O estudo desenvolvido nesta dissertação trata do conceito hegeliano da administração da justiça a partir da obra Filosofia do Direito. (FD, 2003). Essa concepção hegeliana da administração do direito faz parte do conceito de sociedade civil englobada na Eticidade, a terceira parte da Filosofia do Direito. Essa subseção é composta pelos parágrafos 209 a 229, e trata da aplicação do direito. Esta dissertação examina se a instituição do Direito é real e efetiva para a sociedade e para os seus cidadãos; como se formam e se aplicam as leis na sociedade e para seus cidadãos, e por que as mesmas são tão importantes para a estabilidade e para o convívio das pessoas em um Estado segundo a teoria do direito hegeliano. Mas, como se pode dizer que o direito hegeliano, em sua teoria da pena, é estável, tendo em vista as variações na aplicação das leis? E, também em vista do diferente modo como os delinquentes são julgados? Estas respostas serão dadas no tribunal pela pena, que é sancionada a cada caso particular, analisando a intenção pela qual o cidadão se desviou do convívio com os demais membros da sociedade e vendo os danos causados por um infrator. O trabalho também trata dos problemas do “direito de dizer não” e do “direito de necessidade ou emergência”. Também retoma os conceitos de dolo e culpa presentes na moralidade hegeliana. Mas, para que a pena seja efetiva, requer-se que a sociedade possua códigos que permitam que todos os cidadãos reconheçam as leis como guias, assim como os costumes para o bom convívio. Portanto, é importante compreender como as leis se formam e se efetivam na sociedade, o que são e o porquê de sua existência. / The study developed in this dissertation deals with the Hegelian concept of the administration of justice from the work entitled “Filosofia do Direito” (legal philosophy). (FD, 2003). This Hegelian conception of the administration of the law is part of the concept of the civil society encompassed in ethics, the third part of the philosophy of law. This subsection is composed of paragraphs 209-229, and deals with the application of the law. This paper examines if the institution of the law is real and effective for the society and for its citizens; how the laws are formed and applied in social groups, and why they are so important to the stability and coexistence of people in a state according to the Hegelian theory of law. But how can it be said that the Hegelian right, in its theory of punishment, is stable, in view of the variations in the application of laws? Also, in view of the different ways offenders are judged? These answers will be given in court by the penalty chosen, which is given to each particular case, analyzing the intention for which the citizen has deviated from interacting with other members of society and seeing the damage caused by the offenders. This work also deals with the problems of the "right to say no" and the "right of necessity or emergency". It also incorporates the concepts of intent and unintentional guilt present in Hegelian morality. For the penalty to be effective, it is required that society sees it in the form of codes, which will allow all citizens to recognize them as models, and at the same time as costumes needed for a good living. Therefore, it is important to understand how the laws are formed and actualized in society, as this is the reason for their existence.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mario Cesar Carvalho Pinto.pdf: 582935 bytes, checksum: b426f6ceb4efd1596e7d63500fe09f26 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-20 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / How much of Christian theology, especially the Pauline influenced and continues to influence the theory of law today? The dogmatic and conservative Christian theology reflects the teachings of Jesus Christ? Find the answer to the first is a call to a more critical view of the law, its objectives and commitments to society. Answer the second, an act of historical and scientific honesty to recognize that a gospel of bondage and suffering is has nothing to do with the Good News of life announced by Christ, and life in abundance. It is known that the laws are aimed at ensuring justice since that is the basis of social harmony. Therefore, laws, justice and society are closely linked. But there are two major kinds of law, a divine revelation and the fruit of another human, a result of the need for harmony in society. These two types of laws do not always agree among themselves and in many cases, conflict and this conflict raises an important question: Was the submissive human law to divine law or vice versa? This is a very important issue since it is exactly the factor submission arising conflicts between theology and philosophy. Jesus Christ recognized the existence of these two types and independence between them. Already Paul of Tarsus, though professing the contrary, in his Letter to the Romans points in another direction relating the Christian message over to the Mosaic Law of the Old Testament than the New Covenant inaugurated by Jesus Christ. The current formal principles exist no longer respond to the demands of capitalism. Likewise the Law as legislation and law enforcement sees social development depart from the race's history. It can t and nor would it integrate with reality. Bureaucracy clogs the creation and implementation of consensus in society and, often, when new laws go into effect are already outdated. The legal history of humanity through history shows that the more a normativism, legalistic is the legal system, more subservient is the system that gives life, is the judiciary. The more legalistic and conservative lends itself more to serve the powerful at the expense of the weakest. Her attachment to the standard is, in fact, cowardice in the face of system privileges. / Quanto da teologia cristã, especialmente a paulina influenciou e continua influenciando a Teoria do Direito nos dias de hoje? A teologia cristã dogmática e conservadora traduz os ensinamentos de Jesus Cristo? Buscar a resposta para a primeira é um chamamento a uma reflexão mais crítica sobre o Direito, seus objetivos e compromissos com a sociedade. Responder à segunda, um ato de honestidade científica e histórica no sentido de reconhecer que um evangelho que aprisiona e faz sofrer, nada tem a ver com a Boa Nova de vida anunciada pelo Cristo, e vida em abundância. Sabe-se que as leis têm por objetivo garantir a justiça uma vez que esta é a base da harmonia social. Portanto, as leis, a justiça e a sociedade estão intimamente ligadas. Porém existem duas importantes espécies de leis, uma divina, fruto de revelação e outra humana, resultado das necessidades de harmonia na sociedade. Esses dois tipos de leis nem sempre concordam entre si e, em muitos casos, conflitam e deste conflito surge uma importante indagação: Seria a lei humana submissa à lei divina ou vice-versa? Essa é uma questão bastante importante posto que é exatamente do fator submissão que decorrem os conflitos entre a teologia e a filosofia.Jesus Cristo reconhecia a existência desses dois tipos e a independência entre elas. Já Paulo de Tarso, ainda que professe o contrário, em sua Carta aos Romanos aponta em outra direção relacionando a mensagem cristã mais à lei mosaica do Antigo Testamento do que com a Nova Aliança inaugurada por Jesus Cristo.Os atuais princípios formais existentes já não respondem às exigências do capitalismo. Da mesma forma o Direito, enquanto legislação e aplicação da lei vê o desenvolvimento social afastar-se na corrida da história. Não consegue e nem se deixa integrar à realidade. A burocracia emperra a criação e a aplicação de consenso da sociedade e, não raro, as novas leis quando passam a vigorar já estão ultrapassadas.A trajetória jurídica da humanidade através da história demonstra que quanto mais num normativismo, legalista é o sistema jurídico, mais subserviente é o sistema que dá vida, ou seja, o judiciário. Quanto mais legalista e conservador mais se presta para servir os poderosos em detrimento dos mais fracos. Seu apego à norma é, na verdade, a covardia diante dos privilégios do sistema.

O presente trabalho tem como proposta discutir as repercussões da filosofia de Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) nos campos do direito e da política. A busca de Sartre por uma concepção concreta da liberdade é o fio condutor de sua trajetória filosófica. Ao constituir as bases de seu pensamento sobre o tema da liberdade, Sartre evidencia a vocação política de sua filosofa. Com isso, procuramos demonstrar que o desenvolvimento filosófico de Sartre é marcado pelo aprofundamento das noções de liberdade e projeto, não havendo, portanto, ruptura, mas continuidade entre as obras de Sartre. Sendo assim, desde suas primeiras obras (em especial em O Ser e o Nada), Sartre aponta para a construção de uma ética. À medida que o tema das possibilidades concretas da realização da liberdade se desenvolve, as reflexões de Sartre voltam-se mais e mais para o direito e a política. Assim, a tese foi estruturada em três unidades. A primeira propõe-se a estabelecer as bases do existencialismo e de as primeiras reflexões sobre a ética e o direito presentes em O Ser e o Nada e os Cadernos para uma moral; a segunda é dedicada ao estudo do pensamento de Sartre acerca da constituição das estruturas sócio-políticas. Neste ponto, em que a ênfase na História e o diálogo com o marxismo são cruciais, procuramos demonstrar como Crítica da razão dialética inicia amplas discussões sobre o problema da forma jurídica e de sua especificidade histórica. A terceira é última unidade é voltada à discussão da política em Sartre, com destaque para as relações entre legalidade e violência e a questão da democracia. / The present work has the purpose to discuss the repercussions of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in the Law and politic areas. The search of Sartre for a concrete conception of liberty is the conducting line of its philosophical trajectory. By constituting the basis of its thought on the subject of liberty, Sartre evidences the politic vocation of its philosophy. In this sense, we seek to demonstrate that the philosophical development of Sartre is marked by deepening the notions of liberty and project, thus, not having rupture, but continuity between the work of Sartre. Therefore, since its first work (in special in Being and Nothingness), Sartre aims the construction of an ethic. To the extent that the theme of the concrete possibilities of achievement of liberty develops itself, the thoughts of Sartre become more and more directed to the Law and politics. Thus, the thesis was structured in three unities. The first intends to establish the basis of the existentialism and the prime reflections on ethic and Law provided in Being and Nothingness and Notebooks for an Ethics; the second is dedicated to the study of Sartres though regarding the constitution of social-political structures. On this point, in which the emphasis in the History and the dialogue with the Marxism is crucial, we seek to demonstrate how Critique of Dialectical Reason begins wide discussions on the problem of the legal form and its historical specificity. The third and last unity is oriented to the discussion of politics in Sartre, with notability on the relations between legality and violence and the matter of the democracy.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / This dissertation defines and defends the concept of ‘criminal oppression.’ Criminal oppression occurs when people are excluded from full participation in important social and political institutions because they are perceived to have violated certain community norms. Oppression is primarily a structural phenomenon, in which practices of formal and informal institutions unjustly harm people based on group membership. In structural oppression, there is rarely an individual who can be said to be responsible for the oppression, but I argue that at times, individuals may also be agents of oppression when they create, perpetuate, or exacerbate structural oppression. Applying this theory of oppression, the criminal justice system in the United States is an oppressive structure that unjustly harms those considered to be ‘criminals’ through a variety of practices. There are three categories of unjust practices: policing, adjudication and punishment, and collateral effects of arrest and conviction. These three categories of practices create the social group ‘criminals’ by subjecting certain people to these kinds of treatments. I use the word ‘criminal’ to describe those who are treated as criminals by police, the courts, and even private individuals like employers. To be a ‘criminal,’ it is not necessary that one has committed a crime or been convicted of a crime. Racial and criminal oppression deeply related historically and conceptually. Nevertheless, they are distinct kinds of oppression. In the United States, those who are not racially oppressed but are ‘criminals’ face many of the same unjust obstacles as those who are racially oppressed in addition to being ‘criminals.’ Some may argue that ‘criminals’ duly convicted of crimes deserve to be socially and politically excluded. But, I argue that the criminal justice system is not properly conceived of as an apolitical institution that can assess moral blameworthiness. Nor should it be able to offer punishments that amount to social and political exclusion. Instead, the criminal justice system is one political institution amongst many, and it ought to be governed by the same principles of liberty and equality that govern other political institutions. Criminal law’s proper function is to facilitate government as a system social cooperation. Therefore, it ought to respond to criminal acts with actions designed to promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Moreover, even if someone has committed a crime, that does not mean that they ought to be subject to violence or permanent second-class status. Finally, I address specific, feminism-driven arguments for using the criminal justice system to fight violence against women. Some feminists argue that the expressivist function of punishment—the ability of punishment to express disapproval and disavowal—makes it a perfect tool for fighting the normalization of violence against women. The problem, they contend, is that this violence is under-punished in the United States, and the solution to ending violence against women is to increase prosecutions and advocate for harsher punishments because punishment will change the social norms and make violence against women rarer. To this, I argue that those who create laws or mete out punishments do not have control over the social meaning of punishment with precision. The historical and present-day oppressive features of criminal law and punishment interfere with the ability of prosecution and punishment to condemn certain types of acts without also condemning people. Thus, feminists who try to use the criminal justice system to fight gender-based violence will find it to be ineffective and potentially harmful to the already oppressed group of ‘criminals.” Chapter 1argues that ‘criminals’ are oppressed using a structural model of oppression that focuses on how collections of institutional policies and practices can create and maintain unjust power relations between groups of people. I will also use an externalist theory of group identity to argue that being arrested or convicted of a crime is not necessary or sufficient for membership in the social group ‘criminal.’ Chapter 2 explains the relationship between racial oppression and the oppression of ‘criminals,’ noting the historical development of the modern prison system. Chapter 3 argues that the proper role of criminal law is to support systems of social cooperation, not to punish pre-political wrongs. I will suggest that criminal law is in essence part of the social contract, not a separate sphere of justice to which distinctive, retributive principles apply. Instead, the criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness and is only justified in sanctioning rule violations for the sake of supporting social cooperation in a society whose institutions are worth supporting. In Chapter 4, I propose a feminist, expressivist defense of the use of prosecution and harsh punishment as a response to rape and domestic violence that takes the structural nature of violence against women into account. Chapter 5, however, demonstrates why even this theory cannot justify incarceration in the non-ideal sphere because of the oppressive history and practice of the American criminal justice system. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

In this thesis, I attempt to justify the use of foreign precedent in Supreme Court constitutional cases and respond to various criticisms that have been brought forth. There are many critics of this process, as it is typically thought that Supreme Court Justices ought to look to their own domestic constitution and history of precedent when deciding cases. One of the critiques that I highlight is that the process is undemocratic and I respond to this by showcasing a distinction between procedural and constitutional conceptions of democracy. As well, I attempt to justify the process by showing how the utilization of foreign precedent can actually help judges uphold important values that we cherish in a constitutional democracy. I also attempt to do this for those who do not endorse the constitutional conception of democracy, by distinguishing between a community’s moral opinions and true moral commitments. I also examine two landmark cases Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, in order to establish the reasons that judges utilize foreign precedent; namely, as a source of further legal information and not due to any binding requirement. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate young offenders’ first-hand views of community punishment within the context of the extant literature on communicative theories of sentencing. Fuelled by the traditional marginalisation of young offenders’ views of penal interventions, and drawing upon the qualitative information yielded by fifty semi-structured interviews with 16-18 year old offenders, the study purports to enhance our understanding of the penal messages that punishment communicates to those who experience it. This research initiative is premised on the belief that an empirically-driven research project of this nature can contribute to an improved understanding of the relationship between the youth justice system’s preventive and rehabilitative aims and how offenders themselves perceive the communicative dimensions traditionally attributed to punishment. The Introduction contains the genesis of this investigation and establishes the parameters of the inquiry. Chapter Two analyses the available literature on offenders’ views and argues the case for further research. The third chapter examines the literature on communicative sentencing and anchors the project firmly within the relevant academic debate against which the study’s findings are analysed. Chapter Four contains a detailed account of the methodology employed and prefaces the analysis of findings. While Chapters Five and Six examine the penal messages offenders perceive during sentencing, Chapter Seven explores conceptual issues relating to the communicative functions interviewees ascribed to hard treatment and censure. The next chapter takes cognisance of how offenders conceptualise the penal messages that are transmitted to them during the administration of their sentences. The Conclusion examines the implications of the study’s findings for theory and policy, and proposes a cultural shift from an overly sceptical perspective which does not always afford much value to offenders’ viewpoints, to the creation of a new framework which will allow for greater offender participation.

The introduction (§§1-33) to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is the key to the work’s structure, its argumentative strategy and it functions as a foundation for Hegel’s practical philosophy in general. Its explanatory potential is best realised by situating it within the systematic context of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Science of Logic. This interpretative strategy reveals that for Hegel, the true site of agency is ‘the concept’ and that particular individuals and their arbitrary activity are at best the concept’s ‘appearance’. This does not render their activity ‘false’ but describes how willing and freedom are ‘for us’ as self-conscious subjects that confront an external world. For Hegel, ‘true’ freedom in the sense of ‘self-determination to itself’ resides with the universal and singular concept that negatively unites itself with its objectivity to form what he calls the ‘Idea of the will’ or ‘right’. This interpretation contradicts the mainstream of contemporary Hegel scholarship since its proponents either deny the reality of the universal concept as agent or absolutely differentiate between the concept’s activity (subjective action) and its objective reality (norms, institutions). This prevents the interpreter from appreciating that it is Hegel’s concept that is manifest in form of particular willing subjects and their socio-political context. Since most commentators associate ‘activity’ or ‘freedom’ primarily with particular subjects, their notions of freedom are, by Hegel’s standards, either empty and fail to describe actual willing or they fall short of the standard of ‘true freedom’, viz. ‘self-determination to itself’ because their agents’ freedom depends on something that differs from the agents.1 The present commentary argues that such a dilemma can be avoided by an interpretation that attributes agency to Hegel’s concept. By determining itself to be Idea, the universal concept determines itself (as subject) to itself (as object) and rational agency and rational institutions are grasped as aspects of the same entity. This is what Hegel calls the unconditioned Idea of right or ‘objective freedom’.

This dissertation proposes a normative theory of political representation grounded in popular sovereignty and positive law, rather than in democracy and efficient labour allocation. The first three chapters assess the contributions to the idea of representation of three early modern thinkers. Hobbes proposes a formal model of authorised action at a distance, but, contrary to a long-standing consensus in political thought, not an actual theory of representation. Rousseau, a well-known opponent of representation, proposes ideas about government, sovereignty, and positive law, which, despite his contrary intentions, form a foundation for a normative theory of representation. Sieyes refines concepts from both to create a more mature practical statement on representation which he attempts to implement in three revolutionary constitutions in France in the 1790's. The next three chapters make an argument connecting representation to law creation. First the concept of a decision is defined, and then abstracted through various levels of political authority and action. Law creation is distinguished from all other classes of authorised political decision making by four unique properties which tie in with problems initially raised by the early modern philosophers regarding popular sovereignty. Various numbers of authorised actors are considered as constituting political bodies credentialed to carry out the relevant decisions identified as meeting the minimal conditions of law, and ultimately only assembly — a body numbering in the hundreds, with a reserved place for making recognised decisions, and a formal connection to expressed popular preferences — meets the conceptual requirements of the class of decisions mooted. The thesis ends with an argument connecting law to representation as the solution to the problem of plurality.

Nesta dissertação procuramos evidenciar a crise do dever moral em Crime e Castigo, de Dostoiévski, exemplo da nossa própria crise contemporânea, ao mesmo tempo em que buscamos investigar os contornos de um princípio de justiça derivado do dever kantiano. A partir daí, pretendemos evidenciar como este princípio de justiça pode ser partilhado por Dostoiévski, uma vez que o romancista, no seu ideal de comunidade moral, dá continuidade ao sentido ético proposto no dever kantiano, por meio do qual supera a crise que o próprio romance lança. / In this dissertation we seeks to show the crisis of moral duty in Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky, example of our own contemporary crisis, while we seek to investigate the outlines of a principle of justice brought by Kantian duty. Thereafter, we intend to show how this principle of justice can be shared by Dostoevsky, as the novelist, in his ideal of moral community, continues the ethical sense proposed in the Kantian duty, through which overcomes the crisis that spear the novel.