Submitted by Diego Santiago (dcsantiago89@gmail.com) on 2013-09-30T14:06:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 886336 bytes, checksum: 9d486ef132b354c3a86e1c00759e0284 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2013-10-01T12:25:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 886336 bytes, checksum: 9d486ef132b354c3a86e1c00759e0284 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-10-03T17:35:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 886336 bytes, checksum: 9d486ef132b354c3a86e1c00759e0284 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-10-03T17:36:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 886336 bytes, checksum: 9d486ef132b354c3a86e1c00759e0284 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-07-19 / We assess the existence of a long run stationary distribution of expected util- ities in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) incentive structure when the government has only imperfect record keeping and the economy is subject to aggregate shocks. When aggregate shocks are i.i.d., we prove the existence of such a distribution and partially characterize the steady-state allocations. We show that the consumption share of each cohort is invariant to the aggregate state. In contrast, when aggre- gate shocks are persistent, efficient allocations display history dependence, and an invariant distribution need not exist. / Nós abordamos a existência de distribuições estacionárias de promessas de utilidade em um modelo Mirrlees dinâmico quando o governo tem record keeping imperfeito e a economia é sujeita a choques agregados. Quando esses choques são iid, provamos a existência de um estado estacionário não degenerado e caracterizamos parcialmente as alocações estacionárias. Mostramos que a proporção do consumo agregado é invariante ao estado agregado. Quando os choques agregados apresentam persistência, porém, alocações eficientes apresentam dependência da história de choques e, em geral, uma distribuição invariante não existe.

The facts that relative consumption concerns may give rise both to positional and environmental externalities, and that these two externalities are increasingly transboundary require us to derive an optimal commodity tax in an international framework. The corrective tax policy decided at a national level is found to fail to internalize all positional and environmental externalities. The optimal tax policy under an international cooperative framework reflects correction for both global positional and environmental externalities. In this broader framework, we also characterize the provision of pollution abatement as an additional policy instrument. The results show that relative concerns for one of the private goods do not lead to any modification of the policy rule for public abatement.

This thesis consists of an introductory part and the following four self-contained papers: In Paper [I] we analyze the implications of social identity and self-categorization for optimal redistributive income taxation. A two-type model is supplemented by an assumption that individuals select themselves into social categories, in which norms are formed and education effort choices partly depend on these norms. The results show, among other things, that externality correction by a welfarist government leads to an element of tax progression that serves to reduce the discrepancy between the effort norm and the actual effort chosen by low-productivity individuals in the high-effort group. Furthermore, if the preference for social identity is sufficiently strong, increased wage-inequality leads to higher social welfare through a relaxation of the selection constraint. It may thus be desirable to use publicly provided education to induce more wage-inequality, even if higher wage-inequality increases the intrinsic utility of a potential mimicker. In Paper [II] I employ high quality register data to present new facts about income mobility in Sweden. The focus of the paper is regional differences in mobility, using a novel approach based on a multilevel model. This method is well-suited when regions differ greatly in population size as is the case in Sweden. The maximum likelihood estimates are substantially more precise than those obtained by running separate OLS regressions. I find small regional differences in income mobility when measured in relative terms. Regional differences are large when adopting an absolute measure and focusing on children with below-median parent income. On the national level I find that the association between parent and child income ranks has decreased over time, implying increased mobility. In Paper [III] I study the long term effects of inter-municipal moving during childhood on income using Swedish register data. Due to the richness of the data I am able to control for important sources of selection into moving, such as parent separation, parents' unemployment, education, long run income, and immigration background. I find that children's long run incomes are significantly negatively affected by moving during childhood, and the effect is larger for those who move more often. For children who move once, I also estimate the effect of the timing and the quality of the move. I measure the quality of each neighborhood based on the adult outcomes for individuals who never move. The quality of a move is defined as the difference in quality between the origin and the destination. Given that a family moves, I find that the negative effect of childhood moving on adult income is increasing in age at move. Children benefit economically from the quality of the region they move to only if they move before age 12 (sons) and age 16 (daughters). In Paper [IV] I study the bias of IGE estimates for different missing-data scenarios based on simulated income processes. Using an income process from the income dynamics and risks literature to generate two linked generations’ complete income histories, I use Monte Carlo methods to study the relationship between available data patterns and the bias of the IGE. I find that the traditional approach using the average of the typically available log income observations leads to IGE estimates that are around 40 percent too small. Moreover, I show that the attenuation bias is not reduced by averaging over many father income observations. Using just one income observation for each generation at the optimal age (as discussed in the paper) or using weighted instead of unweighted averages can reduce the bias. In addition, the rank-rank slope is found to be clearly less sensitive to missing data.

This dissertation is concerned with tax rates for the use of commodities in general, and energy in particular. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are used to analyze the normative question of whether the tax rate for intermediate use by firms should be the same as the tax rate for final consumption by households. To answer this question, a distinction needs to be made between fiscal taxes for the purpose of raising revenue for the government, and Pigovian taxes for the purpose of changing behaviour. Concerning fiscal taxes, firms should not pay taxes on their use of inputs if the tax rates in final consumption are at their optimal level. If the tax rate for households is above the optimal level, intermediate use in firms should be taxed in order to increase the price of other commodities and reduce the distortion of relative prices. Essay 1 ascertains what factors determine the optimal relation between the tax rate for final consumption by households and intermediate use by firms. Essay 2 analyses Swedish energy taxes from the perspective of reducing global emission of CO2. It is found that the welfare maximizing tax rates are equal for households and firms not participating in emission trading, while firms that participate in emission trading should have a zero tax rate. Essays 3 and 4 deal with methodological issues. Essay 3 derives a new method for estimation of symmetric input-output tables from supply and use tables. This method solves the problem of negative coefficients, makes it possible to use both the industry and commodity technology assumptions simultaneously and enables the commodity technology assumption to be used even when the number of commodities is larger than the number of industries. Essay 4 describes the model used in the first two essays. The price structure developed here makes it possible to take into account price differences between different purchasers other than differences in tax rates. This essay also makes a comparison between the Swedish implementation of this model and other Swedish CGE-models used to analyse climate policy and energy taxation.

This thesis consists of four independent essays grouped in two parts. The first part analyzes the possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform. The second part considers some economic issues related to the tax avoidance activities. The possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform.Many countries face large problems in supporting current pay-as-you-go pension systems arising from demographic changes leading to the situation when returns on capital exceed population growth. Inefficiency arises from implicit taxation on pension contributions. In a closed economy, it is even more destructive due to its negative impact on savings and capital accumulation. Although the transition to a fully funded system is a great improvement of the economy, its implementation entails several difficulties if Pareto-efficiency is required. The first essay, “The Possibility of a Pareto Improving Pension Reform in a Heterogeneous Economy”, demonstrates that Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems nearly always exist. To demonstrate this, I classify existing theoretical results according to the type of reformed economy, the form of pension benefits, and the policy instruments used during the transition. Then, I show that intergenerational heterogeneity should no longer be considered as an obstacle when implementing Pareto-improving pension reforms. To maintain redistributive or insurance mechanisms supported by pay-as-you-go systems, I propose to replace inefficient social security with redistributive tax and transfer payments inside one generation. This would save the economy from the inefficiency related to the implicit taxes on pension contributions imposed by pay-as-you-go systems. The second essay, “Designing Optimal Pareto Improving Pension Reforms: A More Distorted Economy Can be Reformed Faster”, investigates the optimal Pareto-improving debt-financed transition from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems. In particular, I examine the relationship between key parameter values characterizing the preferences, the technology and the size of the initial system, and the necessary time for a Pareto-improving transition. My finding is that a more distorted economy can be reformed faster. This result gives an additional explanation to the success of the Chilean reform, where an initial pay-as-you-go system was the largest and, at the same time, the most distorting.An Economy with Clever Tax Avoidance Providers.In the third essay “The Importance of Income Distribution for the Price of the Tax Avoidance Service”, I design a model with a clever tax avoidance provider, who maximizes a profit by setting the price for the tax avoidance services. Therefore, the price for the tax avoidance service is endogenously defined. In that setup, the change in income distribution is not less important than changes in the tax code, which together are responsible for the tax avoidance demand. The model has a wide range of applications. In particular, I analyze the relation between inequality and the collection of tax revenue. The paper shows that tax revenue as a percentage of GDP might grow with inequality when the tax code is not significantly changed. Moreover, higher inequality implies lower marginal cost of additional revenue. This assay also considers tax base broadening, providing examples where this leads to a reduction in tax revenue.In the fourth essay, “ Tax Avoidance as a Reason for Secession”, I provide an additional explanation for the intentions to secede related to expected changes in the tax codes after the ''break down of a nation''. To demonstrate my points, I use a tax avoidance model designed in the third essay, where active tax avoidance providers make a decision about the price and quantity of their services. Secession gives the avoidance provider the option of setting different prices in separate regions.  As a consequence, the price for the tax avoidance service may fall in the poorer region and the elite of this region would be able to avoid the tax, which is impossible in union. Moreover, regional separation may lead to tremendous changes in the shape of income distribution, forcing new governments to change the tax codes. Thus, the government of the richer region may reduce tax rates in order to enlarge the tax revenue collection. To avoid a breakdown of the state, the government should reduce inefficient spending and tax duties. Promoting democracy or increasing the political influence of poor households may reduce the tendency to separate. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002

This thesis studies tax competition from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In chapter 1 we develop a dynamic two-country optimal taxation model to study tax competition. We find that tax competition is costly and that the equilibrium with tax competition differs remarkably from the first-best outcome in a fiscal union, both during transition and in the long run. In chapter 2 we empirically test the relationship between taxation and agglomeration economies. In the presence of agglomeration economies firms are less sensitive to changes in tax rates, and therefore capital tax competition has a smaller effect on investment. We find some evidence that municipalities in large agglomerations set higher tax rates than municipalities in smaller ones. / Esta tesis estudia la competencia impositiva tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como empírico. En el capítulo 1, desarrollamos un modelo dinámico de imposición óptima en dos países con el objetivo de estudiar la competencia impositiva. Encontramos que la competencia impositiva es costosa y que el equilibrio con competencia impositiva difiere significativamente del mejor resultado en una unión fiscal, tanto durante la transición como en el largo plazo. En el capítulo 2, analizamos empíricamente la relación entre imposición y economías de aglomeración. En presencia de economías de aglomeración, las empresas son menos sensibles a cambios en los tipos impositivos y, por tanto, la competencia impositiva para atraer capital tiene efectos menores en la inversión. Encontramos evidencia a favor de que los municipios en grandes aglomeraciones establecen tipos impositivos más altos que los que están en pequeñas aglomeraciones.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002.

Submitted by Marcelo Bego (marcelo.bego@gmail.com) on 2017-03-21T14:14:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-03-21T14:58:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-21T16:13:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-22 / Esta tese apresenta três ensaios que investigam três questões relevantes sobre mercados agrícolas: escolha de hedge dos agricultores; imposto ótimo do governo; e reações do governo à volatilidade dos preços. O primeiro ensaio preenche uma lacuna teórica provando que agricultores mais ricos fazem mais hedge que agricultores menos ricos. O segundo ensaio examina imposto ótimo do governo e mostra como políticas do governo de Ramsey competem com o mercado financeiro. O terceiro ensaio mostra o efeito da casualidade da volatilidade dos preços nos subsídios do governo utilizando dados do mercado de trigo dos Estados Unidos. Ele também mostra que o governo reage a volatilidade dos preços, principalmente, quando preços estão baixos o suficiente, e as reações acontecem independente do plano agrícola. / This dissertation presents three essays that investigate three relevant issues about agricultural markets: farmers’ choice of hedge; government optimal taxation; and government farm program reactions to price volatility. First essay fills a theoretical gap showing that high profitable farmers hedge more than low profitable farmers. Second essay examines government optimal taxation and shows how Ramsey government policies compete with financial markets. The third essay shows the causality from price volatility to government subsidies using US wheat market data. It also shows that government reacts to price volatility, mainly, when prices are low enough, despite the farm program design.

Submitted by Thiago Pereira (tpereira@fgvmail.br) on 2011-11-15T22:29:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_Final.pdf: 1369841 bytes, checksum: fd36f0ac693d22db03a6309d1b005d09 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado (andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2011-11-17T13:05:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_Final.pdf: 1369841 bytes, checksum: fd36f0ac693d22db03a6309d1b005d09 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-12-06T10:07:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_Final.pdf: 1369841 bytes, checksum: fd36f0ac693d22db03a6309d1b005d09 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-25 / This thesis is dedicated to study of tax schedule. I investigate how a tax schedule could affect the individuals’ choice and consequently the resources of the country. I show how a tax schedule induce the individuals’ choice, defining hence the allocations of labor, output and consumption of society. In the first and the second chapters I examine the taxation of individuals, while in the third and the fourth chapter I analyze the incidence of levies on different agents of economy. In the chapter one, I examine the optimal tax schedule, following Mirrlees (1971) e Saez (2001). I show how would be the optimal tax schedule in Brazil, charactering by a deeper income inequality among the individuals. Moreover, I investigate a affine tax schedule, that is considered an alternative tax schedule between the current and optimal tax schedule. In the second chapter I analyze the tax schedule known as equal sacrifice. I show how the tax schedule derived by Young (1987), that was renewed by Berliant and Gouveia (1993), behavior itself in the efficiency test derived byWerning (2007). In the third and the fourth chapter I examine how tax reform proposals would affect the Brazilian’s economy. In the third chapter I investigate how a tax reform affects different social classes. In chapter four, I study the better directions to a tax reform in Brazil, showing which rearrange of levies is the less inefficient to the country. In the end, I investigate the effects of two tax reform proposals in the Brazilian economy. I define the gains of output and welfare in each proposal. I call the special attention to gains/loses of short run, because they could make no possible to approve a tax reform, even though the reform could good effects in the long run. / Esta tese dedica-se ao estudo dos sistemas tributários. Eu investigo como um sistema tributário afeta as escolhas dos indivíduos e consequentemente os recursos do país. Eu mostro como um sistema tributário induz as escolhas das pessoas, determinado assim as alocações de trabalho, produto e consumo da economia. No primeiro e segundo capítulo eu examino a taxação sobre os indivíduos, enquanto que no terceiro e quarto capítulos analiso a incidîncia tributária sobre os diferentes agentes da sociedade. No capítulo um, eu examino o sistema tributário ótimo, seguindo Mirrlees (1971) e Saez (2001). Eu mostro como seria este sistema tributário no Brasil, país com profunda desigualdade de renda entre os indivíduos. Ademais, eu investigo o sistema tributário afim, considerado uma alternativa entre os sistemas atual e o ótimo. No segundo capítulo eu analiso o sistema tributário conhecido como sacríficio igual. Mostro como o sistema tribuária derivado por Young (1987), redesenhado por Berliant and Gouveia (1993), se comporta no teste de eficiência derivado por Werning (2007). No terceiro e quarto capítulo eu examino como propostas de reforma tribuária afetariam a economia brasileira. No capítulo três investigo como uma reforma tributária atingiria as diferentes classes socias. No capítulo quatro, eu estudo as melhores direções para uma reforma tributária no Brasil, mostrando qual arranjo de impostos é menos ineficiente para o país. Por fim, investigo os efeitos de duas propostas de reforma tributária sobre a economia brasileira. Explicito quais os ganhos de produto e bem estar de cada proposta. Dedico especial atenção aos ganhos/perdas de curto prazo, pois estes podem inviabilizar uma reforma tributária, mesmo esta gerando ganhos de longo prazo.

Cette recherche s'intéresse à la modélisation des éco-industries et aux propriétés qui leurs sont généralement attribuées. Précisément, mettre l'accent sur les éco-industries requiert de faire des suppositions dont les conséquences ne sont pas triviales. Ce travail détaille ces conséquences ainsi que la pertinence de certaines. Le premier chapitre considère des éco-industries polluantes, alors que l'analyse économique sur ce sujet assume généralement que les biens et services environnementaux suppriment les polluants. Ce chapitre montre le mécanisme par lequel le marché distribue une activité aux éco-industries en fonction de leur technologie. Le deuxième chapitre enquête sur les limites à supposer une allocation de pollution positive à la solution optimale alors qu'une élimination complète serait possible. L'exemple de l'amiante montre qu'il existe des situations où la pollution-zéro est préférable à un niveau positif. Ce chapitre montre sous quelles conditions ce postulat est vrai. Le troisième travail se concentre sur la notion de services environnementaux. Ce chapitre montre que ceux-ci sont parfaitement substituables aux autorisations de polluer. L'Etat peut donc sélectionner le prix des services environnementaux et il devient possible d'établir une allocation optimale des ressources même en présence de compétition imparfaite. Enfin, le dernier chapitre détaille une supposée fusion entre un pollueur et son fournisseur de biens et services environnementaux. Il montre les répercussions de la fusion sur une firme non-intégrée et amène une discussion sur la différence entre réduction de la pollution en procédé-intégré ou en bout-de-chaîne. / This research focuses on the modeling of ecoindustries and the properties commonly assigned to them. Precisely, highlighting ecoindustries requires the making of some assumptions with nontrivial consequences. This work uncovers these consequences as well as the adequacy of some of them.The first chapter considers polluting ecoindustries, although economic analysis on the subject generally assumes that environmental goods and services suppress the pollutants. This chapter shows mechanisms through which the market distributes economic activity to ecoindustries according to their technology.The second chapter investigates the limits of supposing a positive pollution allocation at the optimal solution although complete suppression is feasible. The example of asbestos shows that there are situations in which zero-pollution is preferred to a positive amount. The chapter shows the conditions under which this hypothesis is true.The third work focuses on the concept of environmental services. This chapter shows that environmental services and pollution allowances are perfect substitutes, then the government can decide on their prices so that it is possible to decentralize a first-best allocation of resources even in the presence of imperfect competition.Finally, the last chapter details a fictional fusion between a polluter and its environmental goods and services supplier. It shows the consequences of such fusion on an unintegrated firm and opens a discussion on the difference between process-integrated and end-of-pipepollution abatement.