Enact in Disappearance excavates the unseen through the medium of photography in order to chart a new strategy for knowing and communing with a complicated world.

This article is the first of a series exploring domination culture through the ways narrative has been indoctrinated as reality and weaponized as a holding cell for captives. Within this exploration, the narrative of domination is placed in relation to higher dimensional realms of the unknown; this being the before and after of domination culture. This positioning will allow for the reality of a simultaneous existence within the labyrinth of domination and a higher dimensional unknown to be framed. Within this series of articles, I question the roll of the rogue characters shamanistic agents of resisting domination, the fear of dark matter as a sub-narrative of domination, the power of submitting to the limits of human perception and the way perceived darkness can help unveil the structure of the narrative of domination. This article will begin to define this narrative and introduce the poetic freedom, of what lies beyond human perception.

Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Current scholarly work on E.L. Doctorow’s (1931-2015) novel The Book of Daniel: A Novel (1971) often ignores the narrator Daniel Isaacson’s implicit critique of Rousseau’s civil religion. This paper will show the importance of civil religion within the novel despite its being overlooked by most scholars. In The Book of Daniel, Daniel frequently examines instances of American civil religion and even goes as far as to describe it as inevitable and intrusive on freedom. Daniel implies throughout the novel that the American government models their civil religion on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) conception as described in his treatise The Social Contract (1762). Daniel suggests that Rousseau’s approach to civil religion creates a false dilemma between the ideals of civil religious soldier and enemy. Daniel’s critique shows a limitation within Rousseau’s and possibly America’s understanding of civil religion. Despite there being evidence supporting his critique, Daniel’s extreme intersectional approach to identity makes his critique impossible to implement within societal, political, or legal realms since it allows people to be both soldier and enemy at the same time.

<p>This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

South Africa has embarked on a journey of transformation since 1994. The ruling ANC has introduced many policies aimed at achieving equality, known as "black empowerment". The `empowerment' of black women professionals is especially critical in the transformation era. Empowerment is defined as a process, which "involves individuals gaining control of their lives and fulfilling their needs, …as a result of developing the competencies, skills, and abilities necessary to effectively participate in their social and political worlds" (Kreisberg, 1992:19). From this perspective, empowerment is the essential expression of individualism and self-determination since it embodies the belief that the individual has the ability to effect changes and improve their lives. This individually oriented definition presupposes the importance of constructing one's `self' as unitary and independent. The `unitary self' is a support of the logic of the `Same', which entails the exclusion of otherness and difference. In contrast to this approach, the postmodern theory of Julia Kristeva, with its inherent suspicion of doctrines of pure origins and essences, is corrosive of discourses such as `empowerment' that are developed according to the logic of the Same. Kristeva proposes a subject which is always already `in process'. Identity is a constructed process, rather than a fundamental essence. The Oedipal model, extracted from the Kristevan theory of subjectivity, shows how the nine professional women who partook in this study constructed their selves by placing equality and difference in an antithetical relationship. However, a deconstruction of the Oedipal model opens the construct up to its blind spots and, these subjects are shown to base their identities on the splitting off of their feminine capabilities. Instead of being `unitary self', the subjects are subjects-in-process, and they operate both across and within the competing discourses of traditional femininity and masculinity. As a possible alternative to the positivist paradigm of `empowerment', a Kristevan `herethics' is considered. In South Africa, this is exemplified by the `ubuntu' principle, which entails the recognition of our interdependence. Finally, in order to assist these professional women to embrace the alterity within, whilst competing in a constantly changing and intellectually challenging world, life skills coaching which focuses on the often repressed, emotional aspects, is recommended. / Psychology / D.Litt et Phil. (Psychology)

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study critically explores the meaning of difference in continental philosophy. Concomitantly, it reflects on the norm, with regard to, firstly, the authorities within the philosophical community who take it upon themselves to distinguish, on a “corporate” and/or intellectual level, between the normal and that which is different from the norm; secondly, the apparatus of limitation employed to constitute, legitimate and reinforce this distinction, alongside distinctions between the conventional and the peculiar, the traditional and the marginal, the philosophical and the non-philosophical, the essential and the secondary or supplementary, as well as, the same (or subject) and the other. The focus on these distinctions is narrowed to the field of phenomenology, more particularly, how the anthropologistic readings of Phenomenology of Spirit by the exponents of early French phenomenology not only add force to the canonical reception of Hegel as a follower of a philosophical tradition governed by solipsism and individualism, but also perpetuate two traditional concepts; to wit, otherness as something threatening that must be overcome and self-other relationships as inexorably violent. A reinterpretation of the dialectic of recognition reveals not only Hegel’s appreciation of the degree to which subjectivity is indebted to otherness, but also his notion of friendship as the reciprocal preservation of the other’s otherness. This notion of friendship is appropriated by Simone de Beauvoir, whose engagement with Hegel constitutes a radical departure from French phenomenology; by implication, normal practice. Beauvoir, both personally and in her work, confronts the philosophical community with the short-sighted, often destructive, ways in which it delimits the canon, particularly with regard to its “othering” of women and its disregard for the specificity of difference. In keeping with the anthropological spirit of the respective readings of Hegel, the study itself takes the form of an autobiography. It traces the intellectual journey of a non-Western, non-white, non-male scholar, from her sense of not belonging in the world of continental philosophy, to her critical engagement with Hegel, mediated by Beauvoir. In the process it aims to show that otherness matters and how it matters. Furthermore, it calls for writing and reading differently so as to encourage non-hegemonic philosophy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is ‘n kritiese verkenning van die betekenis van differensie in die kontinentale filosofie. Gepaardgaande hiermee, word besin oor die norm, met betrekking tot, eerstens, diegene wat gesaghebbend binne die filosofiese gemeenskap, d.w.s. met ‘n self-opgelegde mandaat om te onderskei, op ‘n “korporatiewe” en/of intellektuele vlak, tussen die norm en dit wat afwyk van die norm; en tweedens, die begrensing bepaal, wat aangewend word om hierdie onderskeid, tesame met onderskeidings tussen die konvensionele en die eie, die tradisionele en die marginale, die filosofiese en die nie-filosofiese, die sentrale en die sekondêre of aanvullende, asook (die)selfde (of subjek) en die ander, te konstitueer, legitimeer en versterk. Hierdie onderskeidings word ondersoek binne die veld van die fenomenologie; in die besonder, hoe die antropologistiese vertolkings van Phenomenology of Spirit, deur die verteenwoordigers van die vroeë Franse fenomenologie, die kanonieke beeld van Hegel as aanhanger van ‘n filosofiese tradisie, wat deur solipsisme en individualisme aangedryf word, bekragtig en daarmee saam twee tradisionele konsepte bestendig, naamlik, andersheid as ‘n bedreiging wat oorkom moet word en self-ander verhoudings as noodwendig gewelddadig. ‘n Herinterpretasie van die dialektiek van herkenning openbaar nie net Hegel se waarneming van die mate waartoe subjektiwiteit afhang van andersheid nie, maar ook sy idee van vriendskap as die wedersydse behoud van die ander se andersheid. Hierdie nosie van vriendskap word toe-geëien deur Simone de Beauvoir, wie se inskakeling met Hegel radikaal afwyk van die Franse fenomenologie, dus ook van standaard praktyk. Beauvoir, beide in persoon en in haar werk, konfronteer die filosofiese gemeenskap met die kortsigtige, dikwels afbrekende, wyse waarop hul die kanon begrens, veral met betrekking tot hul “be-andering” van vroue en hul minagting van die spesifisiteit van differensie. In ooreenstemming met die antropologiese gees van die onderskeie vertolkings van Hegel, neem die studie self die vorm van ‘n outobiografie aan. Dit volg die intellektuele verkenning van ‘n nie-Westerse, nie-wit, nie-manlike student, aanvanklik vanuit haar gevoel van ontuiswees in die wêreld van die kontinentale filosofie, tot haar kritiese inskakeling met Hegel, bemiddel deur Beauvoir. Hiermee wil die studie wys dat andersheid saak maak en hoe dit saak maak. Voorts beroep dit op ‘n anderse skryf en lees om sodoende nie-hegemoniese filosofie aan te moedig.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

My thesis examines from an ethnographic account how history has been made, told and interpreted by the Angaité people of the Chaco since the Paraguayan nation-state effectively carried out the colonization of this territory in the 19th century until the present day. The key elements of this account are the Angaité’s notions and practices on alterity, storytelling and shamanism and how they interplay with one another. I explore the notions of alterity and its counterpart similarity in the context of multiple material transactions in which the Angaité engage both among themselves and with outsiders. I also examine the inseparable socio-moral evaluations attached to such transactions. I show how certain transactions such as exchange or commoditisation do not necessarily conflict with good social relations. Nevertheless, the closest relationships – preferably evoked in kinship terms - are constantly constructed by the combination of several practices including sharing, pooling, cohabitation and companionship and the relational morality that underpins them. This relational morality, I argue, is both inscribed and enacted through the telling of Nanek Any’a narratives –“Old news/events”. I analyze some of these narratives in order to show how the Angaité people interpret the consequences of the colonization of the Chaco. For this I provide an intelligible context for the Nanek Any’a that may otherwise appear contradictory or incomprehensible to a non-Angaité listener. The Angaité’s versions of history compared to the official accounts challenge the simplistic of the Angaité as “acculturated” and a homogenous indigenous people and situate them as main actors of their own lives. Rather than the Angaité being the victims of history the Nanek Any’a emphasize that it was the mistakes and failing of their ancestors in their original encounter with the Paraguayans that resulted in an unbalanced relationship with the latter in socio-economic terms. In addition to this, I describe in the light of the historical processes undergone in the lives of the Angaité, how the shamanic discourses and capacities and Angaité cosmology have changed. I explore how they have constantly incorporated external elements, and thus such shamanic elements pervades contemporary areas of life and interactions that include not only the paradigmatic indigenous shaman, but unusual figures such as pastors, powerful outsiders and leaders.