Throughout the age of sail, with the exception of finance, there was no aspect of naval warfare that exhibited as much difficulty and anguish as manning the fleet. Finding the necessary skilled seamen to man warships was the alpha and omega of problems for the Royal Navy, as in wartime it was the first to appear with mobilisation and the last to be overcome. Manning the Royal Navy was an increasing problem throughout the eighteenth century as the Navy and British sea trade continuously expanded. This resulted in a desperate struggle for the scarce resource of skilled manpower, made most evident during the initial mobilisation from peacetime to wartime footing. There is no doubt that the Royal Navy depended on able seamen as if they were the very lifeblood of the ships on which they served. In manning its fleets the Royal Navy had to also consider the merchant marine, which depended upon skilled mariners and supplied the British Isles with food, stores, and the economic income generated by sea trade. The task of manning the fleets proved extremely difficult and was only accomplished under great stress as both the Royal Navy and the merchant marine struggled to obtain the services of vitally important skilled mariners. Therefore the fruits of the Royal Navy’s avid search for seamen during the French Revolutionary Wars must be viewed in light of its success in dominating the oceans of the world. This research proves that the Admiralty of the British Royal Navy was as concerned and as cautious in manning warships as they were in fighting them. It also shows that much of what history has said about naval manning has been based on conjecture rather than fact. This research utilizes statistics to reanalyze naval manning and provide a basis for future research.

Britain’s Royal Navy of the nineteenth century was the unquestioned master of the world’s oceans, having won such standing after over a century of near-uninterrupted warfare. However, while the strategies, tactics and technology of the navy evolved dramatically during this period, the laws that governed its many thousands of sailors and officers remained virtually unchanged from the original 1661 Articles of War. Despite minor amendments throughout the eighteenth century and a major reworking in 1749, both capital and corporal punishments were frequently employed as punishment for minor offences in a system that made England’s “Bloody Code” look positively humane. The 1860 Naval Discipline Act provided the first substantive overhaul of the original Articles of War, but historians have generally lamented this act as providing little comprehensive change to the governance of the navy. Using statistical data collected from thousands of courts martial records, this thesis takes a broad look at trends in naval courts martial, studying how these courts interacted with the legislative changes of the 1860s. Viewing how charges and sentences changed on the global scale, it becomes clear that the “arbitrary and cruel punishments” of the previous century had at last given way to a centralized, formal expression of discipline. / Graduate / 2021-07-21

The author of this dissertation examines the role of the United States Navy in the American annexation of the Philippines during the War of 1898. Many historians have considered the American “Imperialist Moment,” but few have considered the primary role played by the United States Navy. The Navy had experienced a period of remarkable growth during the 1880s and 1890s, when that service had switched from the power of sail to steam. The change to steam had been possible only through the study of the British Royal Navy and its engineers. When the U.S. Navy completed its modernization project in the 1890s, it came away with a British understanding of naval engineering and of naval priorities – including the desire to possess naval bases around the globe. This dissertation contains a detailed account of how the U.S. Navy came to understand its needs, and this dissertation demonstrates how the War of 1898 brought home to naval planners the necessity of possessing exclusive American coal stores during wartime. Last, this dissertation includes the thoughts of the most significant American naval planners of the time and their British mentors. This paper is an intellectual history of the U.S. Navy of the late nineteenth century and a specific history of the basis for American foreign policy of the twentieth century. Keywords: History of U.S. Foreign Policy, American Naval History, War of 1898

The subject of this work is the strategic problems faced by the United States Navy in the Western Pacific following the acquisition of the Philippine Islands as a result of the Spanish-American War. Using primary materials from the National Archives, Naval War College, and Library of Congress Manuscript Division, some of which have only recently been declassified, the rarely publicized 'Works of the United States Navy in regards to strategic planning and national interests are detailed. Secondary accounts, along with contemporary periodical literature, supplement the previously classified documents.

No description available.

Doctor of Philosophy / History / Michael Krysko / David R. Stone / This dissertation examines the shifting patterns of naval reform and the implementation of foreign technology in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union from Alexander III’s ascension to the Imperial throne in 1881 up to the outset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. During this period, neither the Russian Imperial Fleet nor the Red Navy had a coherent, overall strategic plan. Instead, the expansion and modernization of the fleet was left largely to the whims of the ruler or his chosen representative. The Russian Imperial period, prior to the Russo-Japanese War, was characterized by the overbearing influence of General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who haphazardly directed acquisition efforts and systematically opposed efforts to deal with the potential threat that Japan posed. The Russo-Japanese War and subsequent downfall of the Grand Duke forced Emperor Nicholas II to assert his own opinions, which vacillated between a coastal defense navy and a powerful battleship-centered navy superior to the one at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. In the Soviet era, the dominant trend was benign neglect, as the Red Navy enjoyed relative autonomy for most of the 1920s, even as the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921 ended the Red Navy’s independence from the Red Army. M. V. Frunze, the People’s Commissar of the Army of Navy for eighteen months in 1925 and 1926, shifted the navy from the vaguely Mahanian theoretical traditions of the past to a modern, proletarian vision of a navy devoted to joint actions with the army and a fleet composed mainly of submarines and light surface vessels. As in the Imperial period, these were general guidelines rather than an all-encompassing policy. The pattern of benign neglect was shattered only in 1935, when Stalin unilaterally imposed his own designs for a mighty offensive fleet on the Soviet military, a plan that was only interrupted by the outbreak of World War II.

Although it has long been portrayed as the nation’s ‘moat defensive’, recent examinations of Anglo-French rivalry during the long eighteenth century have revealed that the English Channel was, in reality, a highly permeable and vulnerable maritime border territory. Within this context, the Channel Islands assumed a strategic and tactical significance which was vastly disproportionate to their physical size, population or resources; emerging as what Morieux terms ‘a lynchpin of control' over local shipping and trade. Although a great deal of research has been already undertaken – particularly in relation to the Channel Islands’ role as a base for commerce-raiding and intelligence gathering – much of this has covered the entire long eighteenth century. However, it was only during the Great French War that the British government embraced the military potential of the Channel Islands to the fullest; not only exploiting the inhabitants’ knowledge of the seas and intimacy with her ‘enemies’, but also transforming the archipelago into a chain of offshore fortresses. In addition, prior scholarship has often focused on individual aspects of the Channel Islands’ involvement in the Great French War; while local historians have tended to embrace the ‘Great Man’ approach, examining the period through the lens of the careers of local commanders. Consequently, this thesis seeks to provide a more complete picture of the Channel Islands’ role within Britain’s military and naval strategy; integrating an examination of local defence and security with several of already well-covered topics. Moreover, in light of the fact that existent scholarship has often centred upon ‘Great Men’, it is hoped that the thesis shall serve to better demonstrate the extent to which the celebrated achievements of Don, Doyle and D’Auvergne rested upon the efforts of a number of ‘unsung heroes’.

Utgör offensiv taktik en betingelse för seger vid sjöslag? Tidigare forskning indikerar att såär fallet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att med utgångspunkt från en teoretisk diskussion ochgenom en kvantitativ metod undersöka huruvida användning av en offensiv taktik betingarsannolikheten för seger vid sjöslag. Uppsatsen har därvidlag undersökt 44 sjöslag frånLepanto 1571 till och med Falkland 1982. Den statistiska analysen visar ett positivt sambandmellan offensiv taktik och sannolikheten för seger. Sambandet kvarstår även när mankontrollerar för betydelsen av relativa kvantitativa styrkerelationer. Den statistiska analysenhar även visat att en kombination av offensiv taktik och styrkerelation endast till delförklarar vad det är som betingar sannolikhet för seger vid sjöslag. Offensiv taktik är såledesen mycket begränsad förklaring av seger. / Does a naval tactical offensive constitute condition for victory? Previousscientific research indicates this to be the case. The purpose with this study is todepart from a theoretical discussion, and using a quantitative method, examinewhether a naval tactical offensive condition the probability for victory. Thestudy examines all 44 major naval battles from Lepanto 1571 until Falkland1982. The statistical analysis shows a positive relationship between tacticaloffensive and the probability for victory. The result has shown that thesubstantial effect of naval tactical offensive constitutes condition for victory.The statistical analysis has also shown that the effect of naval tactical offensiveis unaffected when including a competing variable, in this case relativequantitative naval power relationship. The study shows also that a combinationof naval tactical offensive and strength relation only to a small part explainsvictory. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the nature of military behaviour during the High Middle Ages, in what is normally called the Age of Chivalry. I am not entirely comfortable with this appellation, which is why I have chosen to discuss the ethos and practice of warfare. My focus is essentially on the societies of north-western Europe which displayed certain characteristics in warfare, which they exported into the Mediterranean region and further east. It is somewhat of a simplification to describe this military culture as that of 'knight and castle'; but it is a convenient starting point. In what follows I have drawn together fourteen of my published articles over the period 1982-2005, in order to present my interpretation of the main strands that can be identified in warfare between 1050 and 1250. Although I continue to be research active and have published, or I am still in the process of publishing, half-a-dozen articles over the last five years, I felt that I could best present a coherent thesis from the pieces which I have selected.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2006. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 296-320.