Technological Development in History. From its origins, the human species has been characterized by its ability to develop tools and artifacts of various kinds. This article provides an introduction to the question about the logic of technological development in Western history. The central question that the article addresses is: are techniques developed through the revolutionary or evolutionary path? Does it progress through sudden or  abrupt jumps, or through slow incremental changes? The article is divided into three parts. In the first, we summarize the interpretations of the revolutionary and evolutionary history of technology. Next,  we reconstruct the typology proposed by Serres to characterize technological development through a model that overcomes the dichotomy revolution / evolution. Finally, we show how these approaches to the history of technology influence the formulation of theories of technological change. / Desde sus orígenes, la especie humana se ha caracterizado por suhabilidad para la elaboración de herramientas y artefactos de diversa índole.Este artículo constituye una introducción a la pregunta por la lógica deldesarrollo tecnológico en la historia de Occidente. La cuestión central que eltexto aborda es esta: ¿La técnica se desarrolla por vía revolucionaria o por víaevolutiva? ¿Progresa mediante saltos bruscos súbitos o mediante cambiospaulatinos lentos? El artículo consta de tres partes. En la primera, reseñamoslas interpretaciones revolucionaria y evolutiva de la historia de la técnica;enseguida, reconstruimos la tipología que propone Serres para caracterizar eldesarrollo tecnológico mediante un modelo que supera la dicotomía revolución/evolución; al final, mostramos cómo estas aproximaciones a la historia de latécnica inciden en la formulación de las teorías del cambio tecnológico.

En plus d’un siècle, la philosophie de la technique a pris un essor considérable. De nombreuses critiques sont venues récemment enrichir notre vision du progrès technologique. Cependant, malgré une grande effervescence intellectuelle autour de ces sujets, l’impact des réflexions philosophiques sur les nouvelles technologies est-il réel ? Cette thèse utilise la notion de convivialité, créée par Ivan Illich (1926-2002), pour interroger les nouvelles technologies. L’intérêt de cette recherche repose sur le présupposé selon lequel les technologies modernes, et les systèmes techniques qu’elles constituent, instancient des valeurs morales souvent de manière implicite. C’est pourquoi, tout au long de ce travail, nous défendons l’idée qu’il est erroné de considérer les nouvelles technologies comme de simples outils moralement neutres. La thèse s’articule autour des trois axes constitutifs du concept de convivialité : la survie, l’équité et l’autonomie créatrice. Nous montrons dans un premier temps en quoi les nouvelles technologies représentent plus un danger pour la survie qu’une opportunité. Dans un second temps, nous découvrons qu’elles menacent également le principe d’équité. Dans un troisième temps, nous démontrons que l’orientation actuelle du développement technologique s’inscrit bien souvent aux antipodes de l’autonomie créatrice. Néanmoins, cette tendance ne paraît pas irréversible par nature. L’espoir d’une réorientation, nous permet de conclure sur l’idée qu’une prise en compte effective de la convivialité dans la conception des nouvelles technologies passe vraisemblablement par l’institutionnalisation du concept, au risque de l’exposer à des effets de contre-productivité. / For more than a century, philosophy of technology has grown significatively. Many critics have enriched our vision of technological progress. However, despite a contemporary intellectual effervescence on these subjects, is the impact of these philosophical reflections on new technologies real? This thesis uses the concept of conviviality, created by Ivan Illich (1926-2002) in the 1970s, to question new technologies, and specifically those often mentioned under the NBIC acronym (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science). The purpose of this research work is based on the philosophical premise that modern technologies, and the technical systems they constitute, instantiate moral values. Therefore, throughout this work, we defend the idea that it is wrong to consider new technologies as mere morally neutral tools. The thesis is articulated around the three axes constituting the concept of conviviality: survival, justice and self-defined work. We first show how new technologies are more a danger to survival than an opportunity. In a second step, we discover they also threaten the principle of justice as Illich conceives it. Thirdly, we show that the current direction of technological development is often at odds with self-defined work. However, this trend does not seem irreversible per se. The hope of reorientation allows us to conclude on the idea that an effective and sustainable consideration of conviviality in the design of new technologies would passes by the institutionalization of the concept, at the risk of exposing it to the effects of counterproductivity.

Diese philosophische Untersuchung erfasst den Begriff technologisches Artefakt durch eine kontextuelle und relationale Explikation im Rahmen der Satzform „X ist ein technologisches Artefakt“. Die relevanten Kontexte dieser Satzform bilden dabei die Handlungsformen Entwurf, Verwendung und Herstellung. Die Handlungsformen werden durch die Verwendung von idealen Planstrukturen voneinander und hinsichtlich anderer Handlungsformen unterschieden. Mit der Explikation als Sinnanalyse der Satzform wird das Verhältnis von technologischen Handlungszusammenhängen und materieller Welt begrifflich aufgeklärt. Der Sinngehalt der Zuschreibung wird durch die Charakterisierung von systematischen Verbindungen zwischen den Repräsentationen der Handlungsformen aufgewiesen. Als die Grundform dieser Repräsentationen werden Handlungsanweisungen in Imperativform eingeführt. Neben den anaphorischen Verbindungen der Handlungsanweisungen bildet die technologische Typenbeziehung eine wichtige relationale Charakterisierung des technologischen Zusammenhangs. Die technologische Typenbeziehung beschreibt das Auftreten von Produktionsgegenständen in technologischen Typen und ergibt sich aus der Handlungsform der Herstellung. Typen von Produktionsgegenständen werden durch die Identität von Herstellungsplänen gebildet. Die mit der Sinnanalyse der Satzform gewonnenen begrifflichen Mittel werden schließlich auf die Interpretation von funktionalen und normativen Aussagen im technologischen Kontext angewendet. Abschließend wird gezeigt, wie verwandte Phänomenbereiche wie Kunstwerke, Spiele oder Materialien und Stoffe begründet abgegrenzt werden können.

In this dissertation, I argue that the Rule of Law is made vulnerable by technological innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) that take power previously delegated to legal decision-makers and put it in the hands of machines. I assert that we need to interrogate the potential impacts of AI and ML in law: without careful scrutiny, AI and ML's wide-ranging impacts might erode certain fundamental ideals. Our constitutional democratic framework is dependent upon the Rule of Law: upon a contiguous narrative thread linking past legal decisions to our future lives. Yet, incursions by AI and ML into legal process - including algorithms and automation; profiling and prediction - threaten longstanding legal precepts in state law and constraints against abuses of power by private actors. The spectre of AI over the Rule of Law is most apparent in proposals for "self-driving laws," or the idea that we might someday soon regulate society entirely by machine. Some academics have posited an approaching "legal singularity," in which the entire corpus of legal knowledge would be viewed as a complete data set, thereby rendering uncertainty obsolete. Such "regulation by machine" advocates would then employ ML approaches on this legal data set to refine and improve the law. In my view, such proposals miss an important point by assuming machines can necessarily outperform humans, without first questioning what such performance entails and whether machines can be meaningfully said to participate in the normative and narrative activities of interpreting and applying the law. Combining insights from three distinct areas of inquiry - legal theory, law as narrative scholarship, and technology law - I develop a taxonomy for analysing Rule of Law problems. This taxonomy is then applied to three different technological approaches powered by AI/ML systems: sentencing software, facial recognition technology, and natural language processing. Ultimately, I seek the first steps towards developing a robust normative framework to prevent a dangerous disruption to the Rule of Law.

In this dissertation, I explore a selection of recent work in the philosophy and history of experiment, with an eye toward reformulating its focus and redirecting its future path. Specifically, I re-examine a traditional problem in the philosophy of experiment: how to make sense of scientists' attempts to separate experimental “signal” or “entity” from background “noise” or “artifact.” This aspect of the analysis of the practice of scientists—the day to day task of getting one's experimental equipment and techniques to give reliable results that will be accepted by prevailing scientific standards—requires modifications in order to be made compatible with an adequate notion of historiography and with a philosophically and historically tenable view of scientific epistemology. I show that the concept of historical narrative is a crucial, if not primary, construct in answering these questions about interpreting experimental practice. Particular historical narratives, and the historiographies that guide their construction, constitute the crucial evidence for any legitimate view of the epistemological and cultural significance of scientific experimentation. However, narrativity and historiography must be deconstructed before their conceptual significance for experimentation can be evaluated adequately. The metahistorical construct I implement in order to analyze questions concerning scientific experimentation is the technological infrastructure of science.Joseph Pitt's concept of the technological infrastructure of science, a material/cultural network of artifacts and structures that enables and sustains the mature sciences, provides the theoretical foundation for my analysis of experimentation. I extend and refine Pitt's concept of technological infrastructure in order to create a metahistorical tool that researchers in many fields, including Science and Technology Studies (STS), Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology, Cultural Studies (of Science and Technology), History of Science, and History of Technology, may utilize when analyzing experimentation. To this end, I develop the technological infrastructure as an incorporation, extension and/or replacement of, for example, Thomas Kuhn's “disciplinary matrix,” Bruno Latour's “network,” Peter Galison's “ short-, middle-, and long-term constraints,” Ian Hacking's “coherence of thought, action, materials, marks,” Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's “experimental system,” Andrew Pickering's “mangle of practice,” and Richard M. Burian's “interaction of mechanisms, of structures and functions, at a great many levels.” / Ph. D.

Contemporary research into the values, bias, and prejudices within "Artificial Intelligence" tends to operate in a crux of scholarship in computer science and engineering, sociology, philosophy, and science and technology studies (STS). Even so, getting the STEM fields to recognize and accept the importance of certain kinds of knowledge— the social, experiential kinds of knowledge— remains an ongoing struggle. Similarly, religious scholarship is still very often missing from these conversations because many in the STEM fields and the general public feel that religion and technoscientific investigations are and should be separate fields of inquiry. Here I demonstrate that experiential knowledge and religious, even occult beliefs are always already embedded within and crucial to understanding the sociotechnical imaginaries animating many technologies, particularly in the areas of "AI." In fact, it is precisely the unwillingness of many to confront these facts which allow for both the problems of prejudice embedded in algorithmic systems, and for the hype-laden marketing of the corporations and agencies developing them. This same hype then intentionally obfuscates the actions of both the systems and the people who create them, while confounding and oppressing those most often made subject to them. Further, I highlight a crucial continuity between bigotry and systemic social projects (eugenics, transhumanism, and "supercrip" narratives), revealing their foundation in white supremacist colonialist myths of whose and which kinds of lives count as "truly human." We will examine how these myths become embedded into the religious practices, technologies, and social frameworks in and out of which "AI" and algorithms are developed, employing a composite theoretical lens made from tools such as intersectionality, ritual theory, intersubjectivity, daemonology, postphenomenology, standpoint epistemology, and more. This theoretical apparatus recontextualizes our understanding of how mythologies and rituals of professionalization, disciplinarity, and dominant epistemological hierarchies animate concepts such as knowledge formation, expertise, and even what counts as knowledge. This recontextualization is then deployed to suggest remedies for research, public policy, and general paths forward in "AI." By engaging in both the magico-religious valences and the lived experiential expertise of marginalized people, these systems can be better understood, and their harms anticipated and curtailed. / Doctor of Philosophy / The twenty-first century has been increasingly full of conversations about how human values, biases, and prejudices make their way into what is usually referred to as "Artificial Intelligence." These conversations have increasingly involved experts from not just science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), but also sociology, philosophy, and science and technology studies (STS). Even so, it's still often difficult to get the STEM fields to accept the importance of certain kinds experience and knowledge— especially that of marginalized people. Additionally, religious scholarship is often excluded from these conversations because many in the STEM fields (and the general public) feel that religion and science and technology should be separate fields of study. Here, I demonstrate that knowledge developed from lived experience and religious, even occult beliefs have always already been part of how we think about and understand many technologies, especially "AI." In addition, I show how people's unwillingness to accept the importance of our experience and beliefs is what leads to the prejudice embedded in algorithmic systems, and the hype-laden marketing of the people developing them. This same hype obscures the mechanisms of actions of both the systems themselves and the people who create them, and that obscurity makes it harder for the people most often oppressed by the systems to do anything about it. I highlight a line of connection between bigotry and large-scale social programs like eugenics, transhumanism, and the idea of the "supercrip," to reveal how they all stem from white supremacist colonialist myths about which kinds of lives count as "really human." These myths became part of the religious practice, scientific education, and social fabric from which "AI" and algorithms are developed. I combine tools from multiple fields to help show how mythologies and rituals of education, notions of what it means to "be a professional," and dominant cultural beliefs about knowledge all animate concepts such as learning, expertise, and even what counts as knowledge. By considering both the magical/religious elements and the lived experiences of marginalized people, we can chart new paths for research and public policy, toward making more ethical and just "AI."

Ce travail doctoral se propose d'explorer les origines et les conséquences de la transformation des administrations publiques à l'ère numérique. Plus spécifiquement, notre investigation se concentre sur l'émergence des méthodes de management dérivées de l'ingénierie système dans les organisations publiques, à partir d'un cas concret de transformation mené selon ces méthodes. / "

Este trabalho tem como objetivo pensar a fotografia cinematográfica dentro dos estudos do cinema como um modo de ampliar as perspectivas de abordagem sobre sua imagem. A partir da explicitação de seus aspectos físicos e sua potência em fazer reverberar uma série de questionamentos acerca da dimensão imaterial de seu corpo, traçamos um percurso heterogêneo pelos domínios da filosofia, da teoria da imagem e do cinema para desenvolver um pensamento que tenha como base a conjugação de saberes que constituem o olhar fotográfico. Nossa ênfase está no ato cinematográfico e nas relações recíprocas de seus elementos, isto é, no momento em que os gestos [humanos e técnicos] são acolhidos pela câmera e constroem as camadas do corpo fílmico, sua carne. / This work aims to approach cinematography within film studies as a way to broaden our perspectives on cinema image. Starting from making explicit some of its physical aspects and their potential to reverberate a series of questions about the immaterial dimension of its body, we trace a heterogeneous path through the domains of philosophy, image and cinema theory in order to develop a thought based on the conjugation of knowledge that constitutes the photographic gaze. Our emphasis is on the cinematographic act and the reciprocal relations of its elements, meaning to say, the moment in which gestures [human and technical] are sheltered by the camera and build the layers of the filmic body, its flesh and blood.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo pensar a fotografia cinematográfica dentro dos estudos do cinema como um modo de ampliar as perspectivas de abordagem sobre sua imagem. A partir da explicitação de seus aspectos físicos e sua potência em fazer reverberar uma série de questionamentos acerca da dimensão imaterial de seu corpo, traçamos um percurso heterogêneo pelos domínios da filosofia, da teoria da imagem e do cinema para desenvolver um pensamento que tenha como base a conjugação de saberes que constituem o olhar fotográfico. Nossa ênfase está no ato cinematográfico e nas relações recíprocas de seus elementos, isto é, no momento em que os gestos [humanos e técnicos] são acolhidos pela câmera e constroem as camadas do corpo fílmico, sua carne. / This work aims to approach cinematography within film studies as a way to broaden our perspectives on cinema image. Starting from making explicit some of its physical aspects and their potential to reverberate a series of questions about the immaterial dimension of its body, we trace a heterogeneous path through the domains of philosophy, image and cinema theory in order to develop a thought based on the conjugation of knowledge that constitutes the photographic gaze. Our emphasis is on the cinematographic act and the reciprocal relations of its elements, meaning to say, the moment in which gestures [human and technical] are sheltered by the camera and build the layers of the filmic body, its flesh and blood.

This thesis examines the environmental and social consequences of maintaining the artificial divide between thinking and feeling, mind and matter, logos and eros. New Orleans, a city where the natural environment and human sensuality are both dominant forces, is used as a case study to explore the implications of our attempts to impose rational controls on nature - both physical and human nature. An analysis of New Orleans leading up to and immediately following Hurricane Katrina (2005) reveals that the root of the trouble in the city is not primarily environmental, technological, political, or sociological, but philosophical: there is something amiss in the relationship between human rationality and the corporeal world. I argue that policy decisions which do not include the contributions of experts from the humanities and qualitative social sciences - persons with expertise on human emotions, intentions, priorities and desires - will continue to be severely compromised.