The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peacekeeping by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy.

The hypothesis underlying this research is that Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct extra-continental intervention. This begs two questions. Is Africa right — politically and morally – to assume this task? And should the rest of the world, particularly the traditional intervening powers, accept and/or promote and/or assist African self-pacification? A trend toward subsidiarity and the regionalisation of conflict management in the African context followed reversals for United Nations and Western policy in the early 1990s, notably in Somalia and Rwanda. In the wake of these setbacks the universal impulse to intervene wherever necessary was overshadowed by a particularist/relativist position that distinguished Africa and African conflicts as cases apart. This translated in theoretical terms to a switch away from a cosmopolitan position allowing of international intervention to a communitarian position that promotes the African 'community' or African sub-regional 'communities' as the primary loci for addressing conflict. The continental organisation, the Organisation of African Union (0AU), has been hampered in assuming this task by its strict Charter adherence to state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states. As a result the logic of subsidiarity devolved on Africa's sub-regional organisations, in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). However, these organisations have found development of a security framework problematic, suffered from internal rivalries and have been hindered by paucity of funds and logistics. Interventions undertaken under the auspices of these bodies have often been of dubious legitimacy under international law. Viewed from the perspective of the 'just war' tradition these interventions also invariably seem morally suspect. Unwilling to intervene directly, the United States, France and Britain have established a joint initiative to enhance peacekeeping capacity in Africa. This project, under funded and ill considered, has proven inadequate from the perspective of both African participants and its sponsors. The research examines two case studies — intervention by the OAU in Chad in 1980-1982 and the peacekeeping operation undertaken by ECO WAS in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. These cases confirm that existing mechanisms are ineffective for addressing African intra-state conflict. Moreover, they show that extra-African involvement remains an enduring feature of conflict on the continent. A return to the universal/cosmopolitan impulse in terms of international intervention in African conflicts seems unlikely in the short to medium term. In view of this neglect Africa must continue the project of self-pacification. The West is under a moral duty to set aside narrow national interests and expand and improve its existing peacekeeping capacity enhancement programme.

The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peacekeeping by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy.

Diplomatic stalemate at the seat of the UN Security Council is by no means a recent problem. Nevertheless, it may be argued that 'American unilateralism' reached its apex in July 2002, when the United States stood its ground and demanded immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court ("ICC") for US peacekeepers. This request was accompanied by the heavy-handed and deadly serious threat to veto the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, a threat which was realised over the course of the debates. This political brinkmanship, which pitted the United States against friends and foes alike, finally ceased when the US agreed to accept a Security Council Resolution offering a twelve-month deferral of prosecution for peacekeepers before the ICC. It is the legality of this Resolution which is the focus of this thesis. This thesis will expose the Resolution to the limits of international law and question the legitimacy of the tactics employed by the US. It will argue that in order to appease the recalcitrant superpower, the Security Council passed a Resolution contrary to both the Rome Statute of the ICC and the UN Charter. With the ICC still in its embryonic stage, this thesis will suggest the responses available to the Court when faced with a Resolution of such dubious legality which affects its jurisdiction to try the most heinous crimes known to humanity.

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-86).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A405 671. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "December 2002." AD-A411 086. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. / "December 1995." Thesis advisor(s): Dana P. Eyre, James J. Wirtz. Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-109). Also available online.

Ce travail a pour objectif d'analyser la nature et l'ampleur des tentatives d'institutionnalisation d'un régime régional de sécurité dans le cadre de la communauté des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO). Elle part du constat que la fin de la guerre froide et la globalisation ont provoqué un changement dans la nature de la conflictualité et changé la donne pour l'ONU et les grandes puissances dans le domaine du maintien de la paix. Face à la multiplication des conflits internes et régionaux, on observe l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs de sécurité qui leur contestent le monopole des opérations de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité. En Afrique de l'Ouest, sous l'action de la CEDEAO, on assiste à partir de 1990 à la "sécurisation" progressive d'enjeux non militaires (politique, social, économique et environnemental) avec comme objectif, la mise en place d'une communauté de sécurité. En nous appuyant sur les cas empiriques d'interventions de la CEDEAO au Libéria, en Sierra Léone et en Guinée-Bissau entre autres, nous analysons pourquoi et comment la régionalisation des opérations de paix a produit des transformations, notamment une politique d'intégration et une reformulation des enjeux sécuritaires dans la région. Cela nous conduit à appréhender la CEDEAO comme région et comme acteur de sécurité dans le champ des relations internationales. En recourant à différentes approches (fonctionnalistes, constructivistes, réalistes), nous explorons d'une part le processus régional de sécurisation au plan empirique et institutionnel, et d'autre part les difficultés, les apprentissages et les jeux d'acteurs dans le champ des opérations de paix. Dans la mesure où ce dernier est ouvert et investi par différents acteurs, se pose également la question de la coordination de leurs interventions. / This thesis aims at analyzing the nature and scope of attempts at institutionalizing a regional security regime within the framework of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The end of the Cold War and globalization led to changes in the nature of conflicts and modified the parameters for the UN and the Great Powers in the area of peacekeeping. The multiplication of internal and regional conflicts led to the emergence of new security actors who put an end to the monopolization of peacekeeping and security operations by the traditional actors like the UN. From 1990 on, a progressive "securization" of non-military stakes (political, social, economic and environmental issues) took place in West Africa under the auspices of CEDEAO, with the goal of creating a security community. Based on empirical evidence of CEDEAO interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau among others, we analyze why and how the regionalization of peace operations produced transformations, notably the crafting of an integration policy and the reformulation of security stakes in the region. Such reflection leads us to comprehend CEDEAO not only as a region, but also as a security actor in the field of International Relations. Drawing upon diverse approaches (functionalist, constructivist, and realist) we not only explore the regional security regime construction process in an empirical and institutional perspective, but also analyze difficulties, lessons learned and actor strategies in the field of peace operations. Since peacekeeping is traditionally an open field with many competing actors, we also investigate into the coordination of their interventions.

A Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) foi criada com o objetivo precípuo de assegurar e promover a paz mundial. Em mais de 60 anos de existência, a Organização ainda não logrou implementar a força militar permanente (ver artigo 47, parágrafo 3º da Carta da ONU) que seria a principal encarregada pela consecução desse objetivo por intermédio da coordenação da Comissão de Estado Maior. O fato de não ter constituído a referida força não significou a paralisação da ONU nos assuntos concernentes à paz. Demonstrando grande poder de adaptação, a Organização implementou as Missões de Paz, embora estas não existam oficialmente em seu estatutos. As missões de paz da ONU são a face mais visível do trabalho da Organização na promoção da paz mundial. Em 58 anos de existência, essas missões têm evoluído em quantidade e complexidade, exigindo, cada vez mais, recursos materiais e humanos. Em 1999, o estabelecimento da Missão de Paz no Timor Leste chamou a atenção da comunidade internacional por diversos motivos. Àquela época, a Instituição passava por uma crise de credibilidade provocada pela sua inação nos episódios inicias do Kosovo naquele mesmo ano. Não obstante, logrou desenvolver no Timor Leste a mais bem sucedida missão de paz jamais estabelecida em qualquer outra época de sua história. No Timor, a ONU assumiu todas as funções de governo a fim de ali desenvolver as bases necessárias ao nascimento de um Estado. Este estudo tem por finalidade fazer uma análise de todo esse processo, ressaltando a importância e o significado que essa missão teve no contexto das operações de paz das Nações Unidas. / The United Nations (UN) was created with the primary purpose of ensuring and promoting world peace. In over 60 years of existence, the Organization has not yet succeeded in implementing a permanent military force (see article 47, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter) that would be the main responsible for the attainment of this goal, acting under the coordination of the Military Staff Committee. The fact that the UN failed to constitute the aforesaid force does not mean it is inert when it comes to subjects concerning peace. Demonstrating a great power of adaptation, the Organization implemented the Peacekeeping Missions, although these do not officially exist in its statutes. The UN Peacekeeping Missions are the most visible face of the Organization’s work towards the promotion of world peace. In 58 years of existence, these missions have been evolving in quantity and complexity, increasingly demanding material and human resources. In 1999, the establishment of the Peacekeeping Mission in East Timor called the attention of the international community for a range of reasons. By that time, the Institution was undergoing a crisis of confidence due to its inaction in the early episodes of Kosovo that very year. Still, it managed to develop in East Timor the most successful peacekeeping mission ever established in its history. In Timor, the UN also took over all the government functions in order to develop there the necessary bases for the birth of a State. This study aims at analyzing this whole process, stressing the importance and meaning that this mission had within the context of the UN peacekeeping operations.