Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The US Department of Defense is currently pursuing the most comprehensive transformation of its forces since the early years of WWII. This transformation is a holistic approach to update both the equipment that the forces will fight its conflicts with and the way in which they will fight. This transformation relies heavily on fully networked air, ground and space based platforms. While many experts agree that in the course of the next 10 years communications equipment will emerge to support the networking of these systems, there remains much uncertainty on how operations will be effected if the technology does not mature enough to meet expectations. This research shows that even a 25 percent degradation in communications range could pose significant challenges for this Future Force. Additionally, even small delays (latencies greater than one minute) and constraints on network throughput can increase the Future Force casualties and the duration of battle. While the end result in all analysis shows that the Future Force is a superior element with the same battle end state-victory, the cost of that victory depends significantly on effective communications. / Captain, United States Army

Thesis (Master').

<p>So- called “Network Based Defense” (NBD) was introduced in Sweden in connection with the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces in 1999. NBD is based on the U.S. variant Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which in turn is derived from research on the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In Sweden the concept was introduced and included not only the Armed Forces but was intended to also support the Swedish civilian agencies in order to create networks and hence share the available information and thus more effective crisis management and to provide more "bang for the buck." In developing the concept of NBD the Swedish Armed Forces used both economic and human resources, in the form of research, new technologies, new organization and new methods.</p><p>Between year 2004 and 2006 the Armed Forces once again entered the process of reorganization. This time to “classic” military hierarchical organization and NBD as development engine disappeared due to economic cutbacks, together with the decision to participate in the European Union (EU) rapid reaction force. The purpose of this essay is to study the theories and ideas behind the concept and why the concept "disappeared" a few years later. The result of the work suggests that the concept of NBD in its abstract form was too theoretical. The process of organization introduced by HKV -04 is the clearest example of this abstract ambiguity concerning command and responsibility. Research suggests that responsibility is the basis of military organization and operations. The results also shows that a number of experiences from the development of the NBD has been used in the more practically oriented transformation of the Armed Forces necessary by the commitments for the so- called Nordic Battle Group (NBG-08).</p><p>The results have also shown correlation between NBD development and the increased Nordic cooperation in the form of sea and air surveillance and the well-developed body interaction within the framework of the national crisis management capacity in Sweden.</p> / <p>Nätverks Baserat Försvar (NBF) infördes i Sverige inom ramen för transformationen av Försvarsmakten från ett invasionsförsvar till ett insatsförsvar. NBF bygger på den amerikanska varianten <em>Network Centric Warfare</em> (NCW) som i sin tur härstammar från forskningen kring begreppet <em>Revolution in Military Affairs</em> (RMA). Konceptet infördes och innefattade inte bara Försvarsmakten utan även stödmyndigheter i syfte att skapa ett nätverk och därmed dela tillgänglig information och därmed effektivisera krishanteringen och ge mer ”pang för pengarna”. Kring utvecklingen av konceptet NBF lades stora resurser i form av forskning, ny teknik, ny organisation och nya metoder.</p><p>År 2004 till 2006 omorganiserades Försvarsmakten återigen från införd processorganisation enligt NBF till klassisk militär hierarkisk organisation och NBF som utvecklingsmotor försvann i och med ekonomiska neddragningar tillsammans med beslutet om att delta i Europeiska Unionens (EU:s) snabbinsatsstyrka.</p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera tankar och teorier som ledde fram till NBF och vad som kan vara en förklaring till att NBF försvann några år senare.</p><p>Resultatet av arbetet med uppsatsen tyder på att konceptet NBF i sin abstrakta form blev för teoretiskt. Den processorganisation som infördes med HKV -04 är det tydligaste exemplet på denna abstrakta oklarhet främst vad gäller befäl och därtill kopplat ansvar.  Forskning pekar på att ansvar utgör grunden i militär organisation och verksamhet.  Resultaten visar också på att de positiva lärdomarna från utvecklingen av NBF i form av vikten av ”nätverkande” låg som grund till det mer praktiskt inriktade transformeringen av Försvarsmaktens delar genom Nordic Battle Group, (NBG-08). Resultatet har också påvisat samband mellan NBF utvecklingen och det utökade nordiska samarbetet i form av sjö och luftövervakning samt den likaså utvecklade myndighetssamverkan inom ramen för den nationella krishanteringsförmågan i Sverige.</p>

So- called “Network Based Defense” (NBD) was introduced in Sweden in connection with the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces in 1999. NBD is based on the U.S. variant Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which in turn is derived from research on the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In Sweden the concept was introduced and included not only the Armed Forces but was intended to also support the Swedish civilian agencies in order to create networks and hence share the available information and thus more effective crisis management and to provide more "bang for the buck." In developing the concept of NBD the Swedish Armed Forces used both economic and human resources, in the form of research, new technologies, new organization and new methods. Between year 2004 and 2006 the Armed Forces once again entered the process of reorganization. This time to “classic” military hierarchical organization and NBD as development engine disappeared due to economic cutbacks, together with the decision to participate in the European Union (EU) rapid reaction force. The purpose of this essay is to study the theories and ideas behind the concept and why the concept "disappeared" a few years later. The result of the work suggests that the concept of NBD in its abstract form was too theoretical. The process of organization introduced by HKV -04 is the clearest example of this abstract ambiguity concerning command and responsibility. Research suggests that responsibility is the basis of military organization and operations. The results also shows that a number of experiences from the development of the NBD has been used in the more practically oriented transformation of the Armed Forces necessary by the commitments for the so- called Nordic Battle Group (NBG-08). The results have also shown correlation between NBD development and the increased Nordic cooperation in the form of sea and air surveillance and the well-developed body interaction within the framework of the national crisis management capacity in Sweden. / Nätverks Baserat Försvar (NBF) infördes i Sverige inom ramen för transformationen av Försvarsmakten från ett invasionsförsvar till ett insatsförsvar. NBF bygger på den amerikanska varianten Network Centric Warfare (NCW) som i sin tur härstammar från forskningen kring begreppet Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Konceptet infördes och innefattade inte bara Försvarsmakten utan även stödmyndigheter i syfte att skapa ett nätverk och därmed dela tillgänglig information och därmed effektivisera krishanteringen och ge mer ”pang för pengarna”. Kring utvecklingen av konceptet NBF lades stora resurser i form av forskning, ny teknik, ny organisation och nya metoder. År 2004 till 2006 omorganiserades Försvarsmakten återigen från införd processorganisation enligt NBF till klassisk militär hierarkisk organisation och NBF som utvecklingsmotor försvann i och med ekonomiska neddragningar tillsammans med beslutet om att delta i Europeiska Unionens (EU:s) snabbinsatsstyrka. Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera tankar och teorier som ledde fram till NBF och vad som kan vara en förklaring till att NBF försvann några år senare. Resultatet av arbetet med uppsatsen tyder på att konceptet NBF i sin abstrakta form blev för teoretiskt. Den processorganisation som infördes med HKV -04 är det tydligaste exemplet på denna abstrakta oklarhet främst vad gäller befäl och därtill kopplat ansvar.  Forskning pekar på att ansvar utgör grunden i militär organisation och verksamhet.  Resultaten visar också på att de positiva lärdomarna från utvecklingen av NBF i form av vikten av ”nätverkande” låg som grund till det mer praktiskt inriktade transformeringen av Försvarsmaktens delar genom Nordic Battle Group, (NBG-08). Resultatet har också påvisat samband mellan NBF utvecklingen och det utökade nordiska samarbetet i form av sjö och luftövervakning samt den likaså utvecklade myndighetssamverkan inom ramen för den nationella krishanteringsförmågan i Sverige.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Singapore and many parts of Asia were hit with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in March 2003. The spread of SARS lead to a rapidly deteriorating and chaotic situation. Because SARS was a new infection, there was no prior knowledge that could be referenced to tackle such a complex, unknown and rapidly changing problem. Fortunately, through sound measures coupled with good leadership, quick action and inter-agency cooperation, the situation was quickly brought under control. This thesis uses the SARS incident as a case study to identify a set of network centric warfare methodologies and technologies that can be leveraged to facilitate the understanding and management of complex and rapidly changing situations. The same set of methodologies and technologies can also be selectively reused and extended to handle other situations in asymmetric and unconventional warfare. / Office of Force Transformation, DoD US Future Systems Directorate, MINDEF Singapore. / Lieutenant, Republic of Singapore Army / Civilian, Defence Science and Technology Agency, Singapore

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Military leaders and scholars alike debate the existence of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) based on information technology. This thesis will show that the Information RMA not only exists, but will also reshape how we plan, operate, educate, organize, train, and equip forces for the 21st century. This thesis introduces the Communication Technology (CommTech) Model to explain how communication technologies affect organizations, leadership styles, and decision-making processes. Due to the growth in networking enterprises, leaders will have to relinquish their tight, centralized control over subordinates. Instead, they will have to perfect their use of softer power skills such as influence and trust as they embrace decentralized decision-making. Network Centric Warfare, Self-Synchronization, and Network Enabled Operations are concepts that provide the framework for integrating information technology into the battlespace. The debate that drives centralized versus decentralized control in network operations is analyzed with respect to the CommTech Model. A new term called Operational Trust is introduced and developed, identifying ways to make it easier to build trust among network entities. Finally, the thesis focuses on what leaders need to do to shape network culture for effective operations. / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Goshorn, Rachel ; Goshorn, Deborah. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on June 24, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Anomaly Detection, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, Behavior Analysis, Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Force Protection, Multi-agent Systems, Network-centric Operations, Network-centric Systems Engineering, Network-centric Warfare, Smart Sensor Networks, Systems Engineering, Systems Integration, System of Systems. Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-212). Also available in print.