Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka behovet av indirekt eld och Close Air Support i militäraoperationer i bergsterräng och belysa vilka aspekter som påverkar nyttjandet av försvarsmaktensenheter och verkanssystem vid insatser i bergsmiljö. För att svara på syftet med uppsatsen har följande studiefråga ställts: Hur använde USA den grundläggande förmågan verkan för att påverka motståndaren under Operation Anaconda? Fallstudie och textanalys har använts som vetenskaplig metod och teknik för denna uppsats. Inledningsvis studerades texter om operation Anaconda och hur operationen genomfördes. Därefter studerades svenska doktriner och reglementen avseende teorier om grundläggande förmågor och hur verkan uppnås i striden. Slutligen analyserades hur USA använde den grundläggande förmåganverkan under operation Anaconda med tyngdpunkt på indirekt eld och close air support. De viktigaste slutsatserna är att striden genomförs i tre dimensioner med indirekt eld, direktriktadeld och minor. Alla är väsentliga för att effekt med verkan skall uppnås i striden. Försvinner en dimension bör de andra dimensionerna öka med fler element. / This paper aims to examine the need for indirect fire and Close Air Support of military operations in mountainous terrain, highlighting the aspects that affect the use of Swedish armed forces units and their technical systems in the mountain environment. To answer the purpose of this paper the following question was asked: How did U.S. forces use the basic capacity of effect to the opponent during Operation Anaconda? A case study and text analysis has been used as a scientific method and technique for this thesis. Initially texts about Operation Anaconda were studied on how the operation was carried out. Then Swedish doctrines and regulations relating to theories of basic abilities and the effect achieved in the battle were studied. Finally, the writer analyzed how the U.S. used the basic capacity of effect during Operation Anaconda, with an emphasis on indirect fire and close air support. The main conclusions are that the battle is carried out in three dimensions with indirect fire, direct fire and mines. All are essential to achieved effect in the battle. If one dimension diminishes the other dimensions should increase by more elements.

Informationsoperationer utgör idag en allt viktigare del i svenska internationella uppdrag. Inom informationsoperationer sorterar funktionerna Psykologiska operationer (psyops) och Civil-Militär samverkan (CIMIC). Enligt grundsynen för informationsoperationer skall CIMIC utgöra en stödfunktion åt psyops under internationella insatser. Dock är inte samarbetet mellan parterna närmare preciserat och beskrivet i Försvarsmaktens dokumentation. Syftet med uppsatsen är att beskriva och analysera hur funktionen psyops inom Försvarsmakten kan stöttas av stödfunktionen CIMIC vid en internationell insats. För att uppnå syftets ambition använder uppsatsen sig av en deskriptiv metod i syfte att empiriskt beskriva funktionernas karaktärer och egenskaper. Analysram utgörs av Cialdinis teorier om påverkan av människor och av Agrells teorier om underrättelseanalysens problematik. Resultatet för uppsatsen visar att psyops är i stort behov av kulturella underrättelser om utpekade målgrupper i operationsområdet. CIMIC har enligt analysramen goda möjligheter att genom sitt mångfacetterade kontaktnät och möjligheten att genomföra riktade projekt, inhämta underrättelser väl anpassade efter psyops behov. / Information operations constitute a more and more important part of the Swedish international operations, where Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) are included. Due to the basic view of Swedish information operations CIMIC is meant to have a support function for PSYOPS during international operations. This function of support is however only briefly specified in the documentation of the Swedish Armed Forces. The essay aims at describing and analysing how Swedish PSYOPS can receive support from CIMIC during an international operation. The essay specifically intends to describe PSYOPS and CIMIC individual  characteristics and features. The analysis has been carried out with the help of a descriptive method. To create a theoretical frame for the analysis Cialdinis theory on human influence and Agrells theory on the complexity of the intelligence analysis have been used. The results of the essay show that PSYOPS is in great need of cultural intelligence gained from the appointed target audiences in the operation area. CIMIC has according to the analysis a good potential concerning collecting cultural intelligence thanks to its well-developed circle of contacts and its possibilities to accomplish CIMIC projects.

Thesis (M.S.)--Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 28, 2003). "March 2003." Vita. "AFIT/GOR/ENS/03-04." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-70). Also issued in paper format.

We develop solution methods for the air defense problem of a naval task group in this dissertation. We consider two interdependent problems. The first problem is the optimal allocation of a set of defensive missile systems of a naval task group to a set of attacking air targets. We call this problem the Missile Allocation Problem (MAP). The second problem called the Sector Allocation Problem (SAP) is the determination of a robust air defense formation for a naval task group by locating ships in predefined sectors on the surface. For MAP, we present three different mixed integer programming formulations. MAP by its nature requires real time solution. We propose efficient heuristic solution procedures that satisfy the demanding time requirement of MAP. We also develop mathematical programming models for SAP. Proposed branch and bound solution scheme for SAP yields highly satisfactory solutions. We characterize the interaction between MAP and SAP and develop an integrated solution approach.

Thesis (M. of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / The original document contains color images. Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on May 27, 2008). Includes bibliographic references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

En 1914-1918, les faits apportèrent un démenti cinglant aux prévisions. Au lieu d’une guerre courte, décidée par les seules forces terrestres en une ou deux batailles, les belligérants s’enlisèrent dans une lutte longue et coûteuse que les Alliés finirent par remporter en étranglant l’économie de l’Allemagne et en usant ses forces au moyen d’une succession de batailles partielles. Le cours inattendu que prirent les événements amène à s’interroger sur les représentations de la guerre de cette époque, sur la manière dont elles influencèrent les opérations et réciproquement, ainsi que sur le rôle du haut commandement dans ces relations. Une telle approche des opérations est d’autant plus justifiée que le sujet est méconnu, que la guerre est un domaine où le décalage entre réalité et représentations est très marqué, et que ceci est particulièrement vrai de la Grande Guerre. La question se pose donc de savoir si la difficile évolution des représentations, dans un sens conforme à une conduite des opérations efficace, s’est faite malgré le haut commandement, sous la pression des événements, ou s’il n’y a pas finalement concouru. L’impression prévaut qu’il a longtemps été à leur remorque et qu’il a fallu des échecs retentissants et l’action du pouvoir politique pour qu’il soit renouvelé, avec ses représentations. Cette impression est cependant trompeuse car elle repose sur une confusion entre le haut commandement et le GQG qui n’en était qu’une composante. Mis fréquemment à l’écart par ce dernier, les généraux appartenant au haut commandement contribuèrent à l’évolution de la situation à travers l’action de certains d’entre eux, même s’ils utilisèrent souvent des voies détournées / During WW1, the events bring a severe denial to the previsions. Instead of the short war won by the sole Land forces in one or two battles, the opponents bogged down in a long and costly struggle, which the Allies won eventually in choking the German economy and by the mean of successive battles of attrition.This unexpected course of events raises questions about the representations of war prevailing at this time, about the way they influenced the operations and conversely about the role of the French High Command in those relations. Studying military operations under this point of view is all the more relevant that this topic remains little known and that war is an activity where the discrepancy between reality and representations is most important. This discrepancy increased dramatically within WW1. The question is therefore to know whether the difficult evolution of war representations, in a sense compliant with the efficient conduct of operations occurred despite the High Command, under the pressure of events, or if he did not eventually concur in this evolution. The main impression is that the High Command was constantly trailing behind and that only resounding failures and the resulting decisions of the political authority caused the replacements in the staff required to change the representations. In fact, those impressions are misleading as far as they are based on a confusion between French High Command and French General HQ (GQG), which was only a component of High Command. Often put aside by the GQG, the generals belonging to the high command contributed in the evolution of this situation, through some of them, even if they did it in bypassing hierarchy

For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.