Legally Philosophical Aspects of Searching for Truth in Civil Procedure DIPLOMA THESIS Viktor Gazda Abstract The aim of this thesis is to discuss certain legally philosophical aspects of fact- findings in civil procedure. In a simplified way, this work is focused on exploring the possibility of determining the value of truthfulness of quaestio facti when applying law. The six chapters of the work include three basic themes. The first one examines the reflection of the philosophical concepts of truth in the process of determining the facts of a case, the second one clarifies the nature of the ideological aims of fact-findings in the form of principles of formal and substantive legal truth and the third topic deals with the nature of a judge's beliefs in the truthfulness of factual claims and the role of probability in the judge's belief At first I briefly present the phenomenon of truth in a wider philosophical context so that I can then proceed to outline the selected theories of truth. After explaining the basic essence of the legal procedural principles which have the greatest impact on the process of finding the facts, I pass, in another part of the thesis, to the very analysis of these principles through the prism of selected theories of truth. The reflection of the philosophical concepts of...

My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches to the structure of scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that scientific knowledge is embodied in theories (formulated in some (first-order) symbolic language) with direct interpretative links - via so-called "bridge principles" - to reality, the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the (mathematical) structures which satisfy that theory. The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the interpretative role of the conceptual (i.a. mathematical) models of these theories. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the theory "in terms of' its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between theories and (aspects of) reality in the interpretative chain. The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic formulations of these conceptualisations. Their (particular) meanings can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited context of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation (model) of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked with that of articulated reference, as it - given its model-dependent nature - should be. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Modern philosophy is often said to privilege rationality over received wisdom, but to some extent this is an ideal which we pursue under a measure of uncertainty. It is not always obvious what rationality requires. Nor is it clear how rationality is to be traded against other ideals. This dissertation seeks to clarify both questions as they pertain to the rationality of belief. The choice of topic is apposite, since many argue that the case of belief illustrates that what is rational and what there is most reason to do is one and the same thing. In particular, so-called evidentialists often argue that to believe what the evidence indicates is both to believe rationally and to believe what one has most reason to believe, since (i) rationality consists in responding to reasons, and (ii) only evidence that p can be a reason to believe that p. My first objective is to challenge this thesis. I do so by arguing that the class of reasons that rationalise a belief does not coincide with the class of reasons there are to have the belief all things considered. To equate the two classes would be to conflate the psychological issue of how we respond to reasons with the ontological issue of what reasons there are. My case against evidentialism does not depend on pragmatism being true, however. Even if Pascal was wrong to claim that the expected benefit of believing can be a reason to believe, it does not follow that evidentialism is true. Some non-pragmatic form of anti-evidentialism may still be true. The latter half of the dissertation explores this possibility in greater detail. There I argue that there is at least one class of beliefs which is not subject to common evidentiary strictures. When we use practical reasoning to form intentions about what to do in the future, we typically also form beliefs about what we will do. Yet, those beliefs are not based on evidence about what we will do, I argue. Typically, we do not predict what we do based on what we intend to do. Nor should we. When it is up to us whether we will perform an action, our intentions do to not carry enough weight as evidence that we must use them to predict what we will do. In the last part of the dissertation, I use this point to elucidate how we acquire self-knowledge and how belief relates to truth.

In an age of ever-expanding digital communication platforms and the presence of news online becoming paramount, the amount of information being shared and the truth of that information is becoming more and more difficult to track. The power of these social platforms is one that all should recognize and reflect upon in terms of their use of them, and reliance on them for the information they need. This thesis seeks to explore this power and the ways in which to remedy the falsities spread on the platforms faster than ever before, through photographic journalism.

This research is an analysis of Ontario teachers’ experiences with Grade 11 NDA3M Current Aboriginal Context in Canada curriculum. By deconstructing and critically analyzing the curricular and pedagogical implications, my thesis is a targeted response to number 63 of the Truth and Reconciliation Calls to Action. As outlined by Clandinin and Connelly (2000), this research is centred in narrative research techniques. Additionally, I draw on Miller’s (1996) 3L’s: Look, Listen, and Learn approach, paired with Dion and Dion’s (2004) storytelling as a means of telling and (re)telling the story. I used one-on-one interviews with teachers and one sharing circle with teachers and elders to synthesize data from documents to capture the essence of the lived experiences. Participants revealed their experiences of what Aoki claims is curriculum-as-planned and curriculum-as-lived in this course. The results of this research were revealed responses to components of number 63 of the Calls to Action; NDA3M requires a review of curriculum expectations to align with teachers’ classroom experiences; participants discussed how their respective schools are using every opportunity to students’ capacity and awareness of Indigenous Worldviews; and professional development to support Indigenous education is in high demand.

O objetivo deste trabalho é o exame da concepção espinosista da verdade, com ênfase no Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). Para tanto, empreendemos a análise da teoria das idéias, presente nesse texto, em um cotejo com as demais obras do autor. Apesar disso, privilegiamos o TIE dentre as demais, com o propósito de mostrar que essa obra não é uma fase superada. Com efeito, tem-se considerado o TIE como um fracasso de Espinosa pelo fato de o filósofo não ter conseguido nele elaborar a definição do intelecto. Entretanto, o que pretendemos mostrar é que, mesmo se nao inteiramente explicitada, a definição do intelecto pode ser ali encontrada e que, portanto, a tradicional interpretacao dos editores e comentadores - apesar de longamente endossada - está equivocada. De fato, tornou-se uma convenção dizer que o TIE não possui uma densa articulação com o sistema espinosista. Mostraremos, ao contrario, que ela não apenas existe, mas pode ser perfeitamente comprovada. / The objective of this work is to investigate the Spinozan concept of truth, with emphasis on the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). In order to do so, we have analysed his theory of ideas, presented in this text, in close comparison with that presented in the rest of Spinoza\'s work. Despite this, we have given pride of place to the TIE over the rest, with the firm purpose of showing that this work is not merely a passing phase. In effect, the TIE has been considered, over the years, a Spinoza failure for its (apparent) lack of elaboration of the definition of the intellect. However, what we intend to do is to show that, even if not in an explicit way, the definition of the intellect is there and, therefore, that the editors\' and commentators\' traditional interpretation - despite its being amply endorsed - is wrong. In fact, it has become conventional to say that the TIE does not articulate easily with the core of Spinoza\'s system. It is our purpose, nonetheless, to show that not only does this articulation exist, but also that it can be thoroughly and consistently supported.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 763146 bytes, checksum: 12b30abfdba02d12b58f54feecc93fb1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work has the principal objective highlighted in the differences and similarities between the philosophers Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas about the concept of truth established for both. First, we present the Rorty s thought about truth, passing by the idea of etnocentrism and about the contingency that the language has beyond the idea of a democracy, fundamental subject for we understand his idea of truth. Second, we approach the habermasian idea of truth pointing his concept like something universal and transcendental to cultural contexts and temporal. His idea of life world intersubjectively shared. The appearance of one pos-metaphysic linguistic turns capable of changes in the main point of philosophy and his idea of democracy. Finally, a little sketch of one ethic of the discourse capable of join all necessary characteristics for the formation of one concept of truth universal and transcendental. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal destacar as divergências e semelhanças entre os filósofos Richard Rorty e Jürgen Habermas acerca do conceito de verdade. Primeiramente, apresentamos o pensamento rortyano sobre a verdade, passando pela idéia de etnocentrismo e pela idéia de contingência que a linguagem possui, além de seu pensamento sobre a democracia, para entendermos sua idéia de verdade. Em seguida abordar-se-á a idéia habermasiana de verdade apontando seu conceito como algo universal e transcendente a contextos culturais e temporais. Sua idéia de mundo da vida intersubjetivamente partilhado. O surgimento de uma virada lingüística pós-metafísica capaz de mudar os eixos da filosofia e sua idéia de democracia. E por fim, um pequeno esboço de uma ética do discurso capaz de unir todas as características necessárias para a formação de um conceito de verdade universalizável e transcendental. Por fim, confrontar-se-á os dois filósofos com o intuito de mostrar o debate sobre o conceito de verdade e as posições de cada um.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-12-18Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:37:55Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 eloy_cb_me_assis.pdf: 819605 bytes, checksum: cd0149117bdd3ddb1dbd172fef9c7e47 (MD5) / A violência sexual contra crianças não é um evento incomum; no entanto há a dificuldade de denúncia, pois além do estabelecimento da relação de dominação que o agressor exerce sobre a vítima, a maneira como tal fato é recebido pela sociedade e como é encaminhado pelas instituições judiciárias responsáveis também são determinantes para as omissões. A violência implícita ou explícita dos acontecimentos está contida nos autos processuais, por meio das declarações das pessoas envolvidas e exige procedimentos jurídicos urgentes e eficazes. Inserida no universo dos interrogatórios, muitas vezes, a criança causa confusão ao desmentir o que havia falado antes, reforçando possíveis preconceitos em relação a si. Na especificidade da atuação da Psicologia no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo, em Comarca do interior foi que surgiu o presente trabalho, mediante a vivência das dificuldades encontradas no atendimento à criança vítima de abuso sexual e a determinação judicial para a avaliação da veracidade de seu discurso. Esta pesquisa, utilizando o referencial da teoria das Representações Sociais, traz a análise das diferentes práticas discursivas relacionadas ao processo de produção da verdade nos processos judiciais de abuso sexual infantil. O principal objetivo desta pesquisa foi proporcionar uma revisão dos paradigmas jurídicos frente à problemática da criança vítima de abuso sexual, caracterizando as relações entre a infância e a instituição judiciária, com principal enfoque no sistema de comunicação e notificação desse crime e as conseqüentes intervenções profissionais que buscam a validação, ou não, do relato da criança. Para tanto, foram pesquisados 51 processos judiciais de crimes de atentado... / The sexual violence against children is not an uncommon event; however there is the accusation difficulty, because besides the establishment of the dominance relationship that the aggressor exercises on the victim, the way as such a fact is received by the society and as it is directed by the responsible judiciary institutions are also decisive for the omissions. The violence implicit or explicit of the events is contained in the procedural solemnities, through the involved people's declarations and it demands urgent and effective juridical procedures. Inserted in the interrogatory’s universe, many times, the child causes confusion when denying what had spoken before, reinforcing possible prejudices in relation of itself. In the specificity of the Psychology’s performance in the Tribunal of Justice of the State of São Paulo, in a interior’s District, the present work appeared, by the existence of the difficulties found in the service to the child victim of sexual abuse and the judicial determination for the evaluation of the truthfulness of its speech. This research, using the Theory of the Social Representation’s referential, brings the analysis of the different speech’s practice related to the production’s process of the truth in the infantile sexual abuse’s lawsuits. The main objective of this research was to provide a revision of the juridical paradigms compared to the victim of sexual abuse child's problem, characterizing the relations between the childhood and the judiciary institution, with main focus on the communication and notification system of this crime and the consequent professional interventions that search for the validation, or not, of the child's report. For so much, there were researched 51 lawsuits of crimes ...(Complete abstract, click electronic access below)

Si bien Parménides no otorga, como Jenófanes, una connotación fuertemente negativa al discurso mítico de la tradición poética, no es menos cierto que asistimos con él a una verdadera transmutación del discurso homérico y hesiódico, fundamentalmente en lo que concierne al problema complejo de la verdad, el engaño y la verosimilitud. La originalidad filosófica de Parménides consistiría no solamente en la elaboración de un logos que encarnaría por primera vez en Occidente la idea de una razón crítica personal”, capaz de juzgar” la refutación enunciada por la autoridad de una maestra de la verdad”, y en el establecimiento de un gnōmē (juicio) susceptible de elegir entre lo más verosímil y lo menos verosímil, sino también en el hecho de entablar, mucho antes que Platón –y a diferencia del Sofista–, una reflexión sobre la verdad y el error que está guiada por la cuestión de las buenas y malas mezclas, las buenas y malas separaciones.---Mythos and logos in Parmenides”. Although Parmenides does not present a strongly negative connotation of the mythical discourse of the poetic tradition, as Xenophanes does, there is no less truth to the fact that we witness with him a true transmutation of the Homeric and Hesiodic discourse, especially regarding the complex problem of truth, deceit and verisimilitude. The philosophical originality of Parmenides lies not only in the elaboration of a logos that would, for the first time in Western Thought, embody the idea of a personal critical reason”, capable of judging” the refutation pronounced by the authority of a Master of Truth”, nor in the institution of a gnōmē (judgement) capable of choosing between things with more or less verisimilitude, but also in the fact of undertaking, long before Plato –and in a different manner than in the Sophist–, a reflection on truth and error that is guided by the question of the good and bad combinations, the good and bad separations.

El trabajo analiza la significación de los mitos en la obra platónica partiendo del uso del término en los diálogos y lo compara con la utilización de logos. Se distinguen las diferentes formas en las que se utiliza el término para delimitar un uso propiamente platónico. En esa forma, el mito no se opone al logos escrito. --- Myth in Plato. Some Reflections on a Recurrent Issue”. The paper analyzes the signification of myths in the Platonic work starting from the use of the term in the dialogues and comparing it with the use of the term logos. The different ways in which the term is used are distinguished in order to delimitate a properly Platonic use. In that way, myth does not oppose written logos.