¿Por qué plantear como problema el principio del proceso creativo en el arte en vez de lo bello en sí? Este último no es un problema que prime en el trabajo creativo del artista de hoy, como tampoco lo fue en los artistas de ayer, a pesar de haber sido y de ser un tema relevante para los filósofos. Desde la plataforma de los que somos artistas plásticos o visuales, el proceso creativo sí es parte de nuestra rutina. En ese sentido, urge seguir encontrando un mejor orden que ayude a organizar ese proceso. / Tesis

Wonder has had a rich and diverse history in the western philosophical tradition. Both Plato and Aristotle claim that philosophy begins in wonder, while Descartes marks it as the first of the passions and Heidegger uses it as a signpost for a new trajectory of philosophy away from idealism and nihilism. Despite such a rich history, wonder is almost always thought to be exhausted by the acquisition of knowledge. That is, wonder is thought of almost exclusively in epistemological terms and is discarded as soon as knowledge has been achieved. In this dissertation, I argue for an ontological reorientation of wonder that values wonder beyond its epistemic uses. To do this, I read the phenomenological and ontological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty through recent developments in object-oriented ontology and new materialism. Much of Merleau-Ponty's work is directed toward dissolving the distinction between subject and object. His insights regarding the mutual constitution of the world lead to the possibility of an operative wonder that occurs between subject and object. Both object-oriented ontology and new materialism radicalize these insights by articulating them in terms of a vibrant or quasi-agential material world. Objects and assemblages of objects are capable of performing the becoming of the world that includes human activity, but is not reduced to it. As such, the world is capable of both self-organization and practice. Ultimately I use the philosophy-physics of Karen Barad to argue that operative wonder acts like a kind of superposition of relations between objects, and thereby accounts for a concept of wonder that is both ontologically significant and acutely generative.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-17 / Our research has as central theme of corporeality in Merleau-Ponty, considering the expression and flesh notions articulated to the body and brought in some of his works. Our argument is based on the assertion that the body gains distinction and philosophical thickness along the Merleau-Ponty thought experiment. In order to emphasize the strength of its proposal and the contrast with certain philosophical tradition, initially present understanding the body in Descartes, without losing sight the philosophical and medical context of the XVI e XVII centuries. In a second move, we follow the phenomenological description of the body proposed by Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie de la perception, in order to reveal the textures of the body itself and its modes of expression in the world, and his incisive criticism of the Cartesian philosophy and its impact an empirical science. In the third and final movement of this research, we expose certain plots of esthesiological body articulated to the Merleau- Ponty’s ontological project, with reference to his last writings, L’oeil et l’esprit and Le visible et l’invisible / Nossa investigação tem como centralidade o tema da corporeidade na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, considerando as noções de expressão e carne articuladas ao corpo e apresentadas em algumas de suas obras. Nosso argumento assenta-se na afirmação de que o corpo ganha distinção e espessura filosófica ao longo da experiência do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. No sentido de ressaltarmos o vigor de sua proposta e o contraste com certa tradição filosófica, inicialmente apresentamos a compreensão do corpo em Descartes, sem perder de vista o contexto filosófico e médico dos séculos XVI e XVII. Em um segundo movimento, acompanhamos a descrição fenomenológica do corpo proposta por Merleau-Ponty em Phénoménologie de la perception, no sentido de evidenciar as texturas do corpo próprio e seus modos de expressão no mundo, bem como sua crítica contundente à filosofia cartesiana e seu desdobramento empírico na ciência. No terceiro e último movimento dessa investigação, expomos certas tramas do corpo estesiológico articuladas ao projeto ontológico de Merleau-Ponty, tendo como referência seus últimos escritos, L’oeil et l’esprit e Le visible et l’invisible

Through a detailed analysis of a selection of works produced between 1999 and 2003 by the South African artist Berni Searle, this thesis explores the need to theorise a corporeal viewer in the process of interpreting art works. Such an approach is particularly necessary when dealing with an artist such as Searle because her work, which deals predominantly with the theme of identity, appeals not only to conceptual but also to experiential and corporeal understandings of identity. Searle incorporates the viewer into an experience of her own identity through a physical identification that the viewer feels in relation to her work. For viewers this means that they are made aware of how their own identity in the moment of interpretation is contingent on visual, mental and physical components. In order to develop this argument the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty is drawn on. These two theorists are very useful for an argument of this nature because both interpret identity as a construction involving an enfolding between the mind and, via the act of vision, the body of the subject. Through an inclusion of the corporeal element in interpretation, this thesis also offers a critique of interpretive theories that would reduce analysis to an interaction between eye and mind by analyzing how the viewer's body participates in the act of looking.

viii, 189 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / The question of the present study concerns the relationship between language and nature as it has been taken up in the history of Western philosophy. The goal of this study is to show how language and nature are held together by thinking the transition between them, through the figure of silence. I will show this by drawing primarily on the work of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the body, and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language and nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the hinge of this passage, in which language, in its emergence from the silence of nature, turns back to disclose nature as already expression. Merleau-Ponty's late interrogation into how philosophical language might both emerge from and return to silence turned on the example of Proust's literary language. This study will also draw on Proust's meta-novelistic awakening to his literary calling, as it is recounted near the end of Le Temps Retrouvé, which discusses explicitly how Proust's language makes a turn through silence in order to emerge as literature. This provides an example of the emergence which Merleau-Ponty describes. I will then make the case that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy can be read as the thinking of being as nature, and that it begins to think how language roots human beings in nature as it blossoms out of nature's soil. I will show how Merleau-Ponty repeats a structure of thought traversed by Schelling in his essay on freedom, which will further show how philosophical attention to language discloses nature as a radical excess. Finally, I will discuss how the negotiation between language, nature, and silence, as it is practiced by Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is another turn in a long story of the human place in language and in nature, a story which is at least as old as the mythical thought of ancient Greece. / Committee in charge: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy; Naomi Zack, Member, Philosophy; Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy; Jeffrey Librett, Outside Member, German and Scandinavian

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseEF.pdf: 1200454 bytes, checksum: 3cc2b220954ccdaa9c8640eedaa81fb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-12-14 / Ce travail a l intention d éclarcir la portée des considérations de Merleau- Ponty sur le comportément. On a fait l inventaire critique sur le comportément, tel que cet notion est presentée dans l oeuvre « La Structure du Comportément ». On a cherché de montrer que lesécoles classiques de psychologie, se trouvent devent deux positions : l intellectualiste, que préconise une psychologie analytique de la conscience comme sa cause productrice et son antithèse empiriste, laquelle se mantient fidèle a la pensée causalle, lorsque elle a determinée pour le psychisme une realité matérielle extérieur. Ce sont, deux positions antithétiques vis a vis la relation entre consciencenature : la philosohie intellectualiste que fait de la nature une unité constitué par la conscience et la science empirique, que separe la conscience et la nature comme si elles étaient deux réalités que appartiennent à la même catégorie substantielle, liée par des rélations de cause et effet. Dans la séquence, ayant en vue les conséquences de ces théories classiques, on va dans la diréction d une nouvelle description du comportément : les idées de expérience directe et de structure. Finalement, on a cherché, a travers une lecture de la « Phénomenologie de la Perception », montrer comment une conception phenomenique du comportémentl est elle possible, si on mantient les catégories de expérience directe et de structure, pour qu on puisse, a traves une approche phénomenique du corps, élaborer une nouvelle lecture des relations entre conscience et nature. / Este trabalho procura esclarecer o alcance das considerações merleaupontyanas sobre o comportamento. Fizemos, antes de tudo, o inventário crítico do comportamento como está sugerido em A Estrutura do Comportamento. Nesse caso, buscamos mostrar que as escolas clássicas de Psicologia, na explicação do comportamento, encontram-se, em geral, diante de duas posições: a intelectualista, que preconiza uma psicologia analítica da consciência como causa produtora e a sua antítese empirista que se mantém fiel ao pensamento causal quando determinou ao psíquico uma realidade material e exterior. São, portanto, duas posições antitéticas sobre a relação consciência-natureza: a filosofia intelectualista, que faz da natureza uma unidade constituída pela consciência e a ciência empirista, que separa natureza e consciência como duas realidades da mesma categoria substancial, ligadas por relações de causa e efeito. Depois, num segundo momento, tendo em vista os problemas decorrentes dessas teorias clássicas, apontamos os fundamentos para uma nova descrição do comportamento: as idéias de experiência direta e de estrutura. Finalmente, procuramos através de uma leitura da Fenomenologia da Percepção mostrar como uma concepção fenomênica do comportamento é possível, desde que mantidas as categorias de experiência direta e de estrutura para que possamos, por meio de uma abordagem fenomênica do corpo, elaborar uma nova leitura das relações entre consciência e natureza.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3029.pdf: 967052 bytes, checksum: 331956ebf90a8cfa1602f47ec2f36921 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-19 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / The ways by which the modern thought - namely that belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - intervenes in the construction of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, not only illustrates the importance that the french philosopher gives to the theme of history of philosophy, as they are also signatories of the double effort that animates his project: scrutinize the present using the legacy left by the past and to see indistinctly, through the slits and fissures in buildings erected within the modern philosophy, the future tasks of the thought, the challenges with which the philosophical reason will need reckoning. This dissertation aims to make explicit the ways through which this double effort are present in Merleau-Ponty's work, particularly in his doctorate thesis, titled Phenomenology of perception. Our intention is to examine the statute of the critic towards modern reason in a structural problem which, as we will try to show, is a example of the relation between Merleau-Ponty's project and philosophical modernity: the problem of subjectivity. Our hypotheses is that the criticism to modern reason, found in Merleau-Ponty's book - conducts to the acknowledge of the inalienable presence of the world in the horizon of philosophical reason and to the consequent definition of the phenomenon of the perception as a pre-reflexive adhesion of the subject to the world, as a original opening to being - permits Merleau-Ponty to put back the problem of subjectivity in new basis, not anymore those provided by the cartesian paradigm of substantiality, but those that start from experience of the body, from language and from aesthetic expression / As maneiras pelas quais o pensamento moderno leia-se, aquele dos séculos XVII e XVIII - intervém na construção da filosofia merleau-pontiana, não apenas ilustram a importância que o fenomenólogo francês atribui ao tema da história da filosofia, como também são signatárias do duplo esforço que anima o seu projeto: o de escrutinar o presente à luz dos legados deixados pelo passado e o de tentar entrever, pelas frestas e rachaduras dos edifícios erigidos no seio da filosofia moderna, as tarefas vindouras do pensamento, os desafios com os quais a razão filosófica precisará ajustar contas. Esta dissertação tem como objetivo explicitar os modos através dos quais esse duplo esforço se apresenta na obra de Merleau-Ponty, particularmente em sua tese de doutoramento, intitulada Fenomenologia da percepção. Nossa pretensão é examinar o estatuto da crítica à razão moderna na estruturação de um problema que, tal como tentaremos mostrar, é exemplar da relação entre o projeto merleau-pontiano e a modernidade filosófica: o problema da subjetividade. Nossa hipótese é a de que a crítica à razão moderna na Fenomenologia da percepção, conduzindo ao reconhecimento da presença inalienável do mundo no horizonte da reflexão filosófica e à consequente definição do fenômeno da percepção como adesão pré-reflexiva do sujeito ao mundo, como abertura originária ao ser, permite a Merleau-Ponty recolocar o problema da subjetividade sobre novas bases, não mais aquelas fornecidas pelo paradigma cartesiano da substancialidade, mas as da experiência do corpo, da linguagem e da expressão estética.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:22:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2013-09-26Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:27:48Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 alves_fc_me_ia.pdf: 949904 bytes, checksum: 1884eb7f0cf21d91bbf6cff87dd06d2f (MD5) / Esta dissertação investiga a noção de arte moderna presente na reflexão estética do filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty, partindo da hipótese de que tal noção está inclusa na meditação sobre as indivisibilidades entre a relação homem, natureza e expressão artística. Apresenta a concepção de arte e arte moderna concomitantemente à trajetória e ao discurso filosófico de Merleau-Ponty. Discorre sobre a tese do filósofo acerca do retorno ao mundo percebido, as indivisibilidades, o corpo vidente e visível, o sensível, a carne do mundo, a pintura, o Ser bruto, a Natureza, logos e a expressão. A partir desses temas, foram desenvolvidas leituras sobre os seguintes textos para dimensionar essa noção de arte moderna: “A dúvida de Cézanne”, “A expressão e o desenho infantil”, “A linguagem indireta”, “A linguagem indireta e as vozes do silêncio” e “O olho e o espírito”. Para compreender o pensamento de Merleau- Ponty aproximamos suas ideias a várias teorias da história e da filosofia da arte, a partir dos temas: o espírito moderno, as correspondências, a representação e a expressão. Por fim, destaca os principais valores e ideias que compõem a noção de arte moderna em Merleau- Ponty. / This work investigates the notion of modern art in this aesthetic reflection of philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, on the hypothesis that such a notion is included in the meditation about the indivisibilities on the relationship between man, nature and artistic expression. It presents the concept of art and modern art concomitantly to the trajectory and the philosophical discourse of Merleau-Ponty. This work also discuss the thesis of the philosopher about returning to the perceived world, the indivisibilities, the visible and invisible body, the sensitive, flesh of world, the painting, the Being, the Nature, the logos and the expression. On the themes, the following texts were studied to investigate the author’s notion of modern art: “Cézanne’s Doubt”, “Expression and the child’s drawing”, “The indirect language”, “The indirect language and the voices of silence” “Eye and mind”. To comprehend Merleu-Ponty’s ideas, his thought was related with various History and Art Philosophy theories, under the following themes: the modern mind, correspondence, representation and expression. At last, this work emphasizes the core values and ideas that make up the notion of modern art of Merleau-Ponty.

En la presente investigación nos proponemos analizar la relación que se establece entre las ideas de contingencia y expresión en la obra política del filósofo francés Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Consideramos tres elementos interpretativos para realizar este trabajo, tomando en cuenta principalmente las obras que publicó el autor entre los años 1945 y 1955. Primero, tomamos como perspectiva de lectura el contexto socio-político del autor y cómo este responde a las situaciones vividas en su época (período de entreguerras, Segunda Guerra Mundial), nos centramos aquí en describir los trabajos iniciales de Merleau-Ponty sobre el cuerpo y la expresión, cuya profundización irá madurando hacia una radical reflexión de lo político como contingente. Segundo, analizamos el diálogo que el autor establece con otros filósofos. Nos concentramos sobre todo en el debate de Merleau-Ponty con Hegel, Marx y Sartre, pero también, aunque en menor medida, discutimos su posición frente a otros autores como Maquiavelo, Kant, Alain, Weber, Lúkacs, entre otros. Dicho diálogo busca mostrar la particularidad del pensamiento de Merleau-Ponty respecto a lo político, esto es, su forma de retomar ciertas ideas de la tradición y sus modos de interpretar un contexto político opacado por la unitelaridad ideológica de la Guerra Fría. Tercero, evidenciamos la importancia de su descripción fenomenológica de la percepción, con la que Merleau- Ponty asume una relación sistémica cuerpo-mundo, cuyo desarrollo lo conduce a una nueva comprensión de la institución, la historia y la praxis política tanto individual como colectiva. Planteamos que estas tres perspectivas de indagación muestran claramente la estrecha relación entre la expresión y la contingencia, elementos inherentes que explicitan su reflexión sobre lo político. Para el filósofo francés, lo político comprende dos dimensiones: una primera que llamamos instituida, que condensa las creencias, ideas, comportamientos y expresiones de la vida colectiva históricamente dada; y una segunda dimensión llamada instituyente, que interpela a la dimensión instituida, y hace aparecer un acontecimiento transformativo de la propia historia social, sobre el cual es posible que no se haya vislumbrado su llegada. Ambas dimensiones instituido-instituyente trabajan bajo una dialéctica que reconfigura las relaciones políticas, no desde un sentido de la historia objetiva; sino una historia que tiene su nacimiento en la vida perceptiva, natural, una forma de entender la historia que Merleau-Ponty llamará “vertical” y cuya característica principal es la ausencia de síntesis dialéctica entre lo instituido e instituyente. En el primer capítulo, describimos los momentos centrales del contexto donde se desarrolla la filosofía del autor, identificando cuáles son sus críticas a la filosofía moderna, así también presentamos cómo las ideas fenomenológicas de intencionalidad y corporalidad e institución serán centrales para pensar las relaciones sociales y políticas. En el segundo, analizamos cómo Merleau-Ponty se apoya en la fenomenología para comprender y resignificar su idea de violencia y de la historia. En el tercero, revisamos la influencia de la dialéctica de Hegel en el pensamiento del autor. En el cuarto, presentamos la interpretación de Merleau-Ponty sobre el materialismo histórico de Marx. En el quinto, examinamos las distinciones filosóficas entre Sartre y Merleau- Ponty, como fundamento para comprender las distintas visiones de praxis política que ambos filósofos amigos defienden y que termina por distanciarlos. Finalmente, en el sexto capítulo desarrollamos un análisis de la expresión que llevará al autor a plantear una visión de lo político como el espacio de lo contingente. Hacia el final de este capítulo, e inspirados por la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty, planteamos una relectura del conflicto armado interno peruano, que considere la contingencia de lo político como un elemento de lectura para comprender y profundizar más sobre el periodo de violencia nacional.

Between his first philosophical works and his last, Jean-Paul Sartre radically changed his philosophical outlook. The reasons for this change can be found in European history and Sartre's detailed study of twentieth-century protest movements. Between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s, French intellectuals began an intensive period of introspection, examining the complex relationship between History and social justice. Sartre and the group of intellectuals associated with him combined to fight against Stalinism while searching for a new theory of political action. This thesis discusses the abrupt termination of the ethical project that Sartre proposed to base on his original phenomenological examinations, and discusses his and Simone de Beauvoir's first attempts to construct an Existentialist ethic. Sartre changed from being an Existentialist to a Marxist to finally, late in life, abandoning Marxism in favour of a never well-defined philosophy. But in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, the last of his serious philosophical works, he responded to his ex-friends's critiques in the light of his study of Eastern European history, particularly, the Revolution in Hungary. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)