A discussão contemporânea sobre a organização de uma sociedade política que estabeleça princípios normativos visando à legitimação do Estado de direito está no epicentro da fundamentação das teorias de democracia deliberativa. Assim, indagaremos sobre a estruturação de mecanismos constitucionais que possibilitem o exercício dos direitos políticos para a formação da opinião pública. A tese a ser defendida é que há pontos problemáticos na teoria deliberativa de Habermas que dificultam a sua aplicação na práxis social. O que observamos é a necessidade do estabelecimento de mecanismos para a defesa dos cidadãos perante a forma instrumental por meio da qual os sistemas sociais operam na sociedade capitalista tardia. Por isso, com o auxílio da teoria de democracia contestatória e a concepção de liberdade republicana, apresentadas por Pettit, almejamos salvaguardar os princípios discursivos da teoria habermasiana de democracia e, ao mesmo tempo, possibilitar uma ampliação no processo de reconstrução normativa e discursiva do Estado democrático de direito. A teoria republicana de liberdade como não-dominação nos oferece um estratagema para escapar da aporia na qual as teorias contemporâneas de democracia deliberativa encontram-se aprisionadas, em particular, no que se refere à finalidade de equilibrar a força de legitimação do poder comunicativo e a sua influência na formatação do aparelho administrativo-estatal. / The contemporary discussion on the organization of a political society to establish normative principles aimed at legitimizing the rule of law is at the epicenter of the grounds of deliberative democracy theories. Therefore, we inquire on structuring constitutional mechanisms that enable the exercise of political rights for the formation of public opinion. The thesis to be defended is that there are trouble spots in the deliberative theory of Habermas that hinder their implementation in social praxis. What we observe is the need to establish mechanisms for the protection of citizens before the instrumental means by which social system operate in late capitalist society. Therefore, with the help of contestatory democracy theory and the design of republican liberty, presented by Pettit, we aim to safeguard the discursive principles of Habermas\' theory of democracy and at the same time, enabling an expansion in the process of normative and discursive reconstruction of the democratic state of law. The republican theory of freedom as non-domination gives us a ploy to escape quandary in which contemporary theories of deliberative democratic are trapped in particular as regards the purpose of balancing the legitimacy under power communicative and their influence in shaping the administrative-state apparatus.

A discussão contemporânea sobre a organização de uma sociedade política que estabeleça princípios normativos visando à legitimação do Estado de direito está no epicentro da fundamentação das teorias de democracia deliberativa. Assim, indagaremos sobre a estruturação de mecanismos constitucionais que possibilitem o exercício dos direitos políticos para a formação da opinião pública. A tese a ser defendida é que há pontos problemáticos na teoria deliberativa de Habermas que dificultam a sua aplicação na práxis social. O que observamos é a necessidade do estabelecimento de mecanismos para a defesa dos cidadãos perante a forma instrumental por meio da qual os sistemas sociais operam na sociedade capitalista tardia. Por isso, com o auxílio da teoria de democracia contestatória e a concepção de liberdade republicana, apresentadas por Pettit, almejamos salvaguardar os princípios discursivos da teoria habermasiana de democracia e, ao mesmo tempo, possibilitar uma ampliação no processo de reconstrução normativa e discursiva do Estado democrático de direito. A teoria republicana de liberdade como não-dominação nos oferece um estratagema para escapar da aporia na qual as teorias contemporâneas de democracia deliberativa encontram-se aprisionadas, em particular, no que se refere à finalidade de equilibrar a força de legitimação do poder comunicativo e a sua influência na formatação do aparelho administrativo-estatal. / The contemporary discussion on the organization of a political society to establish normative principles aimed at legitimizing the rule of law is at the epicenter of the grounds of deliberative democracy theories. Therefore, we inquire on structuring constitutional mechanisms that enable the exercise of political rights for the formation of public opinion. The thesis to be defended is that there are trouble spots in the deliberative theory of Habermas that hinder their implementation in social praxis. What we observe is the need to establish mechanisms for the protection of citizens before the instrumental means by which social system operate in late capitalist society. Therefore, with the help of contestatory democracy theory and the design of republican liberty, presented by Pettit, we aim to safeguard the discursive principles of Habermas\' theory of democracy and at the same time, enabling an expansion in the process of normative and discursive reconstruction of the democratic state of law. The republican theory of freedom as non-domination gives us a ploy to escape quandary in which contemporary theories of deliberative democratic are trapped in particular as regards the purpose of balancing the legitimacy under power communicative and their influence in shaping the administrative-state apparatus.

No description available.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

In this essay I discuss if groups can be morally responsible agents over and above the responsibility of their individual members. I consider an important collectivist theory given by List and Pettit arguing that groups can be responsible over its members. I offer some desiderata that a collectivist theory should fulfil and argue that the List and Pettit theory fail to fulfil some of these. Primarily I argue that their theory could come into conflict with a basic ethical and legal principle and that it fails to give a unified account of agency. I draw two conclusions. First, the List and Pettit theory fails to provide a satisfactory collectivist account. And second, a satisfactory collectivist theory ought to give a unified account of agency explaining how the agency side and normative side of responsible group agents fit together.

L’équité est un concept large dont la signification et la richesse conceptuelle ont évolué temporellement au sein de la théorie du droit et de la théorie politique. Au travers d’une histoire de l’équité, partant de la conception d’Aristote jusqu’aux juristes réalistes américains, ce mémoire analyse et explique la transformation graduelle de ce concept dans le droit, dont la place fut tantôt au centre des réflexions autour de la justice, tantôt minimisée, voire écartée, mais jamais complètement supprimée. Nous fondant sur cette riche histoire de l’équité, nous reconnectons ce concept phare de la théorie du droit à une réception de celui-ci au sein de la théorie politique. Pour ce faire, nous mobilisons la théorie de la liberté comme non-domination de Philip Pettit comme le cadre d’une pratique contemporaine de l’équité, au travers de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada sur l’équité procédurale. / The concept of “equity” is vast, and its meaning and depth have dramatically evolved over time within the political and legal theory fields. This thesis offers a history of the concept of equity, starting from Aristotle’s conception of justice and equity to the American legal realist movement. On that basis, this thesis analyzes and explains the reasons why such a gradual transformation of this concept happened and, therefore, how the role of equity changed from being at the centre of theories of justice and law to being minimized, almost excluded from the sphere of legal theory, but never completely suppressed. Drawing on this rich history of equity, we reconnect this key concept of legal theory with its reception in political theory. In that regard, we offer an account of Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom as non-domination understood as the framework for the contemporary practice of equity, notably through the example of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada on procedural fairness.