within Judaism, but as the only true and legitimate group. The ultimate aims of this thesis therefore are, firstly to find out exactly what constituted mainstream Second Temple Judaism according to certain historical and religious factors as well as Judaic ha/achic interpretation. Secondly, the thesis attempts to ascertain if Essenism met the determined criteria to be regarded as part of mainstream Judaism, and if not, if it can be regarded as sectarian Judaism, or as a separate religion altogether. In view of all the abovementioned criteria discussed, the probable conclusion would be that the sectarians from Qumran never thought of themselves as anything other than Jews within the ha/achic tradition, even though it may have been a ha/acha that may in certain respects have radically deviated from that of their fellow Jews. They can therefore rightly be regarded as part of the Judaic tradition of the Second Temple period. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Essenisme is, volgens die data bespreek in hierdie tesis, nou geassosiëer met die materiaal van die Dooie See Rolle, en die eksponente daarvan het hulself vervreem van Tweede Tempel Judaïsme soos gemanifesteer deur beide Fariseïsme en Sadduseïsme. Die probleem wat homself voordoen, is dat Essenisme, saam met Fariseïsme en Sadduseïsme, somtyds gesien word as een van die drie hoofstrominge binne Tweede Tempel Judaïsme, alhoewelskismaties van aard. Met Sadduseïsme wat sy outoriteit aan die Tempel en geskrewe Tora ontleen, en Fariseïsme sy gesag van beide die geskrewe Tora en die mondelinge tradisie van die Wyses, probeer hierdie tesis die kriteria bepaal wat toegepas kan word op kultusse van die Tweede Tempel tydperk, om sodoende as Judaïsties geklassifiseer te kan word, al dan nie. Dit word gedoen om vas te stel wat, in hul eie oë, die Esseners onderskei het van die ander twee prominente groepe. Uit hul geskrifte kan 'n mens aflei dat die Esseners se dryfveer vir eksklusiwiteit baie sterk moes gewees het, aangesien hulle hulself nie net as nog 'n verdere groep binne die Judaïsme gesien het nie, maar in der waarheid as die enigste ware en legitieme groep. Die uiteindelike doel van hierdie tesis is dus eerstens, om vas te stel presies wat verstaan kan word as Tweede Tempel Judaïsme, aan die hand van sekere historiese en religieuse faktore, asook ha/aehiese interpretasie. Tweedens, probeer dit vasstelof Essenisme aan die vasgestelde kriteria voldoen het om as deel van die hoofstroom Judaïsme gesien te kan word, en indien nie, of dit gesien kan word as sektariese Judaïsme, of as 'n heeltemal aparte godsdiens. In die lig van al die bogemelde bespreekte kriteria, sal die waarskynlike gevolgtrekking wees dat die sektelede van Qumran hulself nooit gesien het as enigiets anders as Jode binne die ha/aehiese tradisie nie, alhoewel dit 'n ha/aeha was wat in sekere opsigte radikaal verskil het van die van hul mede-Jode. Hulle kan gevolglik met reg gesien word as deel van die Judaïstiese tradisie van die Tweede Tempel tydperk.

Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law. Since the Second World War, the United Nations and various other international organs have recognised the protection of human rights in various treaties. These treaties protect citizen.s rights against possible infringement on the side of the state. South Africa was isolated from the development that occurred in international human rights law due to the system of apartheid. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, international law had to be made part of South African law so that South Africa could once again take its place in the international community. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various sections that deal with international law and its place within the South African legal system. In particular, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an obligation on courts, tribunals and forums to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights. With regard to section 39(1)(b), this thesis questions whether the Constitutional Court fulfils its obligation when interpreting the right to property and housing in sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution respectively. Through a discussion of Constitutional Court cases on the right to property, it is discovered that the Court does not optimally use the international law sources that are available. The Court does not reflect on the status of international law sources and confuses international law with foreign law. Therefore, the sources relating to the right to property in international and regional international law are outlined. On the basis of the available sources in international law that relate to the right to property, it is argued that there is no justification for the Court not considering the relevant international law sources. With regard to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution and the case law relating to the right, the Constitutional Court is more willing to consult international law to aid its interpretation of the right. This is partly attributable to fact that the right to adequate housing is a well developed right in international law. As a result, the Court refers to a wide range of international law sources when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing. However, the Court does not indicate the status of the various international law sources it uses to interpret the right to adequate housing. Therefore, it is argued that in the instances where there are relevant international law sources available to aid the interpretation of the rights to property and adequate housing, they should be considered. In the event that the Constitutional Court uses international law sources, their status within South African law and their relevance to the rights in question should be made clear. As a result, a method for the use of international law as a guide to interpretation is proposed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die beskerming van menseregte is van groot belang in internasionale reg. Na afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het verskeie internasionale agente, met die Verenigde Nasies in die voorgrond, menseregte begin erken in verskeie internasionale konvensies. Omdat Suid-Afrika die apartheidstelsel toegepas het, was die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geïsoleerd van die ontwikkeling rakende die beskerming van menseregte in internasionale reg. Met die koms van demokrasie was Suid-Afrika genoodsaak om internasionale reg deel te maak van Suid-Afrikaanse reg om te verseker dat Suid-Afrika weer die internasionale gemeenskap kon betree. Gevolglik bevat die Grondwet van 1996 verskeie artikels wat met internasionale reg handel. In besonder plaas artikel 39(1)(b) 'n verpligting op howe, tribunale en ander forums om internasionale reg te gebruik wanneer enige reg in die handves van menseregte geïnterpreteer moet word. In hierdie tesis word daar besin oor die vraag of die Grondwetlike Hof die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) nakom wanneer die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising in artikels 25 en 26 onderskeidelik geïnterpreteer word. Na 'n bespreking van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg tot eiendom, word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die Grondwetlike Hof nie die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) konsekwent nakom nie. Die Hof verwys nie na relevante internasionale of streeks- internasionale reg nie. Verder verwar die Hof internasionale reg met buitelandse reg. In die gevalle waar die Hof wel gebruik maak van internasionale reg, word die status van dié reg in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel nie duidelik uiteengesit nie. Na aanleiding van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg van toegang tot geskikte behuising, is dit duidelik dat die Grondwetlike Hof meer gewillig is om internasionale reg in ag te neem. 'n Moontlike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die reg tot behuising goed ontwikkel is in internasionale reg. Gevolglik maak die Grondwetlike Hof geredelik van internasionale reg gebruik om artikel 26 van die Grondwet te interpreteer. Nietemin, die status van die internasionale reg bronne wat die Hof wel gebruik word nie uiteengesit nie. Daarom word daar aangevoer dat indien daar internasionale reg beskikbaar is wat relevant is tot die geskil, behoort die Grondwetlike Hof sulke reg in ag te neem. Indien die Hof wel internasionale reg gebruik om die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising te interpreteer, moet die status van die bronne uiteengesit word. Daarom word daar ook in die tesis 'n voorstel voorgelê hoe howe te werk moet gaan indien internasionale reg bronne geraadpleeg word.

Thesis (LLM )-University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / 150 leaves printed on single pages, preliminary pages i-xi and numbered pages 1-138. Includes bibliography. / Digitized at 600 dpi grayscale to pdf format (OCR), using a Bizhub 250 Konica Minolta Scanner. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The concept of sectional ownership has been unknown in the Botswana common law because of the maxim superficies solo cedit, which does not recognize separate ownership of apartments in a building. The law must always serve the felt and real needs of the times, and in order to give effect to those needs, the Botswana Sectional Titles Act was enacted in 1999. It is based on the South African Sectional Titles Act of 1986, as amended, which repealed the 1971 Act. In this thesis, a comparative analysis of the South African and Botswana sectional titles law is made to determine whether and, if so, how the existing position in the South African sectional titles law could aid interpretation and application of the sectional titles legislation of Botswana, specifically pertaining to aspects of establishment of sectional title schemes. The main focus is on the legislative provisions of both jurisdictions. However, South African case law is also considered. Landownership and sectional titles is discussed, to determine whether sectional ownership is genuine ownership. This entails a discussion on the publicity principle, which in the case of land is normally achieved by means of registration in the Deeds Registries. The thesis analyses the Botswana and South African statutes on the requirements and procedures involved in the establishment of sectional title schemes to bring to light any shortcomings that may exist in either of the two statutes. An understanding of the shortcomings of the South African statute is relevant to the interpretation and application of the Botswana statute. An examination of the procedural aspects of establishment of a sectional title scheme, as well as the roles of the parties involved in the establishment thereof is undertaken, so as to identify consequences that may ensue if they fail to comply with the requirements of either of the statutes. Consequently, a comparative analysis on the effect of registration of the sectional plan and opening of the sectional title register is made. Although it is not suggested that the Botswana Act should be completely similar to the South African Act, as Botswana may have its own peculiar circumstances, suggestions as to the amendment of the Botswana statute are made. Amendments would make the Botswana Act even more flexible, and would open up the possibilities of development to achieve greater access to land. Further more improvements to the Act will have to be made, some before its implementation, and some after a period of application of the Act, as real practical problems become apparent. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die konsep van deeltitel was tot dusver in Botswana se gemenereg onbekend weens die maxim superficies solo cedit, wat nie aparte eienaarskap van woonstelle in 'n gebou erken nie. Die wet moet altyd die werklike behoeftes van die tyd dien, en om te voldoen aan daardie behoeftes is die Botswana Wet op Deeltitels in 1999 uitgevaardig. Dit is gebaseer op die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels van 1986, soos gewysig, wat die 1971 Wet herroep het. In hierdie tesis word 'n vergelykende studie gedoen van die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels en die gelyknamige Wet in Botswana om te bepaal of, en indien wel, hoe die bestaande posisie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels kan help met die interpretasie en toepassing van die deeltitel wetgewing van Botswana, veral waar dit gaan oor die vestiging van deeltitelskemas. Die tesis fokus op die wetgewende bepalings in albei lande, maar konsentreer op probleemareas in die nuwe Deeltitel wet van Botswana. Grondeienaarskap en deeltitels word bespreek om te bepaal of deeltiteleienaarskap werklike eienaarskap is. Dit behels 'n bespreking van die publisiteitsbeginsel, waaraan gewoonlik, in die geval van grond, voldoen word deur registrasie in die Akteregister. Die tesis ontleed die Suid-Afrikaanse statuut en die statuut van Botswana wat gaan oor die vereistes en prosedures betrokke by die vestiging van deeltitelskemas en enige tekortkominge wat bestaan in enige van die twee statute. Dit is belangrik om die tekortkominge van die Suid-Afrikaanse statuut te begryp, as die statuut van Botswana geinterpreteer en toegepas moet word. Die prosedures wat gevolg word in die vestiging van 'n deeltitelskema, asook die rolle van die verskillende partye betrokke, word bespreek sodat die gevolge as daar nie aan die vereistes van die statuut voldoen word nie, identifiseer kan word. Gevolglik word 'n vergelykende ontleding gedoen van die effek van registrasie van die deeltitelplan en die opening van die deeltitelregister. Die slothoofstuk bevat aanbevelings vir verdere navorsing. Alhoewel daar nie voorgestel word dat die wet in Botswana identies aan die Suid-Afrikaanse wet moet wees nie, (Botswana het te make met ander omstandighede) word voorstelle aan die hand gedoen vir die wysiging van die wet in Botswana. Hierdie wysigings sal die wet meer buigsaam maak en daar sal meer moontlikhede wees vir ontwikkeling wat groter toegang tot grond sal bewerkstellig. Verder sal daar verbeterings aan die wet aangebring moet word nadat dit eers in werking getree het en die werklike probleme kop uitsteek.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

En droit communautaire, les notions « souples », « élastiques », les « mots à sens multiples » ,dont le contenu est déterminé non pas par leur auteur mais par leur interprète, sont nombreux. <p>Parmi ces notions « floues », certaines, à la fois conceptuelles et fonctionnelles, sont intentionnellement indéterminées parce qu’elles permettent une mesure des comportements et des situations en termes de normalité et nécessitent, pour leur application aux cas d’espèce, des références exogènes au droit. C’est le cas, par exemple, des notions de « bon père de famille », de « bonnes mœurs », de « délai raisonnable », d’« abus de droit », de « confiance légitime », ou encore d’ « ordre public ». <p>Ce type particulier de notion indéterminée constitue un standard. <p>La question se pose de savoir si, et dans quelle mesure, les standards présentent des particularités dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, du point de vue de leur substance, c’est à dire de leur contenu, et du point de vue de leur fonction.<p>Il apparaît, d’abord, que la spécificité substantielle du standard n’est que partielle. <p>En effet, certains standards sont marqués par une forte coloration communautaire en ce qu’ils touchent au noyau dur de l’intégration communautaire et à la répartition des compétences au sein de cet ordre juridique (les notions de subsidiarité, de coopération loyale notamment). D’autres standards, en revanche, ont une substance proche de celle qui leur est attribuée dans les ordres juridiques nationaux ou internationaux, tout en étant adaptée à la logique de l’ordre communautaire (c’est le cas, par exemple, des notions de confiance légitime, de bonne administration, ou encore de procès équitable).<p>Il apparaît, ensuite, que la spécificité fonctionnelle du standard communautaire est manifeste. <p>Ce type de notion indéterminée joue, en effet, un rôle lié non seulement aux particularités du système juridictionnel de l’Union et à la contribution du juge à l’intégration européenne, mais aussi aux particularités structurelles de l’ordre juridique communautaire.<p><p> / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Islamic banking in the United States of America, became recognized as an alternative to expand into the market of traditional Muslim consumers, living in the United States. Because of strict regulatory guidelines, no Islamic banks exist in the United States. Instead, conventional banks, Islāmic banking windows (IBW) and other financial institutions offer Shari‘ah compliant products by modifying classical Islamic contracts or attaching a rider to define contract verbiage. This study reviewed techniques of adapting contracts used for Shari‘ah compliant products in the United States to determine if the contracts maintain the true characteristics of the original classical Islamic contracts. Contracts in Islamic sacred law provide protections by ensuring wealth is not wasted, and no injustice is performed by either of the contracting parties. Wealth protection and justice are the inherit characteristics of contracts in the Islāmic law. Any changes or modifications may void or decrease the protections provided in Islamic law. This research reviewed the theoretical aspects of contract modifications, by analyzing the procedures used for the derivative Shari‘ah compliant product contracts used in the Islamic finance industry in the United States. Data was evaluated and compared with the requirements of classical Islamic contract equivalents, to determine the effects of these changes. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Phil. (Religious Studies)

La thèse effectue une revue de la littérature scientifique sur la Cour dans le processus d’intégration juridique, en classant les différentes positions selon qu’ils définissent le rôle de la Cour comme réactif ou pro-actif. En faisant cette revue de la littérature, cinq facteurs sont mis en exergue pour ce qui concerne la problématique de l’autonomie de la Cour, qui feront l’objet d’une analyse approfondie dans la suite de la thèse :<p>I) Limites inhérentes à l’interprétation juridique des Traités tels qu’ils se retrouvent dans les règles institutionnalisées du raisonnement de la Cour ;<p>II) L’interaction, au niveau européen, entre la Cour et les autres institutions ;<p>III) Les pressions et les stratégies d’influence des Etats membres vis-à-vis de la Cour comme agent de leurs préférences ;<p>IV) La dépendance structurelle de la Cour supranationale vis-à-vis ses interlocuteurs judiciaires au niveau national ;<p>V) Le degré d’obéissance que les appareils administratifs et exécutifs des Etats membres démontrent vis-à-vis la jurisprudence de la Cour.<p>Par rapport à ces facteurs, et leur importance relative dans la détermination de la ligne d’action de la Cour de Justice, la thèse évalue les changements et les défis auxquels est soumise la fonction de la Cour de justice au niveau de l’Union européenne, en particulier par rapport à l’environnement de plus en plus critique ou évolue la trajectoire jurisprudentielle de la Cour par rapport aux acteurs politiques et juridiques, l’érosion du caractère sui generis du droit communautaire dans le contexte du droit international, le rôle de plus en plus affiché des cours nationales, et le contexte institutionnel dans lequel se trouve à agir cette juridiction. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Les juges de la Cour Suprême des États-Unis et la notion de constitution vivante.Une constitution écrite peut-elle évoluer au cours du temps et s’adapter aux besoins et aux valeurs évolutives de la société, sans pour autant être révisée formellement ? Et si oui, qu’en est-il du texte constitutionnel ? Devant ces interrogations, la notion de constitution vivante vise à résoudre le paradoxe du changement matériel de la Constitution sans modification du texte. Elle est sans aucun doute un topos – qui ne manque pas de susciter des critiques,notamment celle de la théorie dite « originaliste » - de la pensée constitutionnelle américaine, un concept mobilisé, en l’occurrence, pour justifier la cause de la réforme juridique et sociale. Elle a été développée,durant le XXe siècle, principalement par des juges de la Cour Suprême américaine qui ont fourni une approche stimulante et fertile de la nature de la Constitution. La notion de constitution vivante exprime donc une conception évolutive de la Loi suprême, qui saurait, par sa flexibilité et sa fonctionnalité,s’adapter au changement de circonstances. Dans ce cadre, elle a été instrumentalisée afin de surmonter la rigidité de la procédure de révision formelle prescrite par l’article V de la Constitution. Cette notion est dès lors porteuse de la tension entre la permanence du texte et l’évolution du droit constitutionnel positif. Pour justifier ce décalage entre la forme et le fond, les juges défenseurs de la constitution vivante ont toujours traité le texte comme un « document vivant », qui doit être lu à la lumière des valeurs évolutives et des idéaux partagés par le peuple américain. / The Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the notion of the livingConstitutionCan a written constitution evolve over time and adapt itself to the changingneeds and values of society, without being formally amended? If yes, thenwhat about the text? The notion of the living constitution tries to solve theparadox of constitutional change without modification of the text. It is acommon place notion – though subject to fierce criticism, notably byoriginalism - of U.S. constitutional thought, a concept invoked on manydifferent occasions in order to promote constitutional and social change. It hasbeen primarily elaborated by certain Justices of the Supreme Court of theUnited States during the 20th century, who have offered a stimulatingapproach of the nature of the U.S. Constitution. From their point of view, thenotion of the living constitution is based on the idea that the Constitutionevolves over time adapting itself to the ever changing circumstances. It thusleads to a theory of interpretation which treats the constitutional provisionsthat allocate powers or guarantee individual rights as flexible and vital.Furthermore, the notion of the living constitution has been used as a means ofovercoming the barrier of the amendment procedure as prescribed by Article Vof the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, it is marked by the tension between thepermanence of the text and the evolution of constitutional law. In order tojustify this evolution, the Justices who defend the notion of the livingConstitution, have always treated the text as a living document, which mustbe read in light of the aspirations and the high ideals of the American people.

Text in English and Arabic / In pre-colonial Africa, the Southwestern Sahara which includes Mauritania, Mali and Senegal belonged to what was then referred to as the Sudan and extended from the Atlantic seaboard to the Red Sea. The advent of Islam and the Arabic language to West Africa in the 11th century heralded an intellectual marathon whose literary output still fascinates us today. At a time when Europe was emerging from the dark ages and Africa was for most Europeans a terra incognita, indigenous African scholars were composing treatises as diverse as mathematics, agriculture and the Islamic sciences. A twentieth century Mauritanian, Arabic monograph, Irshād al- Muqallidīn ʿinda ikhtilāf al-Mujtahidīn1, written circa 1910/1332, by a yet unknown Mauritanian jurist of the Mālikī School, Bāba bin al-Shaykh Sīdī al- Shinqīṭī al-Ntishā-ī (d.1920/1342), a member of the muchacclaimed Shinqīṭī fraternity of scholars, is a fine example of African literary accomplishment. This manuscript hereinafter referred to as the Irshād, is written within the legal framework of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh). A science that relies for the most part on the intellectual and interpretive competence of the independent jurist, or mujtahid, in the application of the methodologies employed in the extraction of legal norms from the primary sources of the sharīʿah. The subject matter of the Irshād deals with the question of juristic differences. Juristic differences invariably arise when a mujtahid exercises his academic freedom to clarify or resolve conundrums in the law and to postulate legal norms. Other independent jurists (mujtahidūn) may posit different legal norms because of the exercise of their individual interpretive skills. These differences, when they are deemed juristically irreconcilable, are called ikhtilāfāt (pl. of ikhtilāf). The author of the Irshād explores a corollary of the ikhtilāf narrative and posits the hypothesis that there ought not to be ikhtilāf in the sharīʿah. The proposed research will comprise an annotated translation of the monograph followed by a synopsis and commentary on its dominant themes. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Islamic Studies)