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11	A teoria do objeto de Emil Lask / The object theory of Emil Lask Resende Júnior, José de 30 August 2005 (has links) Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 A teoria do objeto de Emil Lask - J Resende.pdf: 1357581 bytes, checksum: aa3206cca43099b9aee518f3bbdc405e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-08-30 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The purpose of the present work is to introduce the object theory developed by Emil Lask in his Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre (1910). Even if such theory is not its goal, it works as auxiliary support in the attainment of book´s aim: to hold categorically the validity (Geltung) and save it from all hypostases forms, through that Lask deepens and transforms the value theory (Werttheorie) of Windelband and Rickert indeed under the critics of Husserl and the influence of the Lebensphilosophie. The present work will just expose and analyse the objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) species developed by Lask, among which is included, for instance, objects as the tree, the green, the being, the beautiful, the ethical, the language and the numbers. In fact such objectivity is a sense theory completely independent of subjectivity / Este trabalho visa apresentar a teoria do objeto que Emil Lask desenvolve na sua obra Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre (1910). Apesar de não ser a meta de Lask, esta teoria do objeto se desenvolve como instrumento auxiliar na consecução do objetivo da obra: tratar categorialmente a validade (Geltung) e livra-la de todas as formas de hipóstase, através do que Lask aprofunda e transforma a teoria do valor (Werttheorie) de Windelband e Rickert em face das críticas de Husserl e da influência da Lebensphilosophie. O presente trabalho limita-se à exposição e análise das espécies de objetualidade (Gegenständlichkeit) desenvolvidas por Lask, dentro das quais se incluem, por exemplo, objetos como a árvore, o verde, o ser, o belo, o ético, a linguagem e os números. Objetualidade esta que em última instância se constitui numa teoria do sentido totalmente independente da subjetividade objetualidade sentido categorias lógica da filosofia neokantismo objectivity sense categories logic of philosophy neo-kantianism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
12	Conscience and its referents : the meaning and place of conscience in the moral thought of Joseph Butler and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, John Balguy and Richard Price Daniel, Dafydd Edward Mills January 2015 (has links) Joseph Butler's moral thought and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, and his followers, John Balguy and Richard Price, are frequently distinguished, as a result of: (a) Butler’s empirical method (e.g., Kydd, Sturgeon); (b) Butler's emphasis upon self-love in the 'cool hour passage' (e.g., Prichard, McPherson); (c) Butlerian conscience, where, on a neo-Kantian reading, Butler surpassed the Clarkeans by conveying a sense of Kantian 'reflective endorsement' (e.g., Korsgaard, Darwall). The neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans in (c) are consistent with (d) Francis Hutcheson's and David Hume's criticisms of the Clarkeans; (e) modern criticisms of rational intuitionism that follow Hutcheson and Hume (e.g., Mackie, Warnock); and (f) the contention that the Clarkeans occupied an uneasy position within 'post-restoration natural law theory' (e.g., Beiser, Finnis). (d)-(e) thus underpin the distinction between Butler and the Clarkeans in (a)-(c), where the Clarkeans, unlike Butler, are criticised for representing moral truth as the passive, and self-evident, perception of potentially uninteresting facts. This study responds to (a)-(f), by arguing that Butlerian and Clarkean conscience possessed more than one referent; so that conscience meant an individual's experience of his own judgement and God’s judgement and the rational moral order. As a result of their shared theory of conscience, Butler and the Clarkeans held the same theory of moral development: moral agents mature as they move from obeying conscience according to only one of conscience's referents, to obeying conscience because to do so is to satisfy each of conscience's referents. In response to (a)-(b), this study demonstrates that the Clarkeans agreed with Butler’s method and 'cool hour': natural considerations of individual judgement and self-interest were necessary aspects of the progress towards moral maturity in both Butler and the Clarkeans. With respect to (c), it is argued that Butler and the Clarkeans shared the same understanding of practical moral reasoning as part of their shared understanding of conscience and moral development. This study places limits upon proto-Kantian readings of Butler, and neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans, while making it inconsistent to divide Butler and the Clarkeans on the basis of Butlerian conscience. In answer to (c)-(f), Clarkean conscience shows that the Clarkeans were neither complacent nor ‘externalists’. Clarkean conscience highlights how the Clarkeans positioned themselves within the tradition of Ciceronian right reason and Thomistic natural law. Consequently, in both Butler and the Clarkeans, the intuition of moral truth was not the passive perception of an 'independent realm' of normative fact, but the active encounter, in conscience, with reason qua the law of God’s nature, human nature, and the created universe. 142
13	F. A. Hayek's Critique of Legislation Holm, Cyril January 2014 (has links) The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. Hayek legislation rules law rationality rational action rational social order equilibrium utilitarianism method of deliberation criterion of correctness Elinor Ostrom Avner Greif Vernon Smith Joshua Epstein complexity knowledge social cooperation information know-how the Hayek problem the invisible hand Adam Smith Mises Keynes Marx welfare state Gilbert Ryle Michael Polanyi theory of legislation legisprudence jurisprudence Neo-Kantianism historicism cognitive closure theory of prices competition syntax grammar game theory generative social science agent-based computational modeling institutional policy analysis normative primacy of economics primacy of politics Sheri Berman constructivist rationalism socialism social democracy Nozick Rawls distribution justice freedom Kant polycentric government process of experimentation speculative philosophy analytical philosophy freedom under the law liberty philosophy of mind consequentialist

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