Disertacinis darbas pirmą kartą išsamiai sistemiškai nagrinėjamas parlamentinės kontrolės institutas kaip konstitucinės teisės dalis, sudaranti parlamentinės teisės pošakį ir disertaciniame darbe, remiantis Didžiosios Britanijos, Vokietijos, Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų ir Prancūzijos parlamentinės kontrolės modelių analize, vertinamas Lietuvos parlamentinės kontrolės modelis ir jo įgyvendinimas. Disertacinio darbo tikslas - išnagrinėti ir įvertinti parlamentinės kontrolės institutą kaip konstitucinės teisės institutą. Darbas sudarytas iš įvado, darbo metodologijos ir tyrimų apžvalgos, keturių dėstomosios dalies skyrių, išvadų ir pasiūlymų. Pirmojoje disertacinio darbo dalyje analizuojama tautos suvereniteto doktrinos ir valdžių padalijimo principo įtaka parlamentinės kontrolės instituto, vystymuisi. Antrojoje - nagrinėjamas parlamentinės kontrolės ir priežiūros sąvokų įvairovės ir specifinių bruožų klausimas ir parlamentinės kontrolės sąvokos turinio aspektai: sensu stricto ir sensu largo. Trečiojoje darbo dalyje analizuojami parlamentinės kontrolės įgyvendinimo modeliai senosios demokratijos valstybėse. Nagrinėjant parlamentinės kontrolės institutą, analizuojama ir parlamentinė praktika, „tipiniai“ modeliai demokratinėse valstybėse, šių modelių įgyvendinimo ypatumai. Ketvirtojoje disertacinio darbo dalyje nagrinėjamas Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės veiklos parlamentinės kontrolės įgyvendinimo modelis. Nagrinėjama ne tik Konstitucinio Teismo doktrina, bet ir parlamentinė... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The doctoral for the first time it systematically studies the institute of parliamentary control as a part of the constitutional law forming a sub-branch of the parliamentary law and the doctoral dissertation provides the evaluation of the Lithuanian model of parliamentary control and its implementation based on the analysis of such models in Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America and France. The aim of the doctoral dissertation is to analyze and assess the institute of parliamentary control as the institute of constitutional law. The dissertation includes the introduction, methodology and research reviews, four chapters of the body, conclusions and recommendations. The first part of the doctoral dissertation analyses the influence of the Nation‘s sovereignty doctrine and the principle of separation of power on the development of the institute of parliamentary control. The second part establishes problem of variety in definitions specific features of parliamentary control and supervision and content dimensions of the parliamentary control definition: sensu stricto and sensu largo. The third part of the doctoral dissertation analyses models of parliamentary control implementation in the countries of the old democracy. Together with the institute of parliamentary control, the parliamentary practice is also studies, as well as “typical” models in the democratic countries and peculiarities of implementation of these models. The forth part of the dissertation... [to full text]

This article discusses Parliamentary control over bureaucracies. In the first place, it reviews a number of studies that explain how the American Parliament influences public administration with the intention of guarantying that their intererst and preferences are protected in the decision making process. The American example demonstrates that the model of separation of powers does not take into account that Parliaments should avoid attempts to control the bureaucracy. In the second place, it analyses the Peruvian case and proposes a series of informal mechanisms by which the Parliament exerts influence over the bureaucracy and the public policy cycle. / Este artículo discute el control que los Congresos pueden ejercer sobre los cuerpos burocráticos. En primer lugar, se revisa una serie de estudios que explican cómo el Parlamento en Estados Unidos influye sobre la administración pública con la intención de garantizar que sus intereses y preferencias sean considerados en la toma de decisiones. El ejemplo estadounidense demuestra que el modelo  de separación de poderes  no supone que los  parlamentos deban renunciar a controlar activamente a la burocracia. En segundo lugar, se desarrolla el caso peruano y se expone una serie de mecanismos informales a través de los cuales el Congreso influye sobrela burocracia y el proceso de las políticas.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Patricia Rosset.pdf: 2437906 bytes, checksum: 6ec53bb4896a0aca474141bcbe4cd3d4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-29 / This study is not intended to provide solutions for the complex problems in which the States are inserted in the world today due to the clear mitigation of the Principle of Sovereignty and the enormous difficulty in defending democracy in the formal aspect. Today s society presents itself with a factual multiplicity arising from the existence of actors in the decision-making arena in economy, political power, corporate power, the NGOs and internet among others. The State is not the only actor in the national and international scene, this is a unanimous position among contemporary philosophers, constitutionalists or not. What we aim in this study is to outline what can be taken under consideration analyzed institutional relationships in the Brazilian political system, focusing in the Legislative, how it presents and which are its constitutional competences, the challenges that are set and then give solutions for better performance and efficiency in its fundamental prerogatives, that is, as representative of the Brazilian people. Therefore, from the reading of the constitutional text, analyze the factors that led to the current situation where the Legislative meets. In this context it is necessary to outline how the State and the Legislative presents contemporaneously and the difficulties posed by global complexities the next step is to approach the Legislative in the 1988 Constitution, resuming the discussions that preceded the constitutional text during the debates of the Constituent mentioning the debates, the concerns and suggestions presented, to understand the configuration of the Magna Carta text and what resulted from those studies. Thirdly analyze the institutional role of the Supreme Court in these relations between the powers in the Constitution safeguard. To finally focus in the coalition presidentialism, current modus operandi in the current relationship between the powers in native scenario, based in its definition, how it shows and its requirements of existence, questioning such practices installed since it is an institutional anomaly against the constitutional principles of our current Charter. In conclusion, we present our answers and proposals for some of this problems and possible solutions to strengthen the Legislative / O presente estudo não visa dar soluções para tão complexos problemas em que estão inseridos os Estados no mundo, hoje, com a clara mitigação do princípio da soberania e na enorme dificuldade em defender a democracia no aspecto formal. A sociedade de hoje se apresenta com uma multiplicidade fática, decorrente da existência de atores na arena decisória no âmbito da economia, do poder político, do poder empresarial, das ONG(s), da internet, dentre outros. O Estado não é o único ator no cenário nacional e internacional, posição essa unânime entre os filósofos contemporâneo, constitucionalistas ou não. O que visamos no presente estudo é delinear o que pode ser levado à reflexão, analisado no âmbito das relações institucionais, no sistema político brasileiro, focando o Poder Legislativo, como se apresenta e quais são suas competências constitucionais, os desafios que estão postos para então dar algumas soluções visando um melhor desempenho e eficácia nas suas prerrogativas fundamentais, ou seja, de representante do povo brasileiro. Assim da leitura do texto constitucional, analisar os fatores decorrentes que levaram ao quadro atual em que se encontram as relações entre os três poderes. Nesse contexto, faz-se necessário delinear como o Estado e o Poder Legislativo se apresentam contemporaneamente e suas dificuldades postas pelas complexidades mundiais. O passo seguinte é abordar o Poder Legislativo na Constituição de 1988, retomando as discussões que precederam o texto constitucional durante o período da Constituinte, fazendo menções aos debates e às preocupações e sugestões apresentadas, para entender a configuração do texto da Magna Carta e o que resultou desses trabalhos. Em terceiro lugar, analisar o papel institucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal nessas relações entre os poderes na salvaguarda da Constituição. Para, enfim, focar o presidencialismo de coalizão, modus operendi atual de relação entre os poderes no cenário Pátrio, com base na sua definição, como se apresenta, e requisitos de existência, problematizar que tal prática instalada se trata de uma anomalia institucional face aos princípios constitucionais da nossa Carta vigente. Para concluir, apresentamos nossas respostas e propostas para alguns desses problemas e possíveis soluções no sentido de fortalecer a instituição Legislativa

This article discusses the use of the mechanism of parliamentary control of interpellation to ministers in the Peruvian case, with the objective of stablish which factors determine the effectives of opposition groups to approve the motions of interpellations they present during the post- Fujimori goverrnments of Alejandro Toledo, Alan García and Ollanta Humala (2001-2013). Taking into account the size, discipline and the number of motions presented, this research argues that the most effective parliamentary groups have high levels of discipline and present a reasonable number of motions, in relation to their capacity to approve them. The levels of discipline and effectiveness of each parliamentary group were calculate through the recompilation ofdata from 85 motions and 36 debates about the admission of the process. / Este artículo aborda el uso del mecanismo de control político parlamentario de interpelación a ministros en el caso peruano, con el objetivo de identificar cuáles son los factores que influencian en la efectividad de las bancadas de oposición para aprobar las mociones de interpe- lación durante los gobiernos post-Fujimori de Alejandro Toledo, Alan García y Ollanta Humala (2001-2013). Tomando en cuenta el tamaño, la disciplina y el número de mociones presentadas por cada bancada parlamentaria, se concluye que las bancadas más efectivas son aquellas que tienen un alto nivel de disciplina y que presentan un número de mociones razonable, de acuerdo a su capacidad para aprobarlos. Para hallar los niveles de disciplina del voto y efectividad se recopiló los datos de 85 mociones de interpelaciones y de 36 votaciones sobre su admisión.

Le contrôle des parlements nationaux envers les affaires européennes a récemment reçu beaucoup d’attention autant des institutions de l’Union européenne (UE) que des auteurs participant à la littérature sur le déficit démocratique. Pour autant, si plusieurs travaux ont démontré comment ce contrôle pouvait contribuer à améliorer la médiatisation des enjeux européens ou encore la transposition des directives, son rôle sur les attitudes des citoyens tient souvent du postulat et n’a jusqu’à présent fait l’objet d’aucune recherche. En mobilisant les données issues du projet Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) récoltées entre 2010 et 2012, cette étude adopte une méthodologie quantitative avec pour ambition de mesurer l’influence que le contrôle parlementaire des affaires européennes pourrait avoir dans la formation des attitudes envers l’UE. Étant donné que les attitudes envers le niveau national et européen sont étroitement reliées, nous avons en premier lieu démontré que le contrôle parlementaire participait à renforcer la confiance envers le parlement national. En ce qui concerne le niveau européen, nos résultats indiquent que le contrôle parlementaire semble avoir un effet antagoniste sur la confiance envers l’UE avec d’une part la capacité institutionnelle des parlements ayant un effet positif, et d’autre part l’activité parlementaire ayant un effet négatif. Cette recherche, bien qu’exploratoire et donc perfectible, pose ainsi les bases d’une meilleure compréhension du rôle que pourraient jouer les parlements nationaux dans la formation des attitudes envers l’UE. / The oversight of national parliaments over European affairs has recently received a great deal of attention, both from institutions of the European Union (EU) and from authors contributing to the literature on the democratic deficit. However, while several studies have shown how this control could contribute positively to the media coverage of European issues or to the transposition of directives, its role on citizens' attitudes is often postulated and has so far not been demonstrated. By mobilizing data from the Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) project collected between 2010 and 2012, this study adopts a quantitative methodology with the ambition of measuring the influence that parliamentary oversight over European affairs could have in shaping attitudes towards the EU. Since attitudes towards the national and European level are closely linked, I first demonstrated that parliamentary oversight helps to build confidence in the national parliament. Regarding the European level, the results indicate that parliamentary control seems to have an antagonistic effect on trust in the EU; on the one hand, the institutional capacity of parliaments have a positive effect, and on the other hand, the parliamentary activity has a negative effect. This research, although exploratory and therefore preliminary, thus lays the foundations for a better understanding of the role that national parliaments could potentially play in shaping attitudes towards the EU.

This dissertation analyses the idea that parliament controls public money in parliamentary constitutional systems of government. That analysis proceeds through an historical and contemporary examination of the way legal practices distribute authority over public money between different institutions of government. The legislative and judicial practices concerning taxation, public expenditure, sovereign borrowing, and the government financing activities of central banks are selected for close attention. The contemporary analysis focuses on the design and operation of those legal practices in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Australia, in the context of the boom-bust-recovery economic conditions experienced between 2005 and 2016. The dissertation's ultimate claims are explanatory: that "parliamentary control" is a poor explanation of the distribution of financial authority in parliamentary systems of government and should be jettisoned in favour of an idea of "parliamentary ratification". An empirically engaged methodology is adopted throughout the dissertation and (historical and contemporary) public sector financial data enrich the legal analysis. The dissertation acknowledges the impact of, but remains agnostic between, different economic and political perspectives on fiscal discipline and public financial administration. The dissertation makes a number of original contributions. It provides a detailed examination of the historical development, legal operation and constitutional significance of annual appropriation legislation, and the legal regimes governing sovereign borrowing and monetary finance. It also analyses the way that law interacts with government behaviour in situations of economic emergencies (focusing on the Bank of England's public financing activities since 2008), and the institutional and doctrinal obstacles facing judicial involvement in disputes concerning public finance (focusing on the Australian judiciary's recent engagements with public expenditure legislation).