[pt] A possível mudança no paradigma de formação de preço no Brasil do modelo vigente por custos auditados para o modelo por oferta, com o objetivo de modernizar o Setor Elétrico e buscar práticas que incentivem a competição, implica a necessidade de estudos prévios para auxiliar o processo de transição e a definição do desenho de mercado adequado à realidade brasileira. Nesse sentido, o uso de modelos de equilíbrio, notadamente o Equilíbrio de Nash, desponta como uma poderosa ferramenta ex-ante que permite analisar o comportamento dos competidores para identificar possíveis ineficiências a serem mitigadas. Com esse fim, o presente trabalho modela o processo decisório de ofertas ótimas de um competidor em um mercado de energia elétrica de dia-seguinte de base hidrotérmica por um modelo de otimização binível, possibilitando a identificação do Equilíbrio de Nash do mercado através de um algoritmo baseado em Gauss-Seidel. Adicionalmente, o método é aplicado a dois experimentos numéricos: a um sistema-teste de três barras e a um caso representativo do sistema brasileiro completo, permitindo a análise do comportamento dos competidores a partir da comparação dos resultados com os modelos de Custos Auditados e Equilíbrio Competitivo. Foram observados os impactos das afluências e das cascatas de usinas hidrelétricas de múltiplos proprietários nas receitas e, consequentemente, no comportamento dos competidores. Por fim, foi verificada a ocorrência de competição exclusivamente pelas quantidades, além da prática de retenção de ofertas por parte dos competidores para a modificação do preço de equilíbrio de mercado, aumentando suas receitas. / [en] The potential shift in Brazil s energy pricing paradigm from the current Audited Costs model to the Bid-Bases model, with the aim of modernizing the electricity sector and seeking practices that encourage competition, implies the need for preliminary studies to assist the transition process and define the appropriate market design for the Brazilian reality. In this sense, the use of equilibrium models, notably the Nash Equilibrium, emerges as a powerful ex-ante tool that allows the analysis of competitors behavior to identify possible inefficiencies to be mitigated.To this end, this thesis models the optimal bidding decision process of a competitor in a hydrothermal day-ahead electricity market using a bilevel optimization model, enabling the identification of the Nash Equilibrium of the market through an algorithm based on the Gauss-Seidel. Additionally, the method is applied to two numerical experiments: a three-bus test system and a representative case of the complete Brazilian system, allowing for the analysis of competitors behavior by comparing the results with the Audited Costsand Competitive Equilibrium models. The impacts of water inflows and hydro plants in cascade with distinct ownership on revenues and consequently competitors behavior were observed. Finally, the occurrence of competition exclusively in quantities was verified, as well as the practice of quantity bids retention by competitors in order to modify the market equilibrium price, increasing their revenues.

No description available.

[ES] Esta tesis se ha desarrollado dentro del marco de la línea de investigación de Economía y Regulación de las Telecomunicaciones. En el programa de Doctorado de Telecomunicaciones por la Universitat Politècnica de València. Como parte del proceso de investigación se participó en los siguientes proyectos de investigación: Plataforma de servicios para ciudades inteligentes con redes M2M densas (TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R), Entrepreneurship in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (COHWAN, TIN2010-21378 C02-02) y ATLAS-Dynamic network slicing in 5G Radio Access. Así como, se realizó una estancia doctoral en el IMT Atlantique en Rennes- Francia. Como resultado de estas actividades se publicaron varios artículos científicos que permiten sustentar los modelos de negocio para Operadores Móviles Virtuales (Mobile Virtual Network Operators-MVNOs) presentados en este documento. En este estudio, se plantean modelos de negocio que se sustentan en el desarrollo de las características técnicas de Redes de Cuarta Generación (Fourth-Generation Networks-4G) y Redes de Quinta Generación (Fifth-Generation Networks-5G), que facilitan la compartición de infraestructura de los Operadores Móviles de Red (Mobile Network Operators-MNOs). Al respecto, en este documento analiza el estado del arte que permite sustentar la viabilidad técnica de los modelos basados en la compartición de infraestructura, que ha permitido disminuir las barreras de entrada al mercado y el desarrollo de nuevos modelos de negocio para los MVNOs. Sin embargo, los nuevos modelos que permite la compartición de infraestructura deben ser analizados desde el aspecto económico para determinar la viabilidad de los mismos. Específicamente, en el primer modelo se analiza la viabilidad económica de un MVNO que brinda el servicio a su base de usuarios y divide su tráfico de red a dos MNOs, los que alquilan su capacidad de red al MVNO. En el análisis del modelo se consideran tanto las características del sistema como las económicas. En cuanto a las características del sistema, un MVNO proporciona servicio a los usuarios finales utilizando el soporte de infraestructura de dos MNOs. El servicio proporcionado por el MVNO, se modelada mediante una cola M/M/1, donde cada usuario genera paquetes de forma independiente siguiendo un proceso de Poisson. Los tiempos de servicios de los paquetes, se distribuyen exponencialmente. En el sistema propuesto la métrica de calidad más relevante, es el tiempo medio de servicio. El acuerdo entre el MVNO y los MNOs, es tal que, el MVNO dividirá el tráfico de la red entre los dos MNOs y pagará a cada MNO por el tráfico servido a través de su infraestructura. En cuanto a las características económicas, los incentivos se modelan a través de las utilidades de los usuarios y los beneficios de los operadores. En el segundo modelo, se analiza la viabilidad económica de dos escenarios para un modelo de negocio en el que, un MNO alquila su infraestructura de red al MVNO y cada operador sirve a su propia base de usuarios. El primer escenario denominado monopólico, el MNO presta servicio a las dos bases de usuarios (MNO y MVNO). En el segundo escenario denominado estratégico, el MNO presta servicio a su base de usuarios, así como, alquila su infraestructura al MVNO para que preste servicio a su base de usuarios. Para los dos escenarios, la red se ha modelado por una cola con prioridad, utilizando una disciplina de servicio Compartición Discrimitatoria del Servidor (Discriminatory Processor Sharing-DPS). En el análisis de compartición de infraestructura, se considera un pago al MNO por cada usuario que accede al servicio de MVNO. Finalmente, para determinar la viabilidad económica de los diferentes escenarios propuestos para los modelos de negocio, se utilizan conceptos de microeconomía, teoría de juegos y teoría de colas, la cuales han permitido conocer las decisiones en equilibrio que toman los operadores, así como las decisiones en equilibrio de los usuarios; de esta manera se ha obtenido el efecto de estas decisiones sobre los beneficios de todos los agentes del modelo y se han identificado las condiciones bajo las cuales estos nuevos modelos de negocio son viables en entornos de redes 4G y 5G. Como resultado del análisis de los modelos de negocio para los diferentes escenarios propuestos, se observa que la asociación entre MNOs y MVNOs a través de la compartición de infraestructura es viable económicamente para los modelos propuestos. En relación a los usuarios, su comportamiento es sustancial para determinar la viabilidad económica de los diferentes modelos de negocio propuestos, por lo tanto, resulta imprescindible explorar diferentes funciones de utilidad que expresen el comportamiento de los usuarios en estudios futuros. En cuanto a los operadores, en el primer modelo de negocio se demuestra que, la provisión de capacidad de red es un mecanismo válido para optimizar los beneficios de los operadores. Así como, en el segundo modelo de negocio, se demuestra que, la compartición de infraestructura entre un MNO y un MVNO es deseable desde el punto de vista de los usuarios para el modelo de negocio estratégico, ya que permite un mayor número de usuarios. Mientras que, desde el punto de vista económico el modelo de negocio monopólico es más deseable debido a que ofrece un incentivo mayor a los operadores. En resumen, en esta tesis se demuestra la viabilidad económica de modelos de negocio de compartición de infraestructura entre MNOs y MVNOs, soportados técnicamente por las características tecnológicas de las redes móviles de ultima generación. / [CA] Aquesta tesi s'ha desenvolupat dins del marc de la línia d'investigació d'Economia i Regulació de les Telecomunicacions. En el programa de Doctorat de Telecomunicacions per la Universitat Politècnica de València. Com a part del procés d'investigació es va participar en els següents projectes d'investigació: Plataforma de servicios para ciudades inteligentes con redes M2M densas (TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R), Entrepreneurship in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (COHWAN, TIN2010-21378-C02-02) i ATLAS -Dynamic network slicing in 5G Radio Access. També es va realitzar una estada doctoral en l'IMT Atlantique en Rennes-França. Com a resultat d'aquaquests activitats es van publicar diversos articles científics que permeten sustentar els models de negoci per a MVNOs presentats en el present document. En aquest estudi, es plantegen models de negoci que se sustenten en el desenrotllament de les característiques tècniques de 4G i 5G, que faciliten la compartició d'infraestructura dels MNOs. També s'analitza l'estat de l'art que permet sustentar la viabilitat tècnica dels models basats en la compartició d'infraestructura, que ha permès disminuir les barreres d'entrada al mercat i el desenvolupament de nous models de negoci per als MVNOs. No obstant això, els nous models que permeten la compartició d'infraestructura han de ser analitzats des-de l'aspecte econòmic per a determinar la viabilitat dels mateixos. Específicament, en el primer model s'analitza la viabilitat econòmica d'un MVNO que brinda el servei a la seua base d'usuaris i divideix el seu tràfic de xarxa a dos MNOs, els que lloguen la seua capacitat de xarxa al MVNO. En l'anàlisi del model es considerentant les característiques del sistema com les econòmiques. Respecte a les característiques del sistema, un MVNO proporciona servei als usuaris finals utilitzant el suport d'infraestructura de dos MNOs. El servei proporcionat pel MVNO, es modelada per mitjà d'una cua M/M/1, on cada usuari genera paquets de forma independent seguint un procés de Poisson. Els temps de servei dels paquets es distribueixen exponencialment. En el sistema proposat, la mètrica de qualitat més rellevant és el temps mitjà de servei, que comprén tant el temps d'espera com el temps mitjà de servei. L'acord entre el MVNO i els MNOs, és tal que el MVNO dividirà el tràfic de la xarxa entre els dos MNOs i pagarà a cada MNO pel tràfic servit a través de la seua infraestructura. Respecte a les característiques econòmiques, els incentius es modelen mitjançant les utilitats dels usuaris i els beneficis dels operadors. En el segon model, s'analitza la viabilitat econòmica de dos escenaris per a un model de negoci en què un MNO lloga la seua infraestructura de xarxa al MVNO i cada operador serveix a la seua pròpia base d'usuaris. El primer escenari denominat monopòlic, el MNO dona servei a les dos bases d'usuaris (MNO i MVNO). En el segon escenari denominat estratègic, el MNO dona servei a la seua base d'usuaris, a més a més, lloga la seua infraestructura al MVNO per a que aquest puga prestar servei a la seua base d'usuaris. Per als dos escenaris, la xarxa s'ha modelat per una cua amb prioritat, utilitzant una disciplina de servei DPS. En l'anàlisi de compartició d'infraestructura, es considera un pagament al MNO per cada usuari que accedeix al servei de MVNO. Finalmente, para determinar la viabilidad económica de los diferentes escenarios propuestos para los modelos de negocio, se utilizan conceptos de microeconomía, teoría de juegos y teoría de colas, la cuales han permitido conocer las decisiones en equilibrio que toman los operadores, así como las decisiones en equilibrio de los usuarios; de esta manera se ha obtenido el efecto de estas decisiones sobre los beneficios de todos los agentes del modelo y se han identificado las condiciones bajo las cuales estos nuevos modelos de negocio son viables en entornos de redes 4G y 5G. Como resultado del análisis de los modelos de negocio para los diferentes escenarios propuestos, se observa que la asociación entre MNOs y MVNOs a través de la compartición de infraestructura es viable económicamente para los modelos propuestos. En relación a los usuarios, su comportamiento es sustancial para determinar la viabilidad económica de los diferentes modelos de negocio propuestos, por lo tanto, resulta imprescindible explorar diferentes funciones de utilidad que expresen el comportamiento de los usuarios en estudios futuros. En cuanto a los operadores, en el primer modelo de negocio se demuestra que, la provisión de capacidad de red es un mecanismo válido para optimizar los beneficios de los operadores. Así como, en el segundo modelo de negocio, se demuestra que, la compartición de infraestructura entre un MNO y un MVNO es deseable desde el punto de vista de los usuarios para el modelo de negocio estratégico, ya que permite un mayor número de usuarios. Mientras que, desde el punto de vista económico el modelo de negocio monopólico es más deseable debido a que ofrece un incentivo mayor a los operadores. En resumen, en esta tesis se demuestra la viabilidad económica de modelos de negocio de compartición de infraestructura entre MNOs y MVNOs, soportados técnicamente por las características tecnológicas de las redes móviles de ultima generación. / [EN] This thesis has been developed within the framework of the research line of Economics and Regulation of Telecommunications. In the PhD program of Telecommunications by the Universitat Politècnica de València. As part of the research process, we participated in the following research projects: Service Platform for Smart Cities with Dense M2M Networks (TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R), Entrepreneurship in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (COHWAN, TIN2010-21378-C02-02) and ATLAS-Dynamic network slicing in 5G Radio Access. A doctoral stay at the ITM Atlantique in Rennes, France, was also arranged. As a result of these activities, several scientific articles were published which support the business models for MVNOs presented in this document. In this study, business models based on the development of the technical characteristics of 4G and 5G are proposed, which facilitate the sharing of the infrastructure of MNOs. In this regard, this document analyzes the state of the art that supports the technical feasibility of models based on infrastructure sharing, which has lowered barriers to market entry and the development of new business models for MVNOs. However, the new models that infrastructure sharing allows, must be analyzed from an economic aspect to determine their viability. Specifically, the first model analyses the economic viability of an MVNO that provides the service to its user base and splits its network traffic between two MNOs, which rent their network capacity to the MVNO. The analysis of the model considers both the characteristics of the system and the economic ones. In terms of system characteristics, one MVNO provides service to end-users using the infrastructure support of two MNOs. The service provided by the MVNO is modelled through an M/M/1 queue, where each user generates packets independently following a Poisson process. The service times of the packages are distributed exponentially. In the proposed system, the most relevant quality metric is the average service time, which comprises both the waiting time and the average service time. The agreement between the MVNO and the MNOs is such that the MVNO will split the network traffic between the two MNOs and pay each MNO for the traffic served through its infrastructure. In terms of economic features, incentives are modelled through user profits and operator profits. In the second model, we analyze the economic viability of two scenarios for a business model in which, an MNO rents its network infrastructure to the MVNO, and each operator serves its user base. In the first scenario, called monopoly, the MNO serves both user bases (MNO and MVNO). In the second scenario, called strategic, the MNO serves its user base, as well as leases its infrastructure to the MVNO to serve its user base. For both scenarios, the network has been modelled by a priority queue, using a DPS discipline. In the infrastructure sharing analysis, a payment to the MNO is considered for each user that accesses the MVNO service. Finally, to determine the economic viability of different scenarios proposed for the business models, concepts of microeconomics, game theory and queuing theory are used, which have allowed us to know the equilibrium decisions made by the operators, as well as the equilibrium decisions made by the users. In this way, the effect of these decisions on the profits of all the agents in the model has been obtained, and the conditions under which these new business models are viable in 4G and 5G network environments have been identified. As a result of the analysis of the business models for the different scenarios proposed, it is observed that the association between MNOs and MVNOs through infrastructure sharing is economically viable for the proposed models. In relation to users, their behavior is substantial to determine the economic viability of the different proposed business models; therefore, it is essential to explore different utility functions that express user behavior in future studies. As for the operators, the first business model demonstrates that the provision of network capacity is a valid mechanism for optimizing operators’ profits. As well as, in the second business model, it is demonstrated that, the sharing of infrastructure between an MNO and an MVNO is desirable from the users’ point of view for the strategic business model since it allows a greater number of users. Whereas, from an economic point of view, the monopolistic business model is more desirable because it provides a greater incentive for operators. In summary, this thesis demonstrates the economic viability of business models of infrastructure sharing between MNOs and MVNOs, technically supported by the technological characteristics of the latest generation mobile networks. / Sacoto Cabrera, E. (2020). Análisis basado en teoría de juegos de modelos de negocio de operadores móviles virtuales en redes 4G y 5G [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/158595

Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit verallg. Nash-Gleichgewichtsproblemen im Zusammenhang mit Optimalsteuerungsproblemen mit (nichtlinearen) partiellen Differentialgleichungen. Ausgehend von der Existenzfrage von Nash-Gleichgewichten werden Bedingungen an Optimalsteuerungsprobleme mit nichtlinearen Lösungsoperatoren hergeleitet, welche die Konvexität des reduzierten Problems garantieren. Dazu nutzen wir die verallg. Konvexität von vektorwertigen Operatoren. Da keine expl. Darstellung des Lösungsoperators bekannt ist, werden hinreichende Bedingungen an die Operatorgleichung formuliert. Zusammen mit Anforderungen an das Zielfunktional wird so die Konvexität des reduzierten Problems garantiert. Das erlaubt auch Stationaritätssysteme im nichtglatten Fall herzuleiten. Eine zusätzliche Bedingung an die Lösung der Operatorgleichung koppelt die Strategien der Spieler. Das markiert den Übergang zu verallgemeinerten Nash-Spielen. Um diese Probleme anzugehen, wenden wir eine Penalty-Technik an. Damit wird die beschriebene Abhängigkeit vermieden und zum Zielfunktional transportiert. Damit wird eine Folge von Ersatzproblemen formuliert, deren Grenze das ursprüngliche Problem ist. Für die mathematische Beschreibung entwickeln wir eine erweiterte Γ-Konvergenz für Gleichgewichtsprobleme. Das Verhalten der Lagrange-Multiplikatoren im Stationaritätssystem wird unter Verwendung einer Pfadverfolgungstechnik analysiert und eine numerisch nutzbare Updatestrategie wird hergeleitet. Für ein praktisch anwendbares Lösungsverfahren ist eine Diskretisierung notwendig. Dazu verwenden wir eine Finite-Elemente-Methode. Die Herleitung der A-priori-Konvergenz basierend auf der zuvor verallgemeinerten Γ-Konvergenz wird für Gleichgewichtsprobleme mit gleichzeitiger Regularisierung etabliert. Im Blick auf durch Hindernisbedingungen erzeugte Kontaktmengen wenden wir uns auch adaptiven Finite-Elemente-Methoden zu. Unsere theoretischen Ergebnisse werden durch mehrere akademische Anwendungen illustriert. / The present work deals with generalized Nash equilibrium problems related to optimal control problems on (nonlinear) partial differential equations. Starting from the question of the existence of Nash equilibria, conditions for optimal control problems with nonlinear solution operators are derived that guarantee the convexity of the reduced problem. To do so, we discuss generalized convexity of vector-valued operators. As no explicit representation of the solution operator is known, conditions on the operator equation that imply this property are formulated. In combination with requirements for the objective functional, the convexity of the reduced problem can be guaranteed. This approach also allows us to derive stationarity systems even in the nonsmooth case. The presence of a condition on the solution of the operator equation couples the players' strategies. This marks the transition to generalized Nash games. To address these problems, we apply a penalty technique. Hence, the described dependency is avoided and transported to the objective. As the penalty functional is scaled with a parameter, a sequence of surrogate problems, whose limit is the original problem, is formulated. For its mathematical description, we introduce an extended Γ-convergence for equilibrium problems. The behavior of the Lagrangian multipliers in the stationarity system is analyzed using a path-following technique, and a numerically usable update strategy is derived. A discretization is necessary for a practically applicable solution method. For this, we use a finite element method. The derivation of the a priori convergence based on the previously generalized Γ-convergence is established for equilibrium problems with simultaneous regularization. With regard to the presence of contact sets induced by obstacle conditions, we also turn to adaptive finite element methods. Our theoretical results are illustrated by several academic applications.

In this thesis we consider constrained systems of equations. The focus is on local Newton-type methods for the solution of constrained systems which converge locally quadratically under mild assumptions implying neither local uniqueness of solutions nor differentiability of the equation function at solutions. The first aim of this thesis is to improve existing local convergence results of the constrained Levenberg-Marquardt method. To this end, we describe a general Newton-type algorithm. Then we prove local quadratic convergence of this general algorithm under the same four assumptions which were recently used for the local convergence analysis of the LP-Newton method. Afterwards, we show that, besides the LP-Newton method, the constrained Levenberg-Marquardt method can be regarded as a special realization of the general Newton-type algorithm and therefore enjoys the same local convergence properties. Thus, local quadratic convergence of a nonsmooth constrained Levenberg-Marquardt method is proved without requiring conditions implying the local uniqueness of solutions. As already mentioned, we use four assumptions for the local convergence analysis of the general Newton-type algorithm. The second aim of this thesis is a detailed discussion of these convergence assumptions for the case that the equation function of the constrained system is piecewise continuously differentiable. Some of the convergence assumptions seem quite technical and difficult to check. Therefore, we look for sufficient conditions which are still mild but which seem to be more familiar. We will particularly prove that the whole set of the convergence assumptions holds if some set of local error bound conditions is satisfied and in addition the feasible set of the constrained system excludes those zeros of the selection functions which are not zeros of the equation function itself, at least in a sufficiently small neighborhood of some fixed solution. We apply our results to constrained systems arising from complementarity systems, i.e., systems of equations and inequalities which contain complementarity constraints. Our new conditions are discussed for a suitable reformulation of the complementarity system as constrained system of equations by means of the minimum function. In particular, it will turn out that the whole set of the convergence assumptions is actually implied by some set of local error bound conditions. In addition, we provide a new constant rank condition implying the whole set of the convergence assumptions. Particularly, we provide adapted formulations of our new conditions for special classes of complementarity systems. We consider Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) systems arising from optimization problems, variational inequalities, or generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) and Fritz-John (FJ) systems arising from GNEPs. Thus, we obtain for each problem class conditions which guarantee local quadratic convergence of the general Newton-type algorithm and its special realizations to a solution of the particular problem. Moreover, we prove for FJ systems of GNEPs that generically some full row rank condition is satisfied at any solution of the FJ system of a GNEP. The latter condition implies the whole set of the convergence assumptions if the functions which characterize the GNEP are sufficiently smooth. Finally, we describe an idea for a possible globalization of our Newton-type methods, at least for the case that the constrained system arises from a certain smooth reformulation of the KKT system of a GNEP. More precisely, a hybrid method is presented whose local part is the LP-Newton method. The hybrid method turns out to be, under appropriate conditions, both globally and locally quadratically convergent.

This thesis aims to contribute to a fundamental objective of Network Economics: to provide based incentives explanations of real social network topologies. By using game theoretical tools, the three papers of this thesis analyze how real social networks can arise from the strategic interaction of self-interested individuals.In the first paper, we discuss the influence of imperfect information on the process of social network formation and, specifically, on the possibilities of observing racially segregated societies when agents' preferences are not racially biased. The second work attempts to complete the Network Economics' explanation of the puzzle regarding how agents can benefit from structural holes over a long time period. The third paper presents a model that focuses on the mechanisms underlying the formation of scientific collaboration networks. We show how researchers' heterogeneity and limited processing capability explain the basic characteristics of these networks. / Aquesta tesi aspira a contribuir a un objectiu fonamental de l'Economia de Xarxes: oferir explicacions basades en els incentius de les topologies que adopten les xarxes socials. Usant les eines de la Teoria de Jocs, els tres articles de la tesi analitzen com les xarxes socials que observem a la realitat poden esser fruit de la interacció entre individus que responen als seus propis interessos.En primer lloc, estudiem la influència de la informació imperfecte en la formació de xarxes socials i, específicament, en les possibilitats de tenir societats racialment segregades quan les preferències dels agents no estan racialment esbiaixades. El segon treball, intenta completar l'explicació que l'Economia de Xarxes dóna a l'interrogant referent als forats estructurals i a la gent que s'en beneficia de manera continuada. El darrer capítol, se centra en els mecanismes que expliquen la formació de xarxes de col·laboració científica. Es mostra com l'heterogeneïtat i la limitada capacitat de processament dels investigadors expliquen les caractarístiques bàsiques d'aquestes xarxes.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to devise new paradigms on radio resource sharing including cache-enabled virtualized large cellular networks for mobile network operators (MNOs). Also, self-organizing resource allocation for small cell networks is considered. In such networks, the MNOs rent radio resources from the infrastructure provider (InP) to support their subscribers. In order to reduce the operational costs, while at the same time to significantly increase the usage of the existing network resources, it leads to a paradigm where the MNOs share their infrastructure, i.e., base stations (BSs), antennas, spectrum and edge cache among themselves. In this regard, we integrate the theoretical insights provided by stochastic geometrical approaches to model the spectrum and infrastructure sharing for large cellular networks. In the first part of the thesis, we study the non-orthogonal multi-MNO spectrum allocation problem for small cell networks with the goal of maximizing the overall network throughput, defined as the expected weighted sum rate of the MNOs. Each MNO is assumed to serve multiple small cell BSs (SBSs). We adopt the many-to-one stable matching game framework to tackle this problem. We also investigate the role of power allocation schemes for SBSs using Q-learning. In the second part, we model and analyze the infrastructure sharing system considering a single buyer MNO and multiple seller MNOs. The MNOs are assumed to operate over their own licensed spectrum bands while sharing BSs. We assume that multiple seller MNOs compete with each other to sell their infrastructure to a potential buyer MNO. The optimal strategy for the seller MNOs in terms of the fraction of infrastructure to be shared and the price of the infrastructure, is obtained by computing the equilibrium of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly game. Finally, we develop a game-theoretic framework to model and analyze a cache-enabled virtualized cellular networks where the network infrastructure, e.g., BSs and cache storage, owned by an InP, is rented and shared among multiple MNOs. We formulate a Stackelberg game model with the InP as the leader and the MNOs as the followers. The InP tries to maximize its profit by optimizing its infrastructure rental fee. The MNO aims to minimize the cost of infrastructure by minimizing the cache intensity under probabilistic delay constraint of the user (UE). Since the MNOs share their rented infrastructure, we apply a cooperative game concept, namely, the Shapley value, to divide the cost among the MNOs. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on tuottaa uusia paradigmoja radioresurssien jakoon, mukaan lukien virtualisoidut välimuisti-kykenevät suuret matkapuhelinverkot matkapuhelinoperaattoreille. Näiden kaltaisissa verkoissa operaattorit vuokraavat radioresursseja infrastruktuuritoimittajalta (InP, infrastructure provider) asiakkaiden tarpeisiin. Toimintakulujen karsiminen ja samanaikainen olemassa olevien verkkoresurssien hyötykäytön huomattava kasvattaminen johtaa paradigmaan, jossa operaattorit jakavat infrastruktuurinsa keskenään. Tämän vuoksi työssä tutkitaan teoreettisia stokastiseen geometriaan perustuvia malleja spektrin ja infrastruktuurin jakamiseksi suurissa soluverkoissa. Työn ensimmäisessä osassa tutkitaan ei-ortogonaalista monioperaattori-allokaatioongelmaa pienissä soluverkoissa tavoitteena maksimoida verkon yleistä läpisyöttöä, joka määritellään operaattoreiden painotettuna summaläpisyötön odotusarvona. Jokaisen operaattorin oletetaan palvelevan useampaa piensolutukiasemaa (SBS, small cell base station). Työssä käytetään monelta yhdelle -vakaata sovituspeli-viitekehystä SBS:lle käyttäen Q-oppimista. Työn toisessa osassa mallinnetaan ja analysoidaan infrastruktuurin jakamista yhden ostaja-operaattorin ja monen myyjä-operaattorin tapauksessa. Operaattorien oletetaan toimivan omilla lisensoiduilla taajuuksillaan jakaen tukiasemat keskenään. Myyjän optimaalinen strategia infrastruktuurin myytävän osan suuruuden ja hinnan suhteen saavutetaan laskemalla Cournot-Nash -olipologipelin tasapainotila. Lopuksi, työssä kehitetään peli-teoreettinen viitekehys virtualisoitujen välimuistikykenevien soluverkkojen mallintamiseen ja analysointiin, missä InP:n omistama verkkoinfrastruktuuri vuokrataan ja jaetaan monen operaattorin kesken. Työssä muodostetaan Stackelberg-pelimalli, jossa InP toimii johtajana ja operaattorit seuraajina. InP pyrkii maksimoimaan voittonsa optimoimalla infrastruktuurin vuokrahintaa. Operaattori pyrkii minimoimaan infrastruktuurin hinnan minimoimalla välimuistin tiheyttä satunnaisen käyttäjän viive-ehtojen mukaisesti. Koska operaattorit jakavat vuokratun infrastruktuurin, työssä käytetään yhteistyöpeli-ajatusta, nimellisesti, Shapleyn arvoa, jakamaan kustannuksia operaatoreiden kesken.

Made available in DSpace on 2009-11-18T18:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2004 / The present paper has the proposal to assess the management process of complex negotiation of the 5th OMC that took place at Cancun from September 10th until the 14th , 2003. This thesis points out the problems and questions that resulted on the collapse of a possible agreement, it also suggest proposal to solve these issues. The future of OMC is uncertain and traumatic changes suffered by many countries that live under the rules of OMC shows that something at OMC will have to change, principally on the process of complex negotiation, such as the integrity of the organization to avoid having to compromise and being damaged. There were searches for answers on the analysis and assessment of the negotiation process, studying and researching the bargain positional concepts, giving full details on the negotiation process based on principIes, exploring profusely the state of art for the management of difficult conversation. This thesis also tackles the sources of conflicts and the building of coalitions such as the G20, showing the difficulty existing in the resolution of public disputes and in the use of instruments to break the impasses. We also defined theoretical instrumental, which allowed the diagnostic ofthe actual situation at OMe. It was recommend to explore the valuation of conflicts, based on justice and equitant, the best form of negotiation by principIes, of management demanding public, on the multi stakeholder dialogue and the importance of informal parallel conversation. The environment of complexity and the extensive vision that it provides to adjust the functioning of autopoietics systems. / Pretende-se no presente trabalho avaliar a gestão do processo de negociação complexa da 5ª Conferência Ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio em Cancún, ocorrida entre os dias 10 e 14 de setembro de 2003, no México, apontando os problemas e questões que resultaram no colapso de um possível acordo. O futuro da OMC é incerto e mudanças traumáticas sofridas por muitos países que vivem sob as regras da OMC indicam que alguma coisa na OMC terá que mudar, principalmente nos processos de negociação complexa, de forma que a integridade da organização não seja comprometida. Buscou-se respostas na análise e avaliação da gestão do processo de negociação, estudando e pesquisando os conceitos de barganha posicional, detalhando o processo de negociação baseado em princípios, explorando em profundidade o estado da arte para gestão de conversas difíceis. Dissecando a questão dos conflitos e das coalizões, mostrando a dificuldade existente na resolução de disputas públicas e no uso de instrumentos para quebrar o impasse nas negociações buscou-se estabelecer o instrumental teórico que possibilitasse aprofundar o diagnóstico da situação atual na OMC. Como recomendação explorou-se a avaliação de conflitos, com base na eficiência - teoria dos jogos-, justiça e na eqüidade, a melhor forma de negociação baseada em princípios, de gestão de público demandante, no diálogo dos multistakeholders, a importância das conversas informais paralelas, o ambiente da complexidade e a visão ampla que proporciona o enfoque do funcionamento de sistemas decisórios autopoiéticos.

Cette thèse est une contribution à la théorie économique sur trois aspects: la dynamique de prix dans les marchés financiers avec asymétrie d’information, la mise à jour des croyances et les raffinements d'équilibre dans les jeux de signaux, et l'introduction de l'ambiguïté dans la théorie du prix limite. Dans le chapitre 2, nous formalisons un jeu d'échange à somme nulle entre un secteur mieux informé et un autre qui l'est moins, pour déterminer de façon endogène, la dynamique du prix sous-jacent. Dans ce modèle, joueur 1 est informé de la conjoncture (L) mais est incertain de la croyance de joueur 2, car ce dernier est seulement informé à travers un message (M) qui est lié à cette conjoncture. Si L et M sont indépendants, alors le processus de prix sera une Martingale Continue à Variation Maximale (CMMV) et joueur 1 peut disposer de cet avantage informationnel. Par contre, si L et M ne sont pas indépendants, joueur 1 ne révèlera pas son information pendant le processus, et il ne bénéficiera donc pas de son avantage en matière d'information. Dans le chapitre 3, je propose une définition de l'équilibre de Test d'hypothèse (HTE) pour des jeux de signaux généraux, avec des joueurs non-Bayésiens qui sont soumis à une règle de mise à jour selon le modèle de vérification d'hypothèse caractérisé par Ortoleva (2012). Un HTE peut être différent d'un équilibre séquentiel de Nash en raison d'une incohérence dynamique. Par contre, dans le cas où joueur 2 traite seulement un message à probabilité nulle comme nouvelle inespérée, un HTE est un raffinement d'équilibre séquentiel de Nash et survit au critère intuitif dans les jeux de signaux généraux mais pas inversement. Nous fournissons un théorème d'existence qui couvre une vaste classe de jeux de signaux qui sont souvent étudiés en économie. Dans le chapitre 4, j'introduis l’ambiguïté dans un modèle d'organisation industrielle classique, dans lequel l'entreprise déjà établie est soit informée de la vraie nature de la demande agrégée, soit soumise à une incertitude mesurable classique sur la conjoncture, tandis qu'un éventuel nouvel arrivant fait face à une incertitude a la Knight (ambiguïté) concernant cette conjoncture. Je caractérise les conditions sou lesquelles le prix limite émerge en équilibre, et par conséquent l'ambigüité diminue la probabilité d'entrée. L'analyse du bien-être montre que le prix limite est plus nocif dans un marché où la demande escomptée est plus élevée que dans un autre où celle-ci est moindre. / This thesis contributes to the economic theory literature in three aspects: price dynamics in financial markets with asymmetric information belief updating and equilibrium refinements in signaling games, and introducing ambiguity in limit pricing theory. In chapter 2, we formulate a zero-sum trading game between a better informed sector and a less 1nformed sector to endogenously determine the underlying price dynamics. In this model, player 1 is informed of the state (L) but is uncertain about player 2's belief about the state, because player 2 is informed through some message (M) related to the state. If L and M are independent, then the price proces s will be a Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation (CMMV), and player 1 can benefit from his informational advantage. However, if L and M are not independent, player 1 will not reveal his information during the trading process, therefore, he does not benefit from his informational advantage. In chapter 3, I propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested, by an updating rule according to the Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may differ from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of dynamic inconsistency. However, in the case in which player 2 only treats a zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and survives the intuitive Critenon in general signaling games but not vice versa. We provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics. In chapter 4, I introduce ambiguity in a standard industry organization model, in which the established firm is either informed of the true state of aggregate demand or is under classical measurable uncertainty about the state, while the potential entrant is under Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the state. I characterize the conditions under which limit pricing emerges in equilibria, and thus ambiguity decreases the probability of entry. Welfare analysis shows that limit pricing is more harmful in a market with higher expected demand than in a market with lower expected demand.

Advances in wireless communication and microelectronics have led to the development of low-power compact sensor nodes (popularly called motes) that are capable of sensing, computing, and communication. A large number of these nodes can be deployed over some area of interest to form a multi-hop network, commonly referred to as a wireless sensor network (WSN). Typical applications of WSNs include, environment and process monitoring in industrial installations, forest fire detection, structural health monitoring, etc. In such applications where the variables to be measured are slowly varying, or the events to be monitored are rare, continuous sensing is unnecessary. Instead, the nodes, in order to conserve their battery power, can sleep-wake cycle whereby each node is allowed to independently alternate between an ON state and a low power OFF state. Sleep-wake cycling, while increasing the network lifetime, renders the network disconnected a large fraction of the time; however, connectivity can be established over time by transporting packets in a store-and-forward manner, whereby packets are held by a forwarding node until a suitable node wakes up in its neighborhood that can serve to forward the packet towards the destination. We are concerned with sleep-wake cycling multi-hop wireless networks whose main task is to carry sporadic alarms packets from sensing nodes to a sink node. Our objective is to design simple local-information based routing solutions for such networks. With this in mind, we propose a relay selection problem that arises at a forwarding node (which is currently holding the alarm packet) while choosing a next-hop relay node. The forwarder, as and when the relays wake-up, evaluating the goodness of a relay based on a “reward” metric (e.g., a function of the relay’s progress towards sink, and the power required to get the packet across), has to decide whether to forward to this relay or to wait for future ones (i.e., to stop or continue). The forwarder’s objective is to choose a relay so as to minimize a combination of the average delay incurred and the average reward achieved. A basic version of our relay selection problem is equivalent to the basic asset selling problem studied in the operations research literature. After reviewing the solution to the basic problem we will proceed to study a model with full information, referred to as the completely observable (CO) model, where the number of relays is exactly known to the forwarder. Formulating the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) we will characterize the solution to the CO model in terms of recursively-computable threshold functions. Next, we consider the partially observable (PO) model where only a belief (probability mass function) on the number of relays is known. Hence, the PO model falls within the realm of partially observable MDPs. After incorporating our model into this framework we will characterize the solution in terms of stopping sets, which is the set of all belief states where it is optimal to stop. Our main contribution here is to obtain inner and outer bounds for the stopping sets. We next propose a variant where the relays, upon waking up, do not reveal their rewards immediately, but instead the forwarder can choose to probe the relay to know its reward, incurring a probing cost. Thus, to the existing set of stop and continue actions, we have added a new probe action. This model is motivated by the efforts required to learn the channel gains (by probing) in a wireless system. A key result we prove here is that the solution is characterized in terms of stage independent thresholds. Finally, we study a model comprising two forwarders which are competing against each other to choose a next-hop relay (one for each). Here, a relay is allowed to offer possibly different reward to each forwarder. We will first consider a complete information case where the reward pair of a relay is known to both the forwarders. Using stochastic game theory we will characterize the solution to this model in terms of Nash equilibrium policy pairs (NEPPs). We obtain results illustrating the structure of NEPPs. Next, we study a partial information model where each forwarder gets to observe only its reward value. Towards obtaining the solution for this model, we will first formulate a Bayesian game which is effectively played by both the forwarders at each stage. Next, for this Bayesian game we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies within the class of threshold strategies. This result will enable us to construct NEPPs for the partial information model. Although our primary contribution from the thesis is the theoretical study of the above mentioned variants of the basic relay selection model, we have also conducted extensive simulations to study the end-to-end performance obtained by applying the solution to these models at each hop en-route to the sink in a sleep-wake cycling WSN.