Recent changes in the politics of gay rights have led to a gay rights demand for liberal governments: i) decriminalization of sodomy and ii) full governmental recognition of civil, same-sex marriages. Challengers to liberalism argue that a neutral liberalism cannot satisfy the gay rights demand. I argue that the liberal political framework put forth by Ronald Dworkin can adequately fulfill the gay rights demand. Dworkinian liberalism, which is neutral with respect to the ethical life, need not be neutral with respect to moral and non-ethical values. I argue for the more modest claim that Dworkinian liberalism has the conceptual tools and principles for satisfying the gay rights demand. In arguing for my claim, I discuss the internal criticisms of Carlos Ball and Michael Sandel and the external criticism of John Finnis. I argue that these concerns are surmountable. Dworkinian liberalism is capable of offering a robust defense of same-sex relations.

According to the Principle of Formal Justice like cases must be treated alike, and different cases must be treated differently. This principle is derived from the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice. Aristotle held that ‘All men agree that what is just in distribution should be according to merit of some sort, but not all men agree as to what that merit should be’. The classical concept of illegal discrimination, in Community law referred to as direct discrimination, seeks to decide what these merits must not be. This is done by declaring disparate treatment on certain grounds, in certain circumstances, illegal. It is argued in this paper that exceptions to this principle are made through acknowledging that discriminations on prohibited grounds are sometimes justified, and that this should be called justified direct discrimination. It is submitted that it is only obscuring to the concept to suggest otherwise, since the concept of discrimination as such, just as the Principle of Formal Justice, should not be carrying substantive or emotive meanings. The subsequent concept of indirect discrimination aims instead at prohibiting disparate impacts of neutral criteria. There is some ambiguity to this concept, specifically on what it is that amounts to ‘discrimination’ in this context, and how the available defences should be perceived. It is submitted that to pursue clarity, it must be acknowledged that this concept is built on the second element of the Principle of Formal Justice, i.e., that different cases must be treated differently, and that ‘discrimination’ occurs when discriminators omit to do so, causing disparate impacts statistically connected to prohibited grounds of discrimination. A justification defence, if successful, should in such circumstances prompt courts to hold that there has been discrimination, but that it is justified. It is further argued that the concept of positive action is a formal concept through which disparate treatment is required on specific grounds, i.e., that the legislature in this case indeed recognises some ‘merits’ according to which distribution is ‘just’ (according to the legislature). Unlike direct and indirect discrimination, positive action is necessarily a one-way vessel, designed to promote preference for individuals belonging to a certain class of people identified by the positive action norm. The author concludes that all these concepts are built upon a formal structure taken from the Principle of Formal Justice, and that the acknowledgment of this fact can contribute to clarity in anti-discrimination law.

The city of Palitana, India, has become the first region known to legally install de facto meat bans, essentially making Palitana a vegetarian city by law. These legal steps seem to be the direct result of social pressure put on local legislators in the form of a mass hunger strike performed by local Jain monks. This thesis is aimed at discussing the background of this case, its connections to a broader general discussion of moral and ethical vegetarianism, and arguments in favor of and against the legal installment of a meat ban in the Palitana case. It is concluded that although the meat ban is ideologically and theoretically speaking ethically justifiable and defensible it is in practice, at least in its current form, not ethically desirable.

Den här uppsatsen behandlar det delområde inom rättsfilosofin som benämns straffteori och i det här fallet vad som rättfärdigar straff utifrån frågan om varför vi ska straffa. Frågan behandlas genom särskiljandet av juridiskt- och moraliskt straff samt straffteoretisk tolkning, värdering och analys. Utgångspunkten är de av Gertrude Ezorsky tre givna straffteoretiska kategorierna till rättfärdigande av straff: teleologisk-, retributivistisk- och teleologiskt retributivistisk straffteori. Här kommer Jeremy Bentham att representera den teleologiska kategorin, Immanuel Kant den retributivistiska och H. L. A. Hart den teleologiskt retributivistiska. Uppsatsen avslutas med en argumentation för åtminstone delar av innehållet hos en rimligen moraliskt rättfärdigad och intuitivt tillfredställande straffteori.

This thesis is an empirical examination of the articulation of comic offence and the practices of comic censure as conducted in media discourse. Making complaints about comic discourse is a risky endeavour. The joker can retort that it was `just a joke' or can charge the complainer with lacking a sense of humour and libels can fail and be very costly. The main focus is on the discursive strategies and practices used when claiming that comedy has caused offence. This is an under-researched area in humour studies. The ambivalence involved in negotiations between ethical and comic discourse is a central tenet of the thesis. Two main avenuesf or expressing comic offence are used in the thesis: letters of complaint written to the editor of comic discourse and charges of offensive comedy made through the law of defamation. The thesis adopts an eclectic approach to data collection and analysis. The research draws on different data sources: letters pages and readers' letters printed in the satirical magazine Private Eye, newspaper articles reporting on libel cases brought against Private Eye and interviews with editors, journalists, cartoonists and libel lawyers working for Private Eye. Content analytic techniques are used when analysing the readers' letters to provide a clear overview of the general pattern of complaint involved and the common consequences of such complaint. Composition analysis is used to assess how the editor of Private Eye constructs the letters page. Here I explore the strategies employed by the editor when defendingc criticisms that offence has been causeda nd assessh ow the editor discursively treats the offended reader. To examine in closer detail the characteristic ways in which reader's structure their expression of grievance, I then employ more qualitative modes of analysis: linguistic discourse analysis and symbolic cultural analysis. Attention then shifts to the second main avenue for expressing comic offence: the law of defamation. I conduct a quantitative content analysis of Private Eye's libel litigation history to provide an overview of the types of individual who utilise the law of defamation and the bases on which reputations are damaged. Textual analysis is used to assessh ow newspapersre port libel casesb rought against Private Eye in order to explore the press' role in the debate of comic offence and comic censure. In my conclusion I discuss what the thesis suggests about the ethical considerations of humour and comedy and I highlight the importance of the thesis for humour studies. The thesis finishes with some recommendations for future research.

Submitted by IVAN PINHEIRO DE FIGUEIREDO null (ivanpfigueiredo@gmail.com) on 2016-12-12T13:15:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ivan Pinheiro Figueiredo (01 12 2016).pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-12-15T14:42:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 figueiredo_ip_me_fran.pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-15T14:42:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 figueiredo_ip_me_fran.pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-13 / Qual pode ser o significado de o direito brasileiro adotar uma técnica de resolução de demandas que envolve a vinculação de decisões atuais às precedentes? A pergunta, por não inovar os termos nos quais é posta, já teve contra si opostas diversas respostas. Para ensaiar uma mais, o caminho seguido parte dos estudos acerca da linguagem. Desde que a linguagem é tomada como constituinte da sociabilidade, ficam prejudicadas as teorias do sujeito, se essas forem centradas na figura ausente ao sistema que propõem descrever, em torno da qual se estabiliza em univocidade o processo de significação. O atomismo lógico tampouco indica saída ao problema, pois pressupõe a figura do olho que olha apenas para fora, vê apenas projeções fixas correspondentes de figuras da realidade também inertes, no esquema de fotocópia ou espelhamento, em que não há lugar para discutir o método de cópula de um plano a outro, do projeto à construção. De outro lado, a dissolução de qualquer perspectiva de normatividade – ou seja, a posição de um modelo que não funciona, pois nega qualquer estabilidade em favor da mudança aleatória da posição dos termos – serve apenas para reforçar a dinâmica corrente sob uma discussão que, ao girar em falso, perde o pé da sociabilidade. Vistos sob essa luz, os movimentos ocorridos no direito, mesmo que iluminados por prismas diversos, respondem a essas questões. Nesse quadro, a legitimação da utilização de precedentes no Brasil como favor à racionalidade, ao atingimento de patamar avançado em que a pluralidade de significados socialmente atribuíveis tem de ser restringida para dar lugar à centralização da tutela do ordenamento jurídico em cortes às quais o acesso é restrito representa não apenas a integralização do direito como unidade, mas a unificação do acesso à possibilidade de significar a prática que se faz jurídica. / Which could be the meaning of the adoption, by the Brazilian law, of the resolution technique that involves binding precedent to current decisions? The question, that do not innovate the terms in which it is called, has had several answers opposed to itself. To test one more, the path taken follows the studies on language. Since the language is taken as a constituent of sociability, theories of the subject are damaged if centered on the absent figure from the proposed system description, around which can be stabilized at the univocal the meaning process. The logical atomism does not indicates any output to the problem either, because it assumes the figure of the eye that looks just out, sees only the corresponding fixed projections of reality figures also inert in a photocopy or mirroring scheme, where there is no place to discuss the method of copulation of one plane to another, from the design to construction. On the other hand, the dissolution of any normative perspective - i.e., the position of a model that does not work because it negates any stability in favor of random changes of the position of terms - only serves to reinforce the current dynamic under discussion when loses the foot of sociability. Seen in this light, the movements in law philosophy, even if illuminated by various prisms, answer these questions. In this framework, the legitimacy of the use of precedents in Brazil as a favor to a rationality, to the achievement of an advanced level in which the plurality of socially attributed meanings must be restricted to make way for centralization of authority of the legal system in courts, to which access is restricted, is not tributary to the conception of law as unity, but means the unification of access to the possibility to mean the practice that is named legal.

A crescente complexidade das relações intersubjetivas faz com que a criação e a forma de aplicação à norma jurídica evoluam superando a esfera da legalidade. Como parâmetro supralegal, destaca-se a formulação do direito natural em Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino por fornecer características muito importantes para o panorama atual ao tratar da phronesis/prudentia e da mutabilidade da natureza humana. Tal formulação busca uma atitude pensada e adaptável às conjunturas sem descuidar dos princípios básicos atemporais e dos requisitos da razoabilidade prática definidos por Finnis. Nesse ínterim, a ideia de pré-compreensão em Gadamer, que afirma existir uma compreensão prévia funcionando como pressuposto subjetivo hermenêutico presidindo toda a compreensão, caso for adaptada ao direito, constata que, no processo de tomada da decisão jurídica, a ação interpretativa parte de um conjunto de conceitos e conhecimentos prévios, os quais, de certa forma sedimentados, possibilitam alcançar suas conclusões com um mínimo de previsibilidade. O pensamento de Finnis acerca da lei natural, fundada na razoabilidade prática, e a construção de uma hermenêutica filosófica, como a de Gadamer, levam a crer na possibilidade de uma fundamentação ética para a hermenêutica e para o direito, sem olvidar do caráter contingencial e temporal das suas estruturas de compreensão e aplicação. / Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2016-11-24T11:42:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Fabricio dos Santos Vieira.pdf: 1104602 bytes, checksum: 4ea50fb9a15401cafabcb92f1c987584 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-24T11:42:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Fabricio dos Santos Vieira.pdf: 1104602 bytes, checksum: 4ea50fb9a15401cafabcb92f1c987584 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES / The increasing complexity of intersubjective relations makes the creation and application way to the legal rule develops overcoming the sphere of legality and, as supralegal parameter, highlights the natural law formulation in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, for providing very important features to the current situation when dealing with phronesis/prudentia and the mutability of human nature, looking for a thoughtful and adaptable attitude to the situations without neglecting basic timeless principles and practical reasonableness requirements defined by Finnis. In the meantime, the idea of pre-understanding in Gadamer, who says there is a prior understanding working as hermeneutic subjective assumption presiding over all understanding, in case is adapted to the law, appear that, in making the legal decision to the interpretive action as a part of a set concepts and prior knowledge, which somehow sedimented, reaching its conclusions with a minimum of predictability. The thought of Finnis about natural law, based on practical reasonableness and the construction of a philosophical hermeneutics as Gadamer, lead us to believe in the possibility of an ethical foundation for hermeneutics and to the right, without forgetting the contingent and temporary nature of their understanding and application of structures.

O estudo desenvolvido nesta dissertação trata do conceito hegeliano da administração da justiça a partir da obra Filosofia do Direito. (FD, 2003). Essa concepção hegeliana da administração do direito faz parte do conceito de sociedade civil englobada na Eticidade, a terceira parte da Filosofia do Direito. Essa subseção é composta pelos parágrafos 209 a 229, e trata da aplicação do direito. Esta dissertação examina se a instituição do Direito é real e efetiva para a sociedade e para os seus cidadãos; como se formam e se aplicam as leis na sociedade e para seus cidadãos, e por que as mesmas são tão importantes para a estabilidade e para o convívio das pessoas em um Estado segundo a teoria do direito hegeliano. Mas, como se pode dizer que o direito hegeliano, em sua teoria da pena, é estável, tendo em vista as variações na aplicação das leis? E, também em vista do diferente modo como os delinquentes são julgados? Estas respostas serão dadas no tribunal pela pena, que é sancionada a cada caso particular, analisando a intenção pela qual o cidadão se desviou do convívio com os demais membros da sociedade e vendo os danos causados por um infrator. O trabalho também trata dos problemas do “direito de dizer não” e do “direito de necessidade ou emergência”. Também retoma os conceitos de dolo e culpa presentes na moralidade hegeliana. Mas, para que a pena seja efetiva, requer-se que a sociedade possua códigos que permitam que todos os cidadãos reconheçam as leis como guias, assim como os costumes para o bom convívio. Portanto, é importante compreender como as leis se formam e se efetivam na sociedade, o que são e o porquê de sua existência. / Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2017-03-17T14:06:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Djonatan Arsego.pdf: 1436127 bytes, checksum: 08783847f1029eec9349721f4514dfd8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-17T14:06:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Djonatan Arsego.pdf: 1436127 bytes, checksum: 08783847f1029eec9349721f4514dfd8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-17 / The study developed in this dissertation deals with the Hegelian concept of the administration of justice from the work entitled “Filosofia do Direito” (legal philosophy). (FD, 2003). This Hegelian conception of the administration of the law is part of the concept of the civil society encompassed in ethics, the third part of the philosophy of law. This subsection is composed of paragraphs 209-229, and deals with the application of the law. This paper examines if the institution of the law is real and effective for the society and for its citizens; how the laws are formed and applied in social groups, and why they are so important to the stability and coexistence of people in a state according to the Hegelian theory of law. But how can it be said that the Hegelian right, in its theory of punishment, is stable, in view of the variations in the application of laws? Also, in view of the different ways offenders are judged? These answers will be given in court by the penalty chosen, which is given to each particular case, analyzing the intention for which the citizen has deviated from interacting with other members of society and seeing the damage caused by the offenders. This work also deals with the problems of the "right to say no" and the "right of necessity or emergency". It also incorporates the concepts of intent and unintentional guilt present in Hegelian morality. For the penalty to be effective, it is required that society sees it in the form of codes, which will allow all citizens to recognize them as models, and at the same time as costumes needed for a good living. Therefore, it is important to understand how the laws are formed and actualized in society, as this is the reason for their existence.

Propõe-se examinar o processo de afirmação de novos direitos, tomando por ponto de partida o pensamento dos filósofos Alain Badiou e Antônio Negri, de quem se realiza uma leitura seletiva e intensiva das obras. Disserta-se sobre a articulação entre ontologia, evento e poder constituinte, como polos para uma teoria do sujeito. Trata-se da questão da afirmação de direitos além, ou antes, de o estado reconhecê-los. Um direito vivo liberto das mediações do estado e do mercado. O direito como potência e não sob a espécie da norma. Discutem-se ainda os conceitos de direito singular e direito comum. O sujeito em pauta é o sujeito comunista, interno ao movimento real de abolição do estado de coisas, na esteira de Karl Marx. Outros autores abordados com frequência são Spinoza e Hegel. Apresentam-se brevemente o método da copesquisa militante (do operaísmo autonomista), o materialismo dialético da cisão (Badiou) e a práxis constituinte (Negri). Mais além de uma discussão restrita ao campo de filosofia política, adota-se a perspectiva de que o pensamento é imediatamente político, que se pode exercer uma política na filosofia e produção do conhecimento. Conclui-se com o cotejamento entre as teorias do sujeito de Negri e Badiou, quanto aos pontos desdobrados neste trabalho, e como esse parcial encontro pode potenciar ferramentas práticas e teóricas. Especial destaque na conclusão, ao duplo processo pars construens pars destruens, para uma política subversiva e radical. A mútua implicação de um e outro é vital para a capacidade um movimento real transformar o estado das coisas. / This dissertation addresses the issue of how to create new rights, breathing the air of the radical thought of Alain Badiou and Antonio Negri, from whom it has been made an intensive and selective review. It goes over the articulation of ontology, event and constituent power, as polarities for a theory of the subject. The question in discussion is about rights beyond, or before, the state recognizes them. A living law freed from states or markets mediations. Law as power [potentia], and not sub species of the norm. Singular right and common right are also discussed. The subject in question is communist subject, internal to the real movement for the abolition of the present situation, following Marx. Other authors frequently referred: Spinoza and Hegel. Some methodological aspects are presented briefly: con-ricerca (of operaismo autonomist), dialectical materialism of scission (Badiou) and constituent praxis (Negri). Beyond some debate limited to political philosophy field, this work adopts premise that thinking is immediately political, and that there can be exerted a political intervention in philosophy itself and knowledge production. The conclusion puts Negris and Badious theories of subject to interact, on points developed through the text, aiming hopefully to contribute for some practical or theoretical tools. A special remark must be made for the importance of the double procedure pars construens pars destruens, for a truly subversive and radical politics. The mutual incidence of one over the other is vital for any movements real capacity of transformation.

A crescente complexidade das relações intersubjetivas faz com que a criação e a forma de aplicação à norma jurídica evoluam superando a esfera da legalidade. Como parâmetro supralegal, destaca-se a formulação do direito natural em Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino por fornecer características muito importantes para o panorama atual ao tratar da phronesis/prudentia e da mutabilidade da natureza humana. Tal formulação busca uma atitude pensada e adaptável às conjunturas sem descuidar dos princípios básicos atemporais e dos requisitos da razoabilidade prática definidos por Finnis. Nesse ínterim, a ideia de pré-compreensão em Gadamer, que afirma existir uma compreensão prévia funcionando como pressuposto subjetivo hermenêutico presidindo toda a compreensão, caso for adaptada ao direito, constata que, no processo de tomada da decisão jurídica, a ação interpretativa parte de um conjunto de conceitos e conhecimentos prévios, os quais, de certa forma sedimentados, possibilitam alcançar suas conclusões com um mínimo de previsibilidade. O pensamento de Finnis acerca da lei natural, fundada na razoabilidade prática, e a construção de uma hermenêutica filosófica, como a de Gadamer, levam a crer na possibilidade de uma fundamentação ética para a hermenêutica e para o direito, sem olvidar do caráter contingencial e temporal das suas estruturas de compreensão e aplicação. / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES / The increasing complexity of intersubjective relations makes the creation and application way to the legal rule develops overcoming the sphere of legality and, as supralegal parameter, highlights the natural law formulation in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, for providing very important features to the current situation when dealing with phronesis/prudentia and the mutability of human nature, looking for a thoughtful and adaptable attitude to the situations without neglecting basic timeless principles and practical reasonableness requirements defined by Finnis. In the meantime, the idea of pre-understanding in Gadamer, who says there is a prior understanding working as hermeneutic subjective assumption presiding over all understanding, in case is adapted to the law, appear that, in making the legal decision to the interpretive action as a part of a set concepts and prior knowledge, which somehow sedimented, reaching its conclusions with a minimum of predictability. The thought of Finnis about natural law, based on practical reasonableness and the construction of a philosophical hermeneutics as Gadamer, lead us to believe in the possibility of an ethical foundation for hermeneutics and to the right, without forgetting the contingent and temporary nature of their understanding and application of structures.