For over two centuries, Sweden has maintained a policy of non-alignment. This tradition broke on May 18, 2022, when Sweden applied for NATO membership. According to the government, the membership was seen as essential for protecting Sweden due to the worsening security situation caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, this raises a critical question: Given that Sweden has faced similar crises historically without turning to NATO, why choose to do so now? By conducting a descriptive ideal-type analysis based on the theoretical concept of strategic culture, this thesis argues that Sweden’s decision to apply for NATO membership was primarily driven by a series of external pressures and shifts in the regional security landscape. More specifically, the decision was influenced by the exposure of Sweden’s inadequate defense capabilities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Finland’s concurrent shift towards NATO. Crucially, this strategic shift to join a military alliance does not reflect a change in Sweden’s underlying strategic culture. Instead, it marks a pragmatic evolution in Sweden’s defense strategy, responding to new challenges while upholding its foundational values to ensure both national and regional stability amid global uncertainties.

For a decade, the EU and NATO have both claimed to have a relationship purported to be a Strategic Partnership. However, this relationship is widely understood by both academics and practitioners to be problematic. Although not denying that the relationship is problematic, it is claimed here that the argument, whereby the EU and NATO simply do not cooperate, is very limited in its value. In fact, it is argued that the two organisations cooperate far more, albeit less efficiently, outside of the formal Agreed Framework for cooperation. According to the formal rules of Berlin Plus/Agreed Framework (BP/AF), the EU and NATO should not cooperate at all outside of the Bosnia Herzegovina (ALTHEA) context. This is clearly not the case. The fundamental aim of this thesis is to investigate how this cooperation - beyond the BP/AF has emerged. Above all, it asks, within a context where formal EU-NATO cooperation is ruled out, what type of cooperation is emerging? This thesis attempts to explain the creation and performance of the informal EU-NATO institutional relationship beyond Berlin Plus. This thesis, drawing on insights from historical institutionalist theory and by investigating EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy, Kosovo and Afghanistan, puts forward three general arguments. First, in order for informal EU-NATO cooperation to take place outside of the BP/AF, cooperation is driven spatially away from the central political tools of Brussels, towards the common operational areas and hierarchically downwards to the international staffs and, in particular, towards the operational personnel. Second, although the key assumptions of historical institutionalism (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) help to explain the stasis of the EU-NATO relationship at the broad political and strategic level, a more complete understanding of the relationship is warranted. Including theoretical assumptions of incremental change helps to explain the informal cooperation that is now driving EU-NATO relations beyond Berlin Plus. Finally, this thesis makes the fundamental claim that the processes of incremental change through informal cooperation reinforce the current static formal political and strategic relationship. Events and operational necessity are driving incremental change far more than any theoretical debates about where the EU ends and NATO begins. Until events force a situation whereby both organisations must revisit the formal structures of cooperation, the static relationship will continue to exist, reinforced by sporadically releasing the political pressure valve expedited through the processes of informal cooperation. If the EU and NATO are to truly achieve a Strategic Partnership , it will stem from an existential security critical juncture and not from internal evolutionary processes.

When Turkey became a candidate of the EU in 1999 it had been a problematic applicant for forty years due to residual unpopularity with several member states for cultural, economic, security and normative reasons. However, the Helsinki European Council heralded a change of fortunes for Ankara and by 2005 accession negotiations had opened. This happened in spite of Turkey remaining an unpopular candidate with some member states. Moreover, since 2005, Turkey s standing within the EU has returned to a position akin to its pre-1999 stasis. This thesis thus asks: why did Turkey make such progress between 1999 and 2004/5? What was the specific configuration of structures, processes and actions that enabled that to happen then but not before or after? The thesis approaches this puzzle using a stretched eclectic version of Historical Institutionalism which can incorporate the effects of both structure and agency. In this way it can include the influence of wider structural factors, such as CEEC enlargement, Cyprus and ESDP as well as the agency of Turkey s advocates within the EU. It is a detailed qualitative process-tracing study which uses semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence to make a case for a given explanation. It concludes that a path dependent process, influenced by both structure and agency, can be traced from the Helsinki European Council to that in Brussels five years later which rhetorically entrapped the member states into agreeing to open accession negotiations in spite of Turkey s underlying unpopularity. By adopting this framework for analysis, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature on the Turkey-EU accession process by viewing the time period as a whole and taking a temporal rather than a snapshot approach. In so doing it is possible to explain why and how Turkey was able to make such progress between 1999 and 2004. It is also valuable in the study of present Turkey-EU relations as the ultimate conclusion has to be that there was a unique window of opportunity for both Turkey and the EU during this time and the window may now have closed.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the root causes of Russia’s recent aggressive regionalism. Russia’s revival and corresponding military, political, and informational offensives have shaken European security in a way few thought it was capable of following the USSR’s dissolution and Russia’s subsequent fall into ineptitude. At first glance, this shift in Russia’s posture appears to come as a result of an uptick in nationalism driven by the chauvinistic revanchism of its leader, Vladimir Putin. However, this thesis finds that the eastward expansion of NATO’s membership and transition to a more offensive force posture, augmented by the placement of missile defense infrastructure in Europe, has contributed to a Russian impression of besiegement and corresponding sense that its security and sovereignty are threatened. Russia’s perception that NATO is acting to replace Russia in its perceived sphere of influence has been shaped by the fall of the Soviet Union and Soviet security considerations. This thesis recommends that, to prevent the further deterioration of the relationship between Russia and the West, the following policies should be enacted. First, NATO should reestablish relations with Russia and partner with it on the European ballistic missile defense shield as a confidence building measure. Second, NATO should halt the eastward expansion of its traditional collective security membership and instead rely on NATO’s Partnership for Peace program to support democratization efforts in the former Eastern Bloc. While these policies cannot eliminate the historical context that the NATO-Russia relationship is shaped by, they can serve as the beginning of a shift away from mutual antagonism by defusing tensions between NATO and Russia.

This paper examines the broader relationship between the United States and Russia since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, relations between the U.S. and Russia have seriously deteriorated. This thesis lists the four most important contributing factors: ineffective reforms of the 1990s, NATO’s continued expansion, escalation in Ukraine, and the failure to jointly address the Syrian conflict. It argues that one major consequence of the strained relationship is a stronger Russia-China partnership. If Washington continues to ignore Russia’s security and economic interests, relations are likely to further decline, harming U.S. objectives in the long term. In order to improve relations, this thesis recommends that the U.S. transform its existing NATO policy, reverse sanctions, and reorient U.S. foreign policy to focus less on Russia’s non-democratic system of government and more on geopolitical issues, such as coordinating measures with Moscow to stabilize Syria.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In the process of the European implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht in December 1991 until the Franco-British declaration on European defense at Saint-MlÌ o in December 1998, the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) etched out the initial concept of a European Pillar within the framework of NATO expressed in NATO's European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The Franco-British declaration at Saint- MlÌ o demonstrated the willingness of some EU member states to promote autonomous military capabilities within the EU that enables the EU to act outside of NATO's framework. The further development of ESDP led to concern among NATO officials and US diplomats regarding ESDP's potential challenging appearance to NATO. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed this concern about a growing EU opposition to the transatlantic policy of alliance. In January 2003, during the Iraq Crisis, Mr. Rumsfeld labeled France and Germany as the "Old Europe". The relation of ESDP to NATO is strongly affected by the national interests of leading European actors like France and Germany. The development of ESDP as either a competitor or support arm of NATO depends on whether the French or the German approach to European security becomes dominant. / Major, German Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis identifies and explains the critical changes that have occurred in the complex system of interrelated rules which have governed the defense budget process in Poland since 1989. This research explains the legal and institutional evolution of the defense budget process in post-communist Poland, focusing on the role of legislative authority i.e., the Sejm and the Senat of the Republic of Poland within the defense budget process since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It also analyzes the distribution of power among the different actors in the budget cycle. This is followed by a thorough description of rules imposed by the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006, and the Act of Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft. These two documents were instrumental in shaping defense spending in Poland in the years 2001-2003 and will have a great impact on future decisions concerning defense budgets in the years to come. An overview of defense spending by European members of NATO is also provided to allow a comparison of Poland's willingness to commit resources to the common defense of other NATO members. / Captain, Polish Air Forces

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis examines the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) among organizations dealing with security issues, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO. This study further analyzes the OSCE commitments in the fields of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and national minorities. This analysis is performed in order to promote the OSCE to a broader public. The thesis further analyzes and describes the origins of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its development since 1975, when the Helsinki Final Act was signed by the Heads of State or Government of all participating States. The development of the international situation in Europe, the end of Cold War, and escalation of violence, especially in South Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia, caused fundamental changes in the European, and subsequently, the world security environment. The CSCE identified and responded to this new situation, resulting in a dramatic growth of its own role in shaping a common security area. Consequently, the CSCE changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, some critics think that OSCE is a "dead" organization, lacking tangible results and the necessary "teeth." It is necessary to review the main ideas why the CSCE was established and to properly identify the role of the OSCE in the European Security Architecture. Therefore, the main part of the thesis focuses on the European Security Architecture, the OSCE itself, and the OSCE missions, three of which are detailed and evaluated as case studies. / Lieutenant Colonel, Czech Republic Army

No description available.

The current political fraction between Russia and the West has led to the breakdown of the cooperative post-Cold War security order. Russia’s dramatic reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is of concern for how Moscow might shape its foreign policy. Based on the gap in the existing literature on the role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and regional influence, this paper aims to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence by answering the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence? This thesis uses the theoretical frame of Coercive Diplomacy, with focus on compellence, which provides an alternative explanation to one state’s behavior against another in the pursuit of influence. In order to test the hypothesis, offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence, this qualitative study examines the cases of Georgia and Armenia. The implementation of the analytical framework on the empirical material occurs through the method of structured focused comparison. The findings indicate that despite Russia’s engagement in compellence against Georgia and Armenia, the cases show very different outcomes.