La notion d'identité implique certains présupposés de droit privé dont latendance est marquée par certains «généricismes». L'on peut entendre par là lesconceptions qui limitent la définition du genre humain à des traits catégoriels etabstraits, sans suffisamment prendre en compte des particularités sexuellementdifférenciées. Pourtant, le sujet de droit lorsqu'il est féminin doit impliquer la prise enconsidération de singularités liées à son sexe, qui ne peuvent être les mêmes quecelles d'un sujet de droit masculin.Sous couvert de l'égalité des sexes, le droit engage alors la société à uneuniformisation des intérêts cependant divergents et propres à chaque sexe. Il s'agitalors de montrer à la fois l'apport de ces conceptions, mais aussi leurs limites et doncla nécessité de s'ouvrir à l'exigence de conceptions plus «universalistes». En effet, ildoit être démontré que seule une universalité peut garantir la reconnaissance desparticularités et des différences féminines, telle qu'une identité juridique fémininel'admettrait. Si cette étude fera face à divers courants et auteurs de philosophie dudroit, elle prendra pour point de départ le droit positif établi dans ses différentesdisciplines, du droit pénal à certains aspects du droit du travail ou du droit desassurances.L'intérêt de la question est de permettre une évaluation plus précise desqualifications autour de la femme comme sujet de droit singulier, et en intégrant lescritiques contemporaines, qui ont pu montrer l'insuffisance d'une pensée simplementgénérique pour traiter de questions aussi graves que la différenciation sexuelle quece soit en droit civil ou en droit social- critiques qui, néanmoins, n'ont guère assuméla voie épistémologique de la philosophie du droit dans sa spécificité. / The notion of identity involves the presuppositions of private law withwhich the trend is marked by some «genericisms». That means conceptions who limitthe human gender's definition in specific and abstract features and withoutconsidering the sexually differentiated peculiarities. Nevertheless, the subject of rightwhen it's a feminine subject implies the considering of sexual characteristics, whichcannot be the same that those of the male subject.On the pretext of the gender equality, the right submits then the society to astandardization of the divergent interests and peculiar to every sex. It is then aquestion of showing at the same time the contribution of these conceptions, but alsotheir limits and thus the necessity of opening to the requirement of more«universalist» conceptions. Indeed, it must be demonstrated that only a universalitycan guarantee the recognition of the peculiarities and the feminine differences, suchas a feminine legal identity would admit it. If this study will face diverse currents andauthors of philosophy of the right, it will take for starting point the substantive lawestablished in its various disciplines, the criminal law with certain aspects of the laborlaw or the insurance law.The interest of the question is to allow a more precise evaluation of thequalifications around the woman as the subject of singular right, and by integratingthe contemporary criticisms, who were able to show the insufficiency of a simplygeneric thought to deal with questions so grave as the sexual differentiation in thecivil or labor law- criticisms who, however, hardly accepted the epistemological wayof the philosophy of the right in its specificity.

Joseph Raz has developed a concept of authority based on the special relationship between reasons and action. While the view is very complex and subtle, it can be summed up by saying that authorities are authorities insofar as they can mediate between the reasons that happen to bind their subjects and the subjects’ actions. Authorities do this by providing special reasons via directives to their subjects. These special reasons are what Raz calls “protected reasons.” Protected reasons are both first-order reasons for action and second-order “exclusionary reasons” that exclude the subject from considering some reasons in the balance of reasons for or against any action. I first make clear what Raz’s view of authority is, and I then defend this view from some contemporary critics.

In this Study, the empiricist ethical system of Epicurus and idealist ethical system of Kant will be compared. Kant maintains that as Epicurus&rsquo / ethics regards morality as a means for the attainment of happiness, it is nothing but a self-love ethics. He, for this reason, calls Epicurean morality &ldquo / selfishness.&rdquo / According to Kant, the maxims of happiness can be known only through experience but he says, experience can never produce a law which is universal and necessary. He contends that as Epicurean ethics has happiness as its ultimate goal (i.e., the highest good), it cannot be able to produce an objective morality, valid for all rational beings. Kant, on the other hand, tries to found his ethical system on an a priori moral law of pure reason which borrows nothing from experience. This Study would, in a sense, be a defense of Epicurean ethical system against Kant&rsquo / s claims. The main argument of the thesis is that Epicurean ethics is not a self-love ethics, but rather a system which propounds happiness for all. I will be arguing that for Epicurus, one&rsquo / s own happiness is necessarily bound up with the happiness of others, and that his system is sound and consistent. I will also try to show that Kant is not successful in deducing a transcendentally ideal (a priori) law of reason and that his system has some inconsistencies.

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

This thesis explores the meaning and content of s. 41 of the Official Languages Act of Canada, which imposes certain duties on all federal institutions towards French- and English-language minority communities. While vitally important as a component of Canada's language rights archictecture, the nature and content of s. 41 as a legal norm remain woefully unclear. The immediate aim is to determine: (1) whether s. 41 confers a right to specific measures in particular cases; (2) whether such rights are individual or collective; and (3) if collective, what sort of interests are protected. Section 41 presents a number of interpretive challenges. First, it uses terminology which is undefined in the Act and yet has no self-evident meaning. Thus, the nature of the primary legal subject, 'linguistic minority communities' (LMCs), is unclear, as are the nature of the protected interests, 'vitality' and 'development'. Second, the interpretive principles developed by the case-law for official language rights rely on a conceptual framework that is vague and under-theorized. Key components of that framework, like the concept of a necessary link between language and culture, have yet to be fully explored, either in the case-law or in legal scholarship. This presents an acute problem in the case of s. 41, where the content of these concepts will likely prove dispositive. In order to grapple with these challenges, this thesis develops an account of language rights as collective rights. Drawing on the philosophical literature and existing case-law, I argue that LMCs should be conceived of as collectivities rather than mere aggregates of individuals, and that a number of language rights, such as s. 41 of the OLA, and ss. 16.1 and 23 of the Charter, aim to protect the collective interests of these collectivities. I then define some of these interests from both an empirical and a normative perspective. I conclude by arguing that s. 41 of the OLA protects an 'autonomy interest', which both prohibits federal institutions from interfering with existing LMC autonomy, and provides a basis for claiming enhancements to that autonomy, within the confines of the statutory mandate of the institution in question.

[pt] O trabalho consiste em um exame de alguns aspectos da teoria dos sistemas jurídicos desenvolvida por Joseph Raz, notadamente da identidade dos sistemas jurídicos e da individualização de disposições jurídicas. Ao expor suas bases teóricas de forma crítica, e apresentar concepções alternativas propostas por outros autores, especialmente por F. Schauer, resta demonstrado que o caráter peremptório das razões para a ação, tido por Raz como um dos pilares de sua teoria do direito, não só não reflete a maneira como normalmente enxergamos o direito, mas também não compromete sua concepção de Direito. / [en] This work consists on an analysis about some aspects of Joseph Raz theory of legal systems, specially the identity of legal systems and individuation of laws. By exposing critically its theoretic basis and presenting alternative conceptions proposed by others authors, specially F. Schauer, it rests demonstrated that the peremptory character of reasons for action, understood by Raz as one of the basis of his conception of Law, does not reflect the way most people see and understand Law and does not affect Raz Laws conception.

[pt] A presente tese é primordialmente um trabalho de filosofia do direito. Não obstante, também pode ser encarada como uma contribuição para o estudo filosófico sobre a natureza das regras prescritivas (e do uso diretivo ou prescritivo da linguagem), englobando: uma investigação sobre as regras e suas notas características e contingentes e um estudo sobre as diferentes maneiras por meio das quais elas podem integrar o raciocínio prático dos seus destinatários. Para não usar a linguagem de férias, as regras serão discutidas dentro do cenário do positivismo conceitual. O objetivo é mostrar alguns dos principais problemas que devem ser enfrentados quando se pretende levar as regras a sério. Trata-se de uma incursão nas fontes filosóficas dos casos difíceis do direito, quando encarado como um sistema de regras. / [en] The present thesis is primarily an exercise in philosophy of law. However, it can also be viewed as a contribution to the recurring philosophical investigations about the nature of prescriptive rules (and the directive or prescritive use of language in general), encompassing: an inquiry about rules and their characteristic and contigent marks, and a research of several ways by means of which they can play a part in the practical reasoning of its addressees. In order not to use language on holiday, the discussion about rules will be held on the stage set up by conceptual positivism. The aim is to point out some of the main problems that must be faced when rules are taken seriously. In a nutshell, the thesis is an incursion into the philosophical sources of hard cases, when law is conceived as a system of rules.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação. / This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação. / This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.