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La question autrichienne en France dans les années trente (1930-1938) / The Austrian issue in France during the thirties (1930-1938)Lauzun, Hélène de 17 January 2015 (has links)
A la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, la France contribue largement à transformer l’ancienne Autriche-Hongrie, et doit assumer une responsabilité quant à la survie et au devenir de la nouvelle Autriche, à travers différents engagements internationaux, même si aucun traité ne lie formellement les deux Etats. On définit généralement la position française vis-à-vis de l'Autriche par cette alternative : ni Habsbourg, ni Anschluss. A partir de 1930, l'héritier du trône, Otto de Habsbourg, accède à la majorité : se pose alors concrètement la question d'une éventuelle restauration. Les années 1930 voient par ailleurs le développement d'une multitude de projets de réorganisation de l'Europe centrale, alternative à ce retour des Habsbourg. L'arrivée d'Hitler au pouvoir en Allemagne doit pousser la France à des prises de position claires : son dessein est la réunion de l'Autriche au Reich, et le gouvernement français doit déterminer quelle attitude adopter envers le gouvernement autrichien qui choisit la voie de l'autoritarisme contre la poussée nazie. Si une part de l'opinion française a des sympathies pour la cause de l'indépendance autrichienne, le gouvernement n'impose jamais de choix clairs en ce sens, en raison notamment de facteurs idéologiques. Il est aussi prisonnier d'une conception trop économique de l'organisation de l'Europe centrale, qui lui fait sous-estimer les problèmes identitaires existant entre l'Autriche et l'Allemagne. L'absence d'une réflexion sur les spécificités de la nation autrichienne en construction conduit à faire le jeu de l'Allemagne, à travers l'idée d'un « germanisme » commun aux deux Etats. L'Anschluss, sans réaction française, vient couronner plus d'une décennie de contradictions et prépare la défaite symbolique de Munich. / At the end of World War I, France is a major actor of the transformation of old Austria-Hungary and becomes one of the main protectors of Austria through several international commitments; yet no treaty ever connects the two countries. The French policy on Austria is generally admitted to be : neither Habsburg, nor Anschluss. In 1930 Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last emperor, attains the age of majority ; so the issue of restauration appears again to be a major problem in Europe. At the same time, many plans and projects are discussed to reorganize Central Europe, as a possible alternative to the come back of the Habsburg family. With Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in Germany in 1933, France has to make up clear decisions, since Hitler's goal is to achieve the unification of Austria with Germany. The French government has to decide whether to support or not the Austrian government, getting authoritative in order to fight against nazi propaganda and terrorism. Many people in France are quite in favour of the cause of the independence of Austria. Yet the French government doesn't make any decisive choices to defend it, in particular because of ideological reasons. The French policy is also confined to an all-economic conception of international relations in Central Europe, and under-estimates the problems of national identity existing between Austria and Germany. The lack of a reflection on the specificities of an Austrian nation to be built tends to be of a great advantage for Germany, which praises for the idea of a common « germanism » for both countries. The Anschluss is made without any real French reaction, as a consequence of more than ten years of political contradictions ; thus it prepares the symbolical defeat of Munich.
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Les affrontements idéologiques nationalistes et stratégiques au Proche-Orient vus à travers le prisme de la Société des Nations et de l'Organisation des Nations UniesBenfredj, Esther 12 1900 (has links)
L’effondrement et le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale ont conduit les Grandes puissances européennes à opérer un partage territorial du Proche-Orient, légitimé par le système des mandats de la Société des Nations (SDN). Sans précédent, cette administration internationale marqua le point de départ de l’internationalisation de la question de la Palestine, dont le droit international allait servir de socle à une nouvelle forme de colonialisme. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) continua l’action entreprise par la SDN en s’occupant également de cette question sur la demande des Britanniques. En novembre 1947, l’ONU décida du partage de la Palestine en deux Etats pour résoudre les conflits entre sionistes et nationalistes arabes. Si ce partage fut accepté par les sionistes, il fut rejeté par les Etats arabes voisins et de nombreux Arabes palestiniens. Les affrontements opposant nationalistes arabes et sionistes de Palestine laissèrent place au conflit israélo-arabe après la proclamation d’Indépendance de l’Etat d’Israël en mai 1948. Au commencement de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis et l’URSS prirent conscience de l’intérêt géostratégique de cette région, progressivement désinvestie par la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Dans cette étude, nous verrons comment la scène interétatique et la communauté internationale, successivement composée de la SDN puis de l’ONU, ont en partie scellé le sort du Proche et Moyen-Orient. Nous consacrerons également une analyse au rôle joué par les idéologies nationalistes arabes et sionistes, qui tiennent une place centrale au sein de ce conflit. / The collapse and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, led the great European powers to engage in a territorial division of the Middle East, legitimized by the mandates system of the League of Nations. Without any precedents, that international administration marked the beginning of the internationalization of Palestine’s thorny issue. The international law would serve as the pillar for a new form of colonialism. The day after World War II, the United Nations continued the action taken by the League of Nations, as well as for the demand of the British. In November 1947, the UN decided to divide Palestine into two States. If the Zionists had accepted that split, their neighbors, Arab States and Palestinian Arabs, would have rejected it. The clashes opposing the Arab Nationalists and the Palestine Zionists gave space to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the independence of Israel, on May 14, 1948. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union became aware of the geo-strategic interest in this region, gradually divested by France and Great Britain. In this study, we will see how the interstate scene and the international community, successively composed by the League of Nations and the United Nations, have partially sealed the fate of the Near and the Middle East. We will also devote a preliminary analysis related to the role played by the Arabs and Zionists nationalist ideologies, which are central in this conflict.
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Racial Equality Bill: Japanese proposal at Paris Peace Conference : diplomatic manoeuvres and reasons for rejection / Racial Equality Bill : Reasons for rejectionImamoto, Shizuka January 2006 (has links)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Honours) at Macquarie University. / Thesis (MA (Hons))--Macquarie University (Division of Humanities, Dept. of Asian Languages), 2006. / Bibliography: leaves 137-160. / Introduction -- Anglo-Japanese relations and World War One -- Fear of Japan in Australia -- William Morris Hughes -- Japan's proposal and diplomacy at Paris -- Reasons for rejection : a discussion -- Conclusion. / Japan as an ally of Britain, since the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, entered World War One at British request. During the Great War Japan fought Germany in Asia and afforded protection to Australia. After the conclusion of the War, a peace conference was held at Paris in 1919. As a victorious ally and as one of the Five Great Powers of the day, Japan participated at the Paris Peace Conference, and proposed racial equality to be enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Racial Equality Bill, despite the tireless efforts of the Japanese delegates who engaged the representatives of other countries in intense diplomatic negotiations, was rejected. The rejection, a debatable issue ever since, has inspired many explanations including the theory that it was a deliberate Japanese ploy to achieve other goals in the agenda. This thesis has researched the reasons for rejection and contends that the rejection was not due to any one particular reason. Four key factors: a) resolute opposition from Australian Prime Minister Hughes determined to protect White Australia Policy, b) lack of British support, c) lack of US support, and d) lack of support from the British dominions of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa; converged to defeat the Japanese proposal. Japanese inexperience in international diplomacy evident from strategic and tactical mistakes, their weak presentations and communications, and enormous delays in negotiations, at Paris, undermined Japan's position at the conference, but the reasons for rejection of the racial equality proposal were extrinsic. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / xii, 188 leaves
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British intelligence and policy in the Palestine mandate, 1919-1939Wagner, Steven Benjamin January 2014 (has links)
This research argues that during the inter-war years in Palestine, British power was dependent upon intelligence. Intelligence was fundamental to the security of the country, since it varyingly augmented understrength force, or supported overwhelming force. Intelligence also supported policymakers as issues of governance were debated. It allowed British decision makers to avoid making a decision on self-government during the 1920s and it supported Britain’s failed attempts to introduce a constitution during the 1930s. Intelligence also was crucial to Britain’s relations with the Arab nationalist and Zionist communities. Of particular importance was Britain’s partnership and subsequent war with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. This thesis sheds new light on the role of intelligence in British colonial policymaking, the development of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and how Britain failed to manage communal violence. This research offers a new and improved explanation of the origins, unfolding, and defeat of the Palestinian Arab rebellion. British intelligence and policymakers failed to grasp the sophistication of the Palestinian national movement until the mid-1930s, and even then, they focused on clan competition and the politics of ‘notables’. Intelligence and military records explain how British police and military struggled, but ultimately succeeded to suppress and defeat this rebellion. Victory was made possible by innovations within the intelligence and planning staffs, as well as Zionist cooperation. Intelligence shaped policy most clearly at the beginning and end of the period under examination. During 1918-20, the military government was administered by intelligence officers who guaranteed Britain’s future control in Palestine both domestically, and at the League of Nations. In 1939, British policy abandoned its traditional Zionist partners when the need to impose a solution on Palestine coincided with the opportunity, revealed by signals intelligence, to bolster and leverage the influence of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud over the Arab national movement.
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Diverging Wilsonianisms: Liberal Internationalism, the Peace Movement, and the Ambiguous Legacy of Woodrow WilsonKendall, Eric M. 30 January 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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The Millennium and the Madhouse: Institution and Intervention in Woodrow Wilson's Progressive StatecraftPhillips, Matthew Todd 18 July 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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Alternative Vision: The United States, Latin America, and the League of Nations during the Republican AscendancyHaynes, Steven L. 19 November 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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Jesús Baigorri Jalón - profil, dílo, teorie / Profile, work and theory of Jesús Baigorri JalónPejchalová, Milada January 2014 (has links)
The central focus of this Master's thesis was to provide a concise overview of the academic work of the contemporary Spanish interpreter and interpreting historian, Jesús Baigorri Jalón. We carried out an in-depth analysis of his work, accompanied by the critical reception of his two key publications. In the introductory part of our thesis, we focused on the author's methodology and placement in Spanish and Czech academic contexts. Then, we elaborated a comprehensive, chronological overview of the author's two main monographs and outlined the main topics discussed in Baigorri's studies. We also focused on the author's contribution to the translation and interpreting studies, his research methodology and its potential to serve as an inspiration to Czech researchers.
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Le droit de la diplomatie préventive : étude de la règle de prévention en droit international public contemporain / The law of preventive diplomacy : a study of the rule of prevention in contemporary public international lawNikolaeva, Desislava 26 September 2016 (has links)
Le droit international encadre l’exercice de la diplomatie des États dans une finalité de prévenir l’insécurité et, par extension, les conflits armés. Le droit de la diplomatie préventive reflète ainsi l’idée que la prévention de risques imminents de dommages matériels graves délimite l’objet d’un principe général de droit international. L’affirmation d’un principe est fondée sur l’analyse inductive des conventions majeures conclues en matière de maintien de la sécurité collective de 1899 à 1945. Elle est vérifiée à la lumière de la pratique de leur application par les Membres de la SdN et, depuis 1945, de l’ONU. Le caractère général de ce principe est déduit d’une étude combinée de la jurisprudence d’un nombre de juridictions internationales dans une variété de domaines du droit international. Les efforts individuels et collectifs de prévention des conflits obéissent donc à un régime juridique général qui organise le système contemporain de maintien de la paix internationale. / International law regulates States’ diplomacy for the purpose of preventing insecurity, and, by extension, armed conflicts. Accordingly, the law of preventive diplomacy reflects, in a sense, the idea that prevention of imminent risks of serious material damages defines a general principle of international law. The assertion of such a principle is based on an inductive analysis of the major treaties on collective security concluded between 1899 and 1945. It is verified in light of their application by Member States of the League of Nations and, since 1945, of the United Nations. The general nature of this principle is deduced from a combined study of the jurisprudence of a number of international courts and tribunals in various fields of international law. Those findings support the idea that individual and collective efforts of conflict prevention are subject to the respect of a general legal regime governing the current international system of peace-maintenance and collective security.
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顧維鈞與九一八事變 / V. K. Wellington Koo and the Manchurian Crisis林振宙, Lin, Chen-Chou Unknown Date (has links)
No description available.
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