In Meaning as Species, Mark Richard provides an argument to the conclusion that stipulation can transiently create perfect intralinguistic synonymy. The key to achieve this is the notion of meaning as "abstracted common ground” (ACG). In this thesis, I argue that Richard’s argument is not enough to ensure the existence of perfect synonymy. It remains possible to coin a new term, stipulate that it has the same meaning(-cum-ACG) as a previous one, and yet make the case that the coined term is only an instance of the original term. This is important if we use a notion of perfect synonymy for which it is necessary, for two words to be synonyms, that they are different words. To defend my claim, I deal with two distinct notions of perfect synonymy, the criterion of equinormality, and the distinction between word-instances and word-types.

This is a study of how the Spanish phrase mala vida is used in a historical corpus, the Corpus diacrónico de la academia Española, and an attempt to find out the meaning of this enigmatic phrase, based upon its patterns of use in this particular context. Furthermore, the study investigates mala vida as an attribute, in a particular serie of phrases that refer to people (hombres de mala vida, mujeres de mala vida, gente de mala vida), in the same corpus, in order to find out whom they refer to. The study finds that mala vida has many different meanings, and handles the relationship between them by distinguishing between primary and secondary meanings (significados básicos and significados secundarios), where every possible semantic nuance of mala vida is an expression of either one of two significados básicos, which is expressed in a semantic scheme, that has the latter ones subordinated to the former. As for the secondary objective, the study finds that the attributive phrases refer to certain social groups, whose common denominator is their social marginalization. / Esto es un estudio de como se usa la frase mala vida en un corpus histórico, CORDE, y un intento de averiguar el significado de esta frase enigmática, partiendo de sus pautas de uso en este contexto particular. También investigamos mala vida como atributo, en una serie particular de frases que refieren a gente(hombres de mala vida, mujeres de mala vida, gente de mala vida), en el mismo corpus, para averiguar a quien refieren. El estudio descubre que mala vida tiene muchos significados distintos, y maneja la relación entre ellos, distinguiendo entre los significados básicos y significados secundarios de la frase, donde cada nuáncia semántica, en fondo, es una expresión de uno de dos significados básicos, lo que se demuestra en un esquema semántico, donde los segundos están subordinados a los primeros. En cuanto al objetivo secundario, descubrimos que las frases atributivas refieren a ciertos grupos sociales, cuyo denominador común es su marginalización social.

Denna studie syftar till att utforska och problematisera en specifik definition av musikterapi: den som användes av World Federation of Music Therapy från 1996 till 2011. Följande frågeställningar undersöks: vilket sorts språk används, på vilka sätt det finns outsagda förväntningar på förförståelse, vilken typ av definition den kan sägas vara samt om den är giltig och användbar. De teoretiska utgångspunkterna är hermeneutik, analytisk språkfilosofi i G. E. Moores efterföljd samt modern teoribildning kring definitioner enligt A. Gupta. För att svara på frågorna har metoden ”text tolkar text” använts. Definitionen har brutits mot andra texter från angränsande områden och försök har gjorts att fastställa vilken plats och vilken funktion den har i de traditioner den refererar till: musik, terapi och musikterapi. Resultatet visar att definitionen använder sig av ett utvidgat språk och den förutsätter en förförståelse för framför allt ”musik” som inte är intuitivt självklar. Definitionen förefaller också vara av typen explikativ analytisk definition samt en cirkeldefinition. Den är dock användbar och giltig utifrån vad Gupta kallar ”revisionsteorin för definitioner” då den kan användas som det Bruscia kallar ”arbetsdefinition”. / The purpose of this study is to examine and problematize a specific definition of music therapy: the 1996 to 2011 World Federation of Music Therapy definition. The following questions are raised: what kind of language is in use, in what way exist silent expectations regarding pre-understanding, what kind of definition is it and is it valid and useful? Theoretical starting points are hermeneutics, analytical philosophy of language in the tradition following G. E. Moore and modern theories concerning definitions according to A. Gupta. In order to answer the questions the method of ”text explains text” has been employed. The definition has been interpreted by using other texts from neighboring fields of research, and an attempt has been made to identify the place and function of the definition in the traditions it refers to: music, therapy and music therapy. The result show that the definition makes use of an expanded language and presupposes an understanding of above all ”music” that goes beyond what is intuitively self-evident. It appears to be an explicative analytical definition and a circular definition. However it is both valid and useful from the perspective of what Gupta calls the ”theory of revisions of definitions” and as such it is close to what Bruscia calls ”working definitions”.

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How do we work in projects that are expected to bridge cultural, social and historical boundaries? Is it possible to apply stated instructions across these boundaries so that, for example, the task of producing a requirement specification is interpreted in the same way by all the parties involved? In this thesis, the author takes a stand against his personal experience from such a trans-cultural project – a project in which he failed. A factor that made a strong contribution to this failure was the inability of the companies involved to manage the underlying complex of problems, problems associated with the philosophy of language. They possessed neither the knowledge nor the instruments to bridge the chasms of language. Essential reflection and analysis was replaced by the power language of the enterprise; individuals were singled out and held responsible, and the failure was relegated by definition to the level of personal issues. Experience does not automatically become knowledge; this is a process that requires reflection. The author suggests a number of ways of tackling communications problems among people who not only do not understand one another, but do not understand that they do not understand. The latter may mean that two people think that something is unambiguous, yet their interpretations diverge. This is when problems occur. Nobody has made a mistake – both parties have acted properly, they have even (perhaps) talked the matter through and reached agreement, yet the result still does not coincide with what they anticipated. A central concept is dialogue. Through its organised form, dialogue can make openings in problems that cut through cultural, social and historical boundaries. It is an approach that may be illustrated through authors and philosophers such as Witold Gombrowicz, Ludwik Fleck, Oscar Wilde, Joseph Conrad and Galileo Galilei. This study has its basis and its origins in the research area of Skills and Technology at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm (KTH). / QC 20101104

<p>The philosophical work of Ludwig yvittgenstein divides into two periods. His earlier philosophy is found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his later philosophy is most clearly presented in the Philosophical Investigations. In this dissertation I present an interpretation of these two works which demonstrates a fundamental continuity between them concerning the essential relationship of language and reality. The origins of my argument lie in a recent discussion of the question of the nature of religious belief which has been called 'Wittgensteinian Fideism'. The 'Fideists' offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which asserts that language constitutes an epistemologically prior framework which forms a linguistic community's view of reality. In this sense language and its grammar are said to be autonomous from reality and construct an essentially formless world.</p> <p>I argue against this interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work by showing that in both periods of his life he taught that language and its structural principles are one with reality and that this unity is established in human nature. Wittgenstein argues that language is an objective order of facts in the real world, and that the human production of linguistic facts shows the essential unity of all language as well as the essential unity of language and reality. The assumption that human beings are the source of linguistic facts also enables Wittgenstein to argue for an ethical-religious view of man's place in the world. By means of this interpretation of Wittgenstein's works I am able to refute the epistemological approach to Wittgenstein's later work as well as to offer an alternative view of the implications of his philosophy for understanding religion.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

A disjunction is an expression using ‘or’, such as ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot usually infer either disjunct, for example, that ‘Anne has a Ford’. However, in choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. The problem of free choice disjunction is to determine why these choice inferences are legitimate (von Wright 1968, Kamp 1973, Meyer 2016). Central to this discussion is the observation that a modal possibility operator ranging over a disjunction sometimes implies a conjunction of possibilities. In the case of permission, we express this as the choice principle ‘May (P or Q)’ entails ‘May P and May Q’ (Zimmerman 2000). Unfortunately, this inference cannot hold in a logical language without significant modification of the systems involved. I explore the history of proposed solutions to this problem, including semantic solutions that assign a distinctive meaning to free choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that use features of their utterance to solve the problem. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and, using the tools of dynamic logic (Baltag et al. 1998, van Benthem 2010), I present a formal account of one major (Gricean) approach to the problem (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). Ultimately, I explore the role of logic in this debate and argue that we should formally represent the meaning of these expressions directly as conjunctions of possibilities. Thus, rather than trying to account for the choice principle within a logical system, we must instead account for the fact that, in choice situations, the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ translates into logical formalism as (May P & May Q). / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A disjunction is a statement using ‘or’, like ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot infer either disjunct—e.g. ‘Anne has a Ford’. In choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. Why this choice inference is legitimate is the problem of free choice disjunction. I explore the history of solutions to the problem, including semantic solutions that propose a special meaning to choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that appeal to the circumstances in which they are uttered. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and present a formal account of one major pragmatic approach to the problem. Where others have sought to explain how 'May(P or Q)' entails 'May P and May Q', I argue instead that the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ in choice scenarios translates directly into logical formalism as ‘May P & May Q’.