Technology tends to evolve over time, leading over things to evolve with it. One example may be the evolution of weapons with technological advancement. When these weapons change, it changes how war is conducted. This paper seeks to delve into the specifics of this phenomena. With technological advancement, the world has seen new threats such as lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) and cyber weapons. New weapons have been, at times, too threatening. They have created so much stigma around themselves the international community ultimately decided against their use. These weapons may then receive a weapon taboo, discouraging their use. This paper seeks to analyze whether the aforementioned emerging technology weapons – LAWs and cyber weapons – may deserve a taboo. The paper will utilize case studies by examining weapons which were previously given a taboo. By determining why other weapons - specifically chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) and nuclear weapons - received a taboo, this paper will determine whether LAWs and cyber weapons also meet the criteria.

No description available.

No

Russia’s nuclear signaling since the start of the war in Ukraine has been prevalent but far fromeasy to understand. Nuclear threats are often ambiguous and vague—prompting one to wonderjust how effective they are as a coercive tool in general and in the Ukraine war in particular.The destructive potential of nuclear weapons has been described as providing nuclear states witha coercive advantage towards non-nuclear states. Not only as a tool of deterrence but as a tool ofcompellence. However, there may be certain communicative and credibility issues in the way ofsuccessful nuclear coercion. We use data of Russian nuclear signaling in the first 18 months ofthe war in Ukraine and investigate whether these signals are recognized by the Ukrainiangovernment and whether their credibility is questioned. The investigation concludes that Russiannuclear threats are recognized and that the credibility of nuclear threats are sometimesquestioned albeit not consequently. This suggests that the responses to nuclear threats may bejust as ambiguous and vague as the actual threats themselves.

Yes / Are nuclear weapons still relevant to global security? Compared with the nuclear confrontation in the depths of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and deterrence appear to have lost their salience. Considering the conflicts in which the major powers engaged, the focus in strategic studies changed to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and subconventional conflict.2 Only recently, with the conflict in Ukraine and the increasingly confrontational relationship between the United States and China has this narrative come into question. The general perception on international security exhibits a strange paradox. On the one hand the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts, the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, the nuclearization of North Korea and the conflict between India and Pakistan among other regional security issues have given rise to a view that the modern world is less secure than ever, and we live in a world of chaos riven by unpredictable patterns of violence. By contrast, Steven Pinker has demonstrated the casualties from armed conflict are at their lowest point in human history, and interstate warfare has virtually ceased to exist as a phenomenon.3 The imminence of a global nuclear war in which at a minimum hundreds of millions of people would die appears to have dissipated. In some respects, it appears that war has become almost a phenomenon of the past. Most of the recent literature on nuclear weapons has focused on regional crises areas, such as South Asia (India and Pakistan) or the Korean peninsula.4 However, the modernization of arsenals by the nuclear powers, the integration of strategic conventional and nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and the more confrontational dynamics in Great Power politics is cited as evidence that the risk of nuclear use is increasing. This paper contests the emerging narratives on an increased threat of nuclear conflict and considers the sources of insecurity in the contemporary period and in particular the risks of armed conflict between the United States, Russia, and China in order to assess the role of nuclear weapons in contemporary security.

This research investigates the strategic intentions behind the Iranian state's programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Using Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model of national decision-making, this thesis investigates three questions: 1) Iran's motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons; 2) Iran's strategies for actual use of nuclear weapons; and, 3) alternative political frameworks for the U.S. to use with Iran to minimize the negative effects of a nuclearized Iran. This study asserts that Iran would most likely acquire nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-reliance, a greater international voice, to make up for deficiencies in conventional weapons, and for deterrence. Some scholars argue that since Iran should be designated a "rogue" state, it may become aggressive or hostile once obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet, Iran's political actions actually seem to have become increasingly pragmatic. Hence, it appears that Iran would use this arsenal to induce caution among its rivals to avoid major wars, as well as a tool for deterrence. While current political differences between Iran and America are considerable, this research recommends pursuing greater political engagement with Tehran, focusing on mutual benefits. American policymakers should implement policies which rely on positive inducements for change as well as sanctions for non-compliance. If no rapprochement takes place prior to Iran's nuclearization, however, the U.S. will need to employ tactics for minimizing the significance of Iran having nuclear weapons. This research suggests that Washington could begin by implementing economic, technical and material sanctions, establishing a Middle East missile defense system, and beefing-up U.S. coastal defenses. / Master of Arts

The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and security that have been common parlance for the last forty years and more. On the other side lies a unique opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenal. The object of this thesis is to establish how much information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a better position to ease the transitional stage between one set of attitudes and another. / Barrow and Geraldine S. Cadbury Trust

In this paper I apply the Rational Actor model to the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. I begin with two hypotheses: 1) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because of its perception of threat from South Korea and the United States; 2) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because it wanted to use its nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the United States. I conduct a diplomatic historical analysis based on the Rational Actor model to determine which was North Korea's primary objective, and conclude that the primary objective of North Korea was obtaining economic concessions, but that threat perception did seem to play a role in the decision to start the nuclear program. In this process, I show that the Rational Actor model was insufficient in the analysis and that it must be complemented by cultural factors, "thickening" the rationality. / Master of Arts

Thesis explores the relationship between insecurity experienced by a State and the creation of a nuclear weapons program, and concludes that with an increase in insecurity, there is an increase in the likelihood that a State will start a nuclear weapons program. The word insecurity is defined in the Merriam Webster Dictionary as "not adequately guarded or safe," and this insecurity can come from threats or aggressive action taken by a State or a group of States. This positive relationship will be explored by looking at Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa as case studies. The main theory that will be explored is the security dilemma that was first proposed as a theory of international Relations by John H. Herz in his book Political Realism and Political Idealism, and further explored by Herbert Butterfield in History and Human Relations. The main argument in this theory is that States will escalate a conflict among one another if they experience insecurity even if they do not wish to actually go to war but are not willing to communicate and work out their differences diplomatically. Throughout this study, there is a clear connection between these two factors and the security dilemma is a factor in all three case studies. The main conclusion of the paper is that more emphasis should be put on preventing countries from resorting to nuclear weapons programs and creating an environment where diplomacy is used instead of the threat of force, which is a large factor in these countries starting their nuclear weapons programs.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force