The purpose of this essay is to examine whether Sweden work according to the Swedish governments action plan on UNSCR1325 and whether Sweden implements this action plan according to an implementation theory. Initially you will find an explanation of the used method, definitions and the theory used for the study. The second part contains the research where the studied material is analyzed. The study itself is based on reports, literature and material from web pages. The result of the study shows thatSwedenworks according to the government’s action plan on UNSCR 1325.Swedendoes this trough good contact with women, multiple ways of interaction such as MOT, all female MOT: s and Gender Field Advisers who follows patrols. My conclusion shows that Sweden implements the Swedish action plan on UNSCR 1325 according to the implementation theory. / Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida Sverige implementerat regeringens handlingsplan för resolution 1325 från att vi tog över ansvaret i Mazar-e Sharif. Inledningsvis förklaras metod, centrala begrepp och teorin bakom studien. Därefter en empiridel där undersökningsmaterialet redovisas. Undersökningen baseras på rapporter, avhandlingar, litteratur och material från webbsidor som rör kvinnorna i Afghanistan. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att Sverige arbetar utefter regeringens fastslagna handlingsplan för resolution 1325. Sverige gör detta genom bra kontakter med kvinnor, flera olika tillvägagångssätt som MOT, helt kvinnliga MOT och medföljande Gender Field Adviser. Min slutsats är att Sverige implementerar handlingsplanen enligt identifierade faktorer ur implementeringsteorin.

Historians of the founding years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledge General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s role as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), yet they ignore the effect Eisenhower’s rhetoric had in the creation of a sense of unity among Western European nations. Rhetorical analysis of Eisenhower’s time as SACEUR offers scholars a unique look into the founding years of NATO and the beginning of European unification. Using Kenneth Burke’s theory of the four master tropes, I analyze how Eisenhower’s role in the development of NATO was important to the eventual development of a unified Europe.

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has struggled to construct a new foreign policy paradigm in a world that is no longer bipolar. Instead of the Cold War era arms stockpiles, Moscow has signed multiple Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), and instead of physically taking over neighboring territories, increasing diplomacy and economic incentives have become Moscow’s primary tool to garner and maintain influence in its near abroad. Soft power initiatives, that can all roughly fit into a foreign aid model, from the Russian Federation to the near abroad come in different forms: oil subsidies, aid in kind, and direct financial investment. The Russian Federation has used all three of these strategies in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union in an attempt to keep the country in its sphere of influence. The use of foreign aid, be it oil subsides, aid in kind, or direct financial aid, all work towards the same goal of promoting Russian policies and interests in the near abroad. Ukraine, with its unique political, cultural and geographical importance, demonstrates the new struggle between Russia and the West. The struggle’s main actors are the Russian Federation against the eastern half of NATO and the EU, and the conclusion is unclear. Foreign aid and soft power are now playing a critical role in the outcome.

Between Involvement and Detachment takes grasp with the Johnson administration's (1963-1969) perceptions of and responses to the Western European realignments. Arguing that the Johnson administration set out to maintain the American unilateralist position in the transatlantic relation, not just as a function of America's position as a superpower, but also as a function of certain historically based Euro-skepticism, the thesis suggests that America's Western European policy can be seen on a continuum of involvement and detachment. Based on archival research, the thesis concludes, that these policies, essentially, were detached as America rejected the European reason of state. The Western European realignments were recorded in the Johnson administration with de Gaulle's critique of US hegemony in Western Europe in the early 1960s. The thesis argues that the administration to a large extent had a traditional reading of de Gaulle's policies, and feared that if Gaullist thinking spread among the European allies, it would merit to a return to traditional European power politics. The analysis shows that, by 1964 the administration believed, according to this study, that NATO's principle of integration stood between the current 'balanced' Western Europe and the Europe of the pre-War period. In addition the administration held the opinion that the German problem and the Western European détente tampered with the US unilateralism in its relations with the Soviet Union, and its position as the leader of the Western world. De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command in 1966, and the subsequent British and Belgian calls for a reform of the alliance and a détente with East, contributed to the administration's fear of alliance disintegration and return to European power politics. The thesis argues that the Department of State attempted a 'political bargain', with which the allies would be given political consultation and a détente in return for re-commitment to integration, whereas the Acheson Committee proposed a détente and deterrence formula in NATO to the overcome this perceived alliance disintegration. Thus the US proposed the Harmel formula before Harmel. In general, the developments in Western Europe put the Johnson administration in a state of alarm, and the European allies therefore had a larger impact on America's policies, except in the essentially detached nuclear policy, which the administration maintained. Despite changed circumstances, the Nixon administration's relation with and perceptions of the European allies largely resemble the traditionalist view of the Johnson administration.

Uppsatsen avser undersöka om bakomliggande politiska ideologier syns i två svenskar dagstidningars framställning av Sveriges medverkan i de NATO-ledda operationerna under konflikten i Libyen 2011. En kritisk diskursanalys har använts enligt Van Dijks modell. Studien visade att tidningarnas bakomliggande politiska hållning syntes till viss del i rapporteringen. DN:s liberala hållning kunde urskiljas i att de lät många parter komma till tals, medan SvD lutade mycket av sin rapportering på det moderata partiets företrädare. De tycktes också ha lagt olika mycket allvar och dramatik i händelserna i Libyen 2011.

Dette arbeidet gransker svensk-norsk sikkerhetspolitisk, forsvarspolitisk og militært samarbeide i perioden 1945 – 2000. Sentralt i oppgaven står også de to lands forhold til EU og NATO. Siden 1949 har Norge vært medlem av NATO, mens Sverige etter den andre verdenskrig fortsatte sin nøytralitetspolitikk. Skjult foregikk det allikevel et militært samarbeide mellom landene, og oppgaven forsøker å svare på om Norge har vært en agent for Sverige i NATO. Med svensk EU-medlemskap og utviklingen av en militær kapasitet for krisehåndtering i EU, er rollene på en måte snudd. Oppgaven forsøker derfor også å svare på om Sverige har tatt på seg rollen som agent for Norge i dette arbeidet innenfor den europeiske unionen.Oppgaven avsluttes med en gjenomgang av mulige områder for fremtidig samarbeide mellom de to land på det sikkerhetspolitiske, forsvarspolitiske og militære området. / This essay focuses on the security-policy, defense-policy and military relations between Norway and Sweden during the period 1945 –2001. One of the main issues in this report is to investigate the two countries’ relations to the European Union and the NATO-alliance. Norway has been a member of NATO since 1949, while Sweden during the Cold War held on to its policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, a secret military cooperation between the two states took place, and this essay tries to find out whether Norway has been an agent for Sweden in its relations with NATO. In 1995 Sweden joined the European Union and has, as a member of the EU, worked hard to create a military crisis-management capability within the union. This signifies that the roles of the two Nordic countries has somewhat changed. Sweden is today a member of the EU, and Norway is not. This report also tries to investigate whether Sweden has taken the role as an agent for Norway in the Common Security and Defense Policy within the EU. I have found out that there has been a close connection between Norway and Sweden during the Cold War. Norway has helped Sweden in its efforts to prepare for western military support, in case of a military crisis or war in the northern parts of Europe. Nevertheless, I cannot characterize Norway as an agent. In the case of Sweden as an agent for Norway, my conclusions are the same: I have not found any evidence that Sweden wants to fill the role as a liaison between Norway and the EU.The third part of this essay focuses on the future, and what possible future relations I can foresee in the defense sector relating the two countries. My conclusions are that there are many functional areas in which the Nordic countries can cooperate, especially within the business of peacekeeping operations. The already existing “Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support” will probably function as the core for future joint military effort and cooperation between Norway and Sweden. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01

Uppsatsen analyserar den tyska planeringen av Ardenneroffensiven med hjälp avNATO:s planeringsprocess, GoP 99. Inledningsvis så beskrivs planeringsprocessen ochdess koppling till militärteorin. Därefter så analyseras den tyska planeringen införArdenneroffensiven med hjälp av de olika stegen i planeringsprocessen i syfte att hittaskillnader och likheter. Slutligen så förs en diskussion kring planeringsprocessensanvändbarhet som analysinstrument. Resultatet av analysen visar att den tyskaplaneringen i huvudsak har haft samma innehåll som de olika stegen i GoP 99. Enviktig skillnad i den tyska planeringen har dock varit avsaknaden av en tydlig kopplingtill militärteorin och att operationen till del planerats på fel nivå. NATO:splaneringsprocess har genom sin militärteoretiska koppling en tidlöshet som gör att denfungerar som instrument för analyser av historiska operationer. / This essay analyses the German planning of the attack in the Ardennes usingthe NATO guidelines operational planning as help. Firstly the planning processand its interaction with military theory is described. Then the German planningof the Ardennes offensive is analysed by using the different steps of theplanning process in purpose to find differences and similarities. Finally adiscussion is being brought up about the planning process as an instrument foranalyses. The result of the analysis shows that the German planning in generalhas had the same contents as the NATO planning process. An importantdifference in the German planning have been the absence of a clear connectionto the military theory and also that the operation partly was planned on thewrong level. The NATO planning process has by its military theory connectiona timeless shape that makes it work as an instrument for analyses of historicaloperations. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02 / Ardennes, Battle of the 1944-1945

I denna uppsats studeras fransk hållning till europeiskt respektive transatlantiskt säkerhetssamarbeteefter kalla kriget. Analysen görs utifrån ett institutionalistiskt perspektiv där en eventuell växelverkanmellan fransk statsstrategi och EU respektive NATO eftersöks. I den valda metoden delas franskstatsstrategi upp i perioder och jämförs med viktigare fördrag (motsv.) inom NATO respektive EUssäkerhetssamarbete. I studien söks också karaktäristiken på fransk säkerhetspolitiks förhållande tilleuropeiskt säkerhetssamarbete.I studien konstateras att Frankrike varit drivande i utvecklingen av EUs säkerhetssamarbete och attden ömsesidiga påverkan mellan EU och fransk strategi verkar ha tilltagit under det senaste decenniet.Vidare konstateras att framgångsrika initiativ verkar vara beroende av en god relation till Tyskland ellerStorbritannien.Frankrike verkar också ha närmat sig NATO-samarbetet fram till 1997 då närmandena verka haavstannat. Genom det ökade deltagandet verkar dock Frankrike ha högre inflytande över NATO-beslutenän tidigare. Ytterligare närmanden synes vara starkt sammanknippade med franska krav på eneuropeisering av NATOs kommandostruktur.Författaren bedömer att fransk strategi syftar till att stärka EU-samarbetet och genom detta etableraen starkare europeisk pelare inom NATO samt att göra NATO till en organisation som suddar ut dengamla blockuppdelningen i Europa. / The aim of this essay is to analyse the French relation to European andTransatlantic co-operation. A theory of institutionalism is used to support analysiswhich focuses on if and how French security policy and EU or NATO treatieseffect each other during the years of 1989-2001.In order to achieve the objective, questions are posed about if and how theFrench relation to European and Transatlantic security co-operation have changedafter the cold war. Questions are also posed about the characteristics of Frenchpolicy towards security co-operation within EU and NATO.The analyse shows that France have played a major role in the EU securityco-operation development and that the French policy and the EU decisions effecton each other is escalating. It also shows that progress within EU security cooperationseems to bee connected to French relations towards Germany and GreatBritain.France also seems to have taken serious steps towards NATO co-operationup to 1997, after which the progress seems to stop. Through the higher degree ofparticipation France has achieved greater influence over NATO decisions thanbefore. Further steps towards NATO co-operation is probably strongly connectedto French demands on a stronger European position within NATO commandstructure.The writer estimates that French strategy aims on strengthening EU securityco-operation and thereby establishing a stronger European pillar within NATO.Further on it may also aim on developing NATO into a pan-Europeanorganisation which prevents a new block division in Europe. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

En afhandling om parti-rationalitet belyst gennem en undersøgelse af dansk deltagelse i fredsstøttende operationer og EU-forbeholdet på forsvarsområdet med henblik på at vurdere hvorvidt der eksisterer en diskrepans mellem disse to forhold. / The aim of this paper is to examine and explain the rationale of political parties behind, on the one hand, their desire to have Denmark participate in peace support operations and, on the one hand, the parties 1992 decision not to take any part in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of The European Union which have defence implications. It can thereby be determined whether or not there is an inconsistency between the two subjects. The parties who are subject to this examination are Socialdemokratiet(Social Democrats), Det Radikale Venstre(Social Liberals) and Socialistisk Folkeparti(Socialist People’s Party). The theory used is focusing on the fact that political parties have to make trade-offs in order to achieve their political goal or at least as many of these as possible. The theory puts foreward that parties have a small and well-defined set of objectives which in the simplest term can be seen as ”policy-seeking”, ”office-seeking” and ”vote-seeking”. The method used  is a descriptive analysis of the two areas where the decision to participate in peace support operations in The Persian Golf 1990, Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1998 is based on the parties arguments in Folketinget (The Danish Parliament). Due to the fact that there is no official documentation of the negotiations prior to the decision on The European Union question (the reservation) this area is mainly based on interviews with persons who took part in the negotiations and books on the subject. The aim of the descriptive analysis is to determine the rationale of the parties in both areas and thereby why the parties decides to participate in peace support operations and not to participate in The European Unions decisions and actions which have defence implications. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the conclusions from the descriptive analysis in order to determine any inconsistency in the parties rationale and the aims of the decisions. This leads to the conclusion of the thesis; Is there or is there not an inconsistency between Denmark’s wish to participate in peace support operations and the decision not to take any part in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of The European Union which have defence implications. The conclusion is; that there is an inconsistency. The inconsistency is due to the consequence of the implementation of the reservation, and not due to the aim of the reservation . As to the rationale of the parties the paper concludes that the parties seek different objectives. One party generally seeks policy and less office and/or votes, one party generally seeks office and less policy – votes and one party generally falls close to the center of the line policy and/or votes and only marginally in the direction of office. On the way to the conclusion the paper points to possible reasons to why it will not be possible to correct the inconsistency for a (long) time to come. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01

Uppsatsen kartlägger det amerikanska agerandet i fråga om EU: s skapande av en militär krishanteringsförmåga. Dessutom görs ett försök att med hjälp av en teori vars födelse ägde rum före det kalla kriget, förklara USA:s säkerhetspolitiska beteende gentemot Europa. Huvudsyftet med uppsatsen är att ur ett geopolitiskt-realistiskt perspektiv belysa hur USA betraktar den Europeiska Unionens säkerhetspolitiska utveckling. I uppsatsen kan det konstateras att USA:s officiella syn på den europeiska utvecklingen i huvudsak har varit positiv och att man välkomnar att de europeiska allierade staterna satsar mer på sin respektive försvarsförmåga vilket ger en mer jämbördig fördelning av kostnaderna. USA välkomnar europeiska utvecklade förmågor för att förbättra NATO:s kapacitet. Det föreligger en amerikansk oro för att den europeiska uppbyggnaden skall leda till att NATO:s betydelse minskar. Av denna anledning är kravet från USA att den europeiska utvecklingen skall byggas inom NATO:s ram. Det amerikanska agerandet mot Europa har i huvudsak kunnat förklaras med den valda geopolitiska-realistiska teorin i vilken USA:s intresse att kvarstå som den viktigaste aktören i de transatlantiska relationerna dominerar. / The aim of this essay is to identify and explain the security strategy of the United States for Europe during the period 1996 - 2001 from a geopolitical - realistic theoretical perspective.  In order to achieve this objective, two auxiliary questions are posed: Firstly, what was characteristic of the U.S. policy towards the European Union's development of a Common Security and Defense Policy, from the NATO summit in Berlin, 1996, to the present day? Secondly, can this policy be explained by geopolitical - realistic theory?One of the most important conclusions of this essay is that the official U.S. stance toward the above-mentioned developments in Europe has been mainly positive. A second conclusion is that the U.S. emphasizes the improvement of European capabilities, within NATO, in order to strengthen the transatlantic link. The U.S. is, however, concerned that the current process within the European Union may lead to a weakening of the transatlantic link.The essay’s main conclusion is that the U. S security strategy for Europe during the period of 1996 - 2001 can mainly be explained by geopolitical - realistic theory. This is demonstrated through the successful empirical testing of a geopolitical - realistic hypothesis. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01