acase@tulane.edu

In this thesis I will explore the relationship between Nozick’s self-ownership principle and freedom. I will defend G.A. Cohen’s critique of self-ownership and try to show how his argument that self-ownership is hostile to genuine freedom presents a problem for Nozick. I think it is clear that Nozick’s self-ownership does little to protect a meaningful sort of freedom; and a meaningful sort of freedom is exactly what Nozick aims to protect. This is true because eudaimonistic moral beliefs ought to undergird Nozick’s self-ownership thesis, and self-ownership can therefore be assessed in light of whether it actually promotes human flourishing in the relevant ways. This undergirding eudaimonism becomes clear when we see that self-ownership is intended to protect the ability of each individual to pursue and act upon her own conception of the good.

Liberty as well as equality has been the objective of the trend of liberalism ever since it commenced. More common sense exists with respect to the issue of liberty which guarantess and carries out liberalism¡Fnevertheless¡Mopinions differ on fulfilling the idea of equality, particularly the economic issue. In present times,the consequence of the insistence of willfully diminishing liberalism on the market brings about some social problems, such as the widening gap between the rich and the poor. This makes a part of advocates of liberalism, for example, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin redeem economic justice and allocation, persisting in the fact that nations should take regulatory measures or promote social welfare system to implement the idea of looking after the minor groups thereafter. However, the perspective maintained by them incurs the criticism from the core scholars of liberalism like Friedrich A.Hayek and Rober Nozick that opine the perspective will be a far cry from the core concept of classical liberalism, which regards a nation is interference with the economic allocation policy as an invasion of personal freedom. While John Rawls is theory of justice principle constitutes, causing the dispute within the internal lines of contemporary liberalism, the theory, to be blunt, gives rise to a new trend of thought as regards the balance for which liberalism searches to protect personal freedom and facilitate social economic justice. In addition, liberalism cherishes individual freedom, emphasizes personal uniqueness as well as development, and pursues individual value and the conception of the good to embody respecting of personal thoughts. This genre of concept influences the stance a nation holds on the conception of the good, and thinks that personal value should be respected and not be meddled to embody neutral attitude of a nation. Rawls theory ¡]Theory of Justice¡^takes aim at justice to be the primary morality. Furthermore, priority is placed on ego or righteous independence that value or the conception of the good. He also hangs on to chase after the outlook of obligatory theory of the conception of the good under the frame constructed by justice. Yet, the theory of right priority, Atomism , neutral attitude towards a country, and value subjectivity that insisted by liberalism are all denounced by communitarianism who are of the opinion that the consequences of the Atomism in liberalism will lead to the loss of personal meaning, whereas the neutral attitude towards a country will contribute to problems, such as difficulties in building up social correctness to accomplish public interests. As to the criticism made by communitarianism, liberalism has the opportunity of reconsidering and scrutinizing its theory aside from making counter attacks, which generates a positive meaning for the development of theory of modern liberalism.

No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância. / This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância. / This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

Une nouvelle tentative pour faire face au défi sceptique est menée depuis une quarantaine d’années. Cette tentative repose sur une théorie de la connaissance centrée sur la notion d’alternatives pertinentes. La thèse se propose de montrer les faiblesses de cette théorie, même lorsqu’elle s’appuie sur l’appareillage des mondes possibles, et suggère que le scepticisme demeure la meilleure position épistémologique. Dans le premier chapitre on passe en revue une série de difficultés liées au sujet des alternatives pertinentes et l'on essaye d'argumenter en faveur de l'idée qu'il n'y a peut-être pas, finalement, de moyens en quelque sorte objectifs pour établir quelles sont les alternatives pertinentes relativement à une situation quelconque. À partir du deuxième chapitre, il est procédé à une analyse critique des tentatives de certains auteurs qui se sont servis, pour élaborer leurs propres conceptions bien précises, du langage des mondes possibles. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question du degré de proximité qu'un monde possible donné doit exhiber pour être considéré comme suffisamment proche du monde actuel et l'on essaye de montrer qu'il n’est probablement pas possible de tracer d'une manière non arbitraire une ligne de démarcation entre ces mondes possibles qu’on peut ignorer et ceux qu’on ne peut ignorer dans nos attributions de connaissance. Dans le troisième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question des critères qui devraient guider nos évaluations de proximité et l'on essaye de montrer le caractère discutable de n'importe quelle règle visant à établir quels seraient ces critères-là. / Over the last forty years, a new attempt to answer to the skeptic challenge has been proposed. This attempt is based on a theory of knowledge, which is grounded on the notion of relevant alternative. My dissertation aims to show the problems of such a theory, even when formulated in terms of possible worlds, and suggests that in the end skepticism remains the best epistemological option. In the first chapter, I will offer a discussion of the issue of relevant alternatives, and I will argue in favor of the idea that perhaps there are no objective criteria to establish which are the relevant alternatives with respect to a certain given situation. In the second chapter, I will propose a critical analysis of the attempts of some philosophers to formulate their own proposals in the language of possible worlds. In particular, I will focus on the issue of the proximity degree that a certain possible world must have in order to be considered as sufficiently closed to the real world, and I will try to show that perhaps it is not possible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between those possible worlds that we can ignore and those that we must take into account in our attribution of knowledge. In the third chapter, I will critically discuss the criteria that should guide our evaluations about proximity, and I will show the problematic aspects of any rule aimed to establish which these criteria in effect should be.

No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância. / This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magister en Filosofía mención Axiología y Filosofía Política / Años atrás la opinión pública vio como un grupo de jóvenes arrojaba un arma incendiaria contra el palacio La Moneda (símbolo del Estado en Chile). Dicho grupo se auto identificaba como “Movimiento Anarquista” y predicaban más o menos lo mismo que el movimiento anarquista español (o CNT) que luchó en contra de la dictadura franquista; me refiero a un rechazo a la autoridad del Estado. También, desde hace algunos años, vemos como otro grupo le exige al Estado lo mismo que aquel grupo de jóvenes. Ahora, eso sí, no se trata de jóvenes protestando; se trata de gente algo mayor identificados con los altos poderes económicos del país que, con corbatas y ternos exigen algo similar: un Estado que no se entrometa es sus acciones. Pero ¿Qué tienen en común estos grupos tan disímiles? ¿Por qué culpan al Estado de sus males? ¿Qué hace el Estado en su contra? ¿Será que al menos, en esencia, comparten ideas similares? La primera respuesta que a cualquiera que se le viene a la cabeza sobre estos cuestionamientos es que claramente este rechazo de la autoridad del Estado tiene algo que ver con nuestra Libertad. Pareciese, según lo creen algunos, que el gran problema que ven en el Estado es que éste intefiere con nuestra Libertad y con nuestras decisiones; pareciese que el Estado les ata las manos y no les deja actuar a sus anchas. De este modo, si es que aceptásemos que estas respuestas instintivas tienen algo de verdad, deberíamos aceptar también que, por lo menos en apariciencia, estos grupos sostienen que el Estado necesariamente viola Libertades. ¿No sería más sensato ver al Estado como institución política que trata de promover nuestra Libertad? En esta tesis trataremos de mostrar las soluciones teóricas que estas posiciones han dado a estas interrogantes junto con tratar de resolver la cuestión de si estas posturas sotienen una semejanza significativa. Para esto, nuestra primera labor será posicionar filosóficamente lo que representan estas posturas. Respecto a las posiciones Anarquistas, no hay ningún problema ya que dicha postura tiene una vasta defensa teórica representada por un largo historial de pensadores. Respecto a los grupos que exigen más libertad al Estado y que representan a altos poderes económicos del país es algo más complejo, filosóficamente hablando. Es fácil encontrar un correlato teórico en términos económicos (se les suele llamar capitalistas, libre cambistas, liberales, etc.), no obstante en términos filosóficos no es tan claro a quién representan. Descartamos a los liberales (principalmente a los de corte ralwsiano) ya que sus posiciones no representan una confrontación directa entre las Libertades y el Estado. Creemos que la posición filosófica que más se ajusta a dicha descripción son los Libertarios ya que estos serían quienes extreman el rasgo de la libertad en su argumentación que incluso se acentúa cuando hablamos sobre derechos de propiedad.

This thesis aims at answering the following questions:1) How can the existence of a state be justified?2) To what extent does the state have the right to restrict individual´s liberty of action?3) To what extent does the state have the right to restrict or redistribute any kind of "goods", and if so, which restrictions should be allowed on which"goods"?4) Can a moral theory be "goal-directed", and are there moral reasons that it should be "goaldirected"? In order to answer these questions, I will analyze Robert Nozick´s and Michael Walzer´s answers to these questions, as presented in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) and Spheres of Justice (1983). My answers, which are founded on an argument for the necessity of freedom of choice and ambition-sensitivity in theories of justice, are results of a compromise between the ideas in these theories, but also partially on criticism of both theories.

In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.