Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:17:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Joao_Leonardo_Marques_Roschildt_Dissertacao.pdf: 1268493 bytes, checksum: ce96396fe785e4342d2ef113814f032c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-23 / The focus of the present work is the construction of a concept of Right that is compatible with the notion of justice formulated by John Rawls. The verification of the formal and material structures of justice as fairness will finish determining the type of Right that fits to the Rawlsian thought, which is the interpretative doctrine. Thus it is appropriate to emphasize that the theory of the Right in Rawls is opposed to legal positivism, showing itself independent as a liberal political conception of justice so require / O foco do presente trabalho é a construção de um conceito de Direito que seja compatível com a noção de justiça construída por John Rawls. A verificação das estruturas formas e materiais da justiça como eqüidade acabará determinando o tipo de Direito que cabe ao pensamento rawlsiano, qual seja, a doutrina interpretativa. Nesta medida é adequado destacar que a teoria do Direito em Rawls se contrapõe ao positivismo jurídico, e se mostrando independente como uma concepção política liberal de justiça assim exige

Cette étude entend sonder la potentialité spéculative d'une philosophie éminemment kojèvienne qui naisse à partir de la relation entre le Désir et la Loi. Le privilège herméneutique accordé à ce plexus pour une enquête monographique de l'œuvre de Kojève vient de l'intuition d'une unité fondamentale dans sa pensée. Il s'agit de débuter une recherche sur la relation analysée à la lumière de la nouvelle ontologie que Kojève essaie de penser. Nous savons que Kojève est passé à l'histoire en tant que « interprète » de Hegel, en tant que doctor subtilis des légendaires Séminaires sur la Phénomélogie de l'Esprit. L'introduction à la lecture de Hegel a été le Livre-Evénement qui a affecté le Paris intellectuel des années Trente du XXème siècle et ses protagonistes de prestige ; mais fut uniquement la pointe de l'iceberg de la production scientifique de notre auteur. La reconstruction de I'opera omnia de Kojève, par conséquent, a été la base à partir de laquelle est devenue possible ce travail. À partir des écrits de la jeunesse émerge la matrice scientifique et, au même temps, spéculative de la réflexion kojèvienne : je fais référence au Journal d'un philosophe (1920-1923) et à l'idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne (1932). La question, formulée en partie déjà de Kojève, est la suivante : c'est possible associer à la révolution quantique en physique la révolution psychanalytique en considérant que la détermination relative de la réalité physique implique et suppose l'existence de l'inconscient psychique ? Les observations préliminaires sur la science ont été fonctionnelles à donner une réponse affirmative à cette question et à présenter la généalogie de la thèse principale de ce travail : le sujet kojèvien n'est pas seulement - à la Butler - un sujet de désir ; mais, plutôt, un sujet de désir et loi. / This work seeks to explore the potential of the philosophy of Kojève, which has its offspring in the relation between Desire and Law. This plexus is regarded as the hermeneutic theme of the work of Kojève, based on the intuition of a fundamental unity within his thought.This study aims at starting a research about relationship, in the light of Kojève's nouvelle ontologie. Kojève is regarded as “the interpreter” of Hegel and the doctor subtilis of the legendary Seminars on the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction à la lecture de Hegel was the work that revolutionised the scholars in Paris in the 1930s, but it was only the tip of the iceberg of the author's scientific production. Therefore, the reconstruction of the opera omnia of Kojève is the base of this work, which could not have been possible without it.The scientific and speculative roots of Kojève's thought are evident since the early works of the author, and particularly the Journal d'un philosophe (1920-1923) and l'idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne (1932). The main question, partly formulated by Kojève himself, is the following: can we associate the quantic revolution in physics to the revolution of psychoanalysis, given that the relative determination of physic reality implies the existence of the psychological unconscious? The preliminary observations on science have been fundamental in order to give a positive answer to this question. They also represent the foundations of this research. According to Kojève, the subject is not simply, as Butler would hold, a subject of desire; but a subject of desire and law.

This paper presents a revision of the way in which Jürgen Habermas returns to the critical tradition of Marxism regarding the topic of ideology. After the characterization of Habermasian thinking regarding the progress of instrumental rationality (at the expense of communicative reason) it confronts the debate between Habermas and Niklas Luhmann within German Social Theory. Finally, the third section focuses on showing the differences regarding the conception of the place of law in society, based on the theoretical frameworks of Habermas and Luhmann. / El presente trabajo plantea una revisión de la forma en que Jürgen Habermas retoma la tradición crítica del marxismo respecto del tópico de la ideología. Luego y a partir de la caracterización del pensamiento de Habermas respecto del avance de la racionalidad instrumental (en detrimento de la razón comunicativa) afrontaremos el debate que han sostenido Habermas y Niklas Luhmann en el seno de la Teoría social alemana. Finalmente, la tercera sección se centra en mostrar las diferencias en la concepción sobre el lugar del derecho en la sociedad, a partir de los marcos teóricos de Habermas y Luhmann.

Fildelning av upphovsrättsskyddad egendom har ökat i stor utsträckning efter inträdet av ny media och nya kommunikationskanaler. Målet med denna studie är att undersöka om företag behandlas enligt samma normativa standard som vanliga individer när de utsätts för ett brott. Christies teori om det ideala offret används för att analysera brottsmål rörande fildelning i Sverige mellan 2005 och 2011. Resultatet har, i flera bemärkelser, omformulerat hur offerskapet i sig konstitueras; den individ som är det ideala offret är inte svag och försvarslös utan en person med hög social status och inflytande. Företagen i studien behandlas således som objektiva agenter och deras status som offer ifrågasätts inte av domstolarna. / Piracy in intellectual property has grown extensively by the entrance of new media and communication channels. The aim of the present study is to examine if the companies are treated by the same normative standards as regular individuals when they are exposed to a crime. Christie’s theory of the ideal victim has been used in order to analyze legal the company as a victim cases concerning piracy in Sweden between 2005 and 2011. The findings have, in many respects, reformulated how victimhood itself is constituted; the individual who is the ideal victim is not weak and defenseless but a person who enjoys a high social status and influence. The companies in the study are consequently treated as objective agents and their status as victims is not questioned by the courts.

<p>This dissertation explores the way in which different conceptions of human agency have helped to shape the course of jurisprudential thought. The overarching aim is to bring to the surface the deeper commitments of Hartian positivism in its various engagements with rival accounts of the nature of law. In particular, I argue that although contemporary positivists take their account of law to be metaphysically noncommittal, views of what it is to be a human agent continue to motivate, if implicitly, their positions on such enduring jurisprudential questions as the nature and source of law’s normativity, the relationship between law and morality, and so on. In order to better understand these debates, we must therefore understand better the relationship between a theory of law and the conception of human nature that drives it.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.

To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.

This thesis investigates the potentially complex power effects generated in Online Social Networking Sites (‘OSNS’), such as YouTube and Facebook, when legal values, such as copyright and personal data, are protected and/or violated. In order to develop this analysis, in Chapter Two, I critically analyse key academic writings on internet regulation and argue that I need to move away from the dominant ‘regulatory’ lens to my Actor-Network Theory-Foucauldian Power Lens (‘ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens’) in order to be able to capture the potentially complex web of power effects generated in YouTube and Facebook when copyright and personal data are protected and/or violated. In Chapter Three, I develop my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens and explore how key ANT ideas such as translation can be used in conjunction with Foucauldian ideas such as governmentality. I utilise my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens in Chapters Four to Seven to analyse how YouTube and Facebook are constructed as heterogeneous, contingent and precarious ‘actor-networks’ and I map in detail the complex power effects generated from specific local connections. I argue five key points. Firstly, I suggest that complex, multiple, and contingent power effects are generated when key social, legal, and technological actants are locally, contingently, and precariously ‘fitted together’ in YouTube and Facebook when copyright and personal data are protected and/or violated. Secondly, I argue that ‘materialities’ play key roles in maintaining the power effects generated by specific local connections. Thirdly, I argue that there are close links between power and ‘spatialities’ through my analysis of the Privacy Settings and Tagging in Facebook. Fourthly, I argue that my relational understandings of YouTube and Facebook generate a more comprehensive view of the power effects of specific legal elements such as how specific territorial laws in YouTube gain their authority by virtue of their durable and heterogeneous connections. Finally, I argue that we can extrapolate from my empirical findings to build a small-scale theory about the power effects generated in OSNS when legal values are protected and/or violated. Here I also consider the contributions made by my research to three distinct fields, namely, internet regulation, socio-legal studies, and actor-network theory.

This thesis is about the legitimacy of political authority in general and international legal institutions (ILIs) in particular. It is divided into two parts with three chapters corresponding to each part. The first part presents an account of legitimate political authority that is based on Joseph Raz's service conception of authority but also makes some important modifications to it. The central claim of the first part is that the legitimacy of political authorities in general, as measured by the standard of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis, depends in a crucial way on the ability of the subjects to get involved –more so than Raz is prepared to admit– in the activities that are relevant in the political domain. The thesis offers a general account of legitimate political authority, i.e. one that is valid for any type of political authority. The second part, however, examines the implications of this account for the legitimacy of ILIs. These are non-state authorities, such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Criminal Court, that deal with problems of global political relevance. Because of this global approach, the subjects of ILIs (i.e. those whose reasons are to be served by the ILI) are not confined to the boundaries of regions or states, but distributed across the world. ILIs operate by creating, interpreting, and applying public international law. Despite some striking differences between ILIs and other types of political authority (particularly states), I argue that they all ought to be measured by the same standard of legitimacy, namely the Normal Justification Thesis. But I also argue that the requirements for meeting this standard of legitimacy may vary according to the type of political authority (especially with regard to the requirement of democracy).

This thesis examines the Indian system of personal laws (‘the PLS’), under which the state applies a version of religious doctrine to the family matters of citizens whom it identifies as belonging to different religious groups. There has been a lengthy and persistent debate over the PLS, particularly in relation to its discriminatory effects upon women. However, another problem with the PLS has been little commented-upon. Supporters of the PLS emphasise its positive impact on religious freedom to such an extent that there is a pervasive assumption that the PLS is, indeed, good for religious freedom. But there has been surprisingly little critical assessment of the truth of this claim in either academic or political debates. This thesis, a work of applied normative legal theory, attempts to fill this important gap in the literature on the PLS. The thesis addresses the question of how the PLS affects one conception of religious freedom, namely religious autonomy. Its principal findings are that the PLS interferes with the religious autonomy of those subject to it by affecting their religious options (by interfering with their freedom from religion and their freedom to practice religion) and by harming their self-respect (by discriminating on the grounds of sex and religion, and by misrecognising their religious identities). Furthermore, the thesis finds that the PLS cannot be defended in the name of religious autonomy based on the possibility of exit from the system, the advantage of having the ‘option of personal law’, the power it gives people to bind their future selves, the expressive potential of the personal laws, the contribution it makes to membership in a religious community, the contribution it makes to religious group autonomy, or the recognition or validation it provides for religious identities. These conclusions imply that concerns relating to religious autonomy constitute an important set of objections to the PLS. The thesis then considers several reform proposals, including certain modifications of the PLS, a move towards a millet system, ‘internal’ reform of individual personal laws and the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code. It particularly focusses on one reform possibility – religious alternative dispute resolution – which has not been considered closely in the Indian context.