本文討討之重點為在「中」蘇衝突與對抗中，北韓採取何種外交政策以資因應，北韓 為求本身的生存與發展，必須在「中」蘇兩共之間保持均衡。因而本文擬北韓國家目 標來分析其等距外交政策。所述主旨分別如下： 第一章論述研究目的和動機，研究方法與範圍，第二章論述「中」蘇紛爭的背景，及 其理論的爭執與對外政策；第三章：敘述北韓對「中」蘇決策的一般因素，即其意識 形態。國家目標、外交結構、個人因素、以及與南韓對抗的情況；第四章：分析北韓 傾向中共時期的政策，就國際環境、「中」蘇兩共對北韓的壓力及支持、當時國家目 標。及政策的運用與效果；第五章：以與第四章相同的方式來分析北韓親蘇疏「中」 的政策；第六章：分析北韓「自主路線」，特別論究其理論的基礎、目標及展開過程 ；第七章：評估北韓等距外交政策及發展，並檢討其可能產生的變數而藉以推定其未 來之展望。

進入21世紀以來，隨著經濟全球化和地區經濟一體化的深化，中國推動韓半島政策，對外戰略而言含有諸多作為：第一、謀求擴大經濟利益；第二、作為地緣經濟戰略夥伴；第三、作為主導東北亞地區地緣經濟合作的管道。 為此，中國著眼於中、韓、朝三方的國家發展需求和地緣經濟互補性，謀求加強與南北韓政治經濟合作的發展，同時，以三方之間地緣經濟合作優勢確保其在韓半島的影響力，在此基礎上，中國謀求消除韓半島安全不確定性，牽制美國影響力和日本勢力。從此觀點來看，中國對韓半島政策就是中國對外戰略的出發點。 從地緣經濟戰略觀點而言，中國與韓半島關係不僅與中國營造發展經濟良好周邊環境有關，而且中國在中韓、中朝關係上具有政治經濟合作利益空間，因而中國加強與南韓政治領域合作交流，透過以經濟條件拋棄北韓邊緣政策，謀求維持韓半島和平與穩定。另外，中國利用與韓半島地緣經濟所長，加強與南北韓經貿合作，深化南北韓對中國經濟依存度，進而通過中國對南北韓的經濟優勢，主導中韓、中朝的地緣經濟合作，確保對韓半島的戰略優勢與影響力。 中國對韓半島政策的目標，將韓半島作為中國發展經濟戰略的管道，謀求地緣經濟利益最大化，透過提升在韓半島的影響力，使得韓半島走向中立化。中國對韓半島實施地緣經濟政策以來，中國與南北韓關係日益密切，在某種領域上，中國已經超越周邊大國的影響力。 在政治與安全領域，中國與南北韓透過領導人和高層人士進行頻繁互訪、建立相互對話機制或設立熱線管道，提高相互信任，加強雙方關係、謀求地區安全和發展。在經濟上，中國引進為自身經濟建設所需要的資金、高技術及礦物資源，而提供為南北韓經濟成長所需的巨大出口市場，尤其是中國也提供北韓經濟所需的原油和工業產品。由此，最近幾年來，中國成為南北韓對外貿易最大夥伴，與此同時，引起南北韓經濟對中國依存度的深化，因而，中國對韓半島的影響力正在擴大。 / Since the start of the 21st century, with constant intensification of the process of economic globalization and regional economic integration, China has pursued much-evolved Korean Peninsula policy for its own strategic goals as following: First, to strengthen its own economic interest; Second, to make the geoeconomic partnership with the two Koreas; Third, to make the partnership as the leverage for regional strategy. For the sake of securing economic common interest and geoeconomic complementarities with the two Koreas, China seeks to develop the cooperative relationship with North and South Korea. At the same time, China seeks to ensure its influence on the Korean Peninsula by using its geoeconomic advantage on the Korean Peninsula. Based on the relations, China hopes to remove the destabilizing factors in the security on the Korean Peninsula, and seeks to restrain American influence and Japan’s power. From this viewpoint, China’s Korea Policy is the starting point of China's foreign policy. From the perspective of geoeconomic strategy, the relationship between China and the two Koreas are much important with regard to building favorable environment for economic development. At the same time, the relations of China-South Korea and China-North Korea have economically and politically beneficial space. Therefore, on the one hand, China has been strengthening political cooperation with South Korea, and China has been forcing the North Korea to abandon the brinkmanship diplomacy by using economic inducements through cooperation with South Korea. As a result, it was designed for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, by utilizing the geoeconomic advantage with the two Koreas, China has strengthened the economic cooperation with the two Koreas; it has deepened the two Koreas’ economic dependency on China; As a result, it has been taking the lead in geoeconomic cooperation with the two Koreas; and it has been securing its strategic advantage and influence over the Peninsula. The objective of China’s Korea policy is to make the Peninsula be the ditch of China’s economic development; to maximize its geoeconomic interest; besides, to make the Koreas become neutralizing by taking advantage of geoeconomic influence. Since the implementation of China’s geoeconomic policy on the Peninsula, its relations with the two Koreas have become much closer. In some realms, China surpassed neighboring big powers’ influence. In the realm of politics and security, China has pursued the mutual confidence building by the means such as reciprocal visits, mutual dialogue mechanism and hot-line setting with the leadership of the two Koreas for the sake of strengthening of the bilateral relationship and securing of the regional security. And, in the realm of economy, while China brought in investment and high technology from the South side and the mineral resources from the North side, it provided the huge export market for the Peninsula, especially the crude oil and industrial products for the North. Recently, China has become one of the two Korea’s biggest trade partner. Consequently, the two Koreas’ economic dependency on China has been deepening and China’s influence on the Peninsula has been expanding.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Exposure to mercury poses significant risks to the health of humans and wildlife. Globally, coal-fired power plant (CFPP) is a major source of mercury emissions, with China being the largest contributor to global atmospheric mercury. As a signatory country of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, China is developing its National Implementation Plan on Mercury Control, which gives priority to control of mercury emissions from CFPPs. While social benefits play an important role in designing environmental policies in China, the potential public health and economic benefits of mercury control in the nation are not yet understood, mainly due to the scientific challenges to trace mercury’s emissions-to-impacts path. Moreover, little is known about the potential benefits for the neighboring countries in East Asia resulted from China’s mercury control. This study evaluates the health and economic benefits for China and neighboring countries in East Asia from mercury reductions from China’s CFPPs. Four representative mercury control policy scenarios are analyzed, and the evaluation is explicitly conducted following the policies-to-impacts path under each policy scenario. We link a global atmospheric model to health impact assessment and economic valuation models to estimate economic gains for China and its three neighboring countries (Japan, South Korea and North Korea) from avoided mercury-related adverse health outcomes under the four emission control scenarios, and also take into account the key uncertainties in the policies-to-impacts path. Under the most stringent control scenario, the cumulative benefit of the mercury reduction by 2030 is projected to be $430 billion for the four countries together (the 95% confidence interval is $102-903 billion, in 2010 USD). Our findings suggest that although China is the biggest beneficiary of the mercury reduction in CFPPs, neighboring countries including Japan, South Korea and North Korea can also benefit (~7% of the total benefits) from China’s mercury reduction.

北韓研發核武與彈道飛彈對東北亞區域安全造成嚴重衝擊，自1994年以來的北韓核武危機至今仍未獲得解決。在2002年北韓承認持續發展核武後，中共在核武危機中擔任調解人的角色，分別舉行了「三方會談」以及六輪「六方會談」。中共希望透過多邊主義中的談判方式，和平地解決北韓核武發展問題，並提高自身在朝鮮半島議題上以及國際社會中的影響力。但北韓至今仍未放棄核武發展，且從2006年以來一連串的核子試爆、長程火箭與飛彈試射使東北亞安全情勢極度惡化。 平心而論，中共目前是世界上對北韓影響力最大的國家。除了因為韓戰所建立的傳統「血盟關係」，以及在1961年兩國之間所締結之「中朝友好合作互助條約」之外，近年來，中共也提供北韓大量的經濟援助，包括糧食、重油與其他的戰略性物資。但北韓自2006年以來的彈道飛彈試射與地下核武試爆，確實已經對中共的國家安全造成嚴重威脅。北韓研發核武的問題若不解決，將會動搖現行「核不擴散」機制的權威與可信度，甚至造成東北亞區域各國，例如日本、韓國，甚至台灣競相研發核武的可能性，進而引發區域軍備競賽與核武擴散，對中共的國家安全造成損害。其次為北韓研發核武若引起美國的軍事先制攻擊，其難民問題對中共東北邊境所造成的威脅。最後則是北韓的核武研發與常規軍力對中共所造成的直接威脅。此外，北韓研發核武也對中共在於1996年出台之「新安全觀」造成衝擊，尤其中共官方在未來評估東北亞區域安全問題時，勢必將對「新安全觀」作一定程度的修正。在中共的綜合國力以及在亞太地區影響力不斷提升的前提下，中共將藉由北韓這根國際政治權力槓桿，與美國共同形塑未來朝鮮半島的全新權力格局。本研究即欲探討做為北韓傳統支持者與核武危機調停者的中共，如何處理北韓研發核武對其國家安全所造成之威脅。 關鍵詞：中共、朝鮮半島、北韓核武危機、新安全觀、彈道飛彈、軍備競賽 / North Korea developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles pose a serious impact on Northeast Asia, since 1994 the North Korean nuclear crisis has yet to be resolved. North Korea admitted in 2002, continued to develop nuclear weapons, PRC in the nuclear crisis as a mediator, were held “tripartite talks” and “six-party talks.”PRC hopes of multilateralism in the negotiation and peaceful resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue and improve their own issues on the Korean peninsula and the international community's influence. But North Korea has yet to give up nuclear weapons development and since 2006 a series of nuclear tests, long-range rocket and ballistic missile launch to worsen the security situation in Northeast Asia. In all fairness, the PRC is currently the world's greatest influence on North Korea's state. Apart from the tradition established by the Korean War "clan relations", as well as between the two countries in 1961, concluded the “Sino-Korean friendship and cooperation treaty”, the recent years, and that China provides North Korea substantial economic aid, including food, heavy oil and other strategic materials. But North Korea since 2006 ballistic missile and nuclear test pose a serious threat to national security of PRC. This study anticipates exploring the trend and change of the Korean Peninsula Policy and New Security Concept of PRC. The main research goal: to discuss North Korea`s traditional supporter and mediator, PRC, and how to handle North Korea's development of nuclear weapons posed to their own national security threats. Keyword: PRC, Korean Peninsula, North Korea Nuclear Crisis, New Security Concept, Ballistic Missiles, the Arms Race.

在2002年朝核危機引發後，中共居中折衝尊俎，舉辦「三方會談」及數輪「六方會談」，使朝核危機相關諸國得以齊聚北京協商處理朝核問題，揭開朝鮮半島歷史之新頁。中共雖非當事國，然涉入與影響之程度均較前次危機為深，其政策及角色皆有研究之必要。「新安全觀」提出迄今已近十年，做為中共國際關係的「理論」，直接指導其外交政策，其意涵著重於與冷戰思維的差異，以「互信、互利、平等、協作」及對「非傳統安全」的關照為其理論核心，在實踐上則以多邊安全合作為最要，而近歲於朝鮮半島發展之多邊安全合作正為「六方會談」。是故，本論文冀望能從「新安全觀」意涵在「六方會談」的實踐與挑戰，探析中共朝鮮半島政策之走向。主要的研究目的包括：（一）詮釋中共「新安全觀」的動機與意涵；（二）具體呈現中共與各國在朝核問題的立場及互動作為；（三）評估「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中的實踐與挑戰，並分析其朝鮮半島政策取向。 / 「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中體現於以下幾項作為：（一）穿梭籌辦歷輪會談；（二）戮力於會談制度化；（三）保障參與各方權益。然而，「新安全觀」同時也面臨許多挑戰，最值得關切者有冷戰時期所遺留下來的軍事同盟、朝核危機當事兩國的立場分歧、「中國威脅論」的陰影等。大體上，中共對於朝核問題的政策立場有三：（一）朝鮮半島非核化；（二）區域的和平與穩定；（三）以外交談判解決。此外，還強調在解決朝核問題的同時，必須照顧到北韓的生存利益，而為因應諸多挑戰，中共的朝鮮半島政策可能將朝以下方向發展：（一）擴大多邊安全合作；（二）鞏固大國共同利益；（三）強化南韓合作關係；（四）引導北韓經濟改革。因此，就現階段政策取向而言，中共應會並用多邊與雙邊外交途徑，在朝鮮半島持續勸和促談，扮演多重建設性角色，而「新安全觀」若要被徹底落實，將取決於中共的國家利益能否持續與「新安全觀」所訴諸的理念相結合。 / This study anticipates exploring the trend of the Korean Peninsula Policy of China by understanding the implementation and challenge of New Security Concept (NSC) in the Six-Party Talks. The main research goal includes: to interpret the motivation and meaning of NSC, to present China’s position and behavior with other nations in terms of 2002 North Korea nuclear issue, and to evaluate the practice and challenge of NSC in Six-Party Talks. In the past rounds, NSC has been embodied in holding meetings, endeavoring to institutionalize, and ensuring the right and interest of all participants. Even so, NSC has been confronted some challenge in the meantime; embracing the military alliances remained from the cold war era, the gap between North Korea and United States, and so-called “China Threat.” / Briefly speaking, China has three positions in 2002 North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Denuclearization, peace and stability, and solutions through the negotiation in Korean Peninsula. China also emphasizes that every decision dealing with the crisis should be given consideration to North Korea’s interest. It is highly likely to blossom into what follows for the sake of replying these challenges: To extend multilateral corporation, to consolidate the common interest with other powers, to strengthen the relation with South Korea, and to guide North Korea to reform its economy. Therefore, China might use multilateral and bilateral approach simultaneously; continue to mediate and to play a multiple role in the constructive way. The further implementation of NSC depends on the extent of combining with China’s national interest and the ideal of NSC.

North Korea twice conducted ballistic missile tests close to Japan in 1998 and 2006. While Japan responded with non-coercive condemnations to demonstrate its disapproval in 1998, it imposed unilateral economic sanctions in 2006, marking the first instance in post-World War II of applying a substantial coercion to punish a neighbouring state. The research asks why Japanese policy toward the North shifted for a seemingly identical type of provocation. The dissertation seeks contextual explanations by using inductive process-tracing, a type of ‘middle approach’ between historical narratives and parsimonious theories. It is applied to highlight the underlying mechanism through which public discursive changes concerning national security and North Korea during this eight-year period influenced the subsequent policy shift in 2006. The dissertation concludes that the unilateral sanctions were not necessarily a calculated strategic response to punish the missile launch (or North Korean nuclear programs) per se, but were a direct consequence of a deeper shift in societal discourse taking place beforehand. During the eight-year period, there had been other visible provocations and shocks originating from the North, especially the sensational revelation in 2002 of past North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. These highly-publicized incidents facilitated the Japanese public to be increasingly conscious about Japan’s security weaknesses and re-evaluate its historical relations with its neighbour, leading to a hardened domestic environment in which the new idea of pressuring the North became a feasible option even before 2006. These North Korean provocations and the resulting societal security discourse, along with concurrent structural changes in the Japanese government and mass media which made them both highly susceptible to discursive currents among citizens, mutually interacted to produce the policy result when the opportunity arose. The research, however, also challenges the popular view that the sanctions are the first example of the wholesale transformation of Japan’s post-war ‘pacifist’ security principles. It argues that the confined means (economic) by which the sanctions were imposed reflects the highly nuanced discourse, which endorses Japan’s legitimate right to specifically punish the North for the harms done, but that the societal momentum is not equally supportive of the more controversial areas concerning military usage and the current constitution.

North Korea twice conducted ballistic missile tests close to Japan in 1998 and 2006. While Japan responded with non-coercive condemnations to demonstrate its disapproval in 1998, it imposed unilateral economic sanctions in 2006, marking the first instance in post-World War II of applying a substantial coercion to punish a neighbouring state. The research asks why Japanese policy toward the North shifted for a seemingly identical type of provocation. The dissertation seeks contextual explanations by using inductive process-tracing, a type of ‘middle approach’ between historical narratives and parsimonious theories. It is applied to highlight the underlying mechanism through which public discursive changes concerning national security and North Korea during this eight-year period influenced the subsequent policy shift in 2006. The dissertation concludes that the unilateral sanctions were not necessarily a calculated strategic response to punish the missile launch (or North Korean nuclear programs) per se, but were a direct consequence of a deeper shift in societal discourse taking place beforehand. During the eight-year period, there had been other visible provocations and shocks originating from the North, especially the sensational revelation in 2002 of past North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. These highly-publicized incidents facilitated the Japanese public to be increasingly conscious about Japan’s security weaknesses and re-evaluate its historical relations with its neighbour, leading to a hardened domestic environment in which the new idea of pressuring the North became a feasible option even before 2006. These North Korean provocations and the resulting societal security discourse, along with concurrent structural changes in the Japanese government and mass media which made them both highly susceptible to discursive currents among citizens, mutually interacted to produce the policy result when the opportunity arose. The research, however, also challenges the popular view that the sanctions are the first example of the wholesale transformation of Japan’s post-war ‘pacifist’ security principles. It argues that the confined means (economic) by which the sanctions were imposed reflects the highly nuanced discourse, which endorses Japan’s legitimate right to specifically punish the North for the harms done, but that the societal momentum is not equally supportive of the more controversial areas concerning military usage and the current constitution.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal